Studies of democratization and civil–military relations are often undertaken separately. Those who inhabit the world of democratic analysis seldom venture into the world of military affairs, and when they do, they tend to mention the armed forces only in passing. Those who study the military tend to be absorbed with security and defense issues to the exclusion of the wider, political context of the democratic state. With The Military Transition, this unfortunate bifurcation has come to an end. Narcís Serra skillfully integrates the literatures on democratization and civil–military relations, and in doing so devises a new model for gauging how well countries are subordinating their armed forces, and in that manner, enabling their democratic regimes to consolidate.

Serra moves the topic of military reform to the center of conversations about democratic progress. He does so through two main innovations: The first is to tie the very processes of transition and consolidation to stages in the evolution of civil–military affairs, and the second is to map that evolution in a three-dimensional model that examines the stripping away of military prerogatives, the professional development of the military from an institution to an occupation, and the reduction of conflict between governments and soldiers.

Democratic transitions occur when elected officials end military interference in the governing process. Consolidation occurs when those officials establish, manage, and direct the implementation of military and defense policies. In the author's view, any discussion about democratic advance is premature if one has not taken stock of how successful governments have been in transforming what was once a highly autonomous and politically powerful military institution into a nondeliberative agent of the state that faithfully executes the policies of an elected government. The notion that scholars and practitioners should evaluate the civil–military relation before making sure-footed assessments about the overall state of a country's democratic system is intriguing if not novel, and a key theoretical contribution of this book.

For democratic consolidation to occur, there needs to be an ordered, sequential, coordinated movement along the three civil–military axes. The first and perhaps most important axis is the progressive weakening of military autonomy and building up of civilian capacity. This process would entail, among other remedies, removing the military from policymaking arenas, drafting new legislation on defense, strengthening the civilian-led chain of command and the ministry of defense in particular, and curtailing the jurisdiction of military courts. The second axis, which is the transformation of the professional mind-set, is lengthier and more difficult. It is a process of getting the armed forces to jettison their often haughty perception of themselves as the ultimate saviors of the nation and thus above government in value, in favor of a more modest notion as occupational servants of government who, despite any misgivings with policy, will comply with it, always adapting themselves to the needs of their civilian overseers. This necessitates changes in mission, military education, and the quality of military life. The final axis involves the regulation of civil–military conflict. Conflict between government and soldiers can never be entirely eliminated, and indeed it persists in the most consolidated democracies on earth. But it can be mitigated if policymakers are careful to properly sequence and phase in their reforms.

Serra grounds his theoretical innovations in a study of the Spanish case, one he knows very well. As Spain's minister of defense from 1982 to 1991, he helped design, manage, and implement many of the reforms advocated in his book. Because of Spain's great success in both transforming its military and becoming a stable, consolidated democracy, it is tempting to see it as the model of reform that other countries could conceivably emulate. The author is careful not to offer up his prescription as a blueprint, saying, “I am not advocating establishing general laws on the basis of explanations of what happened in Spain” (p. 63). But he does suggest that his proposals are “norms” that “could guide a reform of the military [elsewhere], particularly if it fits the suggested model” (p. 63). Serra insists there must be a balancing of progress along the three axes, along with a proper phasing in of reforms, and that the Spanish example shows us the way. In his view, there are early reforms that come during the transition, and others that must follow later and are part of the democratic consolidation.

The difficulty is that political contexts vary widely and powerfully shape what can be accomplished and when. Other countries may very well look to the Spanish example for advice, and may ultimately succeed. But how they succeed is likely to differ. For example, some Latin American nations have moved well beyond the transition phase but have yet to fully empower their defense ministries. They may either lack civilian defense ministers or civilian staff. These are ingredients that Serra argues are critical if countries are to solidify their democratic gains. That notwithstanding, those same Latin American democracies have made great strides in strengthening their electoral regimes, political parties, and civil liberties. Parts of their democracies are consolidating, even if certain elements of the civil–military relation are lagging behind.

Sequencing of reforms is often a function of what is possible at a particular moment, given the balance of forces in a society. In Chile, for example, the transition from military rule required a substantial delay in pressing human rights through the courts. In Argentina, on the other hand, human rights trials occurred quite early in the transition because the balance of power favored the incoming civilian administration. Because confronting human rights problems comes at different phases of the process, so too does the arc of civil–military tension, since efforts by governments to prosecute offenders often triggers the harshest military reactions. Argentina witnessed traumatic military uprisings in the 1980s yet has not heard from the military rebels since. Despite all predictions to the contrary, Chile has managed to convict dozens of military human rights offenders, and has done so with minimal conflict.

Despite differences in the sequencing of their human rights policies, both nations have made great progress in solidifying democratic and civil–military gains. It is impossible at this point to determine whether either has an advantage for having followed a “proper” sequencing of reforms, or indeed to determine what in fact constitutes a proper sequence. This is not to say that either Argentina or Chile can ignore the prescriptions offered in this book. Far from it. The Military Transition does a splendid job of laying out the requisites for developing a mature, stable civil–military system, one that configures well with a consolidating democracy.

While nations may differ as to when they introduce the reforms that Serra spells out, sooner or later they must initiate such reforms if they wish to democratize. Serra's great contribution here is to offer us a sophisticated theoretical framework for thinking about the elements of military reform, and for pondering whether the Spanish case will serve as the model or a model for advances in civil–military relations.