Charles K. Hyde is a professor of history emeritus at Wayne State University who has written a number of carefully researched books about the history of the American automobile industry. Here he documents the history of the industry in, as Robert Casey, one of the endorsement writers, puts it, the industry's “finest hour”: WWII. Professor Hyde has immersed himself in the archives and seemingly documented what all of the auto companies did during the war. The heart of Arsenal of Democracy is arranged by weapon. There are chapters on Aircraft Engines and Propellers; Aircraft and Aircraft Components, Tanks and Other Armored Vehicles; Jeeps, Trucks, and Amphibious Vehicles; and Guns, Shells, Bullets, and Other War Goods. There are also two opening chapters on defense planning, an informative chapter on the New Workers—whites from Appalachia, African Americans, and women of all races and backgrounds—and a concluding chapter titled the Achievement which sums up the story.
Professor Hyde tells us the full story of each weapon. What the military service wanted, how contractors were chosen, what problems were encountered, when all of this happened, and finally how many weapons of each type were produced. The answer to how many were produced in most cases was—a lot. Over and over the reader will be impressed by the sheer number of weapons produced by the auto industry.
The financial key was the cost plus fixed fee contract. The government paid for almost everything: It paid for the costs of developing a weapon (even if in the end the military decided not buy it) and for new plant and equipment, and then paid a fixed fee for every weapon that came off the assembly line. Profits were not allowed to sky rocket; prices were cut when economies of scale kicked in, and there was an excess profits tax. But the auto companies did well without assuming any financial risk. Producing munitions was like buying a government bond in the days when government bonds paid a decent return.
To judge from Hyde's narrative, the civilian agencies such as the War Production Board played a leading role in the period up to Pearl Harbor, but afterwards their influence declined. Once the United States was at war, the story is mainly about the auto companies and the military services that were buying the weapons they produced. In general, Hyde concludes that the auto companies did a good job. He is not unmindful, however, of the many problems that arose and mistakes that were made. His account of Henry Ford's Willow Run aircraft factory is especially interesting. Ford decided that he would mass produce airplanes the same way he mass produced automobiles. To do that he built the largest factory under one roof in the world. The plan, however, experienced many frustrating delays. Recruiting the workforce was difficult because where the plant was located, a significant distance from Detroit, there was little housing. In addition, there were internal management conflicts, and mass producing a weapon that had to be modified repeatedly in the light of battlefield experience was very different from mass producing an automobile whose plans could be frozen for a model year (or in the case of the Model T, indefinitely). Nevertheless, Hyde concludes, “Once Willow Run solved its initial production problems its achievements were impressive” (p. 103). In 1944 Willow Run produced 48.5 percent of all B-24's, the mainstay of the European bombing campaign, and in 1945, 70 percent. The book is studded with dates and numbers like this: when contracts were signed, when the first model of a weapon was produced, the date and amount of peak production, the total amounts produced, and so on. I would have liked some tables and charts to summarize the data and make more comparisons possible. But to some extent, it's a matter of taste. With a little effort quantitatively oriented economic historians can find most of what they would want.
Hyde has authored a companion volume, Images from the Arsenal of Democracy. It is a coffee table book, but one that is informative as well as visually arresting. All the photos are from the period and in black and white. There are dramatic photos of the production lines, rows and rows of finished weapons, workers, and key figures on the home front such as the architect Albert Kahn, who designed Willow Run and other factories, and William S. Knudsen, a Ford expert on mass production who served in various capacities in the government during the war. The captions, as might be expected, are informative. One picture shows a B-24 as it made a right turn in Ford's Willow Run factory, a plant configuration, Hyde informs us, designed to avoid the higher taxes of Wayne County, Michigan.
Although the cost plus fixed fee contract was undoubtedly the main source of incentives, Hyde appears to take seriously the various government awards that were created to motivate people on the home front. (Full disclosure: my father was on a committee that awarded “Certificates of Individual Production Merit” for ideas that increased production.) The most important award was the Army-Navy E Award for “outstanding achievement in war production,” which went to plants with outstanding records (p. 205). Professor Hyde has written an outstanding book that will be a valued and permanent addition to the literature on the economics of WWII. I hereby recognize his achievement with my own “E” award for excellence!
