While much of the literature on contemporary Russia focuses on the supersized role played by President Vladimir Putin, there is a parallel stream of works that probes the structural underpinnings of his authoritarian regime. Graeme Gill, a veteran observer of Soviet and Russian affairs, contributes to this literature with this compact and clearly written book, which displays a sure command of the material and a wealth of detail.

In the introductory chapter, Gill reviews the state of the literature on authoritarian regimes, focusing, respectively, on opposition strategies (Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik (2011) Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Post-Communist Countries); international influences (Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way (2010) Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War); economic patronage (Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion and Authoritarian Durability.” Perspectives on Politics 10 [4, 2012]: 869–889); and the strength of the ruling party (Barbara Geddes, “Authoritarian Breakdown and Regime Transitions.” Perspectives on Politics 12 [2, 2014]: 313–331). He focuses on political institutions and does not delve into questions of identity politics or the cultural and historical roots of authoritarianism in Russia.

Ruling elites must build institutions to make and implement decisions, as well as to manage public involvement. In the case of Russia, the ruling elite has been highly centralized around the figure of the president. A central theme of the book is that of continuity from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin: The latter represents more a completion of authoritarian trends begun under Yeltsin than a turn away from a democratic path that he had started, which is the more conventional view.

Democracy failed because the elite was not interested in building a democracy (p. 199). Yeltsin (and to a lesser extent Putin) was rhetorically committed to democracy, but was unwilling to share power with opposition forces.

Chapter 2 addresses the Kremlin’s efforts to restrict social movements, control the media, and build popular legitimacy. One paradox that authoritarian rulers face is that in shutting down autonomous social movements, they risk losing the ability to track and adapt to changes in society. Chapter 3, on the party system, devotes most its attention to the electoral rules. Elections are a weak link in the system, requiring constant tinkering. United Russia is a weak institution: a party of rulers, not a ruling party (p. 158). Gill downplays the likelihood of fraud in the 2011 elections (p. 105)—but does not mention the obviously falsified results from the North Caucasus. Chapter 4 looks at the structures of power—the construction of a presidential system, the marginalization of parliament, and Yeltsin’s inability to gain control over the regions.

Gill sees continuity after Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012, unlike most observers, who see a radical shift toward conservative ideology after the December 2011 street protests. The author argues that those conservative values were present from the beginning of Putin’s rule (p. 62). Drawing on Levada Center polling, he shows a public disillusioned with its capacity to bring about change. Consistently, about 20% were willing to go into the streets to support the regime, and only 10% to oppose it (p. 74).

By focusing on structural factors, the narrative passes over several forks in the road where Russian authoritarianism could have taken a different course. There is no discussion of the parliamentary rebellion of October 1993 (mentioned on p. 31), when Yeltsin shelled the parliament into submission. Similarly, Gill downplays the street protests in December 2011 in response to perceived fraud in the State Duma elections; for example, he gives no estimates of their size, which reached more than 100,000 (p. 41). The crisis of fall 1999, when regional elites came close to breaking the Kremlin’s monopoly on power, is passed over in a single paragraph (p. 181). The onset of war in Chechnya played a pivotal role in Putin’s ability to consolidate his grip on power in late 1999, as it did in Yeltsin’s narrow reelection in 1996. But Chechnya is only mentioned in passing, and does not feature in Gill’s analysis of the structuring of authoritarian rule in Russia.

Aside from those dramatic (albeit unsuccessful) challenges to the Kremlin’s power, in the 1990s when opposition parties controlled the parliament, there were myriad ways in which they caused problems for Yeltsin, from rejecting budgets to trying to impeach him. But these tussles do not find their way into the analysis.

Chapter 5 addresses elite stabilization. Gill argues that “Russia is clearly a case of limited pluralism,” with Putin more a manager than a controller (p. 201). He lays out three types of authoritarian leader, who may come from the dominant faction, a minority faction, or none (p. 164). He argues that Yeltsin, Putin, and Dmitry Medvedev all fall into the third category. Members of the president’s inner circle were recruited on the basis of either their personal loyalty or their policy affiliation. Putin stabilized the elite through ideological consensus and effective management, with rich rewards for loyal cadres. The elite enjoys a high degree of autonomy from society and from Western influence (p. 195). The author does not delve into the role of the informal networks that have been central to Putin’s exercise of power, but he does acknowledge that elite stability is threatened by the tension between personal ties and institutional power (p. 201).

Gill writes of Putin that “pictures of his well-muscled body with his shirt off became cultural icons during his first two terms” (p. 192). But the first release of bare-chested photos was in the summer of 2007—presumably in a bid to boost Putin’s personal charisma in anticipation of his stepping down from the presidency in 2008.

Unfortunately, Building an Authoritarian Polity was finished in late 2013, before the March 2014 annexation of Crimea, which profoundly reshaped the dynamics of Putin’s Russia. The conflict with Ukraine (like the wars in Georgia in 2008 and Chechnya in 1999) reminds us that the military represents a crucial pillar of Putin’s regime. Gill does not discuss their role, or the crucial question of whether they can be relied on to repress large-scale unrest. With Putin likely to stay in power until 2024 (at least), Gill will have plenty of opportunity to revisit his model in the years to come.