Legitimacy: The Concept
Amitai Etzioni has written a stimulating and provocative defense of a communitarian conception of legitimacy. He contrasts this view to what he calls the deliberative view. In what follows, I argue that Professor Etzioni cannot do without the deliberative view and that indeed he has more in common with Habermas than he thinks.
Legitimacy is a tricky concept. I want to begin my discussion by introducing a couple of distinctions that I believe are crucial in developing a coherent and compelling conception of legitimacy.
First, questions of legitimacy are not identical to questions of morality, although there is often overlap. Legitimacy as a political concept has to do with questions such as “Why should I obey these people or that law or this regime?” Legitimacy is tied to and implicated by ideas of obligation, authority, and coercion. It is essentially about the reasons I have to obey. Or if this already sounds too rationalist, let's just say the reasons I obey. Sometimes, or perhaps ideally, those reasons might be moral. I refuse to obey that law because it is morally wrong; this regime is illegitimate because it is evil. But at the conceptual level there is still an important difference between morality and legitimacy and this is made clear not in the negative case, when I am coerced to do something that I find morally wrong, but in the positive case, when I am coerced to do something that is morally correct, or thought by someone to be morally correct. A regime overseen by a benign and morally brilliant dictator whose every command is rooted in sound moral claims might still be deeply illegitimate. Thus legitimacy is about the exercise of power over others, not just about the morality of a law or a regime. And philosophers who wish to argue that the morality of a law is in and of itself a justification to coerce people to follow that law need to explain and defend the connection. I will come back to this point below. For now I just want to make the conceptual point that legitimacy and morality are not identical.
The distinction between legitimacy and morality should not be confused with a second distinction, that between empirical (or sociological) and normative ideas of legitimacy. On the surface, an empirical concept of legitimacy seems quite straightforward. Legitimacy is what citizens of a given polity factually consider to be acceptable or justified actions by the state. These actions might appear to us dastardly and yet still be considered legitimate by citizens in another polity with other standards. As social scientists we might be uninterested in any normative evaluation and concentrate on the how much and why questions. How much support was there and why did the Incas come to believe that human sacrifice was an acceptable part of collective life? Do the Myanmarians generally believe that the regime is legitimate? Is it possible to measure this fact? The how much question may not be simply about quantity; it may be about distribution, quality, and strength of support. How strongly do citizens identify with the regime or laws? How much support does one need in a population to be able to say that they accept the regime or believe that the laws are legitimate? Is there a numerical threshold below which we would want to say that the regime is illegitimate? Furthermore, does support need to be distributed in a certain way? What if support for a regime varies widely between ethnic groups?
The why question is also complicated and has motivated an enormous field of social science, spurred into action by Weber's classic tripartite model of legitimacy: people come to believe that their laws and political system are justified either through the charismatic power of an individual, the belief that the political system conforms to a fair and neutral procedure, or the deeply ingrained power of tradition. I take Etzioni's model to be an updated version of the last reason.
While people disagree about how to answer the how much, the why, the who, and even the what questions, no one disputes the existence of beliefs about legitimacy that contribute to the stability of regimes. In contrast to this, many people do dispute whether we can defend a coherent normative conception of legitimacy. A normative conception of legitimacy seeks evaluative standards against which to judge empirical beliefs. While there is evidence that Americans did not find the internment of Japanese during World War II illegitimate, we might want to say that it really was illegitimate and Americans were mistaken or misled in not recognizing it as such. The question is, can we interrogate the legitimacy of the regime in Myanmar independently of empirical levels of support, or (the example that Etzioni uses) the legitimacy of honor killings independently of whether the cultural group within which this practice takes places fully endorses them as legitimate? There is no doubt that we can and do make such cross-cultural judgments. The question is, upon what grounds do we do so, and are those grounds justifiable? I, like Etzioni, believe that normative standards are justifiable and important.
Taking these distinctions as my starting place, it seems to me that Etzioni makes two false moves in his discussion of legitimacy. The first is to conflate morality and legitimacy and the second is to fail to make a plausible connection between his normative conception of legitimacy and his empirical one.
Legitimacy and Morality
Etzioni asks two questions in this paper: “Who legitimates?” and “By what criteria can one judge that which is legitimate?” I take up this second question first. It is in answering this second question that I think he collapses legitimacy into morality. While fully admitting that he has chosen a hard row to hoe, Etzioni proposes that there are universal moral values that can be accessed through collective moral dialogues. He claims that these values are “self-evident across cultures” and that they “can and do serve as an Archimedean point for bestowing legitimacy”(117). The example he offers of such a value is the norm, widely shared across cultures, that children should be taught that telling the truth is superior to lying. Now Etzioni does not claim that the study which offers cross-cultural evidence for this norm is itself proof that there are such universal values. He only uses the study as an illustration of the sorts of things he means. In any case, my concern here is not with the claim that there are cross-cultural values. I tend to agree with Etzioni that there very well might be a limited set of core moral values across cultures. My concern is the connection Etzioni tries to make between these core values and a normative idea of legitimacy. He moves much too quickly from the core values to criteria of legitimacy. At most he seems to offer a minimum standard of moral acceptability. We are never told for example how the norm “teach your children the value of truth” could be used as a standard of political legitimacy. Perhaps he only introduces this to illustrate that there are such norms, not that this particular norm would be helpful in questions of legitimacy. But then I would have liked to have been given an example of a norm that could be used in evaluation. For example, what is the universal cross-cultural norm upon which we can base the judgment that honor killings are illegitimate? Honor killings are immoral. And like Etzioni, I think that one could make a good case for claiming that that judgment can be defended as more than just a cultural prejudice. But I do not think that from there one can get a conception of legitimacy, that is, a coherent justification of the exercise of power over others. Without a lot more argument and elaboration, Etzioni's core values result in a set of prescriptions against evil.
Morality is about telling right from wrong; legitimacy is about the grounds for coercing people to do what is right (or sometimes wrong). Perhaps Etzioni would want to say that the question of coercion is a particularly modern question. Many ancients would have no problem in grounding coercion in moral rectitude. But I do not think Etzioni is defending an ancient view of politics. I think he is defending a modern view of politics in which individuals are free and equal in a moral sense. As a communitarian, he believes that the equal status of human beings is fully mediated through the community, but as a defender of human rights he must also believe that each individual has moral standing that must be respected. Now this moral standing is what poses the problem of legitimacy for all moderns—including those who endorse, say, a natural law conception of moral truth. Rousseau offers one of the classic statements of the modern puzzle of legitimacy: “man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” What grounds do we have to coerce free and equal people?
This dilemma led early contract theorists to hit upon consent as the heart of legitimacy. But consent is a deeply problematic notion. Contemporary liberal theory is still wrestling with the same problem—how to justify coercing people who have equal moral status—but has moved from ideas of consent to ideas of justification.
All liberals believe that power and coercion require justification of some kind. A large subset of liberals argue that power and coercion require public justification which involves seeking, constructing, and offering reasons that are acceptable to citizens. “Consent of the governed” is replaced by “justified to all those affected” as the touchstone of legitimacy. What is the value added we get with justification that we do not get with the older idea of consent? Justification shifts the focus from consent simpliciter to the reasons for consent. The move from voluntaristic to rationalist accounts of political legitimacy releases us from the confines of actual consent. Actual consent is a notoriously difficult criterion to meet. Furthermore, it is subject to all sorts of possible pathologies and distortions connected to human psychology, desires, and manipulation. Thus the focus on reasons for consent rather than on the simple act of consent introduces the possibility of imagining what people would consent to, as well as tying legitimacy to epistemic ideas of consent for good reasons.
Justification rather than consent introduces the possibility of a fully hypothetical model of legitimacy; however, this is not to say that all or even most liberal theorists of public justification opt for a fully hypothetical model of justification. Many theories of public justification introduce some form of hybrid in which there is, on the one hand, a hypothetical argument that might go something like this: “P is a policy for which there are reasons that all could accept.” On the other hand, there is the insistence that some form of actual process of public justification in which these reasons are aired, discussed, and put before the public take place. Indeed, one of the ways to think about adherents of this view of legitimacy is to see them along a deliberative continuum. At one end are theorists who, following Habermas, see public justification as potentially reflected in a continuous iterated set of overlapping conversations in the public sphere. Here the model of justification is a regulative ideal that stands behind our overlapping conversations and against which we can evaluate those conversations. At the other end are theorists who follow a Rawlsian model and tend to think of public justification as a thought experiment undertaken by judges and legislators. The idea, however, is the same in both versions. It is that any time any of us propose and defend a policy, law, or constitutional order, we are proposing and defending a form of coercion. Coercion is made legitimate through seeking a common form of reasoning through which all citizens or all those affected can sign on to the proposal. Because we cannot as an empirical matter canvas every single person and also because actual responses of empirical persons can be unreasonable (the traditional problems with consent), we ought to seek to fold other people's possible consent (or at least their interests, concerns, and perspectives) into our very reasoning: only appeal to reasons that you think might be acceptable to fellow citizens understood as reasonable.
I do not have time to offer a full defense of this view of legitimacy. I want instead to highlight that it is a normative conception of legitimacy in a way that Etzioni's idea of moral core values is not. Perhaps the underlying justification of this view of legitimacy is rooted in universal core values. But as a normative conception of legitimacy it offers a theory of what justifies the exercise of power over free and equal people.
From the Empirical to the Normative
Etzioni thinks that the public justification or deliberative conception of legitimacy is problematic both at the empirical level and at the normative level. His core argument is that people are just not like that. Individuals do not deliberate about what is legitimate and not legitimate and then come to reasoned conclusions. But I want to argue that there is so much distance between his normative conception of legitimacy (core universal values) and his empirical conception of legitimacy (embedded moral dialogues) that only a conception of deliberation can bridge this gap.
How do people come to believe that some things are legitimate and others are not? Etzioni wants to stress that the processes in question are broad, amorphous, and essentially communal. A community's underlying cultural values change over time. That change is brought about through millions of overlapping conversations and interactions which are in turn shaped by changing empirical and causal circumstances. It is important to Etzioni to stress that these processes are outside the control of individual agency. Social science and especially social psychology point to the fact that “the self is both originally shaped and continuously affected by communal environment in ways that the self is unaware of” (110). The causal direction is clear. Individual preferences, including the preference for certain values, that is, a set of ideas about what is or is not legitimate, are the product of acculturation and socialization that the individual has only very limited power to control.
Etzioni calls the communal processes through which societies develop and transmit beliefs about legitimacy moral dialogues. The main point here is that legitimacy is embedded in culture. Communities or polities or cultural groups are the entities that consider certain things legitimate and others not. The content of legitimacy changes over time through this very broad communal conversation.
What then is the relationship between these deeply natural processes whereby communities come to see some things as legitimate and some things as not, and the universal core values? Here Etzioni appears surreptitiously to reintroduce agency and indeed a form of soft deliberative rationalism. We can and do use these core values to criticize other cultures. But more interesting is the claim that communities will naturally hit upon these core values if they have access to open moral dialogue. Etzioni claims that openness or access to “unencumbered” moral dialogues is a condition of the spread of universal values. But one must ask: What is it about open or unencumbered moral dialogue that moves people toward universal values? It must be a critical process of examination and deliberation. The more views that are allowed to be aired, the closer we come to truths. This sounds very Millian and perhaps even Habermasian. And if the role of deliberation was in doubt, Etzioni adds: “I stress that the approach here outlined starts with values that speak to us directly, but that are then subject to the scrutiny of communal moral dialogues as well as personal deliberations, rather than remaining free from examination. Indeed moral dialogues are essential not merely to peel off layers of traditionalism and indoctrination, but also to provide for the examination and specification of the initial claim” (119).
Thus between very general core values and specific ideas of what is legitimate there is a lot of talk, and the more open, critical, and, I would say, deliberative is that talk, the better.
Etzioni values deliberation for its ability to bring moral truth to light, on the one hand, and to shape these moral values into principles of legitimacy, on the other. He does not value deliberation because it is a process through which we can push past Rousseau's paradox. One reason for this is that he steadfastly refuses to see deliberation and dialogue in individual terms. The best we can hope for is that shared understandings appropriately tap into universal core values. But the nonrationalism of his empirical conception fits poorly with the rationalism necessary to access and perfect universal values. In the end he cannot avoid individuals taking stands on questions of legitimacy. Perhaps he is more a Hegelian than a Kantian, but in any event he concedes that progress is brought about by people turning a critical eye on their inherited beliefs to deliberately bring them in line with universals.
