In the late 1990s, the World Bank conducted a far-reaching research program on the causes of civil war. Were civil wars inspired mainly by genuine unresolved political grievances, or were they precipitated by predatory groups (including governments) seeking to profit monetarily from violence and instability? Among the bank's myriad findings, many of them hotly disputed, came one assertion around which there was almost universal consensus: that the single factor that made future conflict likely was past conflict concluded within the previous five years. This finding, based on exhaustive empirical research, has two profound consequences for thinkers and practitioners engaged in formulating and assessing the transition from war to peace. On the one hand, it shows that the risks and costs of failure are high. Failure to foster political reconciliation, to tackle the root causes of conflict, to rebuild shattered economies and (among other things) provide a secure environment is more likely to lead to the outbreak of war and oppression than any other factor. On the other hand, the World Bank findings show that—contra some skeptics who argue that third parties have no part to play and that political conflicts are best resolved violently—long-term success need not be a chimera: Build peace effectively for over five years and the chances of future conflict decrease dramatically. There are clear lessons for Iraq here—civil war need not be inevitable, but to avoid it requires getting a wide variety of things right that are currently going wrong.
The two books reviewed here provide very different approaches to postconflict reconstruction and reconciliation and present sharply different views in several areas. Most notably, the context of their discussion is different. Mark Amstutz focuses on how a society might rehabilitate itself after suffering from a repressive government or from terrorism, focusing on the cases of Argentina, Chile, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. Although there was violence, and lots of it, there was no collapse of central authority, no generalized war, no pitting of national or religious groups against one another in open and sustained combat. Richard Caplan's cases are different. Caplan is interested in the reconstruction of polities, economies, and societies after generalized war, when government has collapsed and new states have formed, where there was widespread open combat, where ethnic and national groups had openly targeted one another, and where economies had utterly collapsed.
To that extent, there is a difference of degree that underlies the sharpest differences between their positions. Most notably, Amstutz's skepticism about the place of war crimes trials in a process of reconciliation stems from the context of generalized oppression, rather than generalized war of which he talks. Thus, he argues that evidence of state-sponsored crimes is often sketchy, that it is difficult to secure evidence against key decision makers, and that the crimes may have been authorized by the state that remains in power (p. 39). For these reasons and others, Amstutz prefers forgiveness to trials. By contrast, Caplan argues that the prosecution of suspected war criminals is pivotal for postconflict reconstruction. In the environments that he focuses on, war criminals represent an ongoing threat to individuals and communities already traumatized by war, inhibit intergroup reconciliation by breeding mistrust, and can distort local politics. In sum, a failure to prosecute might leave in place the very people and structures that contributed to the war and compounded the suffering in the first place (p. 66).
These two positions appear irreconcilable unless it is acknowledged that the authors, while addressing a common problem, are situating that problem in different locales. As Amstutz concedes, “favourable conditions may exist” (p. 39) to permit the prosecution of suspected war criminals—most notably “when former regimes are discredited and replaced”—precisely the context that provides the backdrop for Caplan's work. Thus, while the authors do differ in important respects, those differences may be more ones of degree than anything else. Recognizing this allows one to see these two books as complementary, addressing two different but related challenges that confront those engaged in building peace after war. Indeed, together they make an important contribution to the field.
The Healing of Nations addresses the question of political reconciliation, an issue only tangentially touched on by Caplan, who focuses more on the material aspects of reconstruction. The central argument is that reconciliation after oppression requires forgiveness and that alternative approaches such as collective amnesia or legal retribution are flawed in important respects, not least because they do not directly address the question of reconciliation. Amstutz argues that forgiveness is not an “easy way out” or a means of escaping justice, as some of its critics suggest. Instead, it fulfills at least three important functions: “[I]t provides the sole way by which victims can be healed emotionally” (p. 63), it creates a context for genuine repentance on the part of perpetrators, and it facilitates reconciliation by repairing broken relationships. Forgiveness involves the recognition and acknowledgment of crimes and a willingness to provide reparations; and the collective forgiveness itself, to be successful, requires a consensus on truth, genuine remorse, a renunciation of vengeance on the part of the victims, and a high degree of empathy. After assessing the role of forgiveness in the four case studies, Amstutz concludes that although collective forgiveness has not played a “prominent role” in the process of reconciliation, there is a correlation between the degree of forgiveness and degree of reconciliation, with South Africa standing out as the case with most of both.
This book puts forward a coherent, conceptually informed view of the role of forgiveness, but the overall approach is open to a number of criticisms, and Amstutz himself recognizes some of the limitations: Certain crimes simply cannot be forgiven without criminal punishment; sometimes the degree of state fragmentation caused by oppressive rule or war mitigates against the sorts of transition that Amstutz discusses; and—it could be argued—forgiveness does little to directly address the underlying political, social, or economic causes of conflict and oppression. While important, therefore, forgiveness alone does not capture the full range of concerns that animate those interested in building peace after war. Such concerns must be set alongside the wide range of material matters raised by Caplan.
International Governance of War-Torn Territories is an important book that focuses specifically on the recent phenomenon of international administrations in territories affected by war where the former system of government has utterly collapsed or is in need of transitioning to a new form of government (as in Eastern Slavonia). Caplan offers a detailed and insightful account of transitional administrations and lucidly demonstrates the sheer scope and complexity of such endeavors. As with Amstutz's book, Caplan's focuses on a small number of cases—primarily because there have only been a relatively small number of such administrations, in Kosovo, Bosnia, Eastern Slavonia, and East Timor—but this book is organized thematically rather than by case study. Caplan begins by distinguishing between transitional administrations and peace operations, noting usefully that the former involves assuming the full reigns of government. This makes life particularly difficult in cases where the same organization assumes responsibility for government and for the associated peace operation—effectively being simultaneously the host and the intervener.
The first half of the book outlines the five critical areas that transitional administrations must address if they are to create the building blocks for self-sustaining peace: the provision of public order and security, the return of refugees and displaced persons, the provision of civil administration covering the whole range of services provided by states, the need to build political institutions to assume the reins of government, and economic reconstruction and development. In the second half, Caplan focuses on five critical problems associated with this type of operation—most notably the question of accountability. Crucially, although the role of forgiveness and emotional recognition is downplayed, the paramount conditions that make for a successful administration are the status of the different belligerents and the degree of potential for political reconciliation.
Individually, these books are powerful testaments to their particular approach to developing strategies for building peace in those crucial years after war. The differences of those approaches are clear to see in areas where the authors disagree—most notably on the relative merits of war crimes trials. Acknowledging, however, that to some extent these books are prefaced on quite different contexts allows one to see the ways in which they offer complementary accounts. In short, no amount of institution building and economic reconstruction will foster long-term sustainable peace if such activities are not conducted in tandem with political reconciliation. The converse, however, is also true. Forgiveness and reconciliation without the material and institutional building blocks for legitimate and effective future governance is unlikely to succeed by itself. Together, therefore, these books deliver salient lessons for those charged with bringing peace to Iraq.
