Enlightenment 2.0 has been praised by literary commentators across the country and was recently awarded the 2014 Shaughnessy Cohen Prize for Political Writing. Political scientists are unlikely to be as impressed.
In this new popular book, University of Toronto philosopher Joseph Heath defends a bold and vast programme for progressives the world over. The volume has three parts, corresponding to the three steps of his argument. The first argues that reason is instrumental in the process of pursuing progress. Given our innumerable cognitive biases and the mismatches between our tribal gut feelings and civilized life, reason needs to be highly valued, something both the “hippie left” and the “common sense” conservatives fail to do. The second part argues that reason is playing a diminishing role in our politics, especially in the United States. The rise of communication strategies that appeal to our emotions rather than to our reason is here emphasized.
The third, and most interesting section for political scientists, argues that giving back reason a central place in our politics chiefly requires a number of institutional fixes rather than always more education or simple exhortations from intellectuals to “think harder.” If nothing else, this argument is agenda-setting because what becomes clear in reading the book is that we do not actually know what kind of institutions are conducive to rational behaviour. Heath convincingly argues that such fixes are required: rational thought, to prosper, needs the right environment. The actual institutional fixes that he recommends are disappointing, however. In about twenty short pages toward the end of the book, Heath hurriedly argues, inter alia, that parliamentary regimes, bicameral systems and mandatory voting are more conducive to rational thought than presidential regimes, monocameral systems, and non-mandatory voting. Although plausible (especially the first two), these hypotheses simply remain to be tested empirically.
Empirically testing such claims would be extremely difficult, though, which brings us to the book's main shortcoming: Heath fundamentally underestimates how hard it is to distinguish rational from irrational politics in the real world (that is, to measure his “dependent variable”). This is obviously not a reason to reject his program, but the examples that Heath provides do cast doubts on its fruitfulness. Consider Heath's analysis of Quebec and Canadian nationalism. Heath uncritically accepts PierreTrudeau's view that the opposition between Quebec separatists and federalists is one between emotion and reason. For Heath, “Quebec separatism is, and always has been, driven by the ethnic nationalism of so-called pure laine Québécois… Nationalism of this form is a classic expression of our tribal social instincts” (263). In contrast, Trudeau is portrayed as “the avatar of pure reason” (266) and the 1970 October Crisis as representing “in the starkest form possible, the conundrum faced by proponents of reason in politics” (264). Heath teaches us that Trudeau reacted by “wrestling with the pig”; “a frustrated Trudeau finally gave up on his old motto [reason before passion], admitting that his faith in reason had been mistaken. ‘If they want blood and guts,’ he said, ‘I'll give them blood and guts.’ To this end… he set about creating a new national identity, in part by co-opting traditional French Canadian culture and imposing it at the national level” (265). Incredibly, Heath tells us, Trudeau's cynical strategy has had some success: Quebec continues to produce tribal nationalists, but they now seem to have been partly co-opted. Hence, he reports that “Quebec artists essentially boycotted the [2010 Vancouver] Olympic ceremonies, refusing to participate in what they rightly anticipated would be an orgy of Canadian nationalism. And yet, when the curtain closed, they proceeded to complain about the lack of ‘French content’ in the program” (266).
To any serious student of Canadian politics, such “analysis” will seem like a caricature. Quebec separatism and the defense of the French language are not simply about tribal instincts but about achieving equality. Far from being the avatar of pure reason, Trudeau was just as subject to gut feelings as anyone else. Reducing power dynamics between Canada and Quebec to a cleavage between “reason” and “crazy” is poor social science. Rationality and irrationality certainly cohabit in politics, but impartially distinguishing the one from the other in the real world is not as straightforward as Heath suggests.
In spite of these shortcomings, Enlightenment 2.0 aptly popularizes philosophy, economics and psychology literatures and raises a good question for political scientists: How can we move toward a saner, more “reasoned” politics?
