The Political Economy of Decentralization in Sub-Saharan Africa develops an analytical framework for the study of decentralisation and then uses it in four African countries. In the introduction and first chapter, the editors and Réjane Hugounenq present the comparative ‘blueprint’ or template. The majority of the book (Chapters 2–5) then applies this in Burkina Faso (Dafflon and Madiès, with Abraham Ky), Ghana (Guy Gilbert, Réjane Hugounenq and François Vaillancourt), Kenya (Yvon Rocaboy, Vaillancourt and Hugounenq), and Senegal (Gilbert and Emmanuelle Taugourdeau). This is followed by two concluding chapters: Madiès offers a thematic comparative analysis, before two commentators (Gérard Chambas and Frédéric Audras) propose implications and ‘ways forward’ or ‘actionable avenues’.

This book is thorough and impressive in many ways. It engages with major debates in public finance and the economics of decentralisation, and approaches tricky conceptual terrain with care, absorbing recent lessons about the need for precision in measuring the many dimensions of decentralisation. In so doing, it carefully avoids advocacy for any particular ideal type of decentralised governance. And the book's empirical depth is quite valuable for specialists on the four countries, as each set of authors admirably sifts through complex rules, formulae and even contradictions that underpin decentralisation. (It should be noted that the Kenya chapter is mainly about the system prior to the 2010 Constitution, with only prospective analysis of the recently enacted, more significant devolution.) The book's framework centres on important features: brief histories of decentralisation; the organisation of sub-national government units; decentralised budgets; assignment of responsibilities; local taxation; intergovernmental transfers; and revenue and expenditure statistics. This blueprint rightly highlights the necessity of evaluating decentralisation simultaneously in terms of legal/political structure, expenditure responsibilities and revenue access.

The book's achievements also come with limitations. A main issue is the scant consideration of the incentives of political actors (especially those in central governments) and how these affect decisions to decentralise. Notably, the book takes the passage of decentralisation framework laws as indicative of central government intentions to reform, and casts subsequent implementation problems as obstacles those governments will wish to overcome, so long as decentralisation is defined as following the country's stated aims. This demands further interrogation. Were various actors – presidents, ministers, legislators, donors, civil servants or even citizens – problematised more thoroughly, the challenges might appear in a different light. Political parties, executives and legislators are occasionally referenced in descriptive histories, but not scrutinised with regard to why decentralisation operates as it does. As a result, the fine synthesising chapter by Madiès offers implications that largely rely on governments being disposed to improve the functioning of decentralisation. Three ‘takeaway’ recommendations are to ensure central government (deconcentrated) authorities assist devolved authorities, promote more fiscal devolution, and engage local populations in local accountability. While such proposals are sensible, government actors might have weak motivations (at best) to make them.

Dafflon and Madiès and the authors have developed a useful analytical toolkit, demonstrated a proof of concept across several countries, and brought useful empirical material to the table. Calls for further scrutiny of incentives and causes will ensure that the ‘political’ in The Political Economy of Decentralization in Sub-Saharan Africa is also a part of our understanding of when, how and why decentralisation works or does not.