Making Religion Safe for Democracy tackles an increasingly important—and frustratingly familiar—question for our “postsecular” age. Can liberal democracy be reconciled with religion, especially when that religion is muscular, energized, and no longer content to remain in the private sphere? And, perhaps even more pressing for those of our profession, as Owen puts it in the introduction: “Is political theory, and in particular liberal political theory, as we find it today capable of responding, or even grasping what is at stake” (ix–x)?
The answer, it seems, is no. As Owen presents it, liberalism has been a victim of its own success. The book depicts our present predicament as a political philosophical achievement of the Enlightenment. Its four chapters offer close readings of the authors Owen believes best illustrate that process (Isaac Backus, Jefferson, Tocqueville), along with those most integral to it (Hobbes, Locke). His hope, it seems, is that by recovering the efforts of these “early liberal philosoph[ers] of the Enlightenment” (9) with respect to religion—and understanding them as achievements—modern liberals might finally give up their facile and unpersuasive assertion of the essential distinction between “religion” and “politics” only they are inclined to accept and appreciate instead the engaged and transformative attitude towards religion, and the willingness to do theological work, that have defined “liberal” political thought, as Owen characterizes it, from the very beginning.
Whether he thinks his readers should embrace that project is less clear. The book's four chapters offer nuanced and often original close readings of Backus and Jefferson, Hobbes, Locke, and Tocqueville respectively. The all too brief treatment of Backus, who remains undeservedly neglected by theorists, is particularly welcome. Nevertheless, Owen makes clear that it is the spirit of Hobbes and Locke, via Jefferson, that has triumphed in modern America. Moreover, he argues, it was this quasi-Hobbesian “indifferentist” religion, and not the separatist enthusiasm of evangelicals like Backus, that Tocqueville identified in his greatest work, thus troubling the mainstream view of American exceptionalism when it comes to secularization.
The diagnosis is compelling; however, the prescription remains, perhaps deliberately, obscure. While the individual chapters are powerful, the book reads like a series of interpretive essays on a theme, rather than one continuous argument. It ends abruptly, with a conclusion of only a few pages. One wishes that Owen had spent more time tying his argumentative threads together and explaining to his readers what hope, if any, these authors might offer for the present in the United States or in any other liberal (or nonliberal) democracies—after all, all the world is not America. Furthermore, while Owen is a masterfully close reader of texts and the possessor of an enviable knack of bringing together the disparate parts of an author's corpus in unexpected and enlightening ways (his chapter on Locke is particularly impressive), his haphazard approach to the scholarly literature leads him to overstate his originality. Mark Button's Contract, Culture, and Citizenship (2008) and Matt Scherer's Beyond Church and State (2013), for example, speak helpfully to the theme of transformative—even conversionary—liberalism, while recent work by Douglas Casson on Locke and enthusiasm, or the contributions by Jeffrey Collins, Arash Abizadeh, and Kinch Hoekstra, among others, to the ever expanding literature on Hobbes and religious toleration have offered sophisticated readings of Owen's authors on religion that cover much of the same terrain and anticipate many of his arguments.
This lack of engagement with other scholarship is particularly jarring in the Hobbes chapter. Owen presents the Taylor-Warrender thesis about the place of God in Hobbes's theory of obligation as the state of the debate on Hobbes and religion. The debate has, blessedly, moved on—or perhaps backwards. Clarendon seems to have anticipated much of Owen's argument about Hobbesian theology as a counsel to mundanity and indifference in 1676: “It may appear very wonderful … that after sixteen hundred years Mr Hobbes should arise a new Evangelist, to make the joies of Heaven more indifferent, and the pains of Hell less formidable, then ever any Christian hath before attempted” (A Brief View and Survey of … Leviathan [Oxford, 1676], 219).
Other problems arise owing to Owen's uneven use of historical context. Although he occasionally deploys historical detail to great effect—as when he notes Locke's Socinian reception or the presence of Bayle's Dictionnaire (and hence a debt to Hobbes) in Jefferson's donations to the Library of Congress—at other times, Owen's insistence on sola scriptura leads to interpretive lapses, leaving mysterious what need not be. A prime example is Hobbes's discussion of “unpleasing priests” in Leviathan chap. 12, “not only among Catholics, but even in that church that hath presumed most of reformation.” Owen claims, significantly, that “Hobbes leaves unclear which church he has in mind” (36), but in fact he makes very clear elsewhere that he means the Presbyterians. This is not simply pedantry; it is important for understanding Hobbes's project, as regards religion generally, and for the interpretation of a passage on which Owen places a great deal of weight in particular: the so-called endorsement of the “Independency of the primitive Christians” in Leviathan chap. 47 (41, 51). In this passage, Hobbes alludes to the Independents or Congregationalists—that is, to the other leading puritan Parliamentary faction. Much scholarly ink has been spilled on this passage in recent years, and Owen would have done well to engage with these efforts to understand the relationship between Hobbes's theory and political and religious practice. Such oversights make it difficult to know whether an appeal to Locke's discussion of the relations between “Armenians [sic] and Calvinists” in Constantinople in chap. 3 is a typo or it reflects a genuine misunderstanding of the nature of the theological debates at stake in Locke's own counsel to indifference.
These criticisms should not detract from the sophisticated, nuanced, and often original readings at the book's core; nor are they meant to suggest that everyone must become a Cambridge school contextualist. Far from it. Indeed, many a contextualist could stand to learn from Owen's interpretive skill and the sense of urgency and appreciation he brings to these authors in recovering their reflections on the most pressing and permanent questions of political life. But they do, I think, reaffirm the importance of putting the bad old days of methodological sectarianism in the history of political thought behind us. Done well, contextualization makes the great thinkers of the past not less, but even more relevant to us—not only their questions, but their answers, too. Making Religion Safe for Democracy, at its best, does precisely this.
