Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account, a monograph by Gillian Brock launched in the summer of 2009, makes a high quality contribution to the body of philosophical work on global justice. As its title suggests, the book offers a vision of global justice from a cosmopolitan perspective. What makes the vision cosmopolitan, of course, is the appeal to the ideal of moral equality of all persons as the starting point of a philosophical inquiry into matters concerning justice on a global scale. With this ideal as its starting point, the author offers a theoretical approach, discusses various substantive issues, and situates both the theory and its implications for substantive issues in relation to the larger literature on the subject.
The book is structured in a slightly unusual way. This is, in fact, a feature of the book that makes it very attractive. It has become commonplace in recent years to start a piece of work on global justice with empirical data on global poverty, and then derive an obligation of justice that prescribes economic sacrifices to alleviate global poverty to individuals of affluent (and mostly Western) countries. Sometimes, the justification for this obligation appeals to claims that members of affluent countries are in fact responsible, one way or another, for global poverty. The book avoids this structure and starts clearly and unapologetically with normative theory itself. The empirical considerations are taken up along the way and substantive issues are discussed after the basic components of the normative theory are articulated. This is followed by a reconsideration of the theoretical normative questions.
To reflect this dialectic, the book is divided into three parts. Part I proposes a theory of cosmopolitan justice. It offers an introduction to the debates and an elucidation of the author’s theoretical position on global justice. In doing so, the author articulates an alternative theoretical approach in relation to other positions that have been developed in the literature. Simply called “Theory”, this part contains four chapters: an introductory chapter, a chapter devoted exclusively to the debate around Rawls’s Law of Peoples, a chapter that articulates the author’s proposed theoretical framework, and a chapter on global governance, which also responds to the nationalist challenge that has is often raised and that dominates the debates on global justice. The chapter that offers an original contribution to the debates on global justice is Chapter 3: “A Cosmopolitan Model of Global Justice” (pp. 45-83). Here, Brock explains, against most Rawlsian cosmopolitans, how a Rawls-inspired thought experiment on a global scale would not yield an agreement on a “global difference principle”. She conducts one such thought experiment by appealing to empirical information derived from experimental studies (pp. 54-57). She then argues that the thought experiment conducted in this way gives rise, instead, to what she calls a “needs-based minimum floor principle,” a variant of the principle of equality of opportunities. Human needs are conceptualized as being related to the idea of “capabilities,” which for Brock are central to most proposed conceptions of global justice in the literature, as well as a conception of human rights.
Part II is devoted to first-order issues on how to achieve justice on a global scale, given the theoretical framework previously articulated. The discussions are mostly focused on devising policy proposals on various issues. These include global poverty and taxation, basic liberties, humanitarian intervention, immigration, and international trade. In chapter 5, Brock revises the global tax proposal made in the literature, whose most well-known advocate is Thomas Pogge. Brock’s proposals for a global tax offer a richer array of taxation than Pogge’s, who proposes a narrower Global Resource Dividend. Though Brock’s proposed taxation schemes are not intended to go against Pogge’s, they offer a more diversified and wider range of taxes. Within this framework of a “global tax” scheme, Brock includes taxation schemes for the purpose of protecting global public goods (such as addressing the issue of climate change through a carbon tax). In general the proposals revolve around the idea of taxing various activities of global scope, such as international trade and business ventures. Returning to theory in Part III, Brock takes up the debate on the nationalist challenge to cosmopolitan theories. Chapter 11 is devoted to raising objections to the nationalist challenge. Chapter 12 is devoted to showing how the conception of global justice offered in the book can accommodate some legitimate forms of nationalism, and can meet the nationalist challenge.
Overall, this book is an interesting and engaging read. Some readers will agree with the substantive claims and arguments offered in the book. Others will probably disagree. In other words, the book is likely to generate a great deal of discussion. Engaging with the substantive arguments in any detail is not the purpose of this review. Nevertheless, I would like to raise one point concerning the general approach to global justice offered in the book.
Gillian Brock’s book – like many writings on global justice – gives us a usual dose of two dominant themes. First, it offers a thorough and scholarly critical discussion around Rawls’s writings on the subject as reflected in his Law of Peoples. As important as Rawls’s influence to the debates on global justice is, however, I believe it is time for philosophical inquiry on this topic to move on and start taking the debate on global justice to a new level. This is because so much has already been said critically on Rawls’s position that it is hard to say something that hasn’t been said before. This leads to a stagnation of the philosophical discussion overall, which should also examine some of the new developments in the world and new normative considerations in order to capture the complexity of the issues on global economic ethics and justice.
Second, the book is heavily focused on the tension between cosmopolitanism on the one hand and nationalism of some sort on the other. The nationalist challenge is taken up in the last chapter of Part I. Later on, however, the return to theory in Part III is really a return to this question, and practically the entirety of Part III is devoted to the nationalist challenge. As important as the place of the nationalist challenge is in the literature on global justice, focusing so much on this question has the unfortunate effect of preventing the debates from exploring some genuinely interesting questions that can potentially advance the debates. It is important for the philosophical debate on global justice to be tuned in to new developments and policy debates occurring in the world. Some of the questions central to the literature gain an appearance of importance given how dominant they are among philosophers, but they do not always have the same prominence in actual policy debates and in international negotiations.
The issue of nationalism as articulated in the philosophical literature is an example of this phenomenon. In the context of global justice, the issue of nationalism is worth discussing in relation to questions such as whether protectionist economic and trade policies are detrimental to achieving just terms of trade and human development in emerging markets. But the issue seldom receives attention in this way. Instead, an overwhelming focus on what appears to be the nationalist challenge, as it became commonplace in the philosophical literature, detracts us from looking at new issues, which can potentially help us refine our understanding of global justice. For example, it may be worth focusing whether an international agreement on an appropriate coordination of climate change policy can help us re-think what is required to achieve fair terms of trade and foreign investment. Yet, in the book this question receives very little discussion (p. 132). Only one policy option – that of taxation – is touched upon, with no discussion of the challenges to coordination at the global level. Part II, which takes up many interesting topics, could potentially offer far more detailed analyses of substantive issues than it currently does. The chapters, as they stand, move very quickly from topic to topic that have so much complexity that they each can become the object of a much larger investigation. The chapters offer positive solutions, with great optimism and confidence about what the theoretical framework offered in the book can achieve. But many positive proposals remain too hastily defended, sometimes without full consideration of possible objections that could be raised against them or with quick responses to objections. Putting less weight on already established and dominant themes, such as nationalism, and more weight on new ways of examining different substantive issues would have carried an already interesting discussion on substantive issues even further.
Overall, this book is likely to mark an important stage in the debate on global justice. Because it offers a thorough treatment of at least two problems that have concerned the debates on global justice so far (i.e., the Rawlsian position on global justice and the nationalist challenge), it establishes itself well in the literature and can be said to offer the definitive discussion of those topics, while at the same time opening the floor to possible new explorations of substantive issues pertaining to various aspects of global justice. This book can therefore be the starting point of a new and interesting phase in the debates on global justice.
