There can no longer be any excuse for policymakers, scholars and students, or the general public to stand ignorant of the fundamental dynamics of international affairs in the Gulf region. Gregory Gause's impressive survey of developments in this continually contested part of the world since the departure of the British in 1971 provides us with a sophisticated yet remarkably accessible and eminently readable account that lays out the facts of the case in a consistently evenhanded fashion and offers convincing analyses of a great many pivotal episodes.
Specifically, Gause traces the emergence of the Gulf states system, highlighting the ways that the sharp rise in oil revenues contributed to the basic pattern of interstate alignments and rivalries that took shape between 1971 and 1978 (Chapter 2). He then presents the most succinct and best conceived treatment yet of the impact that the 1978–79 revolution in Iran and the ensuing 1980–88 Iran-Iraq war had on regional affairs (Chapter 3). Along the way, he explains the origins and consequences of “Saudi Arabia's decision to abandon its role of ‘swing producer’” in the world oil market (pp. 79–81) and reminds readers of the enormity of the shooting down of an Iranian civilian airliner by the crew of the USS Vincennes in July 1988 (pp. 84–85). Chapter 4 elucidates the causes, trajectory, and aftermath of the second Gulf War—Iraq's disastrous August 1990 invasion of Kuwait—and the U.S.-led campaign to restore Kuwaiti independence (pp. 89–114); it then recounts the sorry tale of the postwar popular uprising against the Ba'thi regime and Washington's refusal to support the revolt (pp. 114–20). This chapter ends with brief discussions of the recurrent confrontations that took place between Iraq and the United States throughout the 1990s (pp. 121–26) and the steady expansion of the American military presence in the Gulf that complemented Washington's dismissal of repeated Iranian overtures (pp. 127–34).
Events after September 2001 necessitate a broadening of the book's purview. Saudi policy in Afghanistan and the peregrinations of Osama bin Laden receive close attention (pp. 136–44), as does the cooling of Saudi-U.S. relations that followed the strikes against New York and northern Virginia (pp. 144–48). There is an admirable summary of the initiatives undertaken by U.S. officials inside Iraq during the first phase of the occupation (pp. 155–68), along with an equally concise overview of relations between the United States and Iran after 2003 that covers not only developments in the Gulf and post-Ba'thi Iraq but also Tehran's dealings with the Lebanese Islamist organization Hezbollah (pp. 168–78). To top it all off, Chapter 6 lays out a compelling account of U.S. policymaking in the months leading up to the third Gulf War that manages to synthesize the existing journalistic and memoir literature, as well as the voluminous official reports that have been generated by the U.S. Congress.
Specialists in international relations will perhaps be most intrigued by the author's unconventional conceptual approach: In the first place, he writes, “oil was not the primary driver of any of the Gulf wars”; second, “regional states acted more against perceived threats to their own domestic stability emanating from abroad than to counter unfavorable changes in the distribution of power or to take advantage of favorable power imbalances” (p. 9). The former point is a commendable corrective to most writing about the Gulf, which tends to overstate the role of petroleum production and transportation in the strategic deliberations of regional actors and outside powers alike. Gause demonstrates that issues related to oil have been at best tangential to war- and alliance-making in this part of the world, and that more often than not key changes in petroleum affairs resulted from, rather than dictated, matters of High Politics.
Whether or not Gause succeeds in substantiating the second conceptual claim is less clear. Almost immediately, the argument that foreign policy in the Gulf is driven by perceived threats to domestic order (which presumably may or may not conform to reality) gets equated with the notion that leaders act on the basis of (presumably rational and well-grounded) calculations of “how their own domestic regime security would be affected by the outcome of regional conflicts” (p. 9). Moreover, “the most important and distinctive factor in the Gulf regional security complex is not power imbalances but the salience of transnational identities” (ibid.). Gause is too astute to present these three statements as simply different ways to say the same thing, and so it it worth trying to work out the subtleties here.
Explaining crucial events and trends in Gulf international relations in terms of policymakers' responses to perceived external threats to internal stability demands two distinct lines of argument. First, one must show that there is some sort of domestic challenge that outside actors might exploit; second, it has to be demonstrated that leaders, either as individuals or as a group, recognize the threat. This looks like a tall order, and it is not surprising that the argument cannot be sustained across all of the episodes covered in the text. Closest to the mark are the analyses of Iraq's decision to attack Iran in September 1980 and of its decision 10 years later to occupy Kuwait. In the former case, the emergence of an active Islamist opposition at home, combined with blistering rhetoric coming from influential figures in Tehran, can credibly be considered to have posed a serious domestic challenge to the Ba'thi regime (pp. 59–62). But only indirect evidence is adduced that these phenomena were recognized to be a threat by Iraq's leaders. Saddam Hussein embarked on a guarded rapprochement with the Islamic Republic immediately after seizing power in Baghdad in July 1979 (p. 60), switching to a more belligerent posture only after the security forces started to break up militant cells of the Party of the Call to Islam during the spring of 1980 (p. 62). Perhaps the Iraqi leadership still perceived the Islamic Republic as a threat to domestic stability throughout the summer and fall of 1980 and moved that September to eliminate the danger, but it would be nice to have some evidence that this was the case. The apparent facts that officials in Baghdad waited until the authorities in Tehran had weathered a severe internal challenge of their own (pp. 63–64) and that “Saddam Hussein indicated early on that he was willing to accept a cease-fire, though not the withdrawal of his troops from Iran” (p. 64) suggest that the September offensive was more or less opportunistic.
Early 1990 saw the Ba'thi regime once again beleaguered, this time largely due to the costs of the 1980–88 war. Saddam Hussein “viewed [the situation] as part of a concerted effort to pressure, if not destroy his regime” and “thought he had to act quickly to arrest the flow of events against him” (pp. 90–91). The president's state of mind is inferred from detailed reports composed by a prominent local newspaper editor and a high-ranking officer in Iraqi military intelligence. This is about the strongest evidence one can get, although the statements that get quoted from these two sources refer more often to Baghdad's deteriorating position vis-à-vis the United States, Israel, Iran, and the smaller Arab Gulf states than to circumstances at home (pp. 91–96).
Other significant events look much less closely connected to perceptions of domestic threat. Baghdad's willingness to demarcate the boundary with Iran in 1975 “reflected the Ba'thist government's appreciation that its previous policies had isolated it both in the Gulf and in the larger Arab region” as much as, if not more than, “Iranian military pressure [inside Iraq] through the Kurds” (p. 38). Three years later, the Iraqis agreed to postpone sanctions on Egypt “knowing that having Riyadh as a member of the anti–Camp David front would strengthen their position [in inter-Arab affairs] immeasurably” (p. 42). In the fall of 1990, the newly unified Republic of Yemen opted not to oppose Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, a “position [that] very likely arose from its desire to have a strong ally to balance Saudi power in the Arabian peninsula” (p. 106). Saudi policy toward U.S.-occupied Iraq shifted in late 2006 due to “speculation that US forces might be leaving Iraq sooner rather than later,” which prompted officials in Riyadh to think “about how they could preserve their interests in Iraq independent of Washington” (p. 180).
International relations in the Gulf thus exhibit dynamics that one finds in most, if not all, other parts of the world. Peculiarities associated with transnational identities disappear after page 12, only to reappear somewhat startlingly in the conclusion, where the reader is admonished that “one cannot understand the international politics of the Persian Gulf without appreciating the importance of transnational identities in the calculations of state leaders” (p. 241). The conclusion goes on to assert that oil plays a key role not only in aggravating regional conflicts but also in laying a foundation for cooperation among the Gulf states (pp. 245–47). Nothing in the preceding text prepares us for these assertions. On the contrary, the great strength of the book is its lucid exposition of insights that can be gained from the rigorous application of well-established concepts of world politics to the contemporary Gulf.
