In this essay, I review three recent first books by young scholars working on questions of oil and political power in the Persian Gulf. These books present contemporary thought on what can be called the process of hegemonic transformation in the Middle East. Each offers significant contributions to our current understanding of the rise—and possible decline—of American regional influence. Stephen G. Galpern provides important insights on the often-overlooked role of monetary policy in imperial strategy, and provides the most sophisticated analysis of what he describes as “the nebulous nature of the boundary between the public and private sectors in a case in which the lines were especially blurred” (p. 17). Ivan L. G. Pearson offers a nuanced analysis of what might be called the subaltern power of client states in his attempt to demonstrate the continued influence of the British Empire on the postwar Middle East. Andrew Scott Cooper covers the most recent period and raises important issues pertaining to the decline of American influence in the region that demand further theorization. Taken together, these books chart the rise and fall of Great Powers in the Middle East over the course of the late 20th century. While all three should be of interest to specialists, Andrew Scott Cooper's highly readable narrative is particularly well suited for use in an undergraduate classroom.
Steven G. Galpern’s, Money, Oil, and Empire in the Middle East analyzes the transition from British to American hegemony with an emphasis on the underappreciated role of money and monetary policy in world politics. He argues that British policymakers—believing the value of the British pound sterling to be inextricably linked to Britain's influence internationally—were, in the aftermath of World War II, determined to preserve the value of the pound at virtually any cost. This policy orientation was particularly problematic because it set the declining British Empire on a collision course with both “the rising tide of nationalism in the postwar Middle East and the emergence of the United States as a competing power in the region” (p. 2).
The conflict with the United States stemmed from a clash between British visions for a revived postwar empire and American designs for a liberal, multilateral, U.S.-centered world economic order. Whereas Britain responded to the Great Depression and World War II by developing a neomercantilist system of trade and capital controls applied to its colonies, dependencies, and protectorates, the United States sought to impose an “imperialism of free trade” on a British Empire that was reluctant to liberalize (pp. 23–24). In the name of the “Open Door,” American officials demanded the dismantling of trade barriers restricting American corporations from doing business within the bounds of the British Empire—the so-called “sterling bloc.”
Nowhere was the contradiction between British and American interests sharper than in the Middle East, which was soon to become the center of gravity in global oil production. British and American differences centered on who should control the political economy of oil and how to deal with nationalism in the postwar Middle East. The United States, as a newcomer to the region, had interests that were more structurally aligned with those of Middle Eastern nationalists. While the British remained committed to preserving an entrenched colonial order, the United States sought to displace British power by cultivating an alliance with nationalist leaders and championing the value of national self-determination.
Whereas the United States saw communism and the Soviet Union as the principle threat to “Western” interests in the region and sought to cultivate nationalism as an anticommunist force, Britain considered American fears of communism as hyperbolic and regarded American efforts to cultivate an alliance with nationalism as naive (p. 81). From Britain's standpoint, it was nationalism, and not communism, that represented the greatest threat to Western interests in the region. As Galpern shows, this contradiction was manifest in Anglo-American differences over the emergence of nationalist governments in Iran and Egypt in the early 1950s. In both of these cases, Britain was unwilling to accommodate nationalism due to the importance of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Suez Canal Company to the British balance of payments and the overall health of the pound sterling. However, British intransigence only hastened the collapse of British influence in both countries and the broader region and created an opportunity for the United States to capitalize on British misfortune.
Ivan L. G. Pearson covers much of the same ground with his book, In the Name of Oil. But in contrast to Galpern's emphasis on friction and conflict in Anglo-American relations, Pearson shows how Britain forged a new collaborative relationship with the United States over the course of the 1950s in order to retain influence in the Middle East. What is most interesting about Pearson's work is his subtle and nuanced analysis of how power operates in the international system. He offers an incisive “regionalist” critique of traditional “realist theories of international relations that emphasize the primacy of great powers in world affairs” (p. 2). He is particularly critical of the dominant “realist” narrative of the Middle East as an exclusive theater of U.S.–Soviet confrontation. Drawing on anthropological studies of patron–client relations, Pearson offers a theoretically adept approach to overcoming traditional realism's fixation on executive decision-making and military capacity. Rather than reducing all questions of power and influence to military capacity, Pearson confronts the “paradox of unrealized power”—that is, situations in which “materially stronger states” are unable to “impose their will on resource-inferior states” (p. 9).
In Pearson's case, he seeks to show why the relatively strong U.S. “patron” was unable to impose its will on its much weaker British “client.” On a broad conceptual level he seeks to dismantle what Avi Shlaim describes as the myth of the “Great Power Puppeteer and the Regional Puppet” (p. 3). Pearson does this by showing how the British were able to subtly manipulate U.S. policy in the Middle East to maximize British political and economic interests. No one articulated the logic of this strategy as clearly as British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in the closing days of World War II: “you will always permit your American colleague not only to have a superior rank to yourself and much higher pay, but also the feeling that he is running the show. This will enable you to run it yourself” (p. 6).
To do this, British officials, through a process of trial and error in the early 1950s, learned to play upon the Americans’ exaggerated sense of the communist threat to the Middle East. The ultimate example was the joint Anglo-American overthrow of Mohammad Mossadeq in Iran. In that instance, British intelligence chief Monty Woodhouse sought U.S. support for a coup by emphasizing “the Communist threat to Iran rather than the need to recover control of the oil industry” (p. 29). Anglo-American collaboration in the removal of Mosaddeq established the model that British policymakers would follow throughout the region over the course of the 1950s. Key to Britain's strategy was mastering divisions within the fragmented American foreign policy establishment by circumventing the relatively pro-Arab State Department and appealing directly to the more reflexively anticommunist elements in the CIA (pp. 179–80).
When compared to Galpern, Pearson sees much less conflict between U.S. and British interests in the Middle East. Indeed, it may be fair to conclude that Galpern's more narrow focus on monetary relations leads him to exaggerate the tensions between the United States and Britain. While the two powers may have disagreed on monetary issues, and the United States may have been more willing to entertain an alliance with nationalism in pursuit of its own interests in the region, the joint operation against Mossadeq indicates that, when push came to shove, the United States was as opposed to radical nationalism as were the British. As Pearson shows, the British were able to manipulate the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy because the U.S. commitment to national self-determination was always more rhetorical and tactical than substantive.
Despite these differing points of emphasis regarding the early 1950s, both authors agree that by the late 1950s, the United States and Britain developed a stable and cooperative relationship with a clearly delineated division of imperial labor. The United States would provide military and economic assistance to the “front line states”—those bordering the Soviet Union—while the British would maintain a naval presence to ensure the security of Persian Gulf shipping lanes. This relationship held over the course of the 1960s and facilitated a gradual devolution of power to allied states in the region—Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait chief among them. However, by the late 1960s, British Labor governments, responding to British public opinion, had grown disillusioned with the idea of empire and the burdens it entailed. Just as Americans grew increasingly overextended financially and militarily in Vietnam, so too were Britons growing weary of the expense of policing the Gulf. U.S. domestic and Vietnam War spending triggered a massive wave of inflation throughout the global economy. Worldwide inflationary pressures only made it more difficult for the British to maintain the value of the pound sterling and the British naval presence in the Gulf.
Under these pressures, the British made the twin decisions in 1968 to allow the value of the British pound to float on world markets and to begin removing all military forces from east of the Suez Canal. As one British member of parliament put it: “Why should we not, like other European countries, obtain oil from the Persian Gulf by paying for it instead of maintaining forces there?” (quoted in Galpern, p. 264). By the late 1960s, the British were increasingly inclined to rely on market forces to supply oil to western economies, but this only brought them into deepening conflict with the United States, which still believed a military presence necessary to ensuring the security of Persian Gulf shipping lanes.
This perceived security vacuum in the Gulf establishes the context for Andrew Scott Cooper's The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East. Cooper draws on recently declassified U.S. archival sources to offer documentary support for what many have long suspected: that beginning in 1969, the Nixon administration initiated a series of secret agreements that allowed the shah of Iran to spike oil prices in order to finance the shah's arms import program (pp. 6–8). What is most interesting and original about Cooper's work is that he shows how this policy of unrestricted arms sales to Iran overturned a prior effort on the part of the United States to limit Iranian arms purchases, and how U.S. policymakers eventually came to bitterly regret empowering the shah in this way. Most provocatively of all, Cooper argues that officials in the Ford administration eventually came to believe that they “had no choice but to throw [their] support behind a remarkable plan” to ally with the Saudis in order to break the power of the shah, knowing full well that breaking with the shah could spell doom for the Iranian monarch's increasingly fragile regime (p. 7).
Cooper begins by situating the 1969 green light to increase oil prices within a broader historical context. He shows that in the 1960s, American officials, already concerned about the shah's domestic legitimacy, feared that “overspending on military imports to the neglect of the civilian economy would destabilize the shah's rule” (p. 23). In an effort to head off this danger, “Washington erected a fiscal firewall to ensure that the shah's appetite for military equipment did not drain too much capital from Iran's civilian economy” (p. 23). This firewall, named after General Hamilton Twitchell, the chief of the U.S. military mission to Iran, was known as the Twitchell Doctrine.
When President Richard Nixon came into office in January 1969, he and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger quickly began to dismantle the Twitchell Doctrine and replace it with the so-called “Nixon Doctrine”—a strategic concept that envisioned Iran taking responsibility for ensuring the security of Persian Gulf shipping lanes in the face of British naval withdrawal from the region and American military overextension in Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger understood that “the shah could only assume the burden of defending their interests if Iran's revenue stream expanded to generate the money to buy new advanced weapon systems, which in turn meant engineering modest increases in the price of oil and at regular intervals” (p. 26). While the basic contours of this arrangement have been understood for a long time, Cooper presents a wealth of recently declassified documents to demonstrate just exactly how the U.S.–Iranian “special relationship” developed.
The implications of this policy became apparent almost immediately. In the midst of the October 1973 Arab–Israeli war, the shah capitalized on the crisis atmosphere to implement a fourfold increase in the price of oil. However, in so doing, the shah opened up a fissure in U.S.–Iranian relations that would continue to widen over the course of the 1970s. Policymakers led by Treasury Secretary and “oil czar” William Simon were quickest to anticipate that higher energy costs would exacerbate a rate of inflation that had been growing rapidly since the late 1960s (pp. 151–55). By 1974, Simon was an advocate of distancing the United States from the shah and limiting arms sales to his regime.
The shah continued to have advocates among prominent U.S. officials, but space for critique of the shah's regime increasingly widened over the course of the 1970s (pp. 240–46). By the mid-1970s, Jack Anderson of the Washington Post was waging a concerted campaign of criticism directed at the shah's oil gouging policies (pp. 268–73). In 1975, Anderson reported on a devastating leaked CIA psychological profile of the shah (p. 271). The Agency employed a Freudian analysis to argue that the shah was driven by deep-seated insecurities of masculine inadequacy. The report raised increasing concerns over the instability of the shah's emotional, psychological, and physical health, and suggested that the United States begin to plan for a post-shah order in the Gulf (pp. 280–89). The argument that the U.S. was increasingly prepared to sever ties with the shah may be difficult for many scholars to accept. Much of the existing literature emphasizes the extent to which the United States clung to the shah's regime to the “bitter end,” but the evidence presented by Cooper is difficult to discount.
Cooper argues that the key turning point occurred in December 1976, when Saudi Arabia, in consultation with the United States, initiated an oil war with Iran. Saudi Arabia publically opposed the shah's call for a new round of OPEC oil price increases and indicated that it would not abide by OPEC's decision to increase prices. In defiance of majority opinion within OPEC, Saudi Arabia unilaterally increased production from 8.5 to 11.8 million barrels a day (pp. 359–60). The shah and other OPEC price hawks accused Saudi Oil Minister Zakai Yamani of being a U.S. puppet, but the Saudis persisted in their price-cutting drive (pp. 359–60). The Saudis’ price restraint was so unpopular within the kingdom that oil workers went so far as to sabotage Saudi oil production (pp. 370–71).
Saudi Arabia's persistence in the face of public criticism raises an important question regarding Saudi motives. What compelled the Saudis to adopt this position? Cooper is not clear on this crucial question. He states that Yamani “offered three justifications,” but does not list them explicitly (p. 361). However, Cooper does suggest somewhat obliquely that the Saudis acted out of concern for the stability of western economies, in exchange for the United States allowing the Saudis to play a greater role in managing regional affairs (particularly the Arab–Israeli conflict, see p. 340), and out of a desire to check Iran's military spending and replace Iran as the United States’ chief ally in the region (pp. 362–63).
Whatever the Saudi motives, their oil war was successful. In June 1977, the shah finally capitulated and agreed to cut prices (pp. 382–83). In the face of an undiminished appetite for arms, and reduced oil revenue, Iran fell into an increasingly deep fiscal crisis. The shah then implemented austerity measures that enflamed Iranian opinion and tipped the economy into a prerevolutionary situation. In this way, Cooper shows how the policy of unlimited arms sales to Iran sowed the unmaking of the shah's regime.
In chronicling the rise and fall of the U.S.–Iranian special relationship, Cooper has captured a critical moment in the history of the Gulf and the larger world system. The collapse of the shah's regime represents the most significant turning point in the history of U.S.–Middle East relations. The overthrow of the shah set the stage for Iraq's 1980 invasion of Iran and triggered the beginning of what Toby C. Jones calls the “long war” that has continued in one form or another ever since.Footnote 1 Among the first historians to analyze the international relations of the period on the basis of recently declassified documents, Cooper raises a number of important issues that should attract the attention of scholars. Chief among these is the role that the arms trade played in the concatenations of the global economy in the 1970s. Cooper's discussion of the parochial motives of U.S. arms sales to Iran begs further analysis (see esp. pp. 71–72). His research suggests, without fully developing, the idea that just as scholars have long analyzed the role of oil companies in shaping the foreign policies of nation-states, they should apply the same focus to defense contractors. Scholars have long argued about the role of oil and oil companies in the making of global capitalism. Cooper offers an important starting place to think about the role of arms and arms makers in the making of the contemporary world system.
Taken together, these three books chart an evolving balance of power in the postwar Middle East. As the period opened, Britain remained the dominant power in the region. Galpern and Pearson show how the British position was gradually eclipsed by the United States—as well as the particular role that oil played in this process. Cooper explores the limits of U.S. power in the region and explicates origins and dynamics of recent and contemporary trends. While Galpern and Pearson offer conceptual insights that would be particularly welcome in a graduate seminar, Cooper offers an intriguing narrative that should capture the attention of specialists and nonspecialists alike.
