In this thorough, detailed, and nuanced study, Robert Litwak examines the question of how states that defy international norms, especially on terrorism and nuclear proliferation, can be influenced to comply with these norms and be “reintegrated into the ‘community of nations’” (p. xiv). At a time when proliferation is a profound concern, a particular value of the book lies not only in its valuable analysis of past cases, including successes and failures, but in its integration of broader questions about state behavior and international norms. A central premise of his study and a key policy dilemma is that the leaders of these “outlier” states, especially Iran and North Korea, regard integration itself as threatening to the survival of their regimes. In developing this analysis, Litwak takes the reader through the changing nomenclature used to describe these kinds of states, extending from the early designation of “rogue” states in the late 1970s and 1980s, and into the Clinton administration’s eventual change of language to “states of concern”, the Bush era reuse of “rogues”, and the Obama presidency’s adoption of the term “outlier states”. For Litwak, this is more than a matter of semantics. Citing Daniel Patrick Moynihan, he notes that words are a reflection of the concepts that underlie them and that they have fundamental practical consequences. As an example, in explaining the Clinton administration’s decision to shift its use of terminology, he notes that “relegation of states to rogue state status complicated the ability of the Clinton administration to conduct normal diplomacy with them” (p. 2).

In Outlier States, Litwak argues that the issue he is addressing, the challenge to world order by states that defy its prevailing norms, is one of the central concerns of international politics. He begins by providing context in both historical and conceptual terms and by defining what it means to describe a country as an “outlier” state. Here he describes how, around 1980, the definition of rogue or pariah states shifted from a focus on internal conduct to how states behaved in their external conduct, especially in the sponsoring of terrorism and in their efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The distinction between internal and external behavior is not always easy to maintain. Thus, in describing recent cases, Litwak writes that, “The Libyan case highlights the challenge that U.S. policymakers face with other outlier states – Iran and North Korea – in addressing breaches of external norms (terrorism and proliferation) without ignoring egregious violations of internal behavioral norms (human rights)” (p. 127).

Litwak develops the discussion of international norms by examining four pathways by which defiant states have been reintegrated in the past century. These include assimilation of a defeated power (Nazi Germany), gradual evolution of a revolutionary state toward orthodox great power behavior (USSR and China), change of regime through foreign intervention (Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and Tanzania’s of Uganda in 1979), and change from within (Romania 1989). The book then considers how American strategy toward outliers has evolved, and here he includes case studies of Iraq, Libya, Iran, and North Korea, with an emphasis on the latter two and on the dynamics of nuclear proliferation. Here too, he addresses the question of whether power shifts in the international system, especially the rise of the BRICS and others, will affect existing norms and their enforcement.

An important contribution of the book lies in its knowledgeable treatment of policies toward outlier states, especially in the range of measures that have led to change. The work concludes with policy-relevant findings and with recommendations. In his view, efforts to change outlier behavior must include assurances that there will be no external intervention if the target state changes its external behavior. In Litwak’s words, “The outlier states pose a frontal challenge to the global nuclear order whose cornerstone is the NPT [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty]”. With both North Korea and Iran, a retooled strategy of containment – one combining coercive diplomacy, deterrence, and reassurance – would decouple the nuclear issue from the question of regime change and harness internal forces as the agent of social change” (p. 175). Litwak argues that, on a policy continuum, such a strategy lies between the poles of engagement and military action and the policy dilemma that those choices represent (p. 187).

Robert Litwak’s book will be valuable for those wishing to grasp not only the history, but also the policy difficulties that characterize serious efforts to combat nuclear proliferation and state support of terrorism. At the same time, there are points to debate concerning this thought provoking book. One issue (a subtle matter of interpretation) is whether, in explaining the behavior of rogue or outlier states, sufficient weight is given to the element of agency, i.e., the extent to which their external behavior is motivated by their own internal logic, preferences, ideology, history, and path dependency, as contrasted with the policies and actions of the United States. In fairness, Litwak does devote some attention to the internal character of these regimes, but the issue here is one of emphasis, and the book’s focus in the North Korea and Iran cases may put more of the responsibility for actual or potential outcomes on Washington’s policies than on the motivations, priorities, and choices intrinsic to these regimes.

Another caveat concerns a trope altogether too common in the treatment of the Bush era (2001-09), in which a Manichean distinction is drawn between that administration’s unilateralism as a departure from those who have come before and after. One example will suffice. As evidence of Bush’s unilateralism, Litwak notes that after 9/11, Bush declared that the United States would not “seek a permission slip” from the UN in order to defend itself, and that this logic underlied the decision for preventive war against Iraq in 2003 (p. 179). The quote is accurate, but the sin of omission here is that such impulses were not entirely unique to the Bush administration. A more balanced account would have noted that the fateful decision was supported by a 29–21 majority of the Democrats in the Senate vote on the issue (October 11, 2002). Moreover, those voting in favor included not only party stalwarts such as Harry Reid and Hillary Clinton, but also the party’s subsequent 2004 presidential nominee, John Kerry. Indeed, Kerry’s acceptance speech at the Democratic national convention in July 2004 included words nearly synonymous with those of George Bush, “I will never give any nation or international institution a veto over our national security.”

In all, this is an authoritative, substantive, and well-written account that will be essential reading for students, scholars, and the attentive public who wish to understand the problem of outlier states and the policy challenges they represent.