The Socratic claim that virtue is knowledge and vice ignorance is simultaneously one of the clearest and one of the most puzzling statements in the history of Western moral philosophy. Across a number of Platonic dialogues, Socrates resolutely affirms this thesis. Yet the position also affronts some of our most persistent moral intuitions. Lorraine Smith Pangle introduces her excellent book by noting this disconnection. “Not only does intuition tell us that we are free to follow or not follow the knowledge that we have, but. . . that to the extent that we are imperfectly free, it is not ignorance but passion that constrains us” (1).
How should those who take Socratic political philosophy seriously engage this problem? Recent examples of English-language scholarship seem to cluster around two possibilities. The first is that Socrates (whether as historical figure or Platonic character, 4) is absolutely serious; if we accept his position, we must admit that intuitions to the contrary are misguided (see, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 2nd ed. [Cambridge University Press, 2001], 117). Call this a strong intellectualist interpretation of Platonic moral philosophy. The second view treats the various elements of what is called the “Socratic paradox” as responses to the challenges offered by various interlocutors, “enemies” who flaunt the cleverness of injustice (see, e.g., Roslyn Weiss, The Socratic Paradox and Its Enemies [Chicago University Press, 2006], 9, 67). As a rhetorical weapon in Socrates's war against immoralists, the paradox leaves many of our ordinary moral commitments intact (Weiss, 179–80).
Pangle refines and complicates the terms of this controversy. At one level, she is clearly on the side of the intellectualists, seeing the cognitive character of virtue as foundational for Socratic morality (1). This intellectual core is not, however, technical rationality (à la Terence Irwin's “craft analogy”) but what Pangle calls “active wisdom” (her translation of the phronēsis of the Meno and the sophia of the Apology, 15), not a skill but a mode of practice or way of life. Thus interpreted, active wisdom partners with rather than sidelines the emotions (184, 191, 197, 202, 205), avoiding some of the more severe implications of strong intellectualism while nonetheless affirming the centrality of wisdom.
The book also extends the significance of Socrates's paradoxes. Pangle interprets them not simply as rhetorical strategies but as signs of persisting moral ambiguities (2, 36). In one breath, we might praise the practice of virtue as the greatest human good, in another, we might valorize its self-denying heroism (3, 33). Political communities must recognize the irrationality of retribution (49, 76, 229), yet they also must depend for their security on the thumos that bristles at injustice (147, 243). Political life is therefore inherently paradoxical, though in ways demanding investigation not surrendering to contradiction (86). While active wisdom flourishes as a life beyond politics (38), its responsibility toward others reinforces flawed but salutary civic virtues (5, 31).
The argument is both analytic and interpretive. Pangle begins with a typology (5–10) of seven possible meanings of the statement that virtue is knowledge, examining different conceptions of virtue (utilitarian, eudaimonistic, heroic) and alternative structural connections to knowledge (necessary, sufficient, both). The last and richest possibility identifies “virtue [as] wisdom, a trait of character both intellectual and practical” (10). However, this discovery does not dismiss the other possibilities; it clarifies both their attractions and their limits (34).
Most of the book is devoted to interpretations of five dialogues, Apology, Gorgias, Meno, Protagoras, and Laws, focusing on a central theme within each while constructing a general interpretation that connects them. Socrates's defense speech in the Apology reveals how his demand for self-examination both contributes to and clashes with Athens's political culture (18, 29). The confrontation with Polus in Gorgias reinforces the irrationality of retributive punishment (44). Frustrating experiments with Meno expose the limits of instrumental knowledge as a resource for virtue (107, 109). The fuller exploration of the Socratic thesis in Protagoras provides a deeper and more complex understanding of its meaning (189, 197, 202). The Athenian stranger's political program in the Laws acknowledges the compromises needed to move from moral to political philosophy (213, 218, 221, 228).
All of the readings are rich and provocative. Particularly striking are the nuanced excavations into the conflicted moral psychologies of Socrates's opponents. Polus's wise guy taunts about the ubiquity of injustice mask anger at its triumphs (64, 68). The venal and ambitious Meno still seeks the comforts of piety (95, 97). Though Protagoras lives by “safety first,” he harbors admiration for the courageous heroism that disregards it (136, 187, 209). We are thus encouraged to engage in progressively deeper readings of the dialogues as moral dramas and led to see them as essential clues to the deeper content of Platonic moral philosophy. Are Polus, Meno, and Protagoras redeemed by—or do they look even worse in light of—their better selves? In some cases (e.g., the Meno of Anabasis 2.6 who is most dangerous to his friends), does a seemingly better self give cover to a worse? Tellingly, all of these better selves reflect a political virtue that remains fragile absent the support of active wisdom (119).
The Platonic dialogues are rich enough to complicate even the most illuminating readings. Two complications may need more attention. First, as finally revealed, active wisdom radiates serene confidence in its own rectitude (246; cf. 111, 183, 210). Yet the Socrates of these interpretations relentlessly tests himself in experiments with others (2, 24, 128–29); some experiments may be politically damaging (25, 129). Seen in light of Socratic practice, active wisdom seems less assured and more reckless than Pangle's concluding judgment suggests. Would assurance be tempered and recklessness diminished by Socrates's irony? Can we say more about the place of Socratic irony within the practice of active wisdom?
Separating philosophic from civic virtue (5,7, 113, 130, 150, 178, 215), we might hazard that irony is only necessitated by the shortcomings of Socrates's interlocutors (49, 137). Optimally, irony would give way either to active philosophic wisdom or to calm civic strength (242–43). However, a second complication questions the finality of these alternatives. Pangle gives us reasons for asking. By ending her book with reflections on the Laws, she prompts more attention to the differences between Socrates's and the Athenian stranger's approaches to politics. While the Athenian's wisdom is politically applied (212), Socrates's philosophy is politically embedded, social practice (100; cf. Phaedrus 230d) rather than simply intellectual eminence. Would this sort of philosophy flourish as easily within the stranger's “small, rooted communal polis” or the Sparta puzzlingly valorized by Socrates in Protagoras (171–73), both apparently preferred to “the more cosmopolitan and liberal Athens” (5)? As educational practice, however, Pangle's book surely belongs more in Athens. Virtue Is Knowledge elides distinctions between philosophers and citizens by rightfully insisting that its readers somehow be both.
