Do the Taliban qualify as a ‘non-state armed group’?
Since this article deals with the Layha,Footnote 1 it is important to know whether the Taliban in Afghanistan, as a fighting group, qualify as a ‘non-state Islamic actor’. In the context of international humanitarian law (IHL), ‘non-state actor’ (which includes, for example, an Islamic non-state armed group) is a broad concept and may be taken as meaning any group with a military capacity and organizational structure fighting anywhere in the world. But, as we will see below, not every non-state Muslim military group qualifies as a ‘non-state armed group’ under international humanitarian law. What counts in our discussion is whether the armed struggle waged by a Muslim group (in this case the Taliban) is in conformity with the Islamic jus in bello as well as IHL. However, by adding the adjective ‘Islamic’ and the word ‘mujahideen’, there is an expectation that the said mujahideen would have an Islamic identity and an Islamic agenda, and that their code for the conduct of hostilities would be an Islamic one and operate under coherent Islamic rules. The following analysis seeks to determine whether that expectation is fulfilled.
An armed conflict in international humanitarian law
Regarding the question whether the Taliban qualify as a ‘non-state (Islamic) actor’, it is necessary to ascertain in what circumstances a conflict amounts to an armed conflict under IHL. According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), ‘an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State’.Footnote 2 Furthermore, the ICTY has specified two elements required for a conflict between governmental authorities and non-state armed groups to become an ‘armed conflict’: the non-state actor should be well organized and have a hierarchal structure; and the conflict should reach a certain level of intensity.Footnote 3 A non-state armed group that does not fulfil these two conditions is not subject to IHL and their activities may be dealt with under domestic law as banditry, terrorist actions, or unorganized or short-lived insurrections.Footnote 4 The above two elements are not clearly defined by the Tribunal but it has stated in a subsequent case that ‘what matters is whether the acts are perpetrated in isolation or as a part of a protracted campaign that entails the engagement of both parties in hostilities’.Footnote 5 If the above criteria are applied, many Muslim jihadi groups may be excluded from the definition of ‘non-state actor’ under IHL.Footnote 6
The Taliban as an armed group
The Taliban in Afghanistan meet all the above conditionsFootnote 7 and thereby qualify as a non-state armed actor.Footnote 8 The present conflict in Afghanistan is internal or non-international in the sense of Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, but it involves international troops from a number of countries mandated by the Security Council to fight against the Taliban. This is why the situation in Afghanistan may not fit within the old classification of international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. A third category –internationalized non-international armed conflict – can best describe the situation.Footnote 9
The relevant applicable law to non-state parties to an armed conflict is the said Common Article 3. Additional Protocol II of 1977 on non-international armed conflict is also applicable, as Afghanistan is now party to it.Footnote 10 The rules in Common Article 3 have the status of customary international law and non-state groups are bound under international law by customary norms when engaging in an armed conflict. According to the decision of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), ‘it is well-settled that all parties to an armed conflict, whether states or non-state actors, are bound by international humanitarian law, even though only states may become parties to international treaties’.Footnote 11 Whether a conflict is international or non-international, non-state Islamic actors, such as the Taliban in our case, undoubtedly do have obligations under IHL.
The status of the Taliban under Islamic law
It is interesting to consider the status of the Taliban under Islamic law, particularly since the crux of the opinions of many Muslim scholars is that the US attack that led to the dismantling of the Taliban government in Afghanistan was illegal.Footnote 12 Another interesting question is whether the Taliban in Afghanistan can be considered as ‘Ahl al-Baghi’, or rebels under Islamic law. Muslim jurists have laid down four conditions for a group to qualify as Ahl al-Baghi: first, rebelling against state authority by not fulfilling their obligations and refusing loyalty to state laws; second, possessing power and strength; third, openly revolting and fighting against the political authority; and, finally, having their own innovative interpretation of Islamic law to which they strictly adhere (this last condition is controversial).Footnote 13 When the rebels cannot be induced by peaceful means to lay down their arms, the Muslim political authority must fight them to bring them into submission rather than to wipe them out.Footnote 14 However, as stated above, contemporary Muslim scholars consider the toppling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan as illegal and view their war with the occupying power as legal.Footnote 15 Thus, the Taliban do not constitute an example of ‘Ahl al-Baghi’ under Islamic law.
The Taliban's attitude towards Islamic law on the conduct of hostilities
Before examining the Taliban's attitude towards Islamic law on the conduct of hostilities, it is pertinent to mention that the Layha does not make any mention of, or reference to, international humanitarian law. This may be interpreted as meaning either that the Taliban do not acknowledge the existence of IHL or its application in the conflict, or that they base their rules on Islamic law instead. During their short rule in Afghanistan from 1995 to 2001, the Taliban had a very literal, rigid, and radical interpretation of Islamic law. They never referred to moderation or tolerance, or to the protection of the rights of minorities in Afghanistan.
The law of war as part of the Layha
The Taliban assert that their Layha is based on Islamic law. The latest 2010 edition mentions that the Layha was prepared in accordance with Islamic law in consultation with top scholars, muftis (jurisconsults), experts, and specialists;Footnote 16 it is unknown, however, who these scholars, muftis, and experts are. In its jus in bello part, the code of conduct for the Taliban fighters talks of limiting suicide attacks, avoiding civilian casualties, and winning the battle for the hearts and minds of the local civilian population: Section 57, clause ii declares that ‘A brave son of Islam should not be used for lower and useless targets. The utmost effort should be made to avoid civilian casualties’. Between August 2006 and May 2010 the rules have been changed several times and three different versions have been published and enforced. This indicates that the Taliban use Islam, and the Layha in particular, both as rhetoric to serve as a source of unity and to promote mobilization and as a guarantee for compliance with the Islamic law of war.
The 2010 edition of the Layha has eighty-five sections. Not all of them are about the conduct of hostilities. In fact, only thirty-seven sections can be considered relevant to warfare, namely Sections 4, 7,Footnote 17 and 9–16 (on prisoners of war and contractors/suppliers), 17–22 (spies), 23–26 (contractors and suppliers), 27–33 (war booty), 56 (attacks), 57 (suicide attacks), 67–73 (prohibited acts), and 81 (outfit of the mujahideen). The rest concerns, among other things, administrative matters, hierarchical organization, enforcement of Shari‘a law in areas under Taliban control, and the resolution of disputes between people under Taliban control as well as disputes among the Taliban themselves. We now turn to the substantive parts of the Taliban's Layha as compared with the Islamic law of war. However, only the major provisions of the Layha will be discussed here.
The fate of captured persons in particular
Regarding prisoners of war (POWs), there seem to be three categories in the Layha: first, Afghan army soldiers, police, or other officials (Section 10); second, contractors, suppliers, drivers, and personnel of private security companies (Sections 11 and 23–26); and, finally, foreign soldiers (Section 12). In addition, provision is made for a situation that is common to all the above categories: the killing of types of captive during transportation (Section 13).
As far as the fate of those in the first category is concerned, the provincial Taliban governor has to choose between exchanging them for Taliban prisoners, releasing them without setting any condition, or releasing them after securing credible guarantees.Footnote 18 He is not allowed to ransom them. They may be executed or given a ta‘zir punishment only if ordered by the Imam,Footnote 19 his deputy, or the provincial qadi (judge).Footnote 20 Thus, they may be exchanged, released unconditionally, released after credible guarantee, executed, or given some other punishment under ta‘zir. The provincial governor has to choose one punishment from the first three, otherwise the Imam or his deputy or the provincial qadi will choose one of the last two. However, the governor must perform the duties of a qadi if none is appointed in a province. We will consider the Islamicity of these punishments at the end of this section.
The fate of those in the second category (contractors, suppliers, drivers, personnel of private security companies, and spokesmen for the infidels) is mentioned in Sections 11 and 23–26. According to Section 11, read in conjunction with Sections 23–26, if it is confirmed that the contractors build bases or supply materials to ‘infidels and their puppet regime’, the mujahideen should burn their suppliesFootnote 21 and kill such contractors.Footnote 22 High- and low-ranking officials of private security companies, spokesmen for ‘infidels’, and supply drivers are to be given the death penalty by the district qadi.Footnote 23 No other option is available for the qadi. There is some confusion about supply drivers: Section 24 allows their killing on the spot, while Section 11 indicates that they are given the death sentence by the district qadi. Section 26 authorizes the killing of contractors who recruit labourers or other workers.
The fate of a captive non-Muslim combatant can only be decided by the Imam or his deputy, who may choose between that person's execution, exchange, or release without any condition or ransom.Footnote 24 Under Section 13 of the Layha, if the mujahideen have taken captives (who may include locals, foreigners, combatants, contractors, drivers, etc.) and come under attack while transporting them to a secure place, they should kill them if they are enemy combatants or officials. But if the mujahideen are not sure about the identity of the captives, they must not be killed, even if this means that they have to be freed. Regarding the treatment of detainees, Section 15 provides that the mujahideen should not torture them by starvation, thirst, heat, or cold, even if they deserve death sentences or any other ta‘zir punishment.Footnote 25
The fate of all the categories mentioned above may be summarized as follows. (1) Soldiers, police, and other officials of the Afghan regime may be released without any condition, exchanged, or released after they provide a credible guarantee, but they cannot be ransomed and the Taliban governor must decide their fate. They may only be executed or given ta‘zir punishment if authorized by the Imam or his deputy or the provincial qadi, but the governor has to decide on the penalty if no qadi is appointed. This means that the governor is the authority in these matters. (2) All types of contractors, suppliers, drivers, personnel of security companies,Footnote 26 and even those contractors who recruit workers could be either killed or summarily executed or given death sentences by the qadi if arrested. (3) The fate of a captured foreign non-Muslim combatant is decided by the Imam or his deputy, who may authorize his execution, exchange, release, or ransom. (4) Hostages who are suspected of being enemy combatants or other officials can be killed if during their transportation to a secure place the mujahideen come under attack.
Evaluation under Islamic jus in bello: the Layha versus Islamic law
There are three key points to be considered from an Islamic jus in bello perspective. First, what is the fate of POWs in classical Islamic law as well as Islamic military history? Second, can ta‘zir punishment be given to any detainee under Islamic law? Finally, can contractors, suppliers, carriers, drivers, and personnel of security companies be summarily executed or sentenced to death by a qadi if taken captive?
The fate of POWs in Islam
There is disagreement among the Muslim jurists of various schools of thought regarding the fate of POWs under Islam.Footnote 27 I will briefly explain the interpretation of the relevant verses of the Qur'an, the sayings and the conduct of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) and his successors regarding POWs, and the opinions of prominent classical Muslim jurists.Footnote 28 Taking captives is legal in the Qur'an: ‘[A]nd take them captive, and besiege them’,Footnote 29 and verse 47:4 says, ‘And then tighten their bonds’. Muslim jurists agree that their fate is left to the political authority to decide as he sees fit in the best interest of the Muslim community. However, they diverge over the choices available to the Muslim state to terminate their captivity. The various options mentioned by Muslim jurists include execution, exchange, conditional or unconditional release, ransom, and enslavement. According to the majority of Muslim scholars – Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali, Shi‘ite, Zahirite, and Awza‘i – the political authority has the following options: execution, enslavement, ‘mann’ (unconditional release), and ‘fida’' (ransom or release after setting a condition or demanding a promise).Footnote 30 The Malikites add to this the imposition of ‘jizyah’ (poll tax) on them.Footnote 31 The Hanafi jurists agree on execution, enslavement, and setting captives free with the condition that they should pay jizyah, but there is disagreement on ransom.Footnote 32 Imam Abu YusufFootnote 33 and M. Ibn al-Hasan al-ShaybaniFootnote 34 allow ransom.Footnote 35
The Qur'an mentions the fate of POWs in verse 47:4, which says:
Now when you meet [in war] those who are bent on denying the truth, smite their necks until you overcome them fully, and then tighten their bonds; but thereafter [set them free,] either by an act of grace or against ransom, so that the burden of war may be lifted: thus [shall it be].
This verse renders execution illegal and makes captivity a temporary affair that must lead to either unconditional or conditional freedom, or freedom bought with ransom.Footnote 36 Thus, the political authority has the option of releasing prisoners against ransom, or setting them free without any ransom. This is supported by the instructions of the Prophet (PBUH) that he gave while conquering Mecca, ‘Slay no wounded person, pursue no fugitive, execute no prisoner; and whosoever closes his door is safe’.Footnote 37 ‘Ali b. Abi Talib (d. 40 ah/661 ce), Al-Hasan b. al-Hasan (d. 110 ah/728 ce), Hammad b. Abi Suliman (d. 120 ah 737 ce),Footnote 38 Muhammad b. Sirirn (d. 110 ah/728 ce), Mujahid b. Jabr Mawla (d. 103 ah/721 ce), ‘Abd al-Malik b. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz b. Jurayj (d. 150 ah/767 ce), ‘Ata b. Abi Rabbah (d. 114 ah/732 ce),Footnote 39 and Abu ‘Ubayd b. Salam were against the execution of POWs.Footnote 40 According to ‘Imaduddin Isma‘il b. ‘Umar b. Kathir (d. 774 ah/1373 ce), ‘[T]he head of Muslim state has to choose between mann and fida’ only. His [a POW's] execution is not allowed'.Footnote 41 Ibn Rushd (d. 594 ah/1198 ce) mentions that ‘A group of jurists maintained that it is not permitted to execute the prisoners. Al-Hasan b. Muhammad al-Tamimi (d. 656 ah/1258 ce) has related that there is a consensus (ijma‘) of the Companions on this [that POWs shall not be executed]’.Footnote 42
According to authentic reports, in all the wars of the Prophet (PBUH) only three to fiveFootnote 43 POWs were executed. Thus, only ‘Uqbah b. Abi Mu‘it was executed, out of seventy captives of Badr,Footnote 44 for his crimes against the Prophet (PBUH) and Muslims in Mecca.Footnote 45 The second was Abu ‘Izzah al-Jumahi in Uhd.Footnote 46 The third POW was ‘Abdullah b. Khatal, who was executed on the day that Mecca was conquered.Footnote 47 All of them were executed for the heinous crimes they had committed against the Islamic State before their captivity and were wanted criminals in the Islamic State (State of Madina of which Muhammad (PBUH) was the Head). It very clearly was never an established rule at the time of the Prophet (PBUH) that POWs be executed. Probably Al-Hasan b. Muhammad al-Tamimi struck a chord when he proclaimed that the Companions of the Prophet (PBUH) were unanimous on the prohibition of the killing of POWs.Footnote 48
The pro-execution jurists have cited the execution of the combatants of Banu Quraydha as an example to support their point. But can the decision of an arbitrator chosen by the Banu Quraydha themselves to decide the dispute between them and the Muslims be an example for executing POWs? Can a single incident be treated as a general rule; and can the ruling of an arbitrator be accepted as the general and established conduct of the Prophet (PBUH) and his successors? My answer is in the negative. The tribe betrayed the Muslims during the Battle of Ahzab (Arabic for ‘coalition’) by turning against them and supporting the large anti-Muslim coalition headed by the infidels of Mecca, thereby breaching the treaty between the Banu Quraydha and the Muslims, which stated that both sides would defend the city together against any external attack. Once the battle was over, the two sides agreed to refer the matter to an arbitrator. The Banu Quraydha were given the choice to choose an arbitrator and they chose Sa‘d b. Mu‘ad, who was their former ally and who knew the Jewish law. He decided that their combatants should be executed and that their women and children should be enslaved in accordance with that law. According to the Torah:
When thy Lord hath delivered it [the city] unto thy hands, thou shalt smite every male therein with the edge of the sword. But the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and all that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof, shalt thou make unto thyself.Footnote 49
It is clear that if the Banu Quraydha had triumphed over the Muslims they would have dealt with them in exactly the same manner. To sum up this discussion, I conclude that POWs must never be executed. The three who were executed during the life of the Prophet (PBUH) were thus penalized because of the crimes those individuals had committed against the Islamic state or its citizens before their captivity. According to Abu Yusuf Ya‘qub b. Ibrahim (d. 183 ah/798 ce) and Imam Abu Bakr al-Sarkhasi, only the head of the Islamic state can decide to execute a particular POW (even if he is guilty of crimes against the state).Footnote 50 Imam Sarkhasi insists that even the commander-in-chief of the army cannot decide to execute a POW.Footnote 51 The reason is that execution of a prisoner of war is not a rule and to be a prisoner is not an offence per se. In other words, execution of a prisoner of war is an extraordinary act – an act of syasa Footnote 52 (only exercised by the head of the Muslim state) and not an ordinary punishment.Footnote 53 The Third Geneva Convention of 1949 on prisoners of war adopts a similar view in its Article 85, which gives the Detaining Power the right to prosecute a prisoner of war for acts committed prior to his captivity against (the Detaining Power's) law. Under Article 118 of the Third Geneva Convention, prisoners of war must be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.Footnote 54
The conduct of the Prophet (PBUH) regarding POWs
The conduct of the Prophet (PBUH) and his successors regarding the termination of captivity of POWs is very important. There are many examples of them being set free unconditionally, such as the release of Thumama b. Athal, as well as eighty Meccan fighters.Footnote 55 Similarly, all the fighters of Hawazin, Hunayn, Mecca, Banu al-Mustalaq,Footnote 56 Banu al-Anbar, Fazara, and Yemen were set free unconditionally.Footnote 57 Abu Bakr – the first successor of the Prophet (PBUH) – released Al-Ash‘as b. Qays (d. 35 ah/656 ce). ‘Umar, the second successor, pardoned Hormuzan (d. 23 ah/643 ce), an Iranian commander.Footnote 58 Abu ‘Ubayd argues that ransom was taken only from the POWs of Badr and was never taken again; his subsequent conduct was to pardon prisoners. ‘The later precedent from the Prophet (PBUH) is to be acted upon’, he stressed, saying that the practice of pardoning by the Prophet (PBUH) came after Badr.Footnote 59 This view has the support of ‘Abdullah b. ‘Abbas (d. 68 ah/687 ce), ‘Abdullah b. ‘Umar, Hasan al-Basri, and ‘Ata b. Abi Rabah. This shows that the general practice of the Prophet (PBUH) and his successors was to set POWs free without any condition or ransom. According to Abu ‘Ubayd, the Prophet (PBUH) did not practise enslavement, while ‘Umar b. al-Khattab bought the slaves of pre-Islamic times and returned them to their relatives.Footnote 60
Thus, the established practice of the Prophet (PBUH) and his successors was to set POWs free. Ransom was taken on only one occasion, and execution was carried out only for crimes liable to the death penalty that were committed against the Islamic state before captivity. So what of the Layha, which considers execution as one of the options for some captives (such as Afghan soldiers, police, security officials, and foreign soldiers) and as the sole punishment for others (such as contractors, suppliers, carriers, drivers, and personnel of security companies), and allows the killing of captives if they are suspected to be enemy combatants and cannot be transported to a secure place because of an attack. My conclusion is that this rule of the Layha has no basis in Islamic law. Conversely, releasing POWs or exchanging them is based on Islamic law.
The fate of contractors, suppliers, and drivers
Under Islamic law, contractors, suppliers, and drivers are considered as servants. They do not participate in hostilities and their killing is strictly prohibited. It is reported that, when the Prophet (PBUH) saw the body of a slain woman among the dead at the Battle of Hunayn, he asked: ‘Who killed her?’ The Companions answered: ‘She was killed by the forces of Khalid ibn al-Walid’. The Prophet (PBUH) told one of them: ‘Run to Khalid! Tell him that the Messenger of God forbids him to kill children, women, and servants’.Footnote 61 The Prophet (PBUH) is also reported to have prohibited, in the strongest possible words of the Arabic language, the killing of women and servants: ‘Never, never kill a woman and a servant’.Footnote 62
From this it is clear that the killing of such persons as contractors, suppliers, or drivers in an ambush, or putting them to death in captivity, is against Islamic law. It is indicative that the corresponding rules in the Layha for the punishment of contractors, suppliers, and drivers have been changed. The 2006 edition of the Layha allowed their punishment by beating or imprisonment; their killing was allowed only if they could not be captured. Moreover, their captivity would be ended by either exchanging or ransoming them or by some (unknown) punishment (but not by death).Footnote 63 There was no death penalty for them in captivity or when they did not resist arrest. The 2009 edition of the Layha mentions for the first time that contractors, drivers, or other workers, if arrested during transportation, may be given ta‘zir punishment, be exchanged, or be released unconditionally or after a credible guarantee by the governor. Ransoming was prohibited in that edition and execution could be authorized only by the Imam or his deputy.Footnote 64 Thus, execution for this category of captives was introduced for the first time in 2009; yet, although it required the permission of the Imam, it was attributed to Islamic law.Footnote 65
Finally, in the 2010 edition of the Layha, contractors, suppliers, drivers, and personnel of security companies are treated as a different category from Afghan army officials. They face death whenever the mujahideen are able to strike at them.Footnote 66 On arrest the only punishment for them is death.Footnote 67 In the new edition, authorization of execution has been placed in the hands of the mujahideen, and otherwise of the district qadis (judges). The Imam has delegated this authority, which he had exercised since May 2009, to his soldiers and judges. To sum up, the punishment for this category of captive in 2006 was beating or imprisonment. In 2009 they were treated on a par with Afghan soldiers and there was a remote possibility of execution if authorized by the Imam. In 2010 the mujahideen are instructed to kill them in ambush, and, if such persons are arrested, the qadi must sentence them to death; no control or monitoring by the Imam or his deputy is required.Footnote 68 The 2010 rule does not treat such persons as POWs or captives entitled to any privileges. Thus, within a period of four years the rules (each time claimed to be based on Islamic law) have been changed three times. Therefore, these rules cannot be based on Islamic law.
Is ta‘zir punishment an option for the political authority to terminate captivity?
We have described above the various options that are available to the political authority to terminate the captivity of POWs, but the Layha prescribes the punishment of ta‘zir for them as well. Ta‘zir as a punishment for POWs appeared for the very first time in Islamic legal and military history in the May 2009 edition of the Layha, where it is mentioned in Sections 8, 20, and 21 as a punishment for Afghan soldiers, contractors, and drivers.Footnote 69 The 2010 edition, in Sections 10, 15, and 16, also mentions ta‘zir punishment.Footnote 70 Section 15 says that, although mistreatment of captives is prohibited, ‘the mujahideen have to implement ta‘zir [punishment] [to the POWs] whether it is death penalty or any other punishment’. In other words, the Layha considers execution of POWs as ta‘zir punishment. Section 16 is somewhat vague: on the one hand it says that only the Imam or his deputy or the provincial qadi are authorized to give a ta‘zir punishment, and on the other hand that the district qadi must obtain the permission of the provincial qadi for ta‘zir punishments. The governor exercises the powers of the provincial qadi if the qadi's post is vacant. The role of the Imam or his deputy remains uncertain when a provincial qadi or governor can authorize the ta‘zir punishment. Moreover, application of the ta‘zir punishment to POWs cannot be found in any classical or modern treatise on, or text of, Islamic jus in bello.
The ta‘zir punishment occupies an important place in the Islamic criminal justice system. Punishments in Islamic law are usually grouped under four headings: hudud, ta‘zir, qesas, and diya. Hudud crimes are punishable by a hadd,Footnote 71 which means that the penalty for them is prescribed by the Qur'an or by the Sunna (a word spoken, an act done, or a confirmation given by the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH)).Footnote 72Ta‘zir literally means deterrence; technically, it means the power of the qadi to award discretionary and variable punishment.Footnote 73Ta‘zir offences are those that are not included in the other three categories. ‘They comprise conduct that results in tangible and intangible individual social harm and for which the purpose of the penalty is to be corrective’,Footnote 74 and that is precisely the meaning of the word ta‘zir. Penalties for ta‘zir offences may be imprisonment, physical chastisement, compensation, or fines, or a combination of any two thereof. The prosecution and punishment of ta‘zir offences are discretionary, as opposed to hudud, for which they are mandatory; and no ta‘zir penalty can be greater than a hadd penalty. Qesas (retaliation/revenge/chastisement)Footnote 75 crimes are not given a specific and mandatory definition or penalty in the Qur'an. However, the Qur'an refers to qesas in 2:178, 179; 5: 45; and 17:33. Its meaning and content are shaped by state legislation, judicial decisions, and legal doctrine.Footnote 76
In addition to the above punishments, the Imam or head of a Muslim state has the discretionary power of the sovereign, which enables him to apply Islamic law and to regulate, through legislation, some criminal justice, taxation, and police matters. These had not been under the control of the qadi (judge) in the early Abbasid times and were later given the name ‘syasa’. As explained in note 52, syasa literally means ‘policy’ and comprises the whole of administrative justice that is dispensed by the Imam and his political agents.Footnote 77 This area of Islamic law has not attracted serious scholarship, as authors do not give it enough space,Footnote 78 but throughout Islamic legal history the head of the Muslim state has exercised some discretionary powers under syasa.Footnote 79
Muslim jurists of all the four Sunni schools, the Shi‘a schools, and their sub-schools have never prescribed ta‘zir as the punishment for POWs. They did not even discuss it in their treatises on Islamic jus in bello. Ta‘zir is only found in books or chapters on the Islamic criminal justice system, and the penalty for it is discretionary in nature, to be given by the judge. In the Layha, the ta‘zir penalty is imposed by the Imam or his deputy or the (provincial) qadi, and a ta‘zir punishment does not include the option of a ransom or fine.Footnote 80 If ta‘zir as a punishment is accepted for POWs (which, I have submitted, is wrong), then what has the Imam or his deputy to do with its application? The Layha has not only created a new category of punishment but also applies it in a new way. However, ta‘zir as a punishment for POWs has no basis in Islamic law. In contrast, there does seem to be some basis for the application to a spy of ta‘zir punishment either by the district or provincial qadi or by the provincial governor, which appears in Section 17 of the Layha.Footnote 81
Legality of suicide attacks in the Layha
The Layha allows suicide attacks but there are certain conditions with which the mujahideen should comply. First, the suicide bomber should be trained very well to execute the mission. Second, suicide attacks should be carried out against high-value targets. Third, the killing of ordinary people and damage to property should be avoided as far as possible. Finally, all would-be suicide bombers must obtain permission and advice for suicide attacks from the provincial authority. This rule does not apply to those mujahideen who are given a ‘special programme and permission by the higher authority’.Footnote 82 It is important to note that suicide attacks were also allowed in the 2009 edition with the same stipulations.Footnote 83 Moreover, that same rule reveals that there are special agents who are given instructions by either Mullah Omar or his deputy to carry out suicide attacks or other types of attack.
One of the special features of the conduct of hostilities by non-state Islamic entities is that their tactics and strategies rely on methods and means specifically prohibited by both Islamic law and international humanitarian law. By relying on these methods and means, they cannot conduct warfare without intentionally committing criminal violations of Islamic law and of the Geneva Conventions (for which they seemingly care nothing). Among the worst of these violations is perfidy. In Islamic law, perfidy or treachery is to ‘breach the trust and the confidence of the enemy’, and the Prophet (PBUH) and his successors have strictly prohibited it without any exception.Footnote 84 The Prophet (PBUH) is reported to have reiterated this ban on numerous occasions.Footnote 85 In the eighth year after his migration to Medina, he issued commands to his departing army and said, ‘… Fight yet do not cheat, do not breach trust, do not mutilate, do not kill minors’.Footnote 86 On another occasion, while instructing the army led by ‘Abd al-Rahman b. ‘Awf, he said: ‘… never commit breach of trust, nor treachery, nor mutilate anybody nor kill any minor or woman. This is the demand of God and the conduct of His Messenger for your guidance’.Footnote 87 When Abu Jandal b. Suhayl (d. 18 ah/639 ce) fled to Medina from the polytheists of Mecca, he heard that the Prophet (PBUH) intended to return him to his people in execution of the Prophet's (PBUH) covenant with the latter.Footnote 88 Abu Jandal stood up among the Muslims and asked them if they would return him to the polytheists who would torture him to make him renounce Islam. The Prophet (PBUH) answered, ‘Treachery is not good for us, even to save a Muslim from the law of polytheists’.Footnote 89
Islamic law considers any unilateral violation of a treaty by Muslims without first informing the other party to be an act of treachery. The other side must be given due notice of their intention, otherwise the Muslims will be committing perfidy. The Muslim state must abide by the terms of the treaty in letter and spirit. It is reported that the Ummayad Caliph Amir Mua‘wiyah was once preparing his army to attack the neighbouring Roman Empire, although the peace treaty between the two was still in force, for he wanted to attack as soon as it had expired. A Companion of the Prophet (PBUH), ‘Amr b. ‘Anbasah, considered it treachery to prepare for an attack without giving prior notification to the Romans. He therefore hastened to the Caliph shouting, ‘God is great, God is great, we should fulfil the pledge, we should not contravene it!’ The Caliph questioned him, whereupon he replied that he had heard the Prophet (PBUH) saying,
If someone has an agreement with another community then there should be no [unilateral] alteration or change in it till its time is over. And if there is risk of a breach by the other side then give them notice of termination of the agreement on a reciprocal basis.Footnote 90
The Qur'anic verse says: ‘Or, if thou hast reason to fear treachery from people [with whom] thou hast made a covenant, cast it back at them in an equitable manner: for, verily, God does not love the treacherous’.Footnote 91
Shaybani considered it perfidy if a group of Muslims entered the enemy's country feigning to be the representatives of the Caliph, whether or not they showed forged documents; in that case they were not allowed to kill anyone or take away any property as long as they were in the enemy's state. Thus, if they were given protection, then they had to fulfil their obligations arising from that protection. Similarly, if Muslims pretend to be businessmen but are planning to murder someone, they are forbidden to kill, because they have been granted quarter by the enemy.Footnote 92
A suicide attack is a typical example here of perfidy or treachery, because the bomber feigns to be a civilian, and when he is taken to be a non-combatant and spared by the enemy's soldiers, he blows himself up and kills them. Such an act is strictly prohibited in both Islamic law and IHL.Footnote 93 Other examples of treachery or perfidy include engaging in combat while feigning non-combatant status, using non-combatants as shields, using ambulances to carry ammunitions or soldiers, pretending to surrender, feigning sickness, and feigning to be a civilian. As pointed out above, suicide attacks are strictly prohibited in Islamic law, and a suicide bomber might be committing at least five crimes according to Islamic law: killing civilians, mutilating their bodies, violating the trust of enemy soldiers and civilians, committing suicide,Footnote 94 and destroying civilian property.Footnote 95
Notably, while the Layha prohibits mutilation of dead bodies,Footnote 96 by allowing suicide attacks it allows live persons to be mutilated, disfigured, or burnt. Killing in such a way is strictly prohibited in Islamic law. Some scholars argue that suicide attacks are allowed in some situations but not in others. Sheikh Qaradawi, for instance, initially allowed suicide attacks in the occupied territories (Palestine)Footnote 97 but has subsequently disallowed them.Footnote 98
It may be argued that suicide attacks against non-Muslim enemy belligerents occupying Muslim territory, which is the case in Afghanistan, are not forbidden in Islamic law. Before responding to this claim, it is necessary to explain what types of suicide attack Islamic law prohibits in war. The prohibited types of suicide attack include those when a suicide bomber pretends to be a civilian but is wearing a suicide jacket under his civilian outfit and targets combatants or civilians. As already stated, such an attack is an act of perfidy. When the bomber is openly wearing his combat outfit, it might be very difficult even to get close enough to the enemy to carry out such an attack.Footnote 99 Yet if suicide attacks by persons posing as civilians are allowed against occupying forces because they occupy Muslim territory, it would mean that the principles of Islamic jus in bello are applicable only when Muslims conquer and occupy non-Muslim territories, and not when Muslim territory is occupied. This is unacceptable.
The Taliban's law on suicide attacks asks the bombers to avoid civilian casualties and damage to civilian property.Footnote 100 But this cannot be considered as compliance with the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians under Islamic law or IHL, for it is violated in Section 81 of the Layha, which urges the fighters to resemble the local population in their outward appearance: they should keep their ‘hair style, clothing, shoes and other things just like the local people [because] this will allow the mujahideen to protect the local people and will enable them to move freely in any direction’.Footnote 101 It is clear that this provision is contrary to the principle of distinction.Footnote 102 It destroys the credibility of genuine civilians because the adversary's trust is broken, and exposes the genuine civilian population to attacks.
Conclusion
The Taliban's claim that they are the mujahideen (holy warriors) of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan obviously suggests that they must abide by the rules of Islamic law on the conduct of hostilities. The Layha, the code of conduct for their fighters, highlights the limiting of suicide attacks, avoiding civilian casualties, and winning the battle for the hearts and minds of the local civilian population: ‘A brave son of Islam should not be used for lower and useless targets. Utmost effort should be made to avoid civilian casualties’.Footnote 103
In terms of limiting the effects of war, banning some forms of torture, and ruling out non-discrimination based on tribal origin, language, or geographical background, the Layha may be said to show respect for some fundamental humanitarian rules. However, many rules contained in it have no basis either in Islamic law or in international humanitarian law and may even contradict both of them. The rules on the possible execution of POWs, the punishment of contractors, suppliers, and drivers, and the introduction of ta‘zir as a punishment for captives at the discretion of the judge for common criminals who cannot be punished under hudud, qesas, or syasa are examples of rules that cannot be found in Islamic law. Conversely, the unconditional release of POWs, the exchange of POWs, and the prohibition of mutilation are based on Islamic law. The acts of perfidy allowed by the Layha as methods for the conduct of hostilities – such as attacks in which a suicide bomber feigns civilian status – are to be considered perfidy in both divine law and humanitarian law. Rules that combatants should wear the same clothes and shoes and style their hair in the same way as the local people, so as not to be identified by the enemy, violate the principle of distinction between combatants and civilians and endanger the civilian population. There are many provisions in the Layha that are based on Islamic law, such as the requirement that disputes between people (under the mujahideen's control) should be settled according to Islamic law, the prohibition on harming someone's person or property, the prohibition of the use of force in collecting usher, zakat, or donations, and the prohibition of kidnapping for ransom, but these are for the administration of areas under the mujahideen's control and not elsewhere.
Thus, the present Layha contains many provisions of Islamic law as far as administrative control by mujahideen is concerned. However, many rules in the Layha regarding the conduct of hostilities cannot be said to be based on pure Islamic law. Islam is used more as rhetoric to serve as a source of unity and to mobilize, not as a guarantee for compliance with the Islamic law of war.
The mujahideen have to behave well and show proper treatment to the nation, in order to bring the hearts of civilian Muslims closer to them.Footnote 104 If this declared aim is to be accomplished in due respect for Islamic law, the code of conduct must abide by Islamic law and the principles of international humanitarian law. The various changes in the Layha over the last few years show that there is room for improvement in the search for compliance with those principles and above all with the divine law. In sum, the Layha has an ambitious goal to set out principles in accordance with Islamic law and give it a religious sanction, but unfortunately it falls short.
