According to the influential readings of Leo Strauss and his followers, Rousseau endorses the political practice of the ancient republics but breaks decisively with the theoretical commitments of ancient philosophy. Plutarch's noble heroes may have stirred Rousseau's heart, these readers maintain, but it is the materialist ideas of Hobbes that animate his thought. In Rousseau's Platonic Enlightenment, David Lay Williams challenges this familiar interpretation, arguing that Rousseau “is among the greatest and most consistent Platonists of the modern era,” despite his obvious rejection of the distinctive institutional practices proposed in Plato's Republic and Laws (94).
Williams identifies the intellectual core of Platonism as “the commitment to transcendent ideas as the ultimate authority for moral and political arguments” (xxvii). His Rousseau embraces this commitment and is, therefore, far more critic than follower of Hobbes. The conflict between this “Platonic transcendentalism” and “Hobbesian positivism” constitutes the central drama of Williams's book (xxvii). Though his primary focus rests on the intellectual conflict between Rousseau and Hobbes (chapters 3–6), Williams's gaze ranges widely across the history of political philosophy, and he descries reflections of the Rousseau-Hobbes debate in a variety of philosophical conflicts: between Plato and the sophists (the preface), Locke and Hobbes (chapter 1), the modern Platonists and the philosophes who frequented the salon of the Baron d'Holbach (chapter 2), the early Kant and the Kant of the critical period (chapter 7), and, finally, between the politically engaged Marx and Foucault who forthrightly decry injustice and the social-scientific Marx and Foucault, who primly deny that any transcendent standard of right exists (chapter 8).
Williams encounters no difficulty either in demonstrating Rousseau's express hostility to Hobbes's materialism and positivism (92, 125) or in establishing Rousseau's express confidence in the existence of absolute and transcendent moral norms (73–76, 108). Among the most compelling pieces of evidence for the latter claim are Rousseau's observation in the Social Contract, that “what is good and conformable to order is so by the nature of things and independently of human convention” and the tutor's declaration in Emile that “the eternal laws of nature and order do exist” (quoted, 76). Following Christopher Kelly, Williams maintains that Rousseau rejected the practice of esoteric writing and so insists that Rousseau's express statements of hostility to Hobbesianism and support for Platonism must be credited (64).
To discover the metaphysical foundations of Rousseau's Platonic transcendentalism, Williams turns to the Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar, found in the middle of book four of Emile (chapter 3). Engaging directly with the arguments of Arthur Melzer and Victor Gourevitch, who deny that Rousseau endorses all the articles of the Vicar's faith, Williams maintains that the Vicar's address in fact demonstrates “Rousseau's commitment to the central doctrines of modern Platonic metaphysics—the existence of God, free will, an immaterial soul, and transcendent ideas” (62). Unlike Roger Masters, who argues that the metaphysical teachings of the Profession are “detachable” from Rousseau's politics (95), Williams regards these as the essential foundation of his political theory.
Building upon this foundation, Williams rejects the familiar view that the general will “is grounded on nothing more than consent” (94); he maintains instead that it is constrained by “the transcendent idea of justice” (95, 113). In other words, he insists that what distinguishes the general will from the will of all is the substantive conformity of the popular will to the transcendent standard of justice, not such purely formal criteria as whether the whole people have contributed to the formation of the putatively general will or whether the content of that will is a measure that applies to some particular individual or to the people as a whole (95, 177).
Obviously, if Rousseau holds that the legitimacy of legislative enactments is determined by their substantive conformity to a Platonic idea of justice, it must be asked why he would favor political institutions grounded upon popular sovereignty over Plato's institutional proposal that philosopher-kings rule absolutely. Williams anticipates the question and provides two answers. First, he argues that the transcendent ideas are “indeterminate” and may be realized in a number of different ways, depending upon the circumstances in which the ideas are to be realized (120–21). That one Platonist endorses one set of institutional arrangements for one environment need not entail that all other Platonists must endorse the same arrangements when the conditions are different. Second, and more importantly, Williams contends that, unlike Plato, Rousseau holds that “virtually everyone possesses the ability to know the simple moral truths required of a sovereign” (176). Williams's Rousseau holds that knowledge of the transcendent idea of justice is available to all or nearly all because it is, in his view, gained not through study of geometry, mathematics, music, solid geometry, astronomy, and dialectic, but by consulting one's sentiments and heeding the natural voice of conscience (75, 177).
Unfortunately, as Rousseau's epigraph to the Discourse on the Sciences and Arts asserts, we are often “deceived by the appearance of right.” Rousseau may hold the conscience to be infallible, but Williams stresses that Rousseau knows well that we are often unable to hear its quiet voice. In chapter 5, “Of Chains, Caves, and Slaves,” Williams explores the uses Rousseau makes of Plato's celebrated image of the cave from book 7 of the Republic, and he identifies the many ways Rousseau sees that we can be seduced by pleasure or deceived by false claims of right and thus “enchained” and enslaved to illegitimate authorities. Williams's tracing of the connections between Rousseau's account of the emergence of despotism in the Discourse on Inequality and both Marx's account of ideology and Foucault's account of “power-knowledge relations” is carefully done and extremely perceptive (chapter 8).
The claim that the general will is transcendentally constrained, however, is the centerpiece of Williams's account of Rousseau's Platonism, and it is the fulcrum upon which the whole argument of the book turns. As Williams insists, “it is a matter of great importance” whether substantive, transcendent standards of justice exist and are relevant to politics, or not (xxix). If they do exist, and are relevant, then claims of justice and human rights are meaningful and can be vindicated; if they do not exist, or exist but are irrelevant, then there is no real alternative to submitting to the rule of the strongest. It is, in his view, either Plato or Hobbes: there is no third alternative. Williams's explorations of Rousseau's predecessors and successors seek to illustrate the inescapability of this choice and the unacceptable consequences of siding with Hobbes over Plato.
Rousseau's Platonic Enlightenment is a model of thoughtful and sustained philosophical argument, and Williams is a sympathetic and careful reader of Rousseau. He has evidently learned much from his engagement with the commentators and from his effort to situate Rousseau's contributions within a larger intellectual narrative, and his work is rich with insights. Whether or not one is persuaded by its central claim, Rousseau's Platonic Enlightenment provides the most comprehensive account available of Rousseau's use of Platonic themes, and it offers a provocative argument bound to stimulate readers interested in Rousseau or the larger tradition of political thought.
