Damien Cahill asks whether the recent upheavals of the financial crisis spell the end of neoliberalism; he concludes that they do not, because of the continuing weakness of unions and the continuing preference for neoliberalism among state actors. His question is a worthwhile one, but the book falls far short of giving a convincing answer.

The book begins with two chapters in which Cahill attacks what he calls the “idealist” explanation of neoliberalism, which sees neoliberalism as the outcome of the thinking of neoliberal polemicists such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. Cahill draws on secondary sources to point out that neoliberal polemicists did not have such influence over policy, and notes various theoretical problems with the idealist explanation. Other scholars have been making similar points for a long time (indeed, they are the ones on whose work Cahill draws), but it is true that the idealist explanation never goes away no matter how much logic and evidence are thrown against it, so Cahill is right to take it on once again. He is particularly good at arguing against some of the more extreme claims of Philip Mirowski (pp. 33–44).

Cahill’s problems begin when he tries to put forth his alternative to the idealist explanation. He argues that neoliberalism has been embedded in class relations, the state, and ideology, and he devotes a chapter to expanding on each of these. The chapter on embeddedness in class relations briefly discusses various factors, including the globalization of production and the availability of cheap credit, but the main factor seems to be that neoliberalism is embedded in the continuing weakness of unions. The chapter on the state notes that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organization (WTO) continue to impose neoliberal policies on developing countries, and the European Union (EU) has taken a neoliberal line within Europe and other states continue to be neoliberal. The chapter on ideology suggests that elites take neoliberal ideology for granted, although the masses are more conflicted.

Thus, the continuance of neoliberalism is caused by weak unions, state organizations that prefer neoliberalism, and elites who prefer neoliberalism. But surely weak unions, state organizations that prefer neoliberalism, and elites who prefer neoliberalism are the things to be explained. The question, of course, is why unions continue to be weak; why the IMF, WTO, and EU continue to follow a neoliberal line; and why elites still take neoliberal ideology for granted, even in the wake of events that, some argue, have discredited neoliberalism. On those questions Cahill has nothing at all to say. Cahill’s work leads to the conclusion that neoliberalism is caused by…neoliberalism. Certainly policies can be path dependent, but from a book such as this, one would have wanted to see some investigation of what the mechanisms of path dependence are. Why did the financial crisis not lead political elites to rethink their assumptions? In a book with the subtitle “On the Durability of Embedded Neoliberalism,” we need some attention to that question.

Moreover, even on its own terms, the book is unconvincing. For example, Cahill sees the weakness of unions as suggesting a class explanation for neoliberalism. However, Ronald Reagan’s and Margaret Thatcher’s attacks on labor were wildly popular at the time, including among wide segments of the working classes. Cahill surely knows this, as he has read all the literature on neoliberalism, but he does not try to work through what it implies for his class explanation. The analysis in most of the book remains at this level.

The book does not feature any new data or historical evidence, so it must be judged on its ability to deliver convincing new interpretations and arguments—and on that score, it is sorely lacking.