A crucial issue in Daniel Aronoff’s book is the ‘accumulation’ that the author defines as an act of saving by someone who does not intend to spend the savings in the future. Such a person or entity is an “accumulator,” a person who does not obey the non-satiation principle (one of the axioms in economic theory). “Secular stagnation” has been used in different—though related—ways by different authors. “I define secular stagnation as condition in which resources—including labor—are not fully employed, and in which the trend growth rate of the economy is below its potential. The origin of the linkage between Accumulation and secular stagnation is to be found in Book II of Thomas Malthus’s Principles of Political Economy (1836)” (p. 72).
The book is divided into two distinct parts. The first part traces the historical development of the ideas advocated by Malthus, David Ricardo, and Adam Smith on accumulation and secular stagnation, stressing that the first has been underestimated by economists and economic historians, while the second is overrated. This part is quite challenging and substantially constitutes a reinterpretation of the debate between Malthus and Ricardo on glut and secular stagnation. The key question is whether the only practical bound to output are the technological limits of production. The answer is “no.” There are people who produce for the purpose of accumulating productive power, money, and financial claims, without intending ever to convert their wealth into demand for final goods. Thus, there is a deficiency in demand, which prevents the economy from operating at full employment. Following Malthus, aggregate demand plays a role in determining output and employment, even when wages and prices adjust instantaneously to imbalances between demand and supply. In modern terms, we could say that Ricardo is a classical (and rational) economist, while Malthus seems more a behaviorist. Glut and unemployment are disequilibria phenomena for Ricardo; whereas, for Malthus, they are related to habits, classes of society, etc. While Ricardo denies the possibility that a (rational, I would say) man can produce in order not to consume or sell, Malthus says there are capitalists who produce without intending to buy other goods. The volume reminds us that the two great economists have debated at length on the concept of accumulation, on its possibility to manifest itself, and on the economic implications. The debate is enhanced with the contribution of Jean Baptiste Say (via supply) and Adam Smith and, later, of John Maynard Keynes, who detected a kindred spirit in Malthus. This part of the book is written in engaging language, between the journalistic and academic historian.
The second part of the book, as Aronoff points out, is aimed at developing the idea of Malthus on accumulation as the cause of secular stagnation, trying to use the conceptual framework to explain the contemporary malaise of secular stagnation and boom-bust cycles in the United States.
The topic addressed by the author is rather difficult without the aid of an analytical model and also because the relationships between variables that the author uses are complex and define a dynamic general equilibrium model (that, ultimately, is the framework that the author denies).
First of all, the author recalls that Ricardo’s point of view prevailed and the principle of non-satiation is now an axiom of economic theory. Along with declining marginal utility, this principle allows the economic behavior to be modeled with rational maximization agents. Then, the economy has developed as an equilibrium theory. So Ricardo prevailed over Malthus in substantive and methodological terms. Second, Aronoff recalls that Keynes emphasized that Malthus had been the inspiration for his theory of aggregate demand but he criticizes Keynes’s inability to understand the implications of the Malthusian concept of accumulation, considered a phenomenon that may not persist because it will drive down the interest rate to a level that will force the wealth holder to spend their principal. Saving will decline and investment will rise as interest rates fall. Malthus claims, instead, that the adjustment of interest rates is ineffective to rebalance savings and investment when capitalists are engaged in accumulation.
When it comes to using the accumulation (and accumulators) to explain what is happening in the US economy, there emerges a rather nebulous picture, not easy to read, with the author seeking to restore pieces for a single purpose: to show that everything depends on an increase in accumulation. In this part of the volume, we find intertwined the implications of the permanent-income hypothesis and a sort of double propensity to save (and consume) for different social classes; the evolution of the concentration of income and wealth and the distinction between people who pass on inheritances they received to the next generation and those who created inheritances out of income they earned during their lifetime; the breakdown in the relationship between short-term and long-term rates (Greenspan “conundrum”); the bilateral current account deficit with China (and its mercantilist policies) and capital flow bonanzas; Lawrence Summer’s secular stagnation; and a declining population growth; the deficiency in demand and deflationary pressure in Ricardo Cabellero and Emmanuel Fathi’s model of safe asset shortage and the accumulation theory.
The puzzle is the desire to accumulate on the part of a significant group of people. This kind of proposition is constantly repeated in the volume and is cited as the cause of secular stagnation. What is really missing is both a micro- and a macroeconomic explanation of why there is a desire on the part of individuals (households and firms) not to spend and accumulate.
The analysis of this second part of the volume should be enriched with data and stylized facts, with charts and tables that make up a substantial empirical evidence. For instance, the analysis of the concentration of wealth to a smaller and smaller percentage of the population must be quantified and justified; for example, is it related to the business cycle or to a structural change in the way of producing, or to the financial market deregulation? The propensity for accumulation should be explained (we cannot rely only on Malthus’s intuition, though extraordinary) with the help of theoretical schemes and econometric estimates. The same applies to the yield curve. There is a huge literature on this curve because sometimes the relationship between the short and long rates may not develop (see, for instance, Chadha et al. Reference Chadha, Durré, Joyce and Sarno2014).
The “conundrum” was that Alan Greenspan could not control long-term rates as he wished. Long rates do not always track short rates or Fed pronouncements. Often, long-term and short-term interest rates move independently all the time. Moreover, short rates tend to move with the business cycle, which, we know, typically lasts a lot fewer than ten years. When the economy is weak and the Central Bank is trying to revive the activities of households and firms, short rates should be lower than agent expectation of the average for the next ten years. Conversely, short rates are higher than expectation of the average for the next ten years because the economy is running hot and the Central Bank is limiting this race. The yield curve may be inverted when the economy is peaking and poised to go into recession; short rates end up higher than long rates because of the expectation that short rates will fall significantly. After the economy has hit bottom and is ready to grow, the yield curve reflects the expectation of future increases in the short rate to match the expected acceleration in nominal spending, becoming, again, nice and steep. In addition, it should be noted that a ten-year bond yield contains expectations of future short-term interest rates for the next ten years, so changes in those expectations affect the longer-term yield. However, that yield also includes a risk premium to give investors a reason to lock up their money for a decade instead of rolling it over in T-bills.
Daniel Thornton (FED St Louis, quoted by Aronoff, pp. 115–116) argued in a 2010 paper that the disconnection between policy rates and longer-term rates can be traced to institutional changes in the way the Fed made policy in the late 1980s. The change occurred when the Federal Open Market Committee switched from using the funds rate as an indicator of the stance of policy to a variable that it controlled to implement policy. This caused short rates to decouple from the rest of the yield curve, although most people did not notice anything until 2004 to 2006 because of the steady downward trend in all interest rates. However, Aronoff concludes: “I am not going to go into the details of his argument, because it is not relevant to this inquiry, except to note that my proposed explanation is not incompatible with his [i.e., Thornton’s]—it may even be complementary. The increase in accumulation is an independent cause of the breakdown in the relationship between the Fed funds rate and the ten-year treasury yield. It explains the intensification of the decoupling that took place in the 2000s” (p. 116). The “dog that didn’t bark” is not a mystery. The long-term interest rate has several components, including: (1) the real short-term rate expected by market participants as an average for the next ten years; (2) the long-term inflation expectations, at ten years, of these participants; and (3) the term risk premium demanded to invest in bonds with long maturities rather than successively investing in short-term bonds. When the Fed modifies (or announces a change in) the official short-term rate, each of these three components is likely to move either upwards or downwards, depending on the economic context and other forces or shocks (see, among others, Thornton Reference Thornton2012).
The model envisaged by Aronoff should be constructed as an analytical model of an open economy, with well-defined parameters and behavioral functions (micro-founded), in order to obtain from it simulations and estimates. To update the key scheme of Malthus, Aronoff’s elaboration perhaps underestimates some new elements, such as: a system of free capital movements in a context of technological innovation that cancels the execution time of the decisions; a context of substantial deregulation of the financial markets; and the creation of an additional fundamental (like preference, technology, and endowments) called “trust.” In particular, in literature, a developing idea is that confidence is a separate and independent factor that helps to determine the unemployment rate and drives booms and busts. Confidence determines wealth and, therefore, demand and employment.
In two books of 2010, Roger Farmer stressed this new situation: “the only thing that keeps the economy on track is the collective confidence of hundreds of millions of investors that the economy is sound” (2010b, p.121). A loss of confidence in the value of assets can become a self-fulfilling prophecy and lead to a downward spiral in economic activity that ends in a depression. Monetary and fiscal policy might have the effect their proponents claim but only if households and firms regain confidence in the economy. Maybe, in the new evolution of the economy, the “innate human propensity to swing between euphoria and fear” (Greenspan Reference Greenspan2009) has become a significant driver, not only of stock prices; and, maybe, it can help to explain accumulation or excessive (global) savings. Thus, it seems that confidence matters for the accumulation of a growing share of people, as well as fiscal policy. The crucial question in this regard is what happens when governments spend more and accumulate huge debts. In many countries, households save more in response to the fiscal stimulus because they know that their future pensions are in danger and perhaps cannot be delivered. Are they accumulators? Are they also responsible for the secular stagnation? Does government do the right thing to insist on the fiscal stimulus to achieve full employment when household consumption is related to their wealth? These and other issues should be sorted in an organic framework to analyze the current malaise of advanced economies.
Certainly, this volume of Aronoff’s is to be appreciated in the first part, which tells the history of the idea of accumulation. The reading is enjoyable and interesting. The second part of the volume, aimed at analyzing the problems of the modern economy with Malthus’s intuition, looks more complex and nebulous. However, assumptions and hypotheses advanced by the author lead us to reflect both on the specific problems of accumulation and on the need to have an adequate framework for studying the crises.
