Martha Nussbaum, in a reaction to the cultural relativism that pervades much of social science, made the following comment:
Highly intelligent people, people deeply committed to the good of women and men in developing countries, people who think of themselves as progressive and feminist and antiracist, are taking up positions that converge … with the positions of reaction, oppression, and sexism. Under the banner of their radical and politically correct “antiessentialism” march ancient religious taboos, the luxury of the pampered husband, ill health, ignorance, and death. (And in my own essentialist way, I say it at the outset. I do hold that death is opposed to life in the most binary way imaginable, and slavery to freedom, and hunger to adequate nutrition, and ignorance to knowledge.)Footnote 1
Nussbaum's sentiments, if not the specifics of her remarks, surely express the perceived need for a platform from which one can criticize the practices of certain communities. In this regard Amitai Etzioni is no different. Moreover, Etzioni and Nussbaum share the view that the basis of criticism must be some normative principle(s) whose authority is grounded in more than the continued role of that principle(s) in some specific set of practices. In addition, Etzioni and Nussbaum seem to believe that the normative principle(s) will issue in, or support, some sort of cosmopolitanism, and both would likely overlap in their sensibilities concerning any repugnant practices a community might harbor. Nussbaum, however, wants to appeal to “essentialism” or the nature of human existence as the basis for applicable normative principles. Etzioni wants to work with the notion of “community” as his foundation.
Although it is not always clear from his remarks exactly who stands in opposition to him, Etzioni generally regards some form of liberalism as his chief opponent. Apparently Etzioni believes that the typical noncommunitarian liberal adheres to a doctrine where the withholding or granting of consent by individuals is the sole basis for establishing political legitimacy or its absence. This doctrine Etzioni argues is fundamentally mistaken for two reasons: (1) individuals are themselves functions of communities, thus rendering the autonomous consenting individual something of a mythical figure, and (2) there is no straight line from consent to legitimacy that does not pass through community standards. Indeed, if (1) holds up, then the community itself, rather than the individual, becomes the unit of analysis when thinking about legitimacy.
In this connection, Etzioni cites a number of studies concerning the degree to which individuals are functions of their communities. Presumably, this is to undermine the claim that individual consent is the baseline for legitimacy.Footnote 2 Positing the community as the baseline, however, lapses into what might be called the “communitarian's dilemma.” The dilemma exists because for the communitarian (at least as Etzioni represents the position here), all social and political explanations, both descriptively and normatively, must be made in terms of community, or be shown to be a function of community. Given that framework, community practices give rise to the following dilemma: on the one hand, communitarians thus must either keep their doctrine tied to the actual practices of real communities, thereby risking the legitimization of repugnant practices (and having to accept that their own expressions of repugnance are no more than alternate communal expressions), or they must create an idealized community that can be used to criticize actual practicing community, thereby threatening realism.Footnote 3 The dilemma is especially acute when thinking about legitimacy, because all such actual societies would have rules, norms, and procedures for determining if a given practice was legitimate, and the forms of subjugation cited above have all met those tests in many societies, both past and present. The usual strategy for avoiding the first horn is to point to some failure of inclusiveness. So, for example, slavery, the subjugation of women, the relegation of people into castes, and the like—though all held to be perfectly legitimate by the communities that engaged in these practices, and sometimes with the endorsement of the practices by those subjugated—are not the real community, because those subjugated are said not to be included in some relevant way in what constitutes “the community.” Such a move, however, looks strangely as if one is giving primacy to individual consent, and is certainly the sort of move made by liberals of all stripes.
In any case, Etzioni may be relying on consent theory more than he realizes, since the very notion that the legitimization of social/political orders even matters may itself be a function of the acceptance of modern theories of consent-based governance. The concern for legitimacy was ushered in primarily by modern social contract theoristsFootnote 4 who saw the state as an artifice rather than a natural unit, such as the family. It would make little sense to the ancients to ask whether families were legitimate, and analogously to question the legitimacy of governments. Ancient thinkers started with actual experience and then considered political forms that would perfect that experience, and experience did not present societies of significant size without governments. Yet from Hobbes onward there was a movement away from focusing upon the ideal form of government and toward questions of when, and under what conditions, anyone had the right to rule over others. Consent became the basis upon which government should be constructed, because, if nothing else, it was hard to explain how government could come to exist without it.
From this foundation other values tended to follow, such as the importance of equality (at least equality before the law and equality of rights), tolerance, representative government, limited governmental power, impartial administration of justice, inclusiveness, and the like. These liberal values, though not necessarily the exclusive province of liberal regimes, were connected to consent because they were all rooted in the principle that individuals had sovereignty over their own lives, which they partially alienated consensually to form the political order. They would, therefore, not build institutions that violated that basic principle. In short, the presumption at the root of modern social and political legitimacy has been agreement and consent. It is not clear at all that the package of liberal values just enumerated can cohere as a package of political values without those values being deeply grounded in individual consent.Footnote 5
Yet the importance, even the fundamentality, of individual consent does not thereby rule out the importance of community. There is a distinction between the grounds for legitimacy and the procedures that identify and secure it. It is quite conceivable that the grounds could be rooted in individualized consent while the procedures are very much a function of communal norms. As Hobbes long ago noted, there must be public signs for anyone to know that consent has been given. Such signs will, of necessity, come in the form of signals recognized as valid according to community norms. The need for interpersonal norms does not imply, however, that any consent given in accordance with such norms be rational or reflective. Since nothing in the nature of consent requires, a priori, that consent be rational, liberals seek to solve the problem of repugnant practices by moving toward an idealized conception of autonomous rationality. Etzioni analogously pins his hopes on cross-cultural community norms unified into an idealized community. Yet it must be noted that unreflective, biased attitudes do not necessarily imply a communal problem of legitimacy, since there can be community with such consent. Nor is it the case that biased or unreflective consent necessarily produces biased results. It could be, for example, that the procedures set up for distinguishing the legitimate from the illegitimate at the communal level pit biases against one another such that the result is a generally impartial form of legitimacy. That is the point of our own system of checks and balances, division of the legislature into two houses, federalism, the presumption of innocence, and the other safeguards we have put in place to counter predictable biases to which individuals and political bodies are prone.
Nevertheless, as we have read Etzioni, the basic thrust of his paper is not to criticize consent theories and liberalism. Instead his purpose is to move us beyond consent to more substantive principles, like moral norms, upon which to ground legitimacy. However, the desire to move toward grounding legitimacy in a substantive moral principle may not take one as far as one thinks it does. Contrary to the assumption of Etzioni, Nussbaum, Sen, and others, to have such a moral principle is not yet to have a political one.Footnote 6 In the first place, it does not follow from “X is good or right” that therefore X must be politically or legally enforced; nor does it follow from “Y is bad or wrong” that therefore Y should be politically or legally prohibited. In addition, it does not follow from the fact that R is a political regime whose legitimacy is grounded in a moral principle that therefore all moral principles, or even moral principles generally, are under the purview of R. The connection between the moral and political is precisely the central question of political theory and the one that cannot be decisively resolved by discovering or establishing a consensus that practice P is morally objectionable and thus that not-P (or some action A minus P) is morally good or acceptable.Footnote 7 That still does not give us an argument that not-P is to be enforced, encouraged, or mandated by any political order. Etzioni seems to assume that the whole object of politics is to find a way to properly manage morality, for “without cross-cultural moral judgments, one cannot reach the next step—asking what legitimate measures we must take to enforce those judgments we do share” (122). But again, nothing follows from the fact that the sharing of a moral judgment, however broadly, implies that that moral judgment should become an object of political/legal concern. That inference would depend on a host of considerations, not the least of which is whether the sort of institution a political order is makes it appropriate for the enforcement or furtherance of moral principles generally, or for securing particular moral ends. Etzioni himself utilizes a version of the foregoing distinction when he tells us that “one can readily draw a clear line between judging that a given public policy is morally reprehensible or illegitimate, on the one hand, and deeming it sufficiently troubling to justify the use of force, on the other” (122). Hence because something is “illegitimate” does not yet show a need for “public policy.”
Etzioni proposes to find his “clear lines” by starting with “self-evident” moral values shared across cultures and then ensuring that moral dialogue is open as a check upon any errant judgments. Of course, as just noted, even if we get a list of clearly and commonly held moral values, that fact does not yet take us an iota closer to any conclusion about political action or organization. That is a separate argument entirely. The exception might be with respect to gross violations of human rights, as I shall discuss in a moment. In any case, Etzioni's methodology of self-evidence with open dialogue faces a Euthyphro-type problem of whether any “clear line” it produces should be drawn because there is qualified cross-cultural consensus, or whether there is qualified cross-cultural consensus because there is a clear line to be drawn.
In answering this question it may be more appropriate to look at “self-evidence” as a sign of moral truth rather than the very substance of the truth itself.Footnote 8 In this connection I would submit that the possibility of agreement about gross violations of human rights signals that something deeper stands behind the “self-evidence,” namely, a moral truth that explains the ready assent. Such a commitment is, however, closed to Etzioni because it is one that holds that violations of basic human rights are evils quite independently of any degree of cross-cultural consensus or lack of it, however tightly qualified. True, on this moral realist view one would expect moral commonality because people can recognize truth; but the commonality itself is quite irrelevant to establishing the moral truth at issue. What is needed beyond commonality is an additional account of human nature, the human good, and the nature of life in human communities, echoing in some ways Nussbaum's plea for essentialism. Absent that, the riddle of legitimacy still remains, for there is a kind of perpetual open question problem for the cross-cultural communitarian as to why the conclusion of any qualified consensus ought to be followed or held to be true. At some periods of human history, for example, I suspect that the principle “it is fitting to enslave those conquered in war” would have passed Etzioni's test of qualified self-evidence. For the moral realist a qualified consensus can at best only serve as a sign of something substantial, not a substitute for what is substantial itself.Footnote 9 In short, without moral realism, all such devices as consent, consensus, open access, self-evidence, inclusiveness, and the like, never quite resolve the question “Why is that right (or wrong)?” and, by extension, “What implication does that answer have for politics?”
As it turns out, legitimacy is just the sort of thing that gets substantially undermined by open questions, even philosophical ones. And if we haven't quite closed the gap between the moral and the political in theory, we must either make the case or hope for a consensus on just that question. For if there is some doubt about whether something is fully legitimate, it tends to lose its legitimacy altogether. On the other hand, it does seem that if everyone believes something to be legitimate then it functions so. Here what might be called the Meno question arises. In Plato's dialogue Meno Socrates asks whether it matters for moral action that a person believes something is virtuous or knows something is virtuous. The conclusion reached is that believing something is virtuous is sufficient to produce virtuous action. What, then, they ask, is the value of knowledge? Analogously, we might say that believing a regime is legitimate is probably sufficient to produce orderly activity and willing obedience. Why look for anything more?
In response to the challenge of “why knowledge?” Plato points out, by the metaphor of the statues of Daedalus, that belief alone can be swayed by persuasive sophists, because without knowledge one is unable to distinguish the sophist from the philosopher. Only with knowledge can one anchor true belief about virtue. Is there an analogous point to be made with respect to legitimacy and politics? There is, I would argue, at least one value that is substantially destabilized in this push for qualified communal consensus. It is a value threatened by the turn towards ideal communities likely to follow from Etzioni's cosmopolitan push. It is also a value that can be threatened by the realism of a total immersion in actual communal practices. It is a value that is inherently distinct from the moral-management approach to politics manifested in Etzioni's essay and easily trampled upon in any enthusiasm to obtain moral rectitude. That value is liberty.
Etzioni refers to the American Founding Fathers and the Declaration of Independence as an example of the plausibility of an appeal to self-evident moral propositions. These propositions, however, were offered in the context of limiting the abuses of governmental power and for the protection of individual liberty. They were not offered as guidelines for the moral management of the community or even to establish the meaning of legitimacy. If anything they were designed to clarify the nature of the limits, and thus the illegitimate uses, of power, though they might also be useful in another context for thinking about legitimacy as well. The point is that the problem of securing liberty is a very different one from the problem of reaching moral consensus. One could do the latter without paying much attention to the former. Paradoxically, it is the meaning of liberty that, like the statues of Daedalus, moves about as the effort to secure one common moral framework inclusive of all voices progresses. And in the past century and a half, as we have drifted away from the idea of political liberty being restricted to the protection of basic, universal negative rights, the meaning of liberty has jumped about to the degree that its statuesque qualities have completely disappeared. The problem of liberty is one of defining and protecting the boundaries of exclusion, not one of seeking ever-increasing degrees of inclusiveness. It is the problem of finding how the one can stand against all.
Etzioni no doubt is holding to a position like Amartya Sen's, that by including the voice of liberty in the conversation about relevant moral principles one has thereby taken into consideration the problem of liberty.Footnote 10 It might be said then, following the terminology of A. O. Hirschman, that the whole problem of legitimacy for Etzioni seems to come down to one of voice.Footnote 11 As long as all voices have a place at the table, the tendency is to conclude that the point of view at issue is being taken into account and thereby considered to the appropriate degree.Footnote 12 Unfortunately, liberty is not so easily accommodated, for that procedure tells us very little about when one is free to get up from the table or refuse to participate at all in the conversation. Liberty is not about finding a seat at the table, but having the right not to sit down. The problem of liberty, again to use Hirschman's terminology, is thus rather one of protecting the avenues of exit before talk at the table begins.Footnote 13 Historically there was a fairly clear line about the importance of protecting individual negative rights as the means to ensure liberty and from there to move on to other moral considerations. No doubt that concern and value has fallen by the wayside in recent times; but that, of course, is just my point. Foregrounding liberty will also foreground the legitimacy of preventing the violation of basic negative rights and the “self-evident” moral truths they rest upon. Foregrounding inclusive dialogue is likely to have the long-term effect of doing exactly the opposite.
I am by no means suggesting that exit is all that matters and that voice is not important. Indeed, I noted earlier that a theory of legitimacy is unlikely to avoid having a strong component of consent. My point here is that where voice matters most critically is precisely in establishing procedures to ensure the protection of basic rights. It is critical, in other words, that the potential (or actual) victims of such violations be heard because exit does not define its own scope or sanctuaries. Thus in the initial stages of establishing the proper role and limitations of government, voice is especially important. Etzioni is no doubt correct that at this stage at least, one will find commonality and “self-evidence” about the need to protect against murder, rape, theft, and other such forcible aggressions on the part of individuals or governments. After that point, however, what seems most in need of special attention—especially in these days of increasing governmental management of our lives—is to secure exit.Footnote 14 In a conversation where all moral norms are in principle candidates for political management, it is presumed that since there must be some connection between ethics and politics, there can be any. That is the very presumption that must be challenged.
Of course, “self-evidence,” properly qualified, is supposed to separate the wheat from the chaff here. But I fear, finally, that despite Etzioni's laudable effort to ground legitimacy in a normative framework, the end product of his approach must become a pure proceduralism.Footnote 15 Procedures are needed for sorting the valid claims from the invalid, the bright lines from the blurry, and meaningful from unmeaningful contributions to the discussion—not to mention deciding how to “peel off layers of traditionalism and indoctrination” (119), so expressly desired by Etzioni. The need to peel traditions suggests that Etzioni leans toward the ideal. The ideal communities are likely to be managed by qualified elites who interpret the “real” wishes of the many and claim expertise in matters of moral reasoning. The danger, ironically, lies precisely in the abstractness of the ideal from functioning communities. The contrary course of immersing oneself in actual communities risks the inclusion of the repugnant. In either case, I fear for my liberty whether the dialogue takes place among the Harvard faculty or the first hundred names of the Boston phone book. Both are likely to dismiss the notion that the management of one's own moral life or that of the community is not an appropriate function of the state or the defining issue of political legitimacy.
