Most readers of this journal will recognize the name of John Yoo, legal architect of the Bush administration's most controversial policies in the war on terror. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Yoo played a decisive role in the Office of Legal Counsel to the U.S. Department of Justice, where he regularly defended the most extreme legal options under consideration by the administration. In August 2002, he penned a memo arguing that both international and domestic legal prohibitions on torture represent illegitimate restraints on presidential power. His legal views rapidly gained the upper hand because they told the president what he wanted to hear: As commander in chief, the president can do pretty much whatever he wants in order to protect the American people.
Yoo's volume outlines the constitutional theory behind this expansive conception of executive power. For those trying to make sense of the jurisprudential views grounding the Patriot Act, Guantanamo Bay, or the domestic spying scandal, this is the place to look. President George W. Bush typically justifies his legal positions in the war on terror by noting that the Constitution makes him commander in chief and thus chiefly responsible for defending the American people. Yoo's book fleshes out this simple idea. In his view, the Framers always intended for the executive to dominate foreign and military affairs. Of course, the Constitution appears to place the authority to “declare war” unambiguously in the hands of Congress. However, the author interprets this phrase to entail nothing more than a diplomatic courtesy: It offers no check on the president's authority to initiate and conduct most wars, merely requiring an official announcement by Congress of the existence of hostilities after their commencement. Although the conventional reading of the treaty-making power describes it as shared between the Senate and president, Yoo offers a similarly creative reinterpretation, according to which the executive possesses vast power to interpret and terminate treaties at will.
If Yoo is right, not only is the mainstream view of the president and Congress as uneasy but equally indispensable partners in foreign and military affairs misguided, but many political leaders in U.S. history have been badly mistaken about our system as well. As he concedes at various junctures, it is really only during the last century that the president has become a demiurge-like force in foreign affairs, regularly launching military hostilities without bothering to ask Congress for permission. In other words, it is only the imperial presidency that does justice to the Framers' original understanding, and perhaps only Yoo's former boss, George W. Bush, who has most fully achieved it. In this account, Congress is at best a junior partner, maintaining negative rights (e.g., the power of the purse, since Congress can always refuse to fund presidential wars) but destined to play second fiddle to a powerful executive modeled directly on the example of the eighteenth-century British monarch. Since the author grasps that globalization inevitably tends to blur any meaningful divide between foreign and domestic affairs, he occasionally concedes that his defense of executive power has far-reaching implications for domestic affairs as well.
Not surprisingly, Yoo's tendentious views have already ignited significant controversy among legal scholars. In leading academic journals and political periodicals, they have argued that Yoo misrepresents the Framers' views about the war powers. Congress's authority to declare war was envisioned as a strict constitutional rule according to which the executive simply could not launch war without formal congressional authorization. Even in the case of foreign aggression against the United States, the executive might need to act immediately in order to repel concrete physical attacks, yet Congress would then be expected to convene as soon as possible in order to provide proper constitutional guidance to the executive. As his critics have observed, Yoo's readings of the Framers range from eclectic to idiosyncratic. He tends to discount or even ignore familiar materials that work against his argument (see my following comments on Alexander Hamilton), while offering highly peculiar readings of those sources he discusses. In light of the fact that his own presentation places so much emphasis on uncovering the proper historical origins of the U.S. system of war powers, for example, it is odd that he devotes no real attention to the obvious historical question of why a proper understanding of the original constitutional system apparently was lost until the emergence of the imperial presidency. Why did so many of our sage political ancestors—including the Framers' immediate political progeny, who arguably dominated political life in the early republic—miss what only John Yoo has been able to discover?
The Framers also seem chiefly to have had in mind life-or-death physical violations of the body politic (e.g., violent attacks by foreign powers or civil disorder) when debating the president's authority as commander in chief, whereas Yoo tends to operate with a broader conception of the emergency situation, in which many undeniable threats (e.g., terrorism) to the political order tend to get conflated with traditional forms of warfare or violent rebellion. This may seem like an academic distinction, but its implications are huge. If every significant threat to the political status quo (an outbreak of avian flu virus, for example, or another terrorist attack on U.S. territory) necessarily requires massive augmentations of poorly regulated executive power, Americans indeed will probably have to bid farewell to the rule of law.
Let me point to another troubling consequence of his general position hitherto ignored by most legal critics. If Yoo is right, an American Revolution never really took place. To be sure, ragtag American patriots waged heroic battles against British redcoats and their Hessian mercenaries, but the final result was nothing more than the establishment of a political system based in crucial respects on the British monarchy.
According to most scholars, the Framers abandoned one of the central prerogatives of traditional kinship, namely, the monarchist view that the king was, as William Blackstone famously described it in his Commentaries on the Laws of England, “the generalissimo, or the first in military command” ([1765] 1979, Vol. 1, p. 254). Part of traditional monarchist ideology was always the idea that kings played a predominant role in foreign and military affairs because they possessed divine or charismatic powers that made them best suited to military leadership. Monarchist legitimacy was intimately tied to the belief that kings represented, or at least descended from, the leading warriors of the realm. The first Norman king of England, of course, was the aptly named William the Conqueror. According to many scholars, the Framers abandoned this tradition, in part because their reading of European history suggested to them that royal preeminence in foreign affairs opened the door to political and military adventurism. As noted even by the greatest defender of a strong presidency among the Framers, Alexander Hamilton, an elected executive “would be ambitious, with the means of making creatures; and as the object of his ambition would be to prolong his power, it is probably that in case of war, he would avail himself of the emergence, to evade or refuse a degradation from his place” (“Speech in the Constitutional Convention on a Plan of Government” [1787], in Writings, 2001, p. 158). How better to augment executive power than by taking advantage of a foreign or military crisis? Because of this peril, the Framers circumscribed the president's war-making powers, and even Hamilton arguably would have worried about the modern tendency for presidents to undertake military action without express congressional approval.
Yoo insists that we need worry no more. A central theme of The Powers of War and Peace is that the Framers designed our constitutional system strictly in accordance with British models of war making, in which Parliament possessed little more than a series of negative budgetary powers against the royal “generalissimo.” The Framers built directly on the “English system [which] gave the executive leadership in the initiation and conduct of war and the making of treaties, while the legislature primarily played a role by funding the wars, enacting implementing legislation, and impeaching ministers” (p. 32). He concedes that Anti-Federalists like “Cato correctly concluded that in the realm of practical politics, the president's authority under the Constitution did not differ in important measure from that of the king” (p. 113). But the Anti-Federalists were wrong to worry so much. To be sure, Yoo notes, the U.S. system jettisoned Britain's system of hereditary monarchy. Yet his analysis of the presidency repeatedly underscores its continuities with monarchical power. By insisting that the presidency ultimately preserved a core royal prerogative, he begs an obvious question: Might not an apt characterization of the constitutional system he defends be elective monarchy, in which we periodically choose some individual outfitted with vast and effectively unlimited discretionary power in order to protect us?
Yoo never openly concedes that this is an immediate implication of his argument. Nonetheless, if he is right, somebody ought to tell the Daughters of the American Revolution, or at least the little kids waving flags on the Fourth of July. They might be surprised. We dumped one King George two centuries ago, but we now have a new one. The republic is dead; long live the king!
