Case C-482/17, Czech Republic v European Parliament, Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1035
The Czech Republic submitted an application for the annulment of Directive 2017/853, on the grounds that the Directive violates four constitutional principles of EU law, namely: (1) the principle of conferral of powers; (2) the principle of proportionality; (3) the principle of legal certainty; and (4) the principle of equal treatment. In response to this, Advocate-General Sharpston argued that the Directive does not breach any of the principles, and instead facilitates the functioning of the internal market and preserves public safety. The judgment of the ECJ corresponded with A-G Sharpston's argument, and it rejected the annulment request on all counts.
I. Facts
Pursuant to a report in 2014 on the application of Directive 91/477 on the control of acquisition and possession of weapons, and a series of terrorist attacks in Paris (France) and Copenhagen (Denmark) in 2015 that resulted in the deaths of several people, the EU Commission submitted a proposal on amending Directive 91/477.Footnote 1 Following the adoption of the proposal, the EU legislature established Directive 2017/853 on 17 May 2017.
The Czech Republic contested the validity of Directive 2017/853 before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). It raised two applications, one for interim measures and the other for annulment. Its application for interim measures contained an application for an action for the stay of the implementation of Directive 2017/853 pending the delivery of judgment. It argued that the implementation of Directive 2017/853 would cause an administrative burden, staffing challenges, huge financial costs, and potentially move legal firearms into the illegal market. Pursuant to Article 160(3) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court, an order for interim measures can only be granted if the interim measure is justified in fact and law, and that it is urgent to avoid serious and irreparable damage to the applicant’s interests. Declining the application for interim measures, the Court held that the Czech Republic was obliged to implement the Directives in accordance with Article 288 TFEU, and that the claims raised by the Czech Republic were not sufficient to satisfy the provisions of Article 160(3).
II. Judgment
Under its application for annulment, the Czech Republic raised its pleas under four constitutional principles of EU law, namely: (1) the principle of conferral of powers; (2) the principle of proportionality; (3) the principle of legal certainty; and (4) the principle of equal treatment. This commentary analyses the ECJ’s judgment and Advocate General Sharpston’s Opinion in this case, on the basis of those principles.
1. The principle of conferral and legal basis
This principle stipulates that the EU is limited to competences conferred upon it by the Member States. The Czech Republic alleged that Article 114 TFEU was not a valid legal basis for Directive 2017/853. It claimed that recitals 2 and 23 of the Directive stated public safety as the main objective of the Directive, and as such there was no link to the objective of eliminating obstacles in the internal market. In contrast, the Advocate General submitted that the joint interpretation of the recital and the substance of the Directive was required to determine its main purpose.Footnote 2
This argument is in accordance with case law, which states that “the choice of the legal basis for a measure must be guided by objective factors, the aim and content of the measure”.Footnote 3 In this case, this would mean the recital and articles of Directive 2017/853, as proposed by the Advocate General. This therefore raises a question about the extent to which Article 114 can be used as a legal basis.
Article 114 empowers the EU legislature to adopt measures to harmonise all national laws with the aim of facilitating the functioning of the internal market, and also addressing other concerns, provided that the conditions for recourse to Article 114 as a legal basis are fulfilled.Footnote 4 This criterion, established in the Tobacco Advertising case,Footnote 5 does little to limit the extent to which objectives of general interest could be stretched to prevent disparities. Here, Directive 2017/853 provides mainly for more firearms control. Nevertheless, the Advocate General argued that the Directive reduces the need for states to adopt individual – and possibly divergent – public safety measures, which could in turn impede the circulation of goods.Footnote 6 The Court, in dismissing the Czech Republic’s arguments, seemed to suggest that the EU legislature should be given “freedom to amend relevant EU legislation” to enable it to fulfil its task of safeguarding the general interest.Footnote 7
This arguably suggests that the criteria established in the Tobacco Advertising case for recourse to Article 114 afford the EU an almost limitless discretion on issues of general interest, and could be exploited by the EU to indirectly influence issues over which it has no direct authority. Nonetheless, public safety is of great importance and constitutes a genuine general interest, hence both the Court and the Advocate General rightly asserted that Article 114 could be used as a legal basis in this case.
2. The principle of proportionality
This principle requires that measures implemented through EU legislation should be appropriate for attaining the legitimate objectives pursued and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve them.Footnote 8 The Czech Republic alleged that the EU legislature breached this principle by failing to assess the proportionality of the measures in Directive 2017/853, and as a result adopted disproportionate measures under Article 1(6), Article 1(7) and Article 1(19) of Directive 2017/853. It also alleged that the absence of an impact assessment meant that the EU legislature did not analyse the interference of the measures with private rights, particularly the right to own and possess firearms, and whether this was necessary.
The main issue for consideration here is whether conducting an impact assessment is mandatory in order to demonstrate the necessity of a measure? The Advocate General stated that the EU was not obliged to conduct an impact assessment, because the rules on impact assessment set out in Points 12–16 in Part III of the Inter-institutional Agreement (“Tools for better law-making”)Footnote 9 do not contain mandatory terms (such as shall and must). She admitted, though, that impact assessment was an expected step in adopting EU legislation; it facilitated transparent law making, and its omission raised concerns.Footnote 10 Nonetheless, the Advocate General stated that these concerns were addressed in this case, as Directive 2017/853 was established based on some reports, including the proposal by the EU Commission, and the urgent need to adopt the legislation in the light of terrorist events in 2015.Footnote 11
Contrary to Advocate General Sharpston’s interpretation of the Inter-institutional Agreement, the ECJ stated that the provisions of Points 12–16 imply that an impact assessment is a mandatory step, if legislation is liable to have significant economic, environment or social implications.Footnote 12 The Court did not define what it meant by “significant economic, environment or social implications”, however this could mean substantial economic, environment or social changes in the EU. It is unlikely that Directive 2017/853 raises such implications here.
Further to this, the Court stated that the absence of an impact assessment will not constitute a breach of the principle of proportionality “where the EU legislature is in a particular situation requiring it to be dispensed with and has sufficient information enabling it to assess the proportionality of an adopted measure”.Footnote 13 The aim of conducting an impact assessment was to provide “evidence to inform and support decision-making”.Footnote 14 This suggested that an assessment may not be mandatory if there was sufficient evidence to prove that an EU action was required. In this case the use of firearms in the 2015 terror attacks to cause severe casualties, and the threat of further attacks, arguably constituted sufficient evidence of the need for tighter gun control, as well as evidence of the potential for diverging national laws that could hinder trade. It was unlikely that an impact assessment in this instance would provide contrary evidence suggesting that such EU action was not warranted, but would rather re-affirm the need for EU action. Therefore, the Court and Advocate General Sharpston rightly asserted that the absence of an impact assessment here was not contrary to the proportionality principle in this case.
3. The principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectation
The principle of legal certainty requires that rules of law be clear, precise, and predictable in their effect, so that interested parties can ascertain their position in situations governed by EU law.Footnote 15 The Czech Republic alleged that Article 1(6), Article 1(7) and Article 1(19), read individually, were unclear and breached the principle of legal certainty. In contrast, the Advocate General argued that the articles should not be read in isolation, but rather in conjunction with recital 23 of Directive 2017/853,Footnote 16 and that the joint interpretation of both provisions was clear and precise.Footnote 17 This assertion is correct, and was re-affirmed by the ECJ, which stated that the combined interpretation of the provisions did “not give rise to any confusion”,Footnote 18 and therefore were not in breach of this principle.
Furthermore, Advocate General Sharpston argued that the Czech Republic could not rely on the principle of legitimate expectation, as no evidence existed that any of the EU institutions had issued any assurances that might suggest that firearms would not be re-categorised in future.Footnote 19 This assertion is correct and in line with case law, which states that “the right to rely on the principle of legitimate expectation extends to persons to whom an institution of the European Union has given justified hopes”.Footnote 20 Even if a justified hope had been given, which was not the case here, it is unlikely that the right to rely on such hope would be upheld. This is because such a right cannot be invoked to prevent a new rule from being applicable to future effects of situations which arose under an earlier rule.Footnote 21
The Advocate General also rejected the Czech Republic’s argument that Article 7(a) was retroactive. An Act is considered to be retroactive if it takes effect from a date in the past. In this case, Article 7(4a) gives states the discretion to confirm, renew or prolong authorisations for semi-automatic weapons lawfully acquired and registered before 13 June 2017. This arguably applies only to the present and future use of semi-automatic weapons. Nevertheless, the Court rightly noted that the Czech Republic failed to establish that the EU legislature had created legitimate expectation or imposed retroactive application under Article 7(a).Footnote 22 Therefore, the ECJ and Advocate General Sharpston rightly asserted that the Directive did not breach the principle of legitimate expectation.
4. The principle of equal treatment
The principle of equal treatment requires comparable situations to be treated in the same way, and different situations to be treated differently, unless such treatment is justified.Footnote 23 The Czech Republic claimed that Article 6(6) of the Directive, which provides an exception for Switzerland to the prohibition of category A weapons, breached this principle. In response, the Advocate General stated that a comparable situation does not exist amongst all states, as Switzerland’s unique military practiceFootnote 24 distinguished it from other target states, and therefore created a non-comparable situation.Footnote 25 The ECJ supported this view and held that no comparable situation existed.Footnote 26
This assertion seems to be wrong, as a comparable situation did exist in this case. In assessing whether a comparable situation existed, the elements which characterise different situations must be assessed in the light of the subject-matter and purpose of the relevant act, as well as the principles and objectives of the field to which the act relates.Footnote 27 Here, the fact that Switzerland had a reserve army based on conscription, yet EU Member States did not, should not be the relevant “situation” for analysis. Rather, the “situation” was the intrinsically dangerous nature of firearms and their potential to be misused with harmful consequences, which was the same everywhere, and therefore no state should be exempt from the rules. Since all firearms are intrinsically dangerous, and the acquisition/possession of firearms in any state can pose a danger to public safety, a comparable situation existed.
Despite the fact that a comparable situation arguably existed between the states with respect for the potential for firearms to be misused, the exception seems to be justified. “A difference in treatment is justified if the difference relates to: a) a legally permitted aim pursued by the legislation in question, and b) it is proportionate to the aim pursued by the treatment”.Footnote 28 As rightly stated by the Advocate General, Article 6(6) of Directive 2017/853 seemed to be in line with Article 4(2) TEU, which requires the EU to respect the national identities of members.Footnote 29 Hence, the exception fulfilled the first condition.
With regard to the second condition, the exception does not confer any benefit on Switzerland, but rather restricts the issuance of firearms to persons leaving the army. It provides that such persons can be given firearms in “their capacity as target shooters”, and further subjects them to the same conditions imposed on other target shooters. Arguably, by mentioning the Swiss military culture, the EU restricted the acquisition, retention or transfer of firearms to individuals after military service. Therefore, Article 6(6) satisfied the second condition. Based on this, both the ECJ and Advocate General Sharpston rightly asserted that the provisions of Directive 2017/853 did not breach the principle of equal treatment.
III. Conclusion
This case is significant as it raises constitutional issues under EU law. It highlights that the EU legislature has broad discretion to harmonise the laws of Member States to achieve objectives of general interest. The Opinion by Advocate General Sharpston and the ECJ’s judgment arguably expand this discretion even further, especially regarding the adoption of Article 114 as a legal basis. Firearms control and prevention of terrorist attacks is an important objective, where broad legislative discretion is warranted to evoke urgent and strong actions. However, such situations require judicial scrutiny to hold the legislature accountable to the public, and ensure that legislative powers are not abused. Nonetheless, in this case the provisions of Directive 2017/853 seem proportionate to its aims and objectives, and fall within the EU legislature’s powers. Therefore, the ECJ and Advocate General Sharpston rightly stated that the provisions of Directive 2017/853 did not breach the principles of conferral of powers, proportionality, legal certainty and equal treatment.
