As I compose these reflections in the late summer of 2026, I am also completing a time-honoured and sobering professorial ritual: the review of syllabi in advance of a new semester. This is typically a perfunctory exercise: appending boilerplate language to the ever-growing list of university policies; reducing (yet again!) the readings for a new crop of post-literate undergraduates; tweaking lectures to capture student attention. This fall, however, the stakes feel higher. I am offering a course about fascism, a subject that I have taught for the better part of two decades but which still compels me to reassess my handling of core concepts. This urge betrays my scholarly background: as a historian of Italian Fascism and its legacies, I try to remain attuned to new developments in the field and incorporate them into my teaching. Yet it also derives from a sense of heightened responsibility when confronting this topic: to problematise the simplistic – often sensationalist and even valorising – narratives that students encounter in secondary school, in popular culture and online; to provide tools for assessing contemporary challenges to pluralism and liberal democracy; and, at the same time, to encourage debate over the affordances and pitfalls of historical analogy. These imperatives have become ever more insistent and fraught, especially over the past decade.
My obsessive tweaking has yielded a useful – though far from systematic – collection of syllabi and lecture notes from close to twenty years in the classroom. In what follows, I use this home-grown archive to reconstruct a brief personal history of teaching about fascism, from my formative experiences as a graduate student to more than a decade spent at West Virginia University (a flagship land-grant institution in a predominantly rural and conservative American state) to my current position at the University of Toronto (a global research university in Canada’s largest, most cosmopolitan city). I consider the ways in which my pedagogy around fascism reflects institutional cultures and student expectations, the zeitgeist at certain critical junctures, and my own efforts to reconcile the commitments of the historian’s craft with the demands of the present.
During my coming of age as a doctoral student at the University of Chicago from the late 1990s to mid-2000s – in the waning years of Fukuyama’s end of history – fascism loomed large in moral and structural narratives of the recently concluded ‘short’ twentieth century (1914–1989).Footnote 1 Evocatively titled tomes like The Age of Extremes, Dark Continent and Cataclysms positioned Europe between 1914 and 1945 as the fulcrum of the contemporary world order, casting fascism as the expression of reactionary forces – blood, soil, unreason – inimical to progress, egalitarianism and post-Enlightenment modernity.Footnote 2 This was also the early phase of the post-Cold War ‘memory boom’, in which societies and scholars began confronting legacies of dictatorship, genocide, slavery and imperialism.Footnote 3 In this context, ‘fascism’ belonged to the same lexicon as ‘Hitler’ and ‘Auschwitz’, all monitory metonyms for evil, inhumanity and the destructive potential of the industrial age.Footnote 4 Its ‘lessons’ were all too apparent with history’s irrepressible return. Srebrenica reminded Westerners that genocide could still occur under their very noses, while the War on Terror spurred new excesses of the security state. It is worth recalling that warnings of fascism’s reappearance did not begin with an extravagantly coiffed reality TV star’s descent on a golden escalator in 2015: they had already been sounding in Europe for well over a decade as Italy’s Alleanza Nazionale, Austria’s Freedom Party and other far-right parties channelled Islamophobia and anti-EU sentiment into electoral gains.Footnote 5
I brought these perspectives with me when I started my first tenure-track job, at West Virginia University (WVU), in 2009.Footnote 6 With no fascism course on the books, I had to undergo the curriculum approval process. This included a degree of administrative pushback that – while a far cry from the censorship now in effect at public universities in many Republican-led states – signalled the fraught terrain that I would be navigating.Footnote 7 My proposed course, ‘Fascism and the Far Right’, encompassed both interwar regimes and the ongoing resurgence of xenophobic nationalism. The initial title was rejected by the dean’s office, and the description was amended to omit any allusion to the ‘Right’. A revised title, ‘Fascism: History and Theory’, was also denied on the grounds that the word ‘theory’ would scare away students. In the end, we settled on ‘The History of Fascism’, a more neutral moniker that in the administration’s mind restricted this radioactive topic to the quarantine zone of the past. When handled properly – as a recitation of political and military events, populated by megalomaniacal dictators and goosestepping stormtroopers – such volatile material could fuel student interest; without appropriate safety measures, it risked unleashing a catastrophic reaction. From an enrolment perspective, at least, this calculus proved correct: my classes were invariably oversubscribed, with an overrepresentation of young men weaned on Hitler documentaries, the Second World War films and Call of Duty. For my part, the concession over the title was a price worth paying. I did what I wanted once the course was approved (again, a freedom no longer available to instructors at many American institutions).
In many respects, this first version of the course established the template for subsequent iterations. Its central questions were (and continue to be) comparative and thematic: evaluating competing interpretations of fascism, both historical and historiographical; identifying the influences and conditions that nurtured early movements; parsing tensions between and within ideologies; assessing strategies for the conquest and exercise of power, the use of aesthetics and spectacle, and the cultivation of popular consent; and tracing the radicalisation of violence that culminated in war, genocide and self-immolation. The primary settings for these explorations were, and remain, the archetypical regimes of Fascist Italy and the Third Reich. Given that students are typically more familiar with the latter, I turn to the former to disrupt their assumptions. Few of them realise, for example, that Mussolini’s regime predated Hitler’s by over a decade and exerted a formative influence on movements around the globe, including the fledgling Nazi Party. The Italo-German comparison also enables a more expansive understanding of fascist rule. For example, students can explore the continuities between different demographic policies, from pro-natalist measures (Mussolini’s ‘Battle for Births’, the criminalisation of contraception and abortion) to eliminationist ones (forced sterilisations, euthanasia, racial extermination); or trace the trajectory of state violence from domestic repression to colonial conquest to total war and genocide. Foregrounding, per Robert Paxton, ‘what fascists did’ over time rather than distilling essences, minimums or ideal types, provides students with a more holistic and nuanced understanding.Footnote 8 The story of the two major regimes may be punctuated by exceptional events – the March on Rome, Kristallnacht, the invasions of Ethiopia and the Soviet Union – but also took place in ordinary spaces: at school and work, in the street and the bar, and through daily routines and interactions.Footnote 9 Indeed, it is often precisely these dimensions that most affect students, inured by mediatic representations of mass spectacle and atrocity to a more comprehensive conception of totalitarian politics.
In both its earlier and recent incarnations, the course also devotes considerable attention to the question of fascism’s ‘mobility’ beyond its loci classici. Other European formations – the British Union of Fascists, Romania’s Iron Guard, various French groupuscules – are highlighted to emphasise the ubiquity of fascist-inspired politics in the interwar period, the expression of distinct national variants and the preconditions that determine a movement’s success or failure (again, per Paxton, its capacity to ‘root’ itself in the local political soil).Footnote 10 Franco’s dictatorship helps problematise students’ understanding of the relationship between fascists and authoritarian conservatives – the latter occupying a more dominant position than they did in Germany and even in Italy – and illustrate the contrast between radicalised self-immolation and bureaucratised entropy.Footnote 11 Imperial Japan, Peronist Argentina and the Brazilian Estado Novo expand the discussion beyond Europe and introduce alternative models of authoritarian politics. Postwar movements, like various incarnations of the Italian far right from the neofascist Movimento Sociale Italiano to the ‘post-fascist’ Fratelli d'Italia, likewise prompt students to revisit the mobility question from a temporal rather than spatial perspective. My goal in these discussions is not to determine conclusively whether the fascist label applies across these various contexts, but to illuminate both points of convergence (whether through common genealogies, imitation or exchange) and distinctiveness.
In reviewing past notes and syllabi, it is clear that these commitments – admittedly traditional and somewhat Eurocentric – have remained consistent over the years. So too have many of the course’s raw materials: case studies, actors, texts. What has proved more mutable is its temporal positioning. By this, I do not mean the widening or contracting of fascism’s chronological boundaries; rather, I mean animating assumptions about the relationship between history and the present. On the one hand, I am at pains to emphasise the alterity of the past; for example, I disabuse students of the well-worn dictum that ‘those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it’, so often invoked in discussions about fascism’s potential return. I stress the contingencies – structural as well as human – that led to the rise and fall of fascism in interwar Europe and to distinctive expressions of far-right authoritarianism in other times and places. On the other hand, as previously acknowledged, I have long felt the compulsion to make fascism legible to students in familiar terms, even if this means abdicating some of the historian’s traditional responsibility to ‘relinquish the present’. While endeavouring to resist anachronism and teleology, I share the historian of science Naomi Oreskes’s embrace of ‘motivational presentism’, the notion that ‘what matters to us about the past has everything to do with who we are, where we live, and what we think is important – to us, here and now, in the present’.Footnote 12 If there has been a pronounced change in my pedagogical approach, it lies in my attempts to navigate this tension. The shift roughly corresponds to Donald Trump’s golden escalator ride in 2015, which elicited insistent questions in the media, amongst my students, and for me as a scholar and citizen. During the first decade of my career, I treated fascism as a historical chapter with critical legacies, implications and lessons for contemporary society; in the second, I have positioned it as a problem confronting the present, to be addressed through the study of historical antecedents, trajectories and comparisons. These two perspectives do not stand in binary opposition; rather, they are distinct but necessarily connected, like buses travelling in opposite directions on the same loop.
This shift is most palpable in discussions of fascism’s mobility through space and time, and especially of its potential manifestations beyond Europe. The most obvious case in this regard is the United States. In an early version of the course, from 2010, I drew on a brief section of Stanley Payne’s canonical A History of Fascism, 1914–45 detailing ‘populist, nativist, and rightist movements [that] fell distinctly short of fascism’, like the Second Ku Klux Klan, the German-American Bund and Father Charles Coughlin.Footnote 13 To reinforce the paucity of historical exemplars, I even assigned Philip Roth’s 2004 novel The Plot Against America, which I described as ‘an imagining of what a fascistic, or at least pro-fascist, government might have looked like’ in the 1930s. Even at this stage, I felt the impetus to address contemporary developments, especially in relation to the nascent populist insurgency within the Republican Party. To provoke debate, I asked the class whether the likes of Joe the Plumber, Sarah Palin and the Tea Party – all calling for a redemption of the ‘real’ nation from corrupt elites and the parasitic underclass – bore ‘fascistic qualities’. The response of many students – often from conservative and evangelical backgrounds – was a defensive refusal to even contemplate the comparison; I even gave them an out by suggesting that ‘the libertarianism and anti-statism’ of the American Right potentially negated core attributes of fascism.
As fate would have it, I was teaching the same course in the fall of 2016. From the start of term, students had been baying for me to answer what had become the question – some because they wanted their anxieties confirmed, others to dispel the accusation. I held them off, insisting that we first wrestle with definitional debates and historical contexts; we were not due to talk about the United States until the penultimate week of class. But when our meeting happened to fall on the morning after Trump’s electoral victory, I had to concede. We analysed his 2015 campaign launch speech, debating whether his characterisations of Muslims and Mexicans echoed the dehumanising language of fascists past, and whether ‘Make America Great Again’ – then a new slogan and yet to be condensed into a ubiquitous acronym – was an example of palingenetic ultranationalism. We also read contrasting diagnoses from commentators, from those who argued that ‘this is how fascism comes to America’ to those who emphasised the uniqueness of historical fascism to those who assigned other labels, whether ‘authoritarian’, ‘populist’ or ‘illiberal democrat’.Footnote 14 From that point onward, the course has opened – rather than ended – with the question of contemporary comparisons. The first slide that students encounter is a collage of political cartoons depicting not only ‘Il Douche’ and ‘Mango Mussolini’ but an ever-changing cast of characters: Duterte, Orbán, Erdoğan, Modi, Meloni. From the outset, I emphasise that these comparisons are not a given but a problem for students to dissect and debate. The result – both at the start and the end of term – is typically a 50–50 split between those who would apply the fascist label and those who reject it.
I’ve similarly revised my handling of neo-fascism. Previously, I assigned a 1994 CEH article by Diethelm Prowe that identified essential differences between interwar fascism and the postwar radical right. Whereas the former was born of a Europe traumatised by war and rife with revolution and revanchism, the latter ‘emanated from a long period of peace … material prosperity and solid, largely unchallenged, democratic institutions’.Footnote 15 Correspondingly, neo-fascism’s appeal was restricted to losers in the new world of plenty, disaffected young men mired in ‘a deep feeling of boredom, alienation, and sense of powerlessness’.Footnote 16 While many of Prowe’s prognostications – like the rising backlash against immigration, multiculturalism and gender equality – were prescient, one wonders how students today would react to his concluding quotation of the German political scientist Richard Stöss: ‘Grandpa’s fascism is dead’.Footnote 17 Discourse about fascism maintains an outsized presence in both their real and virtual lives: in public debate about its potential resurgence, but also in the form of alt-right messaging on social media and – increasingly – on their own campus. Indeed, many students cite this cacophony as their primary motivation for taking the course. Refusal to engage their questions and erecting a firewall between past and present is thus untenable, as is the unreflective acceptance of facile comparisons. My responsibility, as ever, is helping them cultivate a critical apparatus for assessing this discourse.
In 2021, I moved from WVU to the University of Toronto, a large urban university with a student population reflecting the global diversity of Canada’s largest city. Once again, there was no fascism course on the books; I would have to undergo the approval process all over again. Anticipating a smoother ride (given that I had taught the subject for over a dozen years), I confidently submitted my previous syllabi, only to be told that the course required major revisions: it was too historical, too Eurocentric and insufficiently attuned to imperialism and authoritarianism in the Global South.Footnote 18 Could I incorporate settler colonialism in the Americas, Hindutva, even Zionism? I responded to these suggestions with a combination of flexibility and obstinacy: I recognised the value of expanding the remit of the course to a global scale but balked at the prospect of painting with such a wide brush and using ‘fascism’ as a catch-all for any expression of intolerance or state violence (as I put it in my response, ‘devoting equal airtime to, say, Jair Bolsonaro and Adolf Hitler seems problematic in several respects’). I also recognised the irony that at a moment in which the universalist pretentions of Eurocentric narratives are (justifiably) being unseated, we remain so reliant on the European twentieth century for our moral vocabulary and metaphors. And of course there is irony in the role reversal. At West Virginia, I had been the one pressing for a more expansive framing of fascism; at Toronto, I became the voice of historicist caution and restraint. Ultimately, we reached a happy medium: the fundamental architecture of my course remained intact but was also enriched by a renewed emphasis on global interactions (seen, for example, in a new lecture on Hindu nationalism’s entanglements with the Italian and German regimes). My students remain as motivated as ever, attracted as much by the enduring fascination of interwar European totalitarianism as the spectre it casts over their own time.
As this most recent experience (and, indeed, those accumulated over the past twenty years) suggests, teaching about fascism remains an iterative process and cannot rely on static narratives. Since the inception of Mussolini’s Fasci Italiani di Combattimento in 1919, fascism has functioned not only as a political phenomenon in its own right but as a mirror for others, a screen upon which to project diagnoses of, and anxieties about, contemporary politics and society. For Marxists, it represents the fullest expression of capitalism’s imperialist urges; for classical liberals, its crimes reveal the excesses of the interventionist state; for democrats past and present, it functions as an evil doppelganger, a nightmare of mass politics gone wrong. Fascism – to borrow a phrase from Claude Lévi-Strauss – is good to think with. To ensure that it retains its explanatory power, we must keep working to make it legible to a world in constant flux.
Joshua Arthurs is Associate Professor in the Faculty of Information and the Department of Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Latin American Studies at the University of Toronto. He is the author of Excavating Modernity: The Roman Past in Fascist Italy (Cornell University Press, 2012) and Forty-Five Days: The Fall of Mussolini and Italy’s Reckoning with Fascism (forthcoming from Oxford University Press, 2027); he is also co-editor of The Politics of Everyday Life in Fascist Italy: Outside the State? (Palgrave Macmillan, 2017) and Associate Editor of the Journal of Modern Italian Studies.
