Thesecond Ottoman-Egyptiancrisis from 1839 to 1841 was one of the most important chapters in the history of the Eastern question. At that time, the fragile structure of the Ottoman Empire trembled in its foundations under the pressure of the ambitious, powerful Egyptian governor, Mohammed Ali, who at the end of the 1830s controlled Egypt along with Sudan, Crete, a considerable part of the Arabian Peninsula, and even Syria. Although formally he was the sultan's subject administering some Ottoman provinces, in reality Mohammed Ali governed his dominions as an independent ruler, hence dividing the Ottoman Empire into two parts, one of them ruled from Constantinople and the other from Alexandria. The sultan's attempt to terminate the existence of this dual system ended in disaster; and in the midsummer of 1839, the empire found itself without its army, navy, and monarch, who died at the end of June.

The weakness of the “sick man on the Bosphorus” provoked five European powers to intervene on behalf of the new Ottoman ruler, Abdülmecid I, and caused the internationalization of what had hitherto been a localized affair. Most of the five powers agreed on the need to restrict Mohammed Ali's power to Egypt alone and to use force against him if he would not comply with their demands. On 15 July 1840, Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and the Ottoman Empire concluded a convention in London agreeing on the conditions for a solution to the conflict in the Levant. France, however, remained apart from this coalition because it did not agree with a vigorous limitation of Mohammed Ali's power or with a possible military intervention. Because the Egyptian governor did not want to withdraw, the hostilities were finally opened in September when Ottoman, British, and Austrian forces landed in Syria.

As a result of the rupture within the diplomatic concert, in the autumn of 1840 there was a real fear of war erupting between the signatories of the London convention and France. Although in the end war with France did not happen and Mohammed Ali's power was restricted, the Near Eastern crisis had serious consequences for the future of both the Levant and Europe.Footnote ¹ One consequence was the increased interest of the great powers in the situation of the Christian inhabitants of Syria. Expulsion of the Egyptians and the accession of an inept Ottoman administration facilitated the rivalry of the European states in this region. The Habsburg Empire also participated in solving the Syrian question,Footnote ² and the Austrian Chancellor, Clemens Wenzel Lothar Nepomuk Prince von Metternich, became the driving force in the effort to ensure a secure existence for the Syrian Christians in 1840–1841. Therefore, it is surprising that despite the interest shown by a considerable number of historians in British and French policies in the affair, Metternich's role has never been thoroughly analyzed. Even Caesar E. Farah's important monograph The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon deals only marginally with the Austrian diplomatic efforts in the Syrian question before the summer of 1841.Footnote ³

The neglect of Austrian involvement in the Syrian affairs in 1840–1841 is also the cause of some misinterpretations of Metternich's attitudes and activities. Because historians paid too little attention to Austrian diplomatic correspondence and relied too much on the French diplomats' reports, they tended to use the clichés about Metternich's conservatism and legitimism when clear explanations were missing from the French documents. Although Metternich's attitudes were indeed based on these principles, their excessive application obscures the fact that the prince's remarkable analytical skills in international affairs were burdened to a surprisingly small degree by the partiality stemming from his conservatism. The purpose of this article, however, is not only to explain Metternich's attitude to the situation of the Syrian Christians and his activities on behalf of securing a safe future for them, but also to refute the widespread assertion that the main goal of Metternich's Syrian policy was to deprive France of its protection of the Syrian Catholics to the benefit of Austria.Footnote ⁴

The beginning of Austrian diplomatic activities on behalf of the Christians in Syria was not in February 1840 as Mordechai Elliav asserts;Footnote ⁵ there is no allusion to the Syrian Christians in Metternich's letters or discussions with foreign diplomats until the last day of July 1840. Consequently, my narrative opens with the summer of 1840 and terminates in June of the following year when the Sublime Porte agreed to Metternich's proposals on behalf of the Christians. Owing to the lack of published documents, this contribution to the history of the Eastern question is based primarily on correspondence housed in the archives in Vienna, London, Paris, Berlin, and Munich.Footnote ⁶

Metternich's aspiration to help the Syrian Christians was not of course caused simply by his sympathies, but it should be recognized that these did help motivate his first steps during the crisis. Mohammed Ali and his eldest son Ibrahim Pasha were renowned for their tolerance, and the situation of the Christians in the provinces under their rule had improved considerably. Nevertheless, the construction of a large army and fleet gave rise to high taxes, forced conscriptions, and forced labor that provoked numerous rebellions in the Syrian dominion.Footnote ⁷ These rebellions had one thing in common: Ibrahim Pasha suppressed all of them. The revolt in Mount Lebanon that lasted from May to July 1840 was no different; but it was distinguished by the fact that the Druze, who had been a motivating force of the previous insurrections against Egyptian rule, did not participate in large numbers. Instead, the Catholic Maronites had assumed the lead.Footnote ⁸ The displeased Egyptian governor made hostile statements about the latter. His hostility was surprising because, with respect to the great powers, his words regarding the Christians had always been positive and conciliatory. Moreover, he accompanied his declarations of rigorous measures against the rebels with such a massive engagement of force in Lebanon that rumors spread among the Europeans in Alexandria that Mohammed Ali planned a war of extermination against the Maronites.Footnote ⁹

Having heard this, the Austrian consul general in Egypt, Anton von Laurin, visited the governor on 23 June 1840, hoping to moderate his intentions against the insurgents. However, Mohammed Ali refused to temper his resolve because, as he resolutely stated, the time for negotiation was over and it was time to take action. He declared that the Maronites were surrounded both by Egyptian forces and the Druze and would not escape their fate. Furthermore, the Druze would take advantage of victory to establish their own dominance in Lebanon. Alarmed by these threats of severity against the Maronites, and given the long-lasting enmity between the Maronites and the Druze, Laurin feared that the former would be massacred and no one would be able to distinguish the innocent from the guilty.Footnote ¹⁰ This prognosis was supported by the existing state of affairs in Lebanon. As Laurin reported to Metternich:

Although Laurin did not presume Mohammed Ali himself planned the destruction of this Catholic group for fear of Europe's response, his reports nevertheless produced exactly the same rumors in Vienna as those already circulating in Alexandria. The Egyptian governor was said to want to annihilate all Christians, most of them Maronites, and the prompt intervention of the great powers was considered to be entirely necessary to avoid their annihilation.Footnote ¹²

It is not clear whether Metternich actually believed this rumor, but he was surely aware of the serious situation of the Maronites.Footnote ¹³ Moreover, his interest in their future was increased by Ottoman Foreign Minister Mustapha Reshid Pasha's question addressed to the chancellor concerning the attitude the Porte ought to assume towards the Maronites.Footnote ¹⁴ At the end of July, Metternich advised the sultan to promise clemency to the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, who would rise up against the Egyptian oppression, and to guarantee their ancient privileges and relieve them of tax obligations for several years.Footnote ¹⁵ In Metternich's opinion, nothing could forestall the acceptance of this recommendation made only with a view to “attach a nation interesting for its faith and fidelity to its legitimate sovereign and at the same moment to give to these people guarantees of their further peaceful existence.”Footnote ¹⁶

This was the first step in Metternich's effort to achieve a better future for the Maronites and for all Christians in Syria. A month later he took a second step when he instructed the Austrian representative in Constantinople, Internuncio Baron Bartolomäus Stürmer, to send an emissary to Lebanon to ascertain what demands the spiritual leader of the Catholic nation, Patriarch Yûsuf Hubaysh, might require from the Porte. Simultaneously, the emissary was to assure the patriarch that in the case of the Maronites' loyalty to the Ottoman monarch, the Austrian emperor would work to gain the sultan's assurance for their privileges, autonomy, and property—in short their future life in peace.Footnote ¹⁷ By “loyalty,” Metternich meant the military assistance required from the Christian inhabitants for the planned invasion of Syria by the British, Austrian, and Ottoman forces. The Maronite mountain tribespeople in Lebanon, together with the Albanians, were considered to be the best warriors in the Ottoman Empire, and an alliance with them would be very advantageous. To win them to his side, Metternich did not hesitate to employ the groundless rumor about their imminent extermination: “The Maronites are a very peaceful mountain people if they are not tormented, but they are fully resolved to rise against oppression. Moh.[ammed] Ali has decided to exterminate these people; it is necessary to let them know, and they will be [informed].”Footnote ¹⁸ The Porte assented to the mission both because of its pro-Ottoman character and because of the previous discussions on the topic Stürmer had held with Mustapha Reshid Pasha.

Metternich's order was successfully carried out.Footnote ¹⁹ On 16 September, Stürmer sent a dragoman-adjutant, Anton Steindl von Plessenet, whose mother was a Maronite,Footnote ²⁰ to Lebanon to learn “the Maronites' wishes and to assure them that the Porte is prepared to grant them privileges, immunities, autonomy and everything that will be able to assure their peace and happiness.”Footnote ²¹ He was instructed to ask the patriarch for a written exposé containing the privileges and prerogatives that the inhabitants of Lebanon desired to obtain from the Porte.Footnote ²² On 26 September, Steindl arrived at the Bay of Djounie, 18 kilometers north of Beirut and soon visited Yûsuf Hubaysh, who by chance lived only two hours away from the anchorage. The Austrian agent informed Yûsuf about the emperor's wish to support the menaced Catholic nation and asked him what his people desired from the government in Constantinople. The patriarch required the confirmation of ancient privileges, among them the demand not to be subordinate to any other patriarch and the right to found churches, convents, and schools without restraint or need to ask the sultan for a firman. Moreover, the patriarch raised a new claim that the prince of Lebanon be chosen only from among the Maronite leaders and not from the Greeks, Armeniens, Druze, or other nations. Furthermore, the reform Edict of the Rose Garden (Hatt-i Sharif of Gülhane) of 3 November 1839 was to be activated and taxes were to be abolished or reduced for several years to compensate for alleged suffering in previous years.Footnote ²³ All of these requests were made only verbally because Yûsuf asked Steindl for time to prepare a written document. This document was not delivered until the end of October. Yussuf's claims were accepted in ConstantinopleFootnote ²⁴ and also supported in Vienna. Metternich considered most of them to be just and reasonable, partly because the patriarch wanted only the confirmation of existing rights.Footnote ²⁵

With regard to the second goal of the mission, obtaining the Maronites' support for the fight against the Egyptian forces, Steindl was also successful. Immediately after his visit, Yûsuf called on the Catholic inhabitants to take up arms, and he threatened anyone who would not obey with excommunication.Footnote ²⁶ The Maronites joined forces with the allies in their war against the Egyptians and helped the sultan to regain Syria.Footnote ²⁷ The main reasons for the successful outcome, however, were attributable to the aversion the mountain tribespeople felt to Ibrahim Pasha's rule and particularly to the activities of the British agent, Richard Wood, with whom Steindl was acquainted and had good relations. Consequently, it was not difficult for both men to act together for the desired result.Footnote ²⁸

There was another important outcome of Steindl's mission. During the meeting, Yûsuf complained that France as a great power had assumed the right of exclusive protectorate over Catholics not only in Lebanon, but also in the whole of Syria; yet France had done nothing for the Maronites recently except to provoke them, in the patriarch's words, “not to return force with force, not to take arms, but to suffer peacefully.”Footnote ²⁹ Because Austria had sent ships to protect the Maronites and as a Catholic country desired their prosperity, Yûsuf suggested that after three centuries of French protection of the Lebanese Catholics, Austria should now assume the role of protector. He conveyed this desire also to Laurin, who had accompanied Steindl but had negotiated with the patriarch separately.Footnote ³⁰ Neither Austrian agent was instructed to discuss Austrian protectorship, however, and so they answered evasively, sending the proposal to their superiors.Footnote ³¹

The British supported the patriarch's offer because they longed for an end to French influence in Syria and to be thus rid of their greatest rival. Austrian influence in this area was for them much more acceptable than the French. Therefore, Wood eagerly advised Stürmer to accept the proposal by which the Habsburg Empire would “gain an immense influence in Syria, an object not unworthy of the serious consideration of a great nation.”Footnote ³² Her Majesty's ambassador in Constantinople, John Lord Ponsonby, also expressed the opinion of other British when he declared: “We are intimately and firmly united with Austria. It will be a good thing to establish Austrian influence over the Christians instead of that of the French.”Footnote ³³

In Constantinople, Stürmer's attitude was reserved. In his opinion, Austria possessed the right to intervene at the Porte in favor of the Catholics,Footnote ³⁴ but not the Maronites. The sultan would have to officially agree to Austrian protection, which would inevitably arouse the hostility of the French government. The internuncio maintained that Austria was currently the Maronites' intercessor in Constantinople and had actually become their protector instead of France, who had sacrificed them for Mohammed Ali's sake. In other words, Austria was their patron de fait and it was not necessary to hold this position de jure. Moreover, once the Viennese cabinet had fulfilled the patriarch's wishes concerning his nation in the Ottoman capital, one could expect that the Maronites' situation would improve considerably and no foreign power would need to be involved.Footnote ³⁵

Like Laurin and Steindl, Stürmer also had no instructions enabling him to deal with Yûsuf's offer, and he had to transmit Yûsuf's question to Vienna. He refused to respond to the patriarch and only assured him that Austria would always support his requests at the Divan.Footnote ³⁶ Metternich completely approved of this decision and wrote in the margin of Stürmer's report: “This is the correct form.”Footnote ³⁷ The Austrian chancellor believed that exclusive influence over the Syrian Catholics could only lead to a serious rivalry with France and the other great powers, which would endanger stability in the already restless region. Protectorship would not only contradict Metternich's respect for the inviolability of the monarch's sovereignty, but also the hope to remove areas of friction within the Ottoman Empire that had evoked several crises in the East for twenty long years.Footnote ³⁸ Metternich repudiated the idea of an exclusive protectorate.

Nevertheless, in the chancellor's opinion, the problem was more complicated and had to be treated at two different levels. First, there was a question of foreign interference on the political affairs of the Syrian Christians, as well as Christians elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. In this case, not only did Metternich not demand this right for the Habsburg Empire, but he was also persuaded that no country was entitled to interfere in the civil affairs of the Ottoman citizens because “the sovereign of the country is the only competent and natural defender of the civil and politic rights of his subjects, and foreign courts would violate these rights of the sovereign by competing for the protection of his subjects' rights against his will.”Footnote ³⁹ Second, was the question of protecting the Ottoman Christians' freedom to practice their religion, which, according to the prince, “in no way injures the rights of the sovereign.”Footnote ⁴⁰ To accomplish this end, Metternich did not require an exclusive protectorate over the Maronites; rather, he wanted to share it with other Catholic countries because, as he declared, this privilege belonged to all Catholic crowns and could not be usurped by only one of them: “We do not deny this right to France; exercising it ourselves, we do not treat it as an exclusive privilege.”Footnote ⁴¹

This consideration meant that one of Metternich's principal goals in his Syrian policy was not to deprive the French of their protection of the Catholic faith, but to share it with them. His aim was clearly pronounced in his instructions to Stürmer on 3 November 1840:

The verity of this statement is supported by the above-mentioned fact that neither Steindl nor Laurin was given instructions in case Yûsuf should ask to replace the French protectorship with an Austrian one.Footnote ⁴³ However, not even Metternich had to assume a formal attitude toward this demand because when the patriarch handed over the written list of his nation's wishes at the end of October 1840, to Steindl's surprise, he no longer required Austrian protection. Yûsuf explained the shift in his opinion by the uncertainty over Austrian willingness to satisfy this request.Footnote ⁴⁴

Metternich's moderate ambitions in no way signified that he was well-disposed to France and its activities in the Near East. On the contrary, his policy in Syria, as well as the entire Levant in the 1830s, was significantly anti-French. Metternich opposed French diplomacy before the July revolution, as well as afterwards, not only in serious affairs such as the French occupation of Algeria in 1830 or the French support of Mohammed Ali, but also in matters of minor significance such as the French plan to send Ottoman students to France, the editing of French newspapers in Constantinople, or the foundation of a military academy in the Ottoman capital led by the French military instructors.Footnote ⁴⁵ In 1840, Metternich had already defended the Jews maltreated in Damascus against the anti-Semitic attitude of the Parisian cabinet; and also in the Syrian question, Metternich's conduct was influenced by his strong aversion to France. The Austrian chancellor discounted France's exclusive role as a protector of the Christians jealously guarded by the French governments regardless of the regime. Metternich particularly criticized the fact that for the French this protectorate was only an instrument to gain support for their political and economic goals,Footnote ⁴⁶ and he was not completely mistaken.Footnote ⁴⁷ He clearly stated his opinion in the instructions to Esterházy on 7 March 1841:

Consequently, Metternich's rejection of the idea to replace the French protectorate must be understood as a demonstration of his respect for international law, his desire for general tranquility, and his realistic assessment of Austria's limitations. Moreover, though French influence in Syria was paralyzed in 1840, Metternich, as a rational statesman, did not believe in its entire elimination. Nevertheless, even mere participation in the protection of the Syrian Catholics or in the Austrian-French cooperation would deliver a blow to France because it would break the by then so eagerly watched “French privilege”.

The prince pursued this goal from the very beginning. Already in the initiation of Steindl's mission there appears a clear aspiration to weaken French influence over Syrian affairs and to discard the mask of “the French charlatanism that shrouded the Levant with religious colours as well as all other hues.”Footnote ⁴⁹ At the end of August 1840, Metternich instructed the internuncio to draw the sultan's attention to the minimal value of friendship with a France that sought only its own profit and rivalry with other great powers. Metternich instructed Steindl to inform all Catholics in Lebanon about the particular interest of the Austrian court in their situation and raise their doubts about the utility of the sole protection of France.Footnote ⁵⁰

Austrian activities in Syria naturally did not escape the attention of the French operating in the East. The French consul general in Egypt, Adrien-Louis Cochelet, accused the Austrian agents of trying to persuade local Christians that only the Habsburg Empire could serve as a natural protector of the faith. He wrote to Paris on 18 October 1840:

In the capital on the Seine, reports like this caused considerable concern, in particular when in the autumn of 1840 not only the protectorate over the Catholic inhabitants, but also the very future of France's ally, Mohammed Ali, was in jeopardy. Consequently, whereas Austria and Great Britain urged the Maronites to rebel against Egyptian rule, the French premier, Adolphe Thiers, sent the superior of the Lazarists, Father Etienne, to Lebanon in September to use his influence over the Maronite clergy to prevent a war between the mountain tribespeople and the Egyptian forces. He arrived in Sidon on 24 September, shortly before the allies launched an attack against the city. Owing to the insecure situation in the interior, where the roads were controlled by brigands, Etienne did not consider it appropriate to take risks en route to the Maronites, whose discontent was so great that their fight against the Egyptian forces was imminent. He preferred to end his mission and leave for Alexandria.Footnote ⁵² Attempts by other French agents led by the consuls in Damascus and Beirut, Benoît Ulysse-Laurent-François Count Ratti-Menton and M. Demeloize, to persuade the patriarch and other Maronite clerics to forbid the people to take the sultan's banner also entirely failed in the autumn of 1840. Threats to withdraw French protection of the Catholic Church proved to be useless.Footnote ⁵³ British and Austrian influence apparently predominated in Syria.Footnote ⁵⁴ Nevertheless, one cannot resist the impression that the withdrawal of Yûsuf's offer to place the Maronites under Austrian protection was a consequence of the French efforts.

As for Cochelet's mention of the Austrian schemes in Syria, they undoubtedly existed. However, it seems that the French consul general and his colleagues somewhat exaggerated their importance. The Austrian correspondence offers very few examples of anti-French activity, although the Austrian consular network was relatively large. Besides Steindl's mission that attained everything the Austrian cabinet had originally wished,Footnote ⁵⁵ there was only the intervention of the commander of the Austrian squadron operating on the Syrian coast, Rear-Admiral Baron Francesco Bandiera, on behalf of Melkite Bishop Agapios, who had been seized by mountain tribespeople and taken to the camp of allied British, Austrian, and Ottoman forces.

Agapios faced the accusation that several months previously, he had cleverly extradited several emirs and sheikhs into the hands of Mohammed Ali's ally, Emir Beshir II, causing their exile to Sennar. Further, he was said to be extremely devoted to Ibrahim Pasha and to have forbidden the people in his parish, under threat of excommunication, to join the uprising against Egyptian rule. The commander of the Ottoman forces in Syria (seraskier), Mehmed Izzet Pasha, was ordered to take Agapios and two other captured Melkite priests on board the Turkish warship. As soon as Bandiera learned this, he immediately asked Izzet to surrender the three men and to allow their internment on an Austrian vessel while they awaited trial. The seraskier immediately satisfied this request, and this undoubtedly contributed to Austrian prestige in Syria. Although Agapios was regarded as Ibrahim Pasha's spy and was unpopular among the majority of the Christians, at the same time he was a member of the Catholic clergy and considered by the devout members of this religion to be untouchable. The actions of the Austrian rear-commander contributed to the belief, already widespread among the Lebanese, that in this campaign, the Habsburg Empire sought specifically to protect the Catholic Church and faith.Footnote ⁵⁶

In reference to Austrian activities, the sending of several thousand muskets and twelve doctors to Syria must be briefly discussed. Both measures are usually explained as assistance for the Christians, which was true at least for the muskets.Footnote ⁵⁷ The British government had already asked Austria to grant muskets to the mountain tribespeople at the end of July 1840. However, Metternich did not satisfy this demand until a month later; and the weapons left Trieste only at the beginning of November.Footnote ⁵⁸ As to the twelve Austrian physicians, they arrived in Syria on 27 February 1841. They were to be employed in the Ottoman military hospitals in Jaffa, Acre, Damascus, and Sidon. Because of the problematic conduct of the Ottomans, who showed little interest in their services, however, most of them departed Syria on 18 June 1841. It is not possible to say whether they were instructed to treat only wounded soldiers or also civilians and thereby to increase Austrian influence in the country. Though the latter possibility cannot be entirely refuted, no relevant evidence for this assertion has been found.Footnote ⁵⁹

When the allies captured the strategic stronghold of Acre on 4 November, the fate of Egyptian hegemony was sealed. Ibrahim Pasha concentrated on saving the rest of his army and getting to Egypt with as much of his force as possible. Once the main phase of the war in Syria had ended, the question of the future of the Syrian Christians started to gain strength; and in several weeks it became one of the most important parts of the diplomatic agenda of the European cabinets. The situation at the Austrian chancellery at Ballhausplatz was not different. In the fall of 1840, Metternich contemplated the future of all Syrian Christians regardless of their faith. His interest, originally intended as support for the Maronites and somewhat later for all Catholics, transformed into a concern to ensure conditions that would enable security for all Christians in Syria and thus contribute to the consolidation of a renewed Ottoman administration in the reconquered region.

This approach was to give birth to the cooperation of all European powers facilitating the acceptance of their useful proposals at the sultan's court and at the same time prevent suspicions and rivalry between the same powers that could hamper the achievement of desired results. Metternich was particularly afraid of the Russian tsar, Nicholas I, who was a defender of the Orthodox Christians in the Near East and might be disturbed if Metternich referred only to the members of the Catholic Church. The prince explained this caution in his instructions to the Austrian ambassador in Rome, Rudolf Count Lützow, later on 14 February 1841:

Metternich assumed that the great powers had a right to advise the sultan in Syrian affairs because, with the exception of France, they had helped him to recover this province.Footnote ⁶¹ The Austrian chancellor himself conveyed as much to the Porte on 18 December 1840 in his instructions to Stürmer concerning the future of the Syrian Christians. In his opinion, a considerable number of firmans, hatt-i sharifs, and other regulations on behalf of the Ottoman Christians and churches already guaranteed their freedoms and untroubled existence. Unfortunately, however, most of these decrees were not being properly executed. Therefore, it was not necessary to create new laws or to rebuild the administrative system of the Syrian pashalics, but rather to help the Porte to enforce existing regulations. At the moment when the Porte regained Syria, in places where the Christians formed a considerable proportion of the inhabitants, the most reasonable policy compatible with the sultan's interests was to apply the stipulations of the hatt-i sharif of Gülhane in Syria and to establish an administration capable of granting the security of civil and religious rights to people of all creeds.Footnote ⁶²

The Ottoman monarch's conduct in the case of the Christians was to be based on eight fundamental principles: (1) there should be freedom of religious conviction; (2) each confession could solve its own religious matters; (3) a register of Christians should exist in each district; (4) all existing churches in Syria, including Palestine, had to be confirmed; (5) the Christian Holy Places should enjoy the sultan's special protection; (6) the Ottoman monarch should protect pilgrims traveling to Palestine to visit the Holy Places; (7) every pilgrim was obliged to pay a special fee to the Ottoman treasury in exchange for a permit enabling him or her to visit the Holy Places; afterwards no other charges could be levied on the pilgrim; and (8) non-Muslim foreigners would continue to be under their consuls' jurisdiction, whereas local Christians would be under Ottoman jurisdiction, except in matters related to their faith. The sultan should assure impartial judgments in both criminal and civil cases involving Ottoman citizens regardless of their religion.Footnote ⁶³ As Metternich wrote at the beginning of February 1841, “the intolerance of Muslims is not the cause of Christian suffering in the Orient. It is found primarily in the disorder of the administrative apparatus of the Empire, the logical consequence of which is the tyranny of local authorities and in part the rivalries existing among followers of various Christian sects.”Footnote ⁶⁴

Conservative values naturally influenced these principles, in particular the respect for the state sovereignty that the monarch represented. Though other countries could advise the monarch, they had no inherent right to meddle in his affairs. For this reason, Metternich made a distinction between the foreigners living within the Ottoman Empire and professing the Christian faith, who could be protected by their native countries on the basis of relevant agreements, and the sultan's Christian subjects whose civil and political rights could not be protected by other countries because such protection would be an infraction of the sultan's sovereignty. When it came to religious affairs, however, the powers should be entitled to express their opinions, and this right had to be shared by all of them and not constitute a privilege of one of them. Every church in the East could choose the great power to which it would address grievances concerning problems of faith. With this measure Metternich hoped to forestall French or Russian dominance in the religious affairs of the region.Footnote ⁶⁵

Metternich's other suggestions also sought to weaken the French position. He proposed that while all European powers, including France, should discuss the fate of all Ottoman Christians in the following months, the Maronites' future ought to be resolved only by the signatories of the London convention because this “nation” had requested help only from the other four powers, and from Austria in particular. Both matters should be discussed in Constantinople and not in London, which had served as a centre of negotiations on the Eastern question since December 1839. The significance of this proposal lay in Metternich's ambition to control the course of events through his considerable personal influence at the sultan's court and its proximity to Vienna. Moreover, this would weaken the position of the British foreign secretary, Henry John Temple Lord Palmerston. Protracted discussion in London had also frustrated the chancellor who believed his goals could be achieved more quickly in Constantinople, while preserving the appearance of the sultan's sovereignty. At the moment when the accord was achieved, the sultan could then issue a firman in favor of the Syrian Christians.Footnote ⁶⁶

Metternich's Near Eastern policy sought to encourage peaceful development within the Ottoman Empire. If he could accomplish this end, then the “sick man on the Bosphorus” would no longer attract the other powers' attention and would not cause serious crises with their unfortunate repercussions for the rest of the Continent, as had happened in the autumn of 1840, for example, in connection with the Rhine Crisis.Footnote ⁶⁷ At the same time, Metternich did not hesitate to oppose projects that lacked his pragmatism. One of these was a French plan elaborated by the new foreign minister, François Pierre Guillaume Guizot, who transmitted his own proposal regarding the Syrian Christians to the Austrian chancellor for his examination in January of 1841. Guizot proposed that Jerusalem be declared a free city like the Cracow republic, exempt from Ottoman control and placed under the protection of the great powers. It was unclear how just Guizot thought this goal could be achieved because he outlined no practical steps in his correspondence.Footnote ⁶⁸

Vienna regarded this proposal as dangerous because it attacked the Ottoman sovereignty over Jerusalem and its environs, and the proposal was impracticable for two reasons. First, Jerusalem was a holy city not only for Christians, but for Muslims as well. The sultan could never surrender his sovereignty over this territory, especially since he was not only the secular ruler, but also the head of Islam as a caliph. Second, if Jerusalem were left to the Christians to govern themselves, the Catholics would be undoubtedly oppressed by the Orthodox Christians, who were numerically and materially superior and whose relations with the Catholic community were hostile.Footnote ⁶⁹ The Austrian chancellor considered the Orthodox believers in the Levant to be far less tolerant than the Ottomans, who were at least uninterested in the particular religious affairs of the Christians. Under the given conditions, Ottoman rule was far more advantageous for the Catholic Church.Footnote ⁷⁰

The establishment of a free city would also create a new center of tension and rivalry for the great powers, which was exactly what Metternich opposed. Guizot's comparison of free Jerusalem with the situation of Cracow could in no way appease the chancellor. Austria had experienced only problems with Cracow and in Metternich's words, “the courts upon which weigh the burden of protecting this unhappy creation have enough trouble from the existence of Cracow to ever consent to the creation of a second one.”Footnote ⁷¹ Metternich clearly and vigorously objected to the French minister about the proposal, despite the fact that Guizot tempted him with the possibility that France might return to the diplomatic concert from which it had excluded itself with its refusal to cooperate with other great powers against Mohammed Ali.Footnote ⁷² The Austrian chancellor also asked the French minister “not to be distracted by proposals that under the appearance of humanitarian or religious interests deviate from a practical direction, which is probably the only one that can assure what should be accomplished.”Footnote ⁷³ According to the report of the Austrian ambassador in Paris, Anton Count Apponyi, dated 16 February, Guizot seemed to accept Metternich's arguments.Footnote ⁷⁴ It is questionable to what extent the French minister was actually influenced by them, but he did renounce this project. The key reason for the French retreat must be seen in the fact that Guizot did not have the support of any other power and therefore no hope for the enforcement of his idea at the sultan's court where French influence was minimal given its pro-Egyptian policy.Footnote ⁷⁵

Metternich also repudiated a plan prepared by some Prussians with the consent of King Frederick William IV, a man of “politico-clerical Weltanschauung,”Footnote ⁷⁶ who like Guizot, had decided to take advantage of the situation in favor of the Christian inhabitants in Syria against the alleged “fanaticism of the Mussulmans.”Footnote ⁷⁷ The Prussian plan was sent to Vienna on 24 February 1841 and was composed of six topics leading to the placement of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nazareth under the protectorate of the five powers. The religious communities in those towns would be entrusted to three residents who would supervise the affairs of Christians, Europeans, and the sultan's subjects. Austria and France would nominate the resident for the Catholics; Russia, the resident for the Orthodox Christians; and Great Britain and Prussia together, the third resident for the Protestants. Each of these powers would provide its own resident with 60 soldiers for his security. Some chosen places would be fortified. The property of the Holy Places would become the common property of the great powers.Footnote ⁷⁸

Metternich did not express his objections openly to this plan because he did not want to harm cordial Austro-Prussian relations. Instead, he decided to employ Palmerston for this purpose. During a discussion with the British ambassador in Vienna, Lord Beauvale, on 2 March 1841 and by voluminous instructions sent to London five days later, Metternich tried to convince the British foreign secretary of the ineptitude of the Prussian proposal for the solution of the Syrian Christians' future. He himself was not prepared to answer Frederick William IV until after Palmerston and the tsar had replied.Footnote ⁷⁹

Metternich's reasoning against this real plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem was similar to the objections he had addressed to the French government. Vienna regarded the Prussian idea as impracticable as the French one. The institution of three residents would lead to the factual autonomy of the city and its surroundings, weakening Ottoman supremacy over Jerusalem. As he had in February, Metternich expressed apprehension at the proposed removal of the Ottoman government because of the mutual resentment between the Christian creeds and the importance of Jerusalem for the Muslims:

The destruction of the Ottoman presence in Jerusalem would arouse the animosity of the Muslims as would the presence of European forces that the various Christian confessions could use as instruments for solving mutual disputes.Footnote ⁸¹ In short, as Metternich told Beauvale, the realization of the Prussian plan would “throw that country into inextricable confusion.”Footnote ⁸²

According to the Austrian statesman, there was one important difference between the French and Prussian projects that resulted from the different confessional interests of their authors. What he disliked in the latter was an excessive promotion of Protestant interests, not because of his own Catholic faith, but owing to the fact that the number of Protestants living in Palestine was small, and their church owned almost no estates there, a reallocation of the property of other churches in the region would require donating their property to the Protestants by other confessions who were not willing to share it.Footnote ⁸³ In his instructions to Esterházy dated 7 May 1841, Metternich expressed his opinion:

Metternich hoped that Palmerston would also view the Prussian plan as “stillborn.”Footnote ⁸⁵ The British foreign secretary completely shared the Austrian chancellor's attitude towards the sultan's sovereignty and the solution of the Syrian Christians' future and agreed with Metternich's arguments. The British response to the Prussian project was therefore negative; and because no support came from Petersburg as well, the plan was taken off the table.Footnote ⁸⁶

In part, the two above-mentioned projects reflect the fact that this period saw abundant discussion of various plans that might improve the Christians' situation in Syria and particularly in Palestine. At the end of 1840 and the beginning of 1841, several newspapers and pamphlets in Europe produced many such plans. Their authors were individuals, as well as various associations, whose increased concerns for the future of Syria resulted from the fact that this region had changed its virtual owner with the aid of the great powers. Various fantastic projects like the foundation of a Jewish kingdom or a Christian republic in Palestine, or making from this part of the world a destination for the surplus of people from some European states were in Metternich's view as impractical and harmful as the plans of the French foreign minister and Prussian king because they were motivated by passion and they ignored the real situation prevailing in the Levant.Footnote ⁸⁷ A notable example was the idea of a former physician in Napoleon's army, Barrachin, who wanted to emancipate the Christians living in the Ottoman Empire and liberate the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. His article was printed with a picture of a liberal Frenchman leading a Muslim, Greek, Armenian, and Jew under the flag of a unified religion.Footnote ⁸⁸

Metternich naturally opposed Barrachin's appeal for two familiar reasons. First, the emancipation of the Ottoman Christians would inevitably lead to the weakening of the fragile structure of the empire and the predominance of the Orthodox believers:

Second, in the words of the Prussian envoy in Constantinople, Hans Karl Baron von Königsmarck, the projects propounded in the French press often concealed specific political interests under “the venerable mask of religion and philanthropy.”Footnote ⁹⁰ This hypocrisy was particularly dangerous, as Metternich stated in July 1841:

The prince did not confine himself only to the critique of the others' projects, but also prepared his own plan for the solution of the Syrian question. He discussed it briefly with the French ambassador in Vienna, Louis Count Sainte-Aulaire, at the end of January 1841, and circulated it at the beginning of the following month.Footnote ⁹² In its elaboration, he was particularly motivated by his often proclaimed opinion that the hitherto maltreatment of the Christians did not result from the sultan's and his dignitaries' intolerance, but from the violation of rights accorded to the Christian inhabitants and from the local pashas' arbitrary behavior. As he wrote to Stürmer on 7 February 1841, “it is not necessary to do anything radically new; what must be done is to maintain the privileges and regulate again what had already existed and had lapsed in the course of the centuries.”Footnote ⁹³

On this account, he advocated the appointment of an extraordinary Ottoman emissary in Jerusalem who would occupy himself with the situation of the Christians, the local residents as well as Europeans, with individuals as well as with the churches in the city and in Bethlehem, and protect them from the abuses of Syrian notables. Such an emissary would answer only to the sultan and be completely independent of the local pashas. The confessions would be entitled to send their deputies to him to deal with their problems and simultaneously to appeal to the representatives of the great powers in Constantinople in purely religious affairs. This measure would assure the security of the Christians without affecting the sultan's reign over Jerusalem. According to Metternich, it was a simple but satisfactory solution and above all, in contrast to the ambitious and chimerical projects, easily feasible because, among other reasons, it rested on existing legal rules.Footnote ⁹⁴ In late March 1841, the prince wrote to Stürmer:

Although the plan was not at variance with the Porte's fundamental attitudes as Metternich presupposed them, and although the Austrian chancellor's influence at the Ottoman court was considerable,Footnote ⁹⁶ he also sought the support of the other great powers for the expected negotiations in Constantinople. Despite the proclaimed motto that he did “not aspire to create new political contentions but to alleviate them,”Footnote ⁹⁷ the chancellor was only half successful. The first power he addressed was France; its support would be valuable to him for two reasons. First, Austro-French cooperation would strengthen the Catholics' position in the Levant. He lured Guizot with assurances that both powers ought to defend the Catholic faith together in terms of their “special and intimate concert.”Footnote ⁹⁸ Second, joint action with France would eliminate the danger of mutual rivalry, which was a matter of crucial significance for Metternich.

In February, Metternich tried to persuade Guizot that the Austrian proposal was practical and should be preferred:

Discussion between the two countries did not survive the end of February. Although the Austrian chancellor boasted that Guizot had assented to his arguments and declared his willingness to satisfy Metternich's wish for closer cooperation between Austria and France in the Syrian question, his claim was not demonstrated in practice. Anyone in Vienna could hardly suppose that after the Austrian intervention with the Maronites and its refusal of the French project, the Austrian church policy would achieve the Parisian cabinet's support. Guizot could not and did not want to surrender French dominance in this region that had lasted three hundred years and was now seriously threatened by Metternich's diplomacy. Moreover, although himself a protestant, Guizot held both Catholic circles and the nationalist public in France in high regard. The former advocated intervention for religious reasons; the latter, for reasons of national glory. The French king, Louis Philippe, also took a personal interest in the matter and was evidently aggrieved by the Austrian attitude toward the French proposal.Footnote ¹⁰⁰

Frederick William IV's lack of cooperation can also be most probably ascribed to the disillusionment that failure of the Prussian project caused. Although Metternich had avoided its open refusal, as he had in the French case, nobody in Berlin had any illusions about the attitude of the cabinet in Vienna. Königsmarck's reports from January and the first half of February 1841 show that he assisted Stürmer in the Syrian affair, but this cooperation never happened again. The explanation for this fact is simple: Königsmarck was not instructed to proceed with his Austrian colleague in this affair any more.Footnote ¹⁰¹

The third influential power that refused to support Austria was the Holy See. Already in the autumn of 1840, Metternich had tried to obtain the pope's recognition for his policy toward the Maronites and Catholics in Syria.Footnote ¹⁰² To achieve this objective, Metternich had roundly criticized France and its Egyptian protégé. He had accused the government in Paris of offering protection to the Christians only to promote its political goals and claimed that it had no real interest in the fate of the Catholics because otherwise Paris would have had no reason to try to usurp all the rights for their protection. The Habsburg Empire, on the other hand, sincerely wanted to protect the rights of Syrian Catholics and did not claim an exclusive protection after the fashion of France: “As to the claim of protecting the religious interests of the Catholics in Syria, contrary to wanting to deprive France of it, we will always recognize its [right], not as an exclusive privilege but as a general right belonging to all Catholic Powers… We will not create a protectorate, we will intercede for the Sultan's Catholic subjects with the sovereign.”Footnote ¹⁰³ He went even further in his attack against Mohammed Ali:

In fact, Metternich did not believe his own words about Mohammed Ali's intolerance. It is evident from other documents that he was well aware of Mohammed Ali's contribution to the security of the Europeans, as well as of the local Christians.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ Right at that moment, however, Metternich had not hesitated to exaggerate to convince the representatives of the Papal State that the Ottoman government would not actually be any less tolerant than the Egyptian regime:

To all appearances, Metternich's effort was doomed to failure also in Rome. Lützow and his subordinate, Austrian Chargé d'Affaires Ohms, were convinced of the prevailing pro-French tendency of most of the Catholic clergy in the Eternal City that was intensified by fear of the war preparations in France and the threat of an eventual French campaign in the Apennines in the autumn of 1840. Cardinal Secretary Lambruschini expressed recognition of the Austrian endeavor to help the Syrian Catholics, but that was all that Metternich obtained from the pope. Reports from the Ottoman Empire also imply that the pro-French party really did dominate in Rome.Footnote ¹⁰⁷

The absence of support from Rome, Berlin, and Paris proved to be unimportant because of the attitudes of Russia and Great Britain. Despite the fact that Russia longed to strengthen its own interest not only among the Orthodox, but also among the other Syrian Christians,Footnote ¹⁰⁸ and despite the fact that the Russian vice-Chancellor Karl Robert Count Nesselrode's first reaction to Metternich's activities in the affair was negative, the tsar decided after some hesitation to support the Austrian plan and he wrote expressing his support to the sultan on 1 May 1841.Footnote ¹⁰⁹ Metternich also won the backing of London, where Palmerston completely shared the chancellor's views on the Syrian question.Footnote ¹¹⁰ This was not the case for Ponsonby, who both mistrusted Metternich's aims and considered him to be ignorant on this subject. Ponsonby refused to participate in the affair until he received explicit instructions to do so from London.Footnote ¹¹¹

Ponsonby was wrong about Metternich's alleged ignorance. Thanks both to his extraordinary diligence and to documents obtained by the chancellery legally as well as illegally, the prince was probably the best-informed statesman of his time. According to the testimony of the Bavarian envoy in Vienna, Maximilian Emanuel von Lerchenfeld-Aham, Metternich came to his conclusions after a careful study of relevant documents, including the former decrees of the Ottoman Sultans.Footnote ¹¹² Nevertheless, Stürmer was left until May without British or Russian support; and, despite his original optimism, Metternich was not able to persuade the Porte of the utility of the Austrian plan presented by the internuncio in Constantinople on 18 February 1841. Mustapha Reshid Pasha expressed his accord with the position of the cabinet in Vienna but expected some obstructions in the Divan.Footnote ¹¹³ In the second half of March, Reshid declared his apprehension that the Porte had no suitable candidate for the function of an emissary in Jerusalem acceptable to all Christian factions: “We will never find a man whose disinterest and impartiality will be of a nature that could satisfy all parties.”Footnote ¹¹⁴ Though it is impossible to explain the basis for the Ottomans' protractions from the documents, the fact remains that Ponsonby's noncooperation was the crucial reason why the sultan's reserve was not overcome until the end of May. In mid April, Stürmer could only complain that much more could have been done in the matter of the Syrian Christians if the British ambassador had wanted it.Footnote ¹¹⁵

The internuncio's dismay corresponded to the seriousness of the situation. In the spring of 1841, the situation in Syria deteriorated considerably in consequence of the harsh treatment of the new Ottoman administration. Although the Porte ordered its forces not to maltreat the inhabitants regardless of their creed, the news of the offenses committed by the sultan's soldiers against the Syrians had already been reported in the autumn of 1840.Footnote ¹¹⁶ Not intolerance but laziness and greed seem to have been their cause. The Ottoman soldiers demanded heavy labor from the mountain tribespeople in Lebanon similar to the work their own officers ordered them to carry out even though they knew that forced labor was explicitly forbidden. The inhabitants suffered financial losses not only because of the services demanded by the Ottomans, but also because of the bribes that Ottoman troops often required from the peasants coming to Beirut. Soldiers stopped the peasants at the gates and refused to let them continue to the market without paying a “relevant tax.” Moreover, in the same city the soldiers were billeted only in Christian houses; no Muslim residence was requisitioned for that purpose, and this could not have remained unnoticed.Footnote ¹¹⁷

The Ottomans' vital mistake proved to be the delivery of this territory into the hands of the commander of the Ottoman forces in Syria, Izzet Mehmed Pasha,Footnote ¹¹⁸ who was incompetent and cruel to the local inhabitants and who refused to keep the promises made by Wood in the name of the sultan. British commodore Sir Charles Napier called Izzet “the worst man in the world.”Footnote ¹¹⁹ No wonder that Izzet was unpopular with the Europeans and hated by the Syrians; his conduct hardly contributed to the sultan's popularity.Footnote ¹²⁰ By the end of November 1840, Ponsonby and Stürmer had achieved his recall and the transfer of the command over the Ottoman troops to Selim Pasha, whose behavior was judged much more positively.Footnote ¹²¹

Regardless of this change, no considerable improvement took place. To the contrary, the situation in Syria continued to deteriorate in the new year. The sultan's soldiers continually maltreated the people, and Syria was “ravaged from all sides.”Footnote ¹²² The main offenders were, in particular, the Albanian troops who were well known in the Near East in this period for their disobedience. They regarded the locals as enemies and treated them accordingly. Some Syrians even felt compelled to take up arms to defend their villages from the Ottoman Albanians. After the intervention of British and Austrian agents, the Albanians were gradually removed from Syria.Footnote ¹²³

Nevertheless, neither this measure nor the sultan's order to protect the Christians and to punish the offenders nor the issue of a firman establishing in Syria an administrative system conforming to the Hatt-i Sharif of Gülhane led to the desired easing of tensionsFootnote ¹²⁴ for two main reasons. First, the irregular behavior of some Ottoman troops and officials did not change. The most obvious example of such misconduct was the governor of Damascus, Hadji Nejib Pasha, who openly demonstrated his disdain for the Christians. He forbade them to enter the city on horseback or to wear brightly colored clothes. He ordered them to dress in black according to prescriptions that predated the rule of Mohammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha, who had abolished these degrading regulations that were now unacceptable to the local Christians.Footnote ¹²⁵ Second, the Ottoman administration needed money, and that is why the sultan's promise from the previous year concerning the abolition of the tax burden borne by the Syrians of all professions was not kept. After the losses suffered during the war and the outbreak of a plague in the first months of 1841, the violation of this promise was particularly painful.Footnote ¹²⁶

Not surprisingly, in the spring of 1841, general discontent was widespread throughout Syria. Disillusionment with the Ottoman government was so great that, in the words of the Austrian consul in Damascus, Caspar Merlato, if Ibrahim Pasha “appeared in this state of affairs with a few men on the frontier, he would certainly become the master of the province as rapidly as he was expelled.”Footnote ¹²⁷ Steindl, who was sent again to Syria shortly after his return from the first mission to observe the internal situation, wrote to Vienna of the serious threat of insurrection against the Ottomans.Footnote ¹²⁸ Even the most determined opponents of Mohammed Ali and his son were now muttering that Egyptian rule had been better.Footnote ¹²⁹ When one of the Ottoman officials warned the discontented inhabitants that he would put them under Ibrahim Pasha, they answered with the threat: “More likely we would recall Ibrahim to this country if the government of the Porte does not revise its demands.”Footnote ¹³⁰ Particularly serious was the situation in Lebanon where the Ottomans controlled only the coast. The interior fell increasingly into a state of anarchy caused by worsening relations between the Maronites and Druze. Steindl was convinced that since the ouster of the old prince of Lebanon, Emir Bashir II, and his replacement by his nephew Bashir Qasim III, a weak and, among the people, unpopular governor, a central authority was missing.Footnote ¹³¹

This “sad news from Syria”Footnote ¹³² caused considerable apprehension in Vienna. Metternich considered Ibrahim Pasha's regime to have been tyrannical, but at least stable. In his opinion, the Ottoman administration was in no way stable and inclined to be more and more tyrannical. It affected the interests of the Porte, as well as the great powers, who had helped the sultan to regain this region and were thus responsible for its future. The only court benefiting from the worsening situation in Syria was France, which really was not the goal for which the allies had sacrificed their soldiers.Footnote ¹³³ The chancellor's warning was well founded because the French did not hesitate to take advantage of the Ottomans' difficulties to recover their former influence. They employed priests to agitate among Catholics on behalf of France, declaring that only this great power was entitled to protect the Christian religion, its clergy, and convents.Footnote ¹³⁴ The French also used another effective weapon: charity. Demeloize distributed 10,000 francs among the Maronites in the spring of 1841 as compensation for the damages suffered in the war. The donations continued during the summer and autumn.Footnote ¹³⁵ The French government's goal was nothing other than exclusive protection of the Syrian Catholics, which was confirmed by Demeloize's and Ratti-Menton's efforts to prevent the Imperial Consuls from granting help or protection to the Christians and Pontois' specific recommendation to Stürmer that the Austrians not meddle in the Maronites' affairs but relinquish them to the French agents.Footnote ¹³⁶

The Habsburg Empire was not unresponsive to the French activities and tried to neutralize them by sending financial support to Syria. On 3 July 1841, the Austrian brig Montecuccoli carried to Beirut 80 000 florins (1 million piasters) for the Maronites; part had been donated by the emperor and part had been collected in Viennese churches. Money was given directly to Yûsuf, who was asked to distribute it for the reconstruction of churches and convents damaged during the fight in 1840. For the sake of preserving friendly relations, the Austrians also gave some presents to the Maronite patriarch and clergy and a sword for Selim Pasha decorated with diamonds and with a value at 80 000 piasters.Footnote ¹³⁷ Nevertheless, it does not seem that Austrian activities in Syria equaled the energy of the French agents. As Caesar Farah pointed out, “Austrian consular officials reacted as good Catholics whenever a situation merited it, but made no real effort to elbow past their French colleagues in this delicate area.”Footnote ¹³⁸ The proof can also be found in Steindl's lament concerning his country's limited involvement: “As to our august court, it enjoys the greatest sympathies of all Catholic nations in Syria. It would suffice to want and we would obtain, particularly in Lebanon, more influence than all other governments.”Footnote ¹³⁹

Though Metternich was deliberating at the same moment about possibly instructing the Austrians to intensify their effort,Footnote ¹⁴⁰ in the end whatever he did was not sufficient because the emperor's agents still did not know the exact intentions of the cabinet in Vienna and were poorly instructed in the affair of the Syrian Catholics. On 2 June 1841, Stürmer asked the chancellor to be advised of the imperial interests in the Syrian question to be able to “precisely outline to our Consuls the boundaries within which they should proceed.”Footnote ¹⁴¹ However, no specific instruction to this problem ever came from Vienna and though a clear explanation of this passivity is missing, it is clear that Metternich did not want to go too far and start a serious quarrel with France on account of Syrian Christians, which would cause additional problems to the Ottoman administration. Owing to the difficulties in Syria, the need to assure the Christians' safety administratively became increasingly urgent. Metternich began to occupy himself with the future character of the Ottoman rule in this region only at the beginning of December 1840, but he never paid much attention in his correspondence to this topic, at least in comparison with the purely religious problems, though he certainly understood that the welfare of the Syrian inhabitants depended on the efficiency of the state apparatus.Footnote ¹⁴²

The reason for the limited concern about the latter consisted partly in Metternich's exhaustion with the protracted Near Eastern crisis and partly from his belief that no radical changes had to be made in Syria to attain desired goals. In his opinion, the province ought to return to the situation before the Egyptian invasion and be again divided into four pashalics in which governors able to enforce the Ottoman laws would be appointed. As for Lebanon, Metternich did not adopt any firm attitude toward Yûsuf's request addressed to Constantinople and Vienna that the prince of Lebanon be chosen from among the Maronite leaders because Metternich did not know whether the grounds on which this demand was founded were valid or not. Nevertheless, he found it better that the authority held by a single prince was divided among a greater number of leaders, giving to each of the tribes a chief chosen from itself. Various tribes were thus governed exclusively by their own chiefs paying a very small tribute to the sultan but being responsible for maintaining strict policy within their territories. However, Metternich only submitted this idea “as one which may be worth examination in conjunction with the ministers of the Porte, not as one on which his mind is made up.”Footnote ¹⁴³

As noted above, Metternich's views of the future administration of Syria, as well as the security of Christians living there, were motivated by the respect for the sultan's sovereignty and simultaneously by the desire to weaken the French influence. For these reasons, Metternich proposed to exclude Acre from the local administration and place it into the hands of a governor installed by the sultan and subordinate only to him. Its garrison was to be composed of soldiers sent from Constantinople.Footnote ¹⁴⁴ The chancellor also opposed the idea that some cities on the Lebanese coast, such as Beirut and Latakia, should be governed directly by Emir Beshir III because it would considerably strengthen the influence of the Maronites over this area. According to Metternich, there was no certainty that the Austrian prestige among them would prevail forever and if France were to recover its former interest with this Catholic nation, France would strengthen its influence in the seaports and contribute to its political and economic supremacy. Metternich discussed his designs for Acre and the Lebanese seaports with Palmerston, whose opinions were affirmative.Footnote ¹⁴⁵

The worsening situation in Syria, the French activities, and Ottomans' misconduct against the Christian population in Bulgaria in the spring of 1841 moved Russia and Great Britain to greater activity in the Syrian question and contributed to the greater support on the part of Ponsonby and the Russian chargé d'affaires in Constantinople, Vladimir Titov, for Stürmer's negotation with the Porte.Footnote ¹⁴⁶ On 31 May 1841, the internuncio visited the sultan and began a new series of discussions with new Ottoman Foreign Minister Rifaat Pasha on Syrian affairs.Footnote ¹⁴⁷ No matter how much Pontois opposed their activities,Footnote ¹⁴⁸ the joint effort of three diplomats led to a quick solution that complied with the Austrian chancellor's wishes. On 20 June 1841, Abdülmecid I issued a firman in favor of the Christians in Syria. The Ottoman ferik (a division general), Tahir Pasha, a former chair of the Military Council, was appointed governor of Jerusalem and Gaza subordinate only to the sultan and given great power to protect the safety of the Christian minorities. The existing rights of non-Muslims were confirmed and new privileges were granted in several letters addressed to Tahir Pasha and other Syrian notables. Moreover, the sultan made good on promises made in the previous year to the benefit of the Syrian population, such as the reduction of taxes or granting money to the local chiefs assisting in the fight against the Egyptians.Footnote ¹⁴⁹

Austrian diplomacy hence achieved a success in which Stürmer had “not even dared to hope.”Footnote ¹⁵⁰ Metternich was completely satisfied with the result of his effort to secure a better future for the Syrian Christians.Footnote ¹⁵¹ In July 1841, he evaluated the benefit of the European intervention in his instructions to Lützow: “We are convinced that the results of our action in the Divan are the only attainable and the only really practical and sufficient ones for the fulfillment of all the till now neglected desires of the [Christian] religion, or for at least securing a tolerable existence for the Christians in Syria, which is definitely much better than their existing one.”Footnote ¹⁵²

This statement was only half true. From a short-term view, Austrian diplomacy had undoubtedly been successful. The chancellor had achieved all of his goals relating to the future of the Syrian Christians, and he had been the driving engine of the negotiations that had achieved triumph in June 1841.Footnote ¹⁵³ As to the administrative system, here the Porte also accepted many of Metternich's views because they best served the sultan's own objectives in Syria;Footnote ¹⁵⁴ the future of Acre and the Lebanese coast was settled according to Metternich's advice.Footnote ¹⁵⁵ Above all, in cooperation with Great Britain, Metternich diminished French dominance over the Syrian Christians. Although Austria's influence over Syria did not approach British influence in the summer of 1841, the Habsburg Empire was largely popular among the Catholic population.Footnote ¹⁵⁶

From a long-term view, however, Metternich's victory was considerably less spectacular. The arrangements undertaken by the Porte in June under pressure from three of the great powers did not lead to any significant improvement of the internal situation in Syria because the problems of this province were too complicated and the discontent of its inhabitants too widespread to be removed by the Porte's several firmans.Footnote ¹⁵⁷ The animosity between the Maronites and the Druze escalated, and civil war broke out in Lebanon in the autumn of 1841.Footnote ¹⁵⁸ The privileges recognized or newly bestowed on the Christians, such as their factual equalization with the Muslim majority in terms of the hatt-i sharif of Gülhane, contributed to an increased animosity on the part of local Muslims who saw in this an act of blasphemy.Footnote ¹⁵⁹ Even the changes in the system of taxation affecting all inhabitants were generally regarded as concessions to the Christians.Footnote ¹⁶⁰ Consequently, mutual relations in Syria deteriorated, thanks in part to the intervention of European countries in aid of the Christian churches. This was Metternich's biggest failure. His proposals for religious and administrative affairs had sought to reconcile the internal actors in Syria and to remove any causes for great-power interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Ultimately, he had hoped to consolidate the sultan's power. Thanks to the persistence of conflict in Syria, however, the situation produced a different outcome, and Lebanon became a center of tension that continued to attract the attention of the other European powers.Footnote ¹⁶¹

Moreover, the chancellor's apprehension that France would take advantage of the unsettled situation in Syria finally proved to be the case, and the government in Paris actually restored its temporarily lost influence, particularly among the Maronites. France still jealously guarded its privileged position and was not willing to share it with anybody;Footnote ¹⁶² Metternich's offer of July 1841 for Austrian-French cooperation remained unanswered.Footnote ¹⁶³ Although Metternich had only sought to weaken the French protectorate and not to destroy it, and although the Habsburg monarchy enjoyed greater respect in this region after 1841,Footnote ¹⁶⁴ the French comeback and its disinclination to cooperate must also be regarded as a defeat for Metternich.

Should Metternich also be blamed for social upheaval in Syria and Lebanon after 1841? In fact, he could be blamed simply because he belonged among those who failed to find a long-term solution to the Syrian question. On closer investigation, however, Metternich's views and actions in the complicated affair did not lack correctness and goodwill, and they rested on a realistic assessment of the situation. To answer the question, some other queries must be raised.

Was Metternich entirely ignorant as Ponsonby claimed regarding the Syrian question? He seemed not to be and definitely nobody else offered a better solution at that time. Metternich has been criticized by historians for his reluctance to allow changes in the political and social status quo. In terms of Europe, this criticism is well-founded. Given the complexities of confessional issues in the East, however, his circumspection is understandable. His actions resulted not merely from his conservatism, but also from a realistic appraisal of the situation. French and Prussian plans for Jerusalem, for example, would have had devastating impact on the relations among various religions in this city, as well as in other parts of the Ottoman Empire. The annexation of Holy Places by European countries would have offended Muslims, weakened the sultan's power, and caused a new problem for European diplomacy because no one could presume that the Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant powers would have been able to achieve harmony. The well-known French-Russian dispute before the Crimean War is clear proof of this.

Was Metternich too optimistic when he wagered on the improvement of the Ottoman administration in Syria? In this case, he had no other choice. If the great powers finally declared that they wanted to preserve the sultan's sovereignty over Syria, there was no other prospect for the Syrian Christians than to live within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. The only way to improve their living conditions was to convince the Porte to maintain a functioning administrative apparatus. Past experience had already proved that the Ottomans were capable of assuring Christians an undisturbed and prosperous life: Ten years earlier, with Austrian and French assistance, the life of Catholic Armenians in the Ottoman Empire had been considerably improved by several decrees issued by the Porte.Footnote ¹⁶⁵ Metternich also assured this for the Maronites, at least in religious matters. It was not his fault that the Ottomans failed entirely in their takeover of Syria and that the Maronites could not come to an agreement with the Druze over the distribution of political power in Mount Lebanon.

Did Metternich's involvement in the Syrian question in 1840 and 1841 contribute to an increased interest of the other European powers in the religious and political affairs of this region in the following decades? The answer is positive, but such an outcome would certainly also have occurred without any Austrian measures taken on behalf of the Maronites (and later all Christians) in the same years. Since the autumn of 1840, a Russian-French rivalry over religious affairs was already in progress; and the British also intervened in the internal situation of Syria during the same year.Footnote ¹⁶⁶ What must be assessed positively in Metternich's case is the fact that the aim of his policy was to create conditions that would make the interference of European powers into the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire unnecessary. Although he tried to weaken the French influence over the Maronites at the beginning, particularly because he wanted to use them in the fight against the French protégé Mohammed Ali, Metternich never seriously thought of preventing France from protecting the Catholics and did not allow himself to carry the banner of religion, either before June 1841 nor in the second half of that year when, in the name of Catholicism, the pope tried to drag him into a conflict with Prussia and Russia.Footnote ¹⁶⁷ In short, Metternich did not want to transform the Eastern Mediterranean into a battlefield of religious-political interests; in many ways, he demonstrated greater realism and restraint than one could have expected.