This useful book explores, and defends, Hegel's political philosophy in response to Leo Strauss's critique of Hegel's defense of modernity. The authors have some sympathy for Strauss's critique of modernity, but they argue that Hegel anticipated Strauss's reservations about modernity, and they agree with Hegel, contra Strauss, that virtue and freedom can be reconciled.

Strauss endorses the philosophic quest for wisdom as the highest life, and he acknowledges as admirable the second-best, ethical life of the “gentleman.” But Strauss thinks that modernity honors neither the classic quest for wisdom nor the commitment to the ethical life. Strauss rejects Hegel's historical point of view for endorsing open-ended freedom as the defining characteristic of human existence, thus sacrificing commitment to objective, permanent standards of human conduct. We relinquish the quest for the best life among the multiplicity of desires that inundate us. It is true that Hegel criticizes Plato (and by implication Strauss) for rejecting subjectivity even though Plato saw subjectivity emerge as both a crisis and a discovery in Greek life. Plato thus limited the capacity of his political philosophy to explain the full range of the human condition. Strauss argues that Plato rightly elevated virtue over freedom, fearing that the cultivation of freedom must undermine the idea of virtue.

Hegel, in defending the modern state as superseding the ancient polis, proposed that the ethical life of the community could, without suppressing the individual desires of its members, shape those desires toward a good life recognized to be valid beyond mere calculated self-interest. Freedom and virtue are to be reconciled concretely in a shared ethical life, managed and supported by the modern state. Hegel bows to the ancient idea of citizenship as sharing a way of life, but the sharing has to be constructed by the rational interaction of the wills of the many who form their unity in adjusting and readjusting to their changing conditions. If, as Hegel asserted, in the modern world all are understood to be free, and expect to be treated as free, we require a polity that acknowledges this historic modern condition while guiding its members to right use of their freedom. This may not insulate standards of conduct from historical contingency, but it does insist that the exercise of freedom must be thoughtful and self-disciplined interaction of the self with other selves.

The authors think that Strauss limited his understanding of Hegel in allowing himself to be unduly influenced by Kojève's interpretation of Hegel. They summarize their thesis: “Strauss's return to the ancient world, or Kojève's world homogenous [sic] state, are not the only options open to us. Hegel's philosophy, although misappropriated by Kojève, if read in full, offers another alternative—an alternative that does not see merely a debate between the ancient and modern world, but rather, a way to reconcile the best elements of each” (34).

Our authors show that the Christian tradition is the source of Hegel's reconciliation of freedom and virtue because Christianity embraces both objective principles of right conduct and respect for the individual. They argue that Hegel held to a transcendent principle that is not merely a construction of human self-consciousness (38). They also deny the Strauss/Kojève argument that Christianity entails secularization or that Christianity must realize itself through the divinization of man in the secular world of universal freedom. For Strauss/Kojève, Christianity cannot be the fulfillment of the classical understanding; in embracing subjectivity it must “undo itself” because the “finitude of human nature might be made commensurate with the infinite,” that is, all boundaries are surmounted as human self-understanding advances through time—the human spirit does not receive enlightenment as a gift but generates it from within itself (39).

The authors go on to challenge Strauss's insistence on the stark choice between faith and reason. They note that Strauss undertakes limited examination of the Christian tradition which is indispensable to understanding Hegel's philosophy. If subjectivity is an unavoidable feature of human experience, it cannot be ignored or suppressed; this does not preclude reflection on the nature and purpose of life. A faithful person could think we have been granted subjectivity along with a desire for unity in response to the predicament our equally necessary sociality raises. In this way, Christianity poses a reminder and challenge, risking that it will be either co-opted, or opposed and condemned, by modern relativism. Secular modernity might descend from the Christian tradition but also deny the limitation of self-discipline Christianity requires. Modern thinkers frequently revile Christianity for advocating just such limitation on desire. Hegel's defense of the “rational will” is a Christian-inspired defense against the sort of relativism Strauss believes to be implicated in his thought.

The rational will is hard to pin down, yet, “a world that denies an individual power to determine for himself the nature of right and wrong denies human beings their completion” (95). Moral conduct, as opposed to habitual behavior, requires reflection, the possibility of thinking beyond the established order, not just for the philosophic few but for citizens altogether. Hegel holds the principle that a fully just order depends on its members consciously accepting it—they need to know what they are doing; it is not to be imposed through a “noble lie.” To “go back” to the Greeks will not eliminate, but rather repeat, the tension posed by emergent subjectivity. The predicament cannot be removed. Our authors argue that Strauss thus ought to see Hegel as a potential ally, not an enemy (111).

However, they themselves display an optimism about current culture that is open to question. Hegel's defense of family, civil society, and the state, they say, is central to the reconciliation of freedom and virtue even as they downplay the remarkable redefinition of family and the radical critique of civil society. They accept the bureaucratic/regulatory welfare state, perhaps underestimating the dangers of dependency (the attempt to escape the ordeal and responsibility of being a self). They argue that citizens are becoming stronger and more rational (128). But here they are entering the realm of hopeful assertion: “the Absolute not only endures in the world, but is increasingly manifest” (138). On this score, the authors need to consider a different sort of criticism of Hegel: that, for all his illuminating study of the ancient tragedies, he sought to eliminate the tragic sense of life, believing that the human spirit can mediate all oppositions. This leaves unanswered the question, forced on us over the last century, whether there is genuine evil in the world that cannot and should not be mediated.