Teresa Bejan's Mere Civility is an exercise in both upkeep and revival. The former is accomplished through fresh interpretations of Hobbes and Locke that show they can still speak to our contemporary concerns. More exciting still is her revival of Roger Williams as a political thinker fit to spar with Hobbes and Locke on fundamental questions of political community. While Bejan is not solely responsible for the revival of Williams, her articulation of Williams's “mere civility” as a viable and rewarding response to the stresses of toleration represents a significant contribution to the reconsideration of his place in the history of political thought.
Bejan's primary point is that Williams was right to think that deep disagreement and mutual respect almost never go hand in hand, but that we should not, for all that, abandon deep disagreement (which, in different ways, the solutions of Hobbes and Locke require us to do). A willingness to live alongside and converse with those with whom we disagree deeply is a much lower standard than mutual respect or overlapping consensus, but it is the surest way to wed peace and pluralism. Bejan's minimalist Williams is at odds with the protomulticulturalist Williams presented by Martha Nussbaum and James Calvin Davis (61, 4), and this allows her to offer a more satisfying account of a crucial aspect of Williams's biography: his relations with the Narragansett. That Williams lived among the Narragansett after being exiled from the Massachusetts Bay colony, and maintained amicable relations with them throughout most of his life, adds a great deal of interest to his status as a practitioner, as well as a theorist, of toleration. Bejan nevertheless resists the urge to sanitize Williams's complex attitude towards the Narragansett, which contained admiration as well as disgust (64).
Her unflinching presentation is the more fruitful one, provoking as it does the question of how Williams lived alongside those he thought were condemned to damnation. One of his central metaphors for describing the community of true believers provides insight. The “elect” live among sinners like the shafts of wheat live among tares in Christ's parable. They are always surrounded by “briars, thorns, and thistles” in the “wilderness of the world.” Any attempt by human government to extirpate the weeds risks extirpating some of the true crop as well. Williams extends the metaphor by arguing that the weeds should not be uprooted because some of them might one day be “transplanted” (i.e., converted), as he puts it in Mr. Cotton's Letter Lately Printed, or “cut out of the wild olive, and planted into the true,” as in The Bloody Tenent.Footnote 1
On the lands of the Narragansett and Wampanoag, Williams was a Christian out of Christendom, and his metaphors for religious and political community reflect his isolation. In his Key into the Language of America, Williams turns the American wilderness into a metaphor for the more general “wilderness of the world” in which all Christians wander, and to which all Christians must accommodate themselves. Tying this realism to his American context, Bejan remarks that “life in the wilderness demanded that one make one's peace with discord and din” (79). In this wilderness, there can be no garden without “briars, thorns, and thistles.”
This articulation of community is attractive for its rejection of the possibility of purity; its rhetorical function is at odds with the powerful image of the church as corpus Christianum, the abuses of which Bejan catalogs in striking passages. With the aid of this corporate imagery, the Reformation becomes an attempted “dismemberment of the body of Christ” (29; italics in original), and excommunication is a “cutting off” of sick parts of the body for the sake of the whole. In an earlier era, St. Jerome had called heresy a pollution of the body, prescribing that the “rotten flesh” should be “cut away” in order that the whole body should not die (30). This language persists in the butcher's logic that allows Calvin to justify the execution of a heretic: “Shall the whole body of Christ be mangled that one putrid member remain intact?” (31).
Bejan is consistently attentive to the power of rhetoric, and draws the reader's notice to the contrast between bodily and horticultural metaphors on several occasions (e.g., 65, 72–73), but a fuller treatment of these rival metaphors for religious and political community would have been welcome. She argues that, in addressing an English audience from the context of the colonial frontier, “Williams was … subtly changing the terms and the scope of the debate” about comprehension, toleration, and civility (56), yet his antagonism to the perversion of the corporate metaphor, and his substitution of a horticultural one, are surely important instruments in his attempt to change the terms and scope of that debate. In contrast to Hobbes and Locke, who encourage an escape from the wilderness into the corporate entity of the state, Williams offers a much less demanding image of community that may be, for that reason, less susceptible to violent manipulation.
Any attempt to revive Williams necessarily raises questions about the act of revival itself. By what standard might we judge whether a thinker deserves renewed attention? The most obvious answer is that Williams offers novel insight into a contemporary issue, and on this question Bejan leaves little doubt. Yet we might apply more demanding criteria. Locke combines his political analysis with an original epistemology, and Hobbes provides his theory of sovereignty from within a remarkably consistent materialist ontology; does Williams offer a coherent account of the whole, of which politics is merely a part? If so, is it a radical Puritan one with little place for politics? We do not need to share Williams's Puritanism to reap the benefits of his political insights, but a fuller picture would help clarify those insights.
One of the main tasks of political theory has been to think through better and worse political norms, and it is not clear how helpful Williams can be here. Every community has particular norms to which the civil individual must accommodate herself, because these norms allow the community to persist (64). Yet because of the imperfect nature of life in the wilderness of the world, it seems that these norms must always be arbitrary. Williams acknowledges the importance of norms for structuring community, but it is not clear whether he provides criteria for evaluating better and worse norms, or considers most conventions to be simply arbitrary, and more usefully tolerated than improved. Williams's pessimism is a virtue elsewhere, but here it might be a weakness.
If what he offers is a guidebook for pilgrims during their stay in the wilderness, rather than a theory of how the wilderness can be made most habitable, his contributions to political theory will be limited. Bejan deserves credit for reviving Williams in all his challenging strangeness, but the revival might not yet be complete. It is nevertheless a testament to the richness of Mere Civility that it is both so lush with insight and so suggestive of new and fertile terrain for other theorists to work.
