Protagoras in the Theaetetus is, Robert Bartlett writes, a “more impressive thinker” (222) than the character in the eponymous dialogue. This Protagoras mounts a “theoretical challenge” to Socrates that questions the very possibility of political philosophy. Yet he does so in response to a deeper “theological” challenge which both thinkers face. Because they subscribe to the distinction between nature and convention that originates philosophy, Socrates, the sophists, and pre-Socratics all oppose the prophet's claim to wisdom. But their divergent responses to the prophet's “theological challenge” (203) divide Socrates from both sophists and pre-Socratics. Delineating what unites and divides these ancient thinkers, Bartlett maps the terrain occupied by Socrates's thought. Unlike most ancient maps, however, this one might still guide us, because, Bartlett argues, the hopes that fuel both pre-Socratic philosophy and sophistry endure, as therefore does the need for Socratic political philosophy to remedy the consequent defects. Bartlett's book teaches the contemporary Socratic the great worth of these challenges, and even of challenge itself; notably, Socrates himself conjures the challenge brought by the “more impressive” Protagoras.
Philosophy's original defect is evident in its dismissal of convention. Looking through the lens of nature, hoping to ascertain a comprehensive, rationally accessible order, pre-Socratics and their sophistic offspring disdain convention as mere artifice, a consoling screen erected to obscure difficult truths. Desiring to be “real [men],” not “patsies,” those like Protagoras rely on their own reason, not on the authoritative opinions conveyed by the prophets (196). The prophets’ claim to wisdom challenges Protagoras's desire for mastery, including as regards happiness. This claim challenges Socrates's desire too, but, Bartlett argues, for a different reason.
By clarifying the extensive affinity between Socrates and his predecessors, Bartlett pinpoints just what divides them. His predecessors focused on the discovery of nature; Socrates, on what it means that nature must be discovered. This need renders us seekers rather than possessors of wisdom. As such, Socrates sees, unlike his predecessors, that without a reasoned defense against the prophets’ nonrational claim, the life of reason is itself dogmatic. For Socrates, the theological challenge impugns his claim not to mastery but to self-knowledge.
Socrates's response to this challenge makes convention philosophically significant. It is the soul's character that renders nature something sought rather than possessed. Thus, in undertaking that search, it is crucial to consider its launching point, to reflect on the soul's content and character. Law supplies the notions of good that shape the soul's understanding. It also provides the most evident display of its enduring hopes. Socrates's remedy for philosophy must take the form of political philosophy. The midwifery or dialectics that examines authoritative opinion, in “the only laboratory available to him,” “the human soul revealed in speech,” expresses Socrates's decisive philosophic insight (197). Only in this way can he avoid his predecessors’ substitution of how things are with how they wish them to be. If I understand him correctly, Bartlett judges that this examination makes possible a nondogmatic response to the theological as well as theoretical challenge, eliciting the “stable human perspective” that alone justifies Socrates's own “terrible love of speeches” (Tht. 169c1).
Bartlett shows Socrates at work in the “digression” and in his analysis of Protagoras's three-legged thesis. The latter discloses the cracks in its logical structure that reveal Protagoras's hopes. So great is his desire to “[protect] his own view of the world from attack” (203) that Protagoras willingly propounds a doctrine of flux, the heart of his “theoretical challenge” to political philosophy, that invalidates his own claim to wisdom; he is satisfied if the prophets’ claim suffers the same fate. Bartlett argues that Protagoras's speech undermines the stability even of the good. But the dialogue form lets us also consider Protagoras's deeds, which suggest persistent seriousness about his own good: he does consider the “theological challenge” as a challenge and does undertake a strenuous theoretical response. These deeds may be what vindicates Socrates's continued practice of midwifery even after Protagoras's attempt to show its inadequacy.
Socrates's approach elicits the variety of views of good and his interlocutors’ seriousness about it. But why find this seriousness more impressive than the variety? Why does Socrates derive from his conversations a “stable human perspective” (221) rather than the utter idiosyncrasy of each individual's perception? Bartlett asks how Socrates can “resist the pull of… flux,” posing the question of the rational basis of the philosophic life (223).
Yet in considering how Socrates subordinates the hope for mastery to that for clarity, Bartlett highlights “steadiness,” a virtue not simply reducible to knowledge. Steadiness is the courage to face truths that conflict with one's fondest hopes. It is an unwillingness “to ‘flee’ this world as it is” (196), which Socrates enacts with the self-imposed Protagorean challenge.
Bartlett argues that Protagoras “anticipates a hope,” animating modern political thought (217). Thus, steadiness remains a philosophic requirement. “Present-day scholars” find Protagoras's art of measurement compelling because they share its animating desire for the mastery that guarantees “an inviolable happiness neither chance nor time can damage,” a “salvation” attainable “through altogether human means” (217). When impassioned hopes for reason's mastery go unfulfilled, despair about reason's overall efficacy arises: hence the “kinship” Bartlett notes between Protagoreanism and “contemporary moral-epistemological relativism” (3). We have apparently again walked the path from pre-Socratic philosophy to sophistry, modern philosophy's dogmatic rationalism eliciting the dogmatic skepticism of postmodernism. Because reason is again challenged, the philosophy formulated to respond to reason's crisis remains significant.
Still, the importance of “steadiness” suggests the difficulty of such a response. If philosophy's basis is not reason but “taste or natural inclination” (202), we are left with Protagorean idiosyncrasy. But to hope that reason can provide the comprehensive account that precludes the prophets’ claim is to lapse into dogmatic rationalism. Bartlett illuminates this difficulty in all its depth by tracing its roots to the soul's distinctive power and characteristic longings. Yet precisely in doing so, he discloses a “stable human concern.” Reflection on why it is a human concern, and therefore stable, may be what provides the contemporary Socratic what it did for Socrates: not a rational account of all things but “knowledge, sufficient for life,” specifically, the philosophic life “as Socrates lived it” (223, 4).
Bartlett guides readers to this “concern” in a manner true to Socrates's approach. Because it requires the overcoming of passions, the decision to pursue philosophy must rest with each individual. Philosophy's attractiveness may be learned but not so clearly taught—at least not directly. Bartlett addresses readers’ divergent hopes when he juxtaposes a “rock-solid metaphysical foundation” (1) with “permanent questions” (3) as alternative bases for political philosophy, or when he moves from the abstract considerations of the book's title to the subtitle's conflict between two individuals justifying their “manifestly different lives” (4). He does so, more generally, by leaving us with the deepest challenge, the theological, as a spur to further inquiry.
Bartlett's Socrates embraces the contestability of his own premises. This will to self-scrutiny testifies to the worth of the self-knowledge needed to begin to satisfy the stable human concern for the genuine good. Socrates clearly possesses the steadiness required to live with less than comforting truths. But, as Bartlett indicates, it is not all gritting of teeth and girding of loins. Love of the genuine good and the pleasure of knowing it, which Protagoreanism neglects, fuels Socrates's effort. Opening a path to this pleasure, Robert Bartlett's book encourages Socratic steadiness. It thus prepares an aspiring Socratic for an otherwise unimaginable insight: the great worth of challenges even or especially to our deepest longings.
