On 2 November 2010, the voters of Oklahoma passed the so-called “Save Our State Amendment.” This amendment to Oklahoma's constitution prohibited Oklahoma courts from “look[ing] to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures. Specifically,” it asserted, “the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law.”Footnote 1 This legislative moment in middle America passed quickly. Commentators both inside and outside the United States responded to the amendment with bewildermentFootnote 2—and in 2012, a federal appeals court ruled the amendment unconstitutional. “Save Our State” died before it could have any far-reaching effect.
By positing “international law” and something called “Sharia Law” as distinct threats to the state, however, Oklahoma voters and legislators were tapping into an anxiety about jurisdiction and sovereignty that is not unique to popular American electoral rhetoric. Their motivation in passing the legislation may have been closer to “xenophobic hysteria”Footnote 3 than many would like to admit. Their definition of “Sharia Law”—or, for that matter, “international law”—may have bordered on the absurd.Footnote 4 But their insistence that certain jurisdictional theories and practices challenge the borders and territories of certain types of states was not unfounded. Oklahoma legislators recognized that territorial states do disintegrate, and have disintegrated, in the face of legal systems that do not correspond to discrete territorial units. They recognized, in other words, what a number of scholars of comparative law, jurisdiction, and sovereignty have been increasingly emphasizing in their work: theories of jurisdiction and sovereignty need not start and end with territory.
Unlike the voters of Oklahoma, most scholars of comparative law have not tried to rescue territory from these jurisdictional challenges. Rather, many have begun to dismiss territory altogether as a useful starting point for legal analysis. Many have even posited the nonterritorial legal system—religious law or natural law, for instance—as a model or norm. Scholars of comparative law are suggesting with increasing frequency, in other words, that the territorially delimited sovereign state (often designated, in shorthand, the “Westphalian state”Footnote 5) is irrelevant to studies of law and jurisdiction. More provocatively, these scholars are also asserting that this Westphalian model of sovereignty, and the territorial jurisdiction that goes with it, were never relevant to begin with. Historically, they argue, there has never been such a thing as territorial sovereignty or jurisdiction. And politically, therefore, Westphalian sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction are ineffective reference points in studies of contemporary law and politics.Footnote 6
Rarely do we see questions in this emergent scholarship, for example, about how some variation on religious law might or might not operate within the borders of some modern nation-state. No one questions jurists’ capacity to develop territorially situated interpretations of, say, Islamic law. But territorial interpretations of this potentially deterritorialized law are of decreasing interest to scholars concerned, instead, with theorizing borderless jurisdiction. In a similar vein, scholars have started to bracket questions about why early modern imperial jurists were unable to bring their jurisdictional theories into conformity with Westphalian models of national sovereignty. Instead, the absent or irrelevant border, the mutable legal environment, or the nonterritorial legal system that characterized early modern imperial states has become the measure of other, ostensibly more modern, legal structures. The question posed in this scholarship is not why various imperial—say, Ottoman—theories of jurisdiction and sovereignty could not conform to modern territorial norms but rather how the fantasy of border and sovereign territory could have been maintained for so long by jurists and legal scholars both inside and outside of the (vanishing) boundaries of the Ottoman state.
As much as the four studies of law and sovereignty that appear in this review are separated by chronological, geographical, and methodological reach, they are united in two key ways. First, they each challenge the methodological usefulness (and historical existence) of territorial sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction. And second, they all propose alternatives—usually material or environmental—to territorial theories of jurisdiction. Each begins by confronting the literature that has privileged territory or borders as starting points of legal analysis. And each ends with a theory of jurisdiction that emphasizes the material, nonspatial qualities of law and sovereignty. The question that animates all four is what it might mean for the study of law and politics if jurisdiction is redefined as an environmental or ecological, rather than a spatial or territorial, phenomenon.
STATE OF SOVEREIGNTY
Luise White and Douglas Howland's State of Sovereignty is a collection of thirteen essays that highlight the “uncertainty of sovereign status” (p. 16) in a variety of historical, political, and geographical contexts. The case studies range from the mid-19th century to the present and include an array of methodological perspectives. The volume tends to emphasize East Asia and Africa, but it is rounded out by excellent contributions describing the problems of sovereignty in, for instance, the Balkans and Panama. The primary purpose of the collection is to reintroduce sovereignty and law to conversations about the state—conversations, the editors argue, that have been excessively concerned with nationalism and national identity in recent years (pp. 3, 11).
The editors’ purpose in returning law to discussions of the state is not to rehearse mid-20th-century debates about how to achieve territorial sovereignty—or about why certain states “fail” to do so (p. 14). Nor is it to reify the state within intellectual inquiry. Once again, the move that characterizes the majority of the contributions to this volume is questioning the very relevance of bounded territory in the operations of sovereignty and jurisdiction. Sovereignty, the editors assert, is a set of processes. It “does not accrue naturally to a state” (p. 1), and it has rarely manifested itself as “law applied uniformly within a territory” (p. 6).
As much as the editors and the contributors to the volume recognize the rhetorical force of Westphalian sovereignty, therefore, and as much as they accept that this rhetoric of territorial sovereignty or territorial jurisdiction underlies current international practice (pp. 4–5), their essays all challenge any easy association between territory on the one hand and sovereignty or jurisdiction on the other. Each of these essays makes clear that wherever and whenever Westphalian sovereignty goes, or has gone, into effect, it has done so by negating itself. The paradox of the term “territorial sovereignty” is thus not simply associated with a postcolonial or postnational condition. Historically, too, sovereignty was never purely territorial.
This challenge to theories of territorial sovereignty plays out in expected as well as unexpected ways. The familiar problems that extraterritoriality and colonialism have posed to systems of Westphalian sovereignty, for instance, are prominent in many of the essays. So too are less familiar problems—the criminal, rather than failed, state or the state with excessive, rather than insufficient, international recognition. Moreover, even those contributions that describe more expected dilemmas of territorial sovereignty or jurisdiction do so with unexpected results.
Douglas Howland rests his discussion of extraterritoriality in East Asia, for example, on the point that “extraterritorial privileges negated the sovereignty” of both the state that “granted them” and “the state that claimed to possess them. Actual circumstances,” he concludes, “exceeded the possibilities imagined by written treaties” (p. 50). Even as scholars of international law have held up the treaty as the document responsible for creating a positive (rather than natural) system of territorially bounded nation-states,Footnote 7 therefore, the treaty also became key to dismantling this system. Extraterritoriality treaties created a legal and political situation that could not be described in a language of treaties—they produced an international system that could operate only outside of their purview.
Other essays in the volume get at the internal contradictions that plague the Westphalian system by means of less familiar examples. Aida A. Hozic's contribution links the paradoxical international recognition of the so-called criminal state directly to the broader paradox of territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty. Beginning with the assertion that “crime is what sovereignty is made of,” she continues that states deemed “criminal” (and “not sovereign”) by the international community are, if anything, more sovereign, by practical Westphalian standards, than their noncriminal counterparts (p. 245). Their existence within the international community cannot be denied as they are increasingly monitored, delimited, condemned—and recognized. Just as extraterritoriality treaties were symptomatic of the self-negating quality of international law in a Westphalian system, in other words, the criminal state here is symptomatic of the self-negating quality of international recognition in this system.
Luise White's “What Does It Take to Be a State? Sovereignty and Sanctions in Rhodesia, 1965–1980” also addresses the problem of international recognition but takes this problem as an opportunity to sketch a nonterritorial and non-Westphalian alternative to traditional models of sovereignty. In the mid-20th century, White begins, the international community condemned the Rhodesian white minority's resistance to decolonization, refusing to grant the minority-ruled Rhodesian state sovereign status. But Rhodesia's “status as a state,” White continues, was perhaps irrelevant to “the state form as it was practiced on the ground” (pp. 162–63). If anything, international sanctions “gave the Rhodesian state a place in the world that refuted its illegitimate status” (p. 158).
After making this initial point about the inconsistencies of international recognition, White turns to her new definition of sovereignty—a definition that rests not on sovereign status, and not on sovereign shape, but, intriguingly, on the circulation of sanctioned Rhodesian commodities. Describing the efforts of legitimate states to disguise their consumption of Rhodesian chrome and copper, White asks whether “Rhodesian sovereignty [was] so concrete that it could be found in inanimate objects” (p. 160). Her implicit answer is that yes, it was—Rhodesian sovereignty at this time might be best described as a series of concrete processes or movements rather than as a legal status, territorial shape, or abstract set of institutions. White's contribution to the volume is thus to posit a theory of sovereignty that is predicated not just on illegality, such as that of Hozic, but also on the deterritorialized movement of inanimate objects. Sovereignty in her essay is emphatically sovereignty without borders. It is material and not territorial—environmental and not legal.
White's essay is not the only one to posit this materialist alternative to existing theories of sovereignty. Kevin C. Dunn's “Environmental Security, Spatial Preservation, and State Sovereignty in Central Africa,” for instance, takes the problem of the national park in Uganda as a starting point for a likewise nonterritorial and nonspatial description of sovereignty. The product of a 19th-century colonial fantasy of inert, conservable African environments, Dunn argues, Uganda's national parks have relentlessly undermined Uganda's claims to territorial sovereignty (pp. 228–30). The parks have received greater international recognition than the Ugandan state does, and the borders of the parks have always been more effectively maintained than the state's borders (p. 235).
But, as Dunn also points out, given that these colonial assumptions about the environment are flawed—that the environment is far from an inert space and anything but immobile (or conservable)—these assaults on Ugandan territorial sovereignty are perhaps not as grave as they appear to be. Rather, the “link between sovereignty and space has [already] become disrupted,” and forms of sovereignty in Uganda (and elsewhere) need “no longer rely on a stable political-territorial foundation” (p. 238). As is made clear by the changing course of rivers that once determined boundaries, or by islands “belonging to one imperial power” becoming peninsulas “connected to the other country's mainland” (p. 239), sovereignty plays out as much across mutable, material systems as it does within and among bounded, abstract territories.
Like the other contributors to the volume, then, Dunn challenges the easy model of the bounded, territorial sovereign state—as well as the easy ethical critique of this model. Yes, he argues, territorial sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction pose ethical problems. But, and perhaps more so, territorial sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction are not necessary to the operations of law and legal systems. There are viable alternatives to Westphalian jurisdictional models. These alternatives complicate the ethics of sovereignty. But, if this collection is read carefully, they also raise fascinating new questions and problems in the study of law, politics, and empire writ large.
TERRITORY IN ISLAMIC LAW AND THOUGHT
The State of Sovereignty is a general discussion of sovereignty and jurisdiction—an illustration of the exciting avenues of inquiry that comparative law scholarship is exploring. The Concept of Territory in Islamic Law and Thought, edited by Yanagihashi Hiroyuki, is one example of how these modes of inquiry are faring in the field of Islamic studies specifically. A collection of eight essays on how Muslim philosophers, jurists, and poets have described and defined territory, the volume's aim is, first of all, to set aside the distinction between dār al-Islām and dār al-ḥarb in the study of borders, space, and land in the Muslim world. The collection emphasizes premodern literature, but one essay is devoted to early 20th-century Syria, and another addresses manifestations of territorial jurisdiction in southeast Asia between the 17th and 20th centuries. The essays are equally concerned with west, central, and southeast Asian source material.
Given the collection's chronological and geographical scope, Westphalian sovereignty per se is not as prominent here as it is in other literature with similar concerns. The problem of territorial sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction, however, does lurk behind many of the contributors’ efforts to situate their arguments. On the one hand, for instance, Iik A. Mansurnoor writes in his discussion of Malay theories of jurisdiction that, although “borders or boundaries in Islamic polities . . . continued to be fairly fluid,” it is nonetheless “unfair to say that the idea of territory and boundary never developed in Islamic political thought” (p. 128). On the other hand, Haideh Ghomi asserts in her analysis of Sufi poetry and borders that a blind adherence to geopolitical divisions of territory among many contemporary scholars has prevented them from recognizing that historically, at least, discussions of space and society were not restricted to territory, borders, and boundaries alone (p. 69).
In general, the contributors appear to be more sympathetic to Ghomi's position than to that of Mansurnoor. Once again, the point of these essays is not that Muslim thinkers were unable to imagine a territorially delimited version of Islamic law or society. It is that there are alternatives in Muslim thought to geopolitical models of jurisdiction and sovereignty and that these alternatives are worth exploring. In addition to challenging the notion of a fixed boundary between dār al-Islām and dār al-ḥarb, therefore, this collection also productively complicates more general interpretations of the border's legal and political work. The essays that constitute the collection both question the relevance of Westphalian notions of territory and consider the implications of nonterritorial theories of jurisdiction and sovereignty.
Ghomi, for example, continues her theorization of the nonterritorial work of Sufi poetry with a reflection on how the boundary might be reconfigured without space. Noting, first of all, that Sufis like ʿAttar (d. 618/1221) and Shaykh Abu Saʿid Abi al-Khayr (d. 440/1049) seem not to “make any distinction between the territory of Muslims and that of non-Muslims,” or, for that matter, among “earthly physical territories” (pp. 70–71), she argues that the key division, for them, was between “the inner and outer territory, within and without the soul” (p. 70). From there, Ghomi notes that Rumi in particular used this rearticulated border as an entry point for turning the “‘homeland’ or ‘vatan’” into something both “geographical and non-geographical” (p. 76)—into something beyond space or time (p. 77). Ghomi concludes that “territory” for Rumi both “encompasses all other temporal and geographical spaces” and is “an eternal U-topos (lā-makān) or placelessness” (p. 77).
Here, then, we see less nonterritorial space than a nonspatial territory—a theory of sovereignty that leaves territory or the boundary intact but that challenges their manifestation in space. As a result, Ghomi's essay has idiosyncratic, but essential, legal and political implications. Indeed, although the writing of Sufi poets may appear to be beyond the scope of a discussion of jurisdiction, Ghomi's references not only to the vatan but also to an ongoing, if nonspatial, theory of border and territory lend it a legal character.
Brannon M. Wheeler's “From Dār al-Hijra to Dār al-Islām: The Islamic Utopia” explores the legal implications of this rearticulated territory in more detail. A multi-layered analysis of what is essentially a utopian—or placeless—model of Islamic jurisdiction, Wheeler's essay begins by contrasting territory in the “wilderness” with territory in the dār al-hijra, or the “realm of cities and law” (p. 6). Describing how the demarcation of territory in this latter realm involved the “dispersal and collection of [the Prophet's] sunna and physical remains” (p. 6), Wheeler develops a fascinating theory of nonspatial jurisdiction, which, he suggests, became possible as the physical remains of the Prophet mixed with his words and deeds. “Hair, footprints, and other artifacts of the Prophet,” for example, “are used in the foundation of buildings, such as mosques and madrasas, which are physical manifestations of the territorial distribution of Islam and of the preserved chain of transmission from the Prophet” (p. 8).
As a result, jurisdiction here is inherently material, systemic, and nonspatial. Civilization—the extension of legal jurisdiction and political sovereignty—involves not delimiting spaces with borders but rather extending the textual and physical person of the Prophet over networks and lines of transmission. Whereas Ghomi's Sufi poets defined a geographically (or geopolitically) unsituated territory with reference to the dispersed soul, Wheeler's jurists do the same with reference to the dispersed body. Both, however, work within an ecological or environmental, rather than spatial or geopolitical, theory of jurisprudence. And both essays make clear the methodological benefits of bracketing, even if momentarily, what later came to be called Westphalian theories of sovereignty.
If Wheeler's essay responds more to the problem of jurisdiction in a territory devoid of space or place, Tetz Rooke's “Writing the Boundary: Khitaṭ al-Sham by Muhammad Kurd ʿAli” responds—from the perspective of a very different historical moment—to the problem of “homelands” that are simultaneously geographical and nongeographical. Rooke starts with a seemingly simple issue—the absence of maps in Muhammad Kurd ʿAli's 1925 to 1928 Khitat al-Sham (Geographical–Historical Description of Syria) (p. 168). From there, he proposes a number of fascinating alternatives to the map as the quintessential representation of sovereign space. To the extent that sovereign boundaries exist, they “are written instead of drawn” (p. 178). Likewise, to the extent that territorial details appear in the text, they are verbal instead of visual (p. 178).
The Khitat al-Sham might thus very well be read as a modern variation on Rumi's nongeographical vatan. It is true that Kurd ʿAli wrote at a time when the rhetoric—if not actuality—of territorial jurisdiction and the sovereign border was at its most influential. He could not ignore the centrality of geography to international systems. But, at the same time, he nonetheless developed a theory of sovereignty and jurisdiction without a single reference to line drawing. Nonspatial, but material and territorial, this homeland was characterized by an environmental rather than geopolitical outlook.
Each of these examples from Yanagihashi's collection thus demonstrates, again, the scholarly possibilities of leaving aside space and territory in analyses of law and politics. The point here is not that these disparate geographical and chronological examples of nonterritorial (or nonspatial) jurisdiction are all the same—that space and time do not exist in Islamic law. Rather, it is that these case studies operate as effective alternatives to Westphalian models of sovereignty. Their very geographical and chronological distinctiveness suggests the potential reach of environmental, material, or systemic theories of jurisdiction. Taken together, the essays make clear that there is more to the study of international law and politics than the success or failure of an in any case impossible Westphalian state.
SOVEREIGNTY AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Turan Kayaoğlu's Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China is an extensive comparative study of extraterritoriality in east and west Asia. Similar to Howland, Kayaoğlu argues that colonial extraterritoriality cannot be dismissed as a minor aberration within an otherwise uniform system of territorial, sovereign states. Extraterritoriality represented a fundamental challenge to theories of territorial sovereignty—and describing modern sovereignty requires a careful consideration of “the emergence, function, and abolition of this system” (p. 1).
Kayaoğlu forges these connections between modern sovereignty and extraterritoriality with care. He devotes, for instance, an entire introductory chapter to downplaying the role of the Treaty of Westphalia in the history of sovereignty. Early modern European diplomacy, he states, had far less to do with the practice and theory of sovereignty than 19th-century colonial expansion wed to 19th-century positivist legal theory (pp. 4, 27, 40–41). As European, and especially British, jurists turned to territorial, “sovereign-centric,” and state-based positive law in the elaboration of international systems, Kayaoğlu argues, they created a theory of sovereignty that could be expressed only in colonial practices such as extraterritoriality (p. 27). Sovereignty became coherent only as colonial structures came into effect.
Kayaoğlu is not the only legal scholar to recognize that the theory and practice of modern sovereignty—especially in the realm of international law—are a product of imperial or colonial logic.Footnote 8 But Kayaoğlu makes two unique contributions to this trend in the literature. First, he demonstrates that one specific colonial practice, extraterritoriality, was the sovereign norm in the 19th century. Second, he argues that extraterritorial regimes did not end as part of a general process of decolonization, or because the states in which they operated “fulfill[ed] . . . a set of international normative standards of ‘civilization,’” but because these states successfully implemented “domestic legalization” (p. 91) or “state law” (p. 51). He shows, in other words, that a particular event in each colonized or semicolonized state—the implementation of a bounded, uniform, territorial system of law—ended extraterritoriality in these states and thus ended a key chapter in the story of sovereignty and jurisdiction.
By shifting focus away from civilizational hierarchies and toward a specific legal moment in the life of a colonized state, Kayaoğlu opens up an intriguing new arena for describing law and sovereignty writ large. Rather than rehashing the problems that identity or attitudes toward self and other have posed to supposedly objective or abstract legal systems, Kayaoğlu instead raises the possibility of an altogether different theory of law and sovereignty. He suggests that perhaps the paradoxes of sovereignty and jurisdiction have less to do with the complexity of identity and more to do with the complexity (or impossibility) of territory.
Although the book can be read as a politico-economic narrative of a particular legal institution, therefore, and although it focuses on the seeming triumph of territorial sovereignty or jurisdiction, it also reflects the ongoing scholarly trend away from geopolitical—and toward systemic or material—legal theory. Consider one example from among Kayaoğlu's case studies—the fascinating backstory of the 1867 Ottoman Land Code. A primary reason for the promulgation of the Land Code, Kayaoğlu states, was pressure from European governments to allow foreigners to hold real property. The Ottoman government, however, was unwilling to allow foreigners, with their extraterritorial privileges, into the Ottoman real estate market (p. 127). After four years of negotiations, therefore, the Ottoman Land Code came into effect, along with the partial elimination of foreign extraterritoriality rights in the empire—a compromise between the Ottoman government and European governments. “European states,” Kayaoğlu concludes, “accepted partial Ottoman jurisdiction over foreigners in exchange for Ottoman domestic legalization” (p. 128).
Kayaoğlu uses this example to support his argument that extraterritorial regimes ended when semicolonized states extended and secured domestic state law (p. 128). The specific circumstances under which foreign extraterritoriality rights shrank here, however, are worth emphasizing. It was the Land Code, in particular, that brought about this new jurisdictional situation by allowing a rearticulation of Ottoman sovereignty. Ottoman jurisdiction and Ottoman sovereignty, that is to say, became conceivable only when “territory,” in the abstract, was reconfigured as “ground” or “earth.” The foreign jurists who represented international law had little interest in Ottoman claims over territory. But the government could claim jurisdiction in this legal and political context when territory left the picture to be replaced by a quite material “land.”
Once again, Kayaoğlu's goal is not to develop or explore this materialist alternative to traditional theories of territorial sovereignty. Nonetheless, his systematic dismantling of Westphalian theory, his meticulous description of the colonial foundations of modern sovereign institutions, and the detailed empirical case studies on which he rests his argument all suggest the materialist or environmental potential of his writing. This book is not only a valuable contribution to political science but is also a fascinating example of how the field of comparative law—and Ottoman law more specifically—continues to transform itself.
NATURE AND EMPIRE
Whereas Legal Imperialism is a history of sovereignty and jurisdiction with materialist implications, Alan Mikhail's Nature and Empire in Ottoman Egypt is a history of matter and environments with legal and jurisdictional implications. Mikhail focuses on the shift from early modern imperial water management to modern colonial water management in “the long eighteenth century” (1675–1820) (p. 3). Within this framework, he also describes the transition from an early modern Ottoman reliance on local peasant knowledge (pp. 123, 291) to Mehmet ʿAli's attempts to exert centralized, bureaucratic control over this key natural resource (p. 291).
The lesson to be learned from this story is familiar: progress narratives celebrating Mehmet ʿAli's modernist state-building efforts are perhaps in need of correction, especially given the tolls these efforts took on ordinary Egyptian subjects. But Mikhail does not confine his discussion to this well-known tale. Rather, he deliberately incorporates nonhuman, material, and environmental actors into the narrative. Drawing on the past few decades of work in science and technology studies, he states that “nature,” too, is “a historical actor”—that “the water flowing through Egypt's canals, the dirt that clogged those waterways, and the salt that saturated much of the Egyptian delta's soil all have significant roles to play” (p. 21).
Unlike much of the writing in science and technology studies, Mikhail's work is also thoroughly grounded in legal texts. The archival documents that he uses are primarily local court records, and the analyses in which he engages are contextualized within the extensive literature on sovereignty and jurisdiction (pp. 14, 123). As a result, the book directly tackles the question underlying so much recent work in comparative law: what are the implications of a legal theory that takes the environment as a legal and political figure?
Mikhail's answer is provocative. Once scholars of law recognize the environment as itself an actor or actant, they must set aside territorial sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction as frameworks of inquiry. Indeed, Mikhail goes into some detail about how his narrative and analysis challenge geopolitical theories of sovereignty and jurisdiction. “The practice of environmental history,” he writes, “is necessarily transterritorial” (p. 20). Not only do “water currents, disease vectors, and migratory animals” demonstrate the irrelevance of “politico-territorial demarcations of geographic space,” but also these and other material actants make clear that “the crossing of borders and the transterritoriality of movement [are] foundational rather than innovative” (p. 20).
Just as White takes the mobility of sanctioned Rhodesian chrome as a foundation for an alternative, nonterritorial theory of sovereignty, Mikhail insists that “follow[ing] the trail of a particular set of natural resources” can be a particularly effective way “to get . . . past any static notion of territory” (p. 20). Likewise, just as Dunn describes the problematic (for theories of territorial sovereignty) transition of African islands to peninsulas and then back to islands again, Mikhail makes the point that “islands that temporarily attached to land created all sorts of challenges to social, legal, communitarian, familiar, and agriculture structures, institutions, and traditions”—challenges that alternative models of jurisdiction sought to meet (p. 38).
As much as the book is a critique of traditional theories of territorial sovereignty, therefore, it also sketches a fascinating new environmental take on jurisdiction. Resting on examples as diverse as the etymology of the word sharīʿa as “well-spring” or flowing water,Footnote 9 decisions about whether imperial or local functionaries would be responsible for repairing canals (p. 42), and the imposition of quarantine as a modern response to plague (p. 201), the book's materialist theory of sovereignty and jurisdiction is deeply nuanced and deeply thought provoking.
Mikhail deftly moves from a seemingly straightforward point—that the Ottoman state in Egypt took responsibility for canals that served the common good, whereas local leaders took responsibility for canals that served the “needs of one particular community” (p. 42)—to a unique conclusion about 18th-century Egyptian sovereignty and jurisdiction: communities were “bound” by water, and their governance and sovereignty drew on conventions “that were based on the physical properties of the liquid's movement, viscosity, and flow rate” (p. 45). Sovereignty and jurisdiction, he demonstrates, were physical and mobile here—irrelevant to the abstract, political demarcation of territory. In a similar vein, Mikhail's analysis of Mehmet ʿAli's responses to the plague, while acknowledging the relatively banal point that quarantine radically altered political and social space, also suggests, at least, the continuing relevance of nonterritorial, and indeed nonspatial, jurisdictional models even in this most relentless of state-building moments.
After all, as much as Mehmet ʿAli may have wanted to draw lines around it, or to turn it into a means of differentiating the foreign from the not foreign (p. 238), the plague remained environmental. It was, as Mikhail notes earlier on, a vector. And indeed, as the last chapter of the book, on the failure that was the new Mahmudiyya Canal, makes apparent, Mehmet ʿAli's sovereignty was consistently undermined by the activities of the environments he sought to govern—not just those represented by the activities of the plague but also those represented by the activities of water, wind, and dirt. If Mehmet ʿAli's political work was not all that some historians have claimed it to be, therefore, this is in large part, Mikhail implies, because the leader was blind to the environmental character of law and politics writ large.
Put differently, the underlying message of Mikhail's book is not just that attempts to control, delimit, and territorialize environments have harmed the populations that they have ostensibly sought to uplift or serve—although it is clearly that too. In addition, it is that attempts to theorize sovereignty and territory from the perspective of controlled borders and delimited geopolitical territory is a doomed project. As much as the book is a very good study of the social costs of modern bureaucratic resource management, and as much as it is an excellent study of the biopolitical implications of modern environmental (and environmentalist) discourse, it is also a wonderful extension of the recent writing that has dismantled Westphalian theories of sovereignty and jurisdiction. The book does not shy away from the problem of the environment as a legal and political actor. It turns this problem into the basis of a new trend in legal study broadly defined.
CONCLUSION
It should be apparent by now that none of these books exists in a vacuum. Each has extended, in unexpected but also productive ways, many of the key tropes that constituted the fields of comparative law, comparative sovereignty, and comparative jurisdiction throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Whereas scholars in the 1990s highlighted the imperial and colonial implications of Westphalian sovereignty,Footnote 10 this recent body of work issues a more fundamental challenge. Rather than emphasizing the violent potential or actuality of territorial sovereignty or territorial jurisdiction, it questions the very existence of these modes of sovereignty. Its challenge is not ethical but empirical. If territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction do not exist and have never existed—if no political entity has, or has ever had, jurisdiction over a uniform space surrounded by sovereign borders—then perhaps the sovereign, territorial state, characterized by sovereign, territorial jurisdiction, is an extraneous (rather than oppressive) political model. Perhaps the critique of territorial sovereignty should start with its internal, systemic contradictions rather than with its moral failings.
In a similar vein, whereas a great deal of writing in the early 2000s explored the mutability of space—the problem of space as an ever-shifting product of human activity, rhetoric, and behaviorFootnote 11—recent work in comparative law has taken this scholarship in surprising directions. Indebted as they are to the work that exploded the easy equation between space and territory, scholars of nonterritorial jurisdiction have also begun to question the usefulness of even dynamic, mutable space as an analytical category. Taking seriously the idea of spaces that, themselves, act, these scholars have suggested that “systems,” “environments,” or “ecologies” might be the most effective terms for describing the sets of processes that produce jurisdiction and sovereignty. They have thus moved away not only from theories of territorial sovereignty but also from theories of spatialized sovereignty. They have sketched the contours of a jurisdiction that is systemic, material, and, intriguingly, environmental.
Or, to contextualize these points within the problem that plagued the voters of Oklahoma in 2010: it is in fact the case that certain legal systems and certain ways of doing law dissolve the bounded territorial nation-state. Moreover, they replace this state with something unfamiliar—and something that traditional political, or geopolitical, vocabularies cannot express. But, as this recent work on sovereignty and jurisdiction has also shown, “Our State” cannot be saved with a stubborn refusal to consider the alternatives to Westphalian sovereignty. Territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty have always negated themselves, and it is likely they will continue to do so.
Indeed, as at least one scholar of U.S. law has seemed to suggest, a logical conclusion to the Oklahoman sovereignty demanded by voters saving their state was the dissolution of the national boundaries surrounding the United States itself.Footnote 12 Oklahoma may be saved but only at the expense of its federal environment. And thus, the scholarly choice implicit in this literature becomes clear: either we explore the possibilities of deterritorialized and despatialized jurisdiction and sovereignty, or Oklahoma floats, detached, as the single sovereign state in an exploded international system.
