Zhuge Liang: Strategy, Achievements, and Writings, is focused on Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮 (181–243 ce), a minister and commander during the Three Kingdoms period (220–280 ce), that is the period when China was divided into the states of Wei (220–265 ce), Shu (221–263 ce), and Wu (229–280 ce). While this book claims to be “intended for a broad audience” (p. xi), sinologists will find it useful as well. Not only is it the first book-length English treatment of the titular figure, it also offers substantial coverage of military thought in early medieval China, a topic that has so far not received much attention even in a most recent sourcebook.Footnote ¹ Except in the title, the author adopts the Wade-Giles system throughout the body of the text, but he is considerate enough to supplement readers with a small note on pronunciation (p. xi).

After a terse preface that discusses source materials, Sawyer begins the first part of his book, “Historical Context and Developments”, with an introduction to Zhuge Liang as a multi-faceted person and gives a brief overview of Chinese military history from the end of Eastern Han (25–220 ce) to the Three Kingdoms period. Despite depictions of a brilliant tactician, a creative inventor, or a prognosticator in folktales and fiction, the author argues that a correct appraisal of the real Zhuge Liang ought to be based on authentic sources. A concise exposition of the rise and fall of the Three Kingdoms then follows. The course of the main battles in this period is generally well-presented alongside some interesting observations, such as how the geographic features of Sichuan restricted a northern expedition and strengthened a downstream advance of fleets along the Yangtze. Readers however should note Sawyer's confusion between two Wu commanders, Lü Meng 呂蒙 (178–220 ce) and Lu Xun 陸遜 (183–245 ce), in his narrative (pp. 19–20).

What follows is a well-translated biography of Zhuge Liang from the Sanguozhi 三國志 compiled by Chen Shou 陳壽 (233–297 ce). The author expresses a skepticism towards Zhuge Liang's self-proclaimed smooth initial career on the grounds that there was a pressing need to seek acceptance from his senior comrades and establish an authority among frontline combatants. Zhuge Liang's passive attitude is also questioned on the grounds that a realist without his own martial adherents should be more active in searching for a warlord to serve. His later life in office does not seem to be free from obstacles either, as the emperor over time grew an increasing fatuity and resentment against Zhuge Liang. While Sawyer's translation and appraisal of Zhuge Liang's biography are overall cogent, he has mistakenly entered the “Hou chushi biao 後出師表” as “preserve[d]” in Chen Shou's biography (p. 47) while the memorial actually comes from the commentaries by Pei Songzhi 裴松之 (372–451ce).Footnote ²

The next two sections, “Southern Campaign” and “The Northern Campaigns”, scrutinise the military activities with Zhuge Liang practically in command. In 225 ce, Zhuge Liang led an expedition into the Nanzhong 南中 area to suppress a local rebellion. With the assistance of several subordinate commanders, Zhuge Liang managed to reduce the enemy with a three-pronged attack and eventually seized the rebel leader Meng Huo 孟獲 (fl.225–226 ce). Sawyer suggests that the story of Meng's seven captures may be the result of “an early form of war gaming” on a sand table (p. 63). He also claims that the southern campaign was essentially a process of how “the northern invaders fundamentally plundered the land” (p. 64). The subsequent decades after Zhuge Liang's apparent victory continued to see occasional revolts in the region, indicating his failure to “deter southern leaders from mounting further rebellions” (p. 68).

From 228 ce to 234 ce, Zhuge Liang launched five northern campaigns against the Wei state, an opponent much tougher and more resourceful than his previous southern enemy. Since Wei was occupied with its eastern frontline and unprepared for Shu's onslaught, the first campaign commenced with a decoy that allowed the capture of three areas under Wei's control. His appointment of the incompetent Ma Su 馬謖 (190–228 ce) as forward commander, however, brought about the defeat of Shu troops. After half a year Zhuge Liang hastily attempted a second campaign to engage in a fierce siege, which ended with a loss partially due to his leaked and inflexible tactics. A successful third campaign was undertaken in 229 ce and led to positive outcomes such as the pacification of two districts. The fourth campaign in 231 ce also secured early victories and the repulsion of a Wei raid, but Zhuge Liang was again forced to withdraw because of his delinquent logistic supervisor, Li Ping 李平 (?-234 ce). The well-prepared fifth campaign in 234 ce solved problems of supply and could have annexed Wei's western territory if the expected coalition attack of Wu had succeeded. Unfortunately, his sudden death on the battlefield not only halted the northern expedition, but also prompted an internal strife between the retreating commanders and tacticians. On the whole, Sawyer sees the five campaigns as a failure to produce any substantive result against a wealthy enemy.

The book's first part concludes with a critical assessment of Zhuge Liang's strategic achievements. Sawyer points out that Zhuge Liang's real military accomplishments were rather limited. The prolonged warfare initiated by him caused “great unhappiness and resentment” (p. 111) among the populace. Given the protective terrain of Sichuan, the author questions Zhuge Liang's aggressive strategy and suggests that a defensive stance supported by sophisticated intelligence would have been more successful. In addition, Sawyer criticises Zhuge Liang as “overly cautious and conservative” (p. 119) and that “[h]is profound sense of responsibility apparently entangled him, preventing him from opting for a bold strike” (p. 123). His advance into the far west is deemed redundant and his refrainment from deception is put in contrast with his adventurous contemporaries. His anticipation of public support for the northern campaigns may have overestimated people's resentment at Wei's usurpation and the charisma of his masters of Han imperial descent. Nevertheless, as Sawyer notes, Zhuge Liang should still be praised for his “unwavering determination to battle hopeless circumstances” (p. 108) and his capability in “ensuring the survival of an ineffectual, erstwhile leader amid a turbulent martial sea” (p. 142).

The second part “Military Writings” consists of brief introductory remarks and translated texts. To show that Zhuge Liang is a strong adherent of the “Legalist” school, Sawyer quotes several memorials and letters drafted by Zhuge Liang. The rendered passages, excluding those confirmed routine documents, are divided in three sections: “Collected Military Passages”, “Jiang yuan 將苑”, and “Bian yi 便宜”. Over half of these are accompanied by the author's annotated comments.

“Collected Military Passages” includes twenty seven fragments under the titles “Military Methods (bingfa 兵法)”, “Military Essentials (bingyao 兵要)” or “Army Orders (junling 軍令)”. The single surviving passage of “Military Methods” talks about the importance of “tactical imbalance of power” (p. 156). “Military Essentials” discusses “the army's movements and activities in the field”, while “Army Orders” deals with “order and discipline” as well as “tactical observations” (p. 154). Most of them are attributed to Zhuge Liang himself in a traditional Chinese compendia except for the very last entry in “Military Essentials” (p. 162), the source of which is the Zhugezi 諸葛子 compiled by his nephew Zhuge Ke 諸葛恪 (203–253 ce).Footnote ³

“Jiang Yuan” is a fifty-chapter collection of writings composed in a relatively rustic language and incorporating substantial citations from the Art of War by Sun Wu 孫武 (c. 544–496 bce). While some scholars are dubious about its authenticity, Sawyer appears to take it as genuine by arguing that Zhuge Liang is known for “writing for effect and deliberately [keeping] . . . the language simple so that it would be comprehensible to often illiterate men of action” (pp. 153–154). Its alternative title Xinshu 心書, or Book of Mind, is considered by Sawyer to be consistent with Zhuge Liang's “psychological approach to warfare” (p. 153), though it should be noted that its title is sometimes written as the homophonous Xinshu 新書, or Book of Innovation.

“Bian yi” comprises sixteen “strategies”, or ce 策, that may be a rearranged selection of Zhuge Liang's works originally anthologised by Chen Shou. Their themes range from state administration and ministerial employment to martial drills and military laws. Sawyer finds a number of these writings “unusual” (pp. 219, 226, 231, 251), but he still acknowledges them as a credible reflection of Zhuge Liang's thoughts. Its ninth and lengthiest chapter, “Administering the Army (zhijun 治軍)”, stands as a representative testimony for both reconstructed materials from “Jiang yuan” and their “familiarity with the founding text of traditional Chinese military science” (p. 240).

Notwithstanding his modest stance, Sawyer's rendering of Zhuge Liang's military writings is fairly thorough. This can be seen especially in “Jiang yuan” that has already been translated into English by Thomas Cleary more than two decades ago. Sawyer's translation is beyond doubt more accurate. For instance, the fourth chapter “Jiang cai 將材” quotes a phrase zuqing rongma 足輕戎馬 from the Wuzi 吳子. While Cleary has mistranslated it into “[t]hose who go on foot or on a war-horse”,Footnote ⁴ Sawyer however, interprets it as “[t]hey have the nimble feet of martial horses” (p. 173), and the current reviewer finds this translation more convincing, as the author's prior understanding of this phrase can be traced back to his translation of the Wuzi that gives “fleetness of barbarian horses” for its source.Footnote ⁵ Yet, there are still some careless mistakes in Sawyer's translation here and there, such as the omission of one of the six “army's superlative warriors” in “Ze cai 擇材” (p. 180).

The monograph ends with two short bibliographies, “Critical Sources” and “Suggested Martial and Contextual Reading”. Sawyer's ambition to keep his apparatus short is understandable but reference to works by Achilles Fang, Rafe de Crespigny and J. Michael Farmer would have been desirable.Footnote ⁶ The absence of publication details for the Western titles is equally regrettable.

A distinct feature of Sawyer's approach is that he examines Zhuge Liang's deeds with the standard set up by his predecessors and contemporaries. Most of Sawyer's evaluations of Zhuge Liang's achievements hinge upon discourse from classical Chinese military texts. Establishing Zhuge Liang's connection with specific works such as the Sima fa 司馬法 (pp. 47–51) and Liutao 六韜 (pp. 108, 128–129), Sawyer illustrates how the Shu commander was “well versed in the classic military teachings” (p. 120) but failed to act according to them. Moreover, different military figures, including Han Xin 韓信 (c.231–196 bce) and Cao Cao 曹操 (155–220 ce), are compared with Zhuge Liang to pinpoint his untimely rejection of maneuvers and deceptions (pp. 118–124). The cases of Wu's defeat of a Wei general in 228ce and that of Wei's conquest of Shu in 263ce are also employed as examples to the necessity of unorthodox tactics during this period (pp. 123–128). All these can help contextualise Zhuge Liang's conduct to avoid groundless hindsight.

Sawyer's sole focus on military aspects comes with a drawback, namely his hypothesis about non-martial matters. He assumes that the objective of Zhuge Liang's second northern campaign is “capturing the storehouses that sustained Wei's defensive forces” (p. 83), yet this could be an over-interpretation of the toponym Chencang 陳倉. There is no direct evidence for either large stockpiles of provision in the besieged city or its name's association with the concept of a “storehouse”. Furthermore, Zhuge Liang's confidence in Ma Su and Li Ping should be analyzed in the light of Shu's political environment that required a balancing of power between people from different places and generations. Li Ping was one of the old adherents to the previous warlord occupying Sichuan, while Ma Su was a junior officer with a similar experience to Zhuge Liang’s. To dismiss their employment as an act that “misread the character and reliability of people” (p. 96) is a simplification; having said that, these issues do not really clash with Sawyer's overall judgment, and may even strengthen his views on the futile nature of Zhuge Liang's northern campaigns.

Regrettably, this book suffers from many typographical errors. Nearly every title in the “Critical Sources” section contains one or more typo. The titular figure gets his surname miswritten as 渚葛 twice on one page (p. 7), whilst the given name of his elder brother Zhuge Jin 諸葛瑾 (174–241 ce) is misprinted as 謹 elsewhere (p. 153). These issues may result from the fact that this book is published by an independent publisher without appropriate editorial support.

Regardless, Sawyer's volume serves as a good introduction to one of the most well-known historical personalities in Chinese history and is a rich sourcebook of early medieval Chinese military thought. It will be appreciated by general readers and scholars alike.