Jon Nixon's book joins a line of scholarship exploring the relationship between Hannah Arendt's life and her thought. For Nixon, the idea of friendship is a particularly useful concept for understanding her personal relationships and her political theory. Much of the intellectual biography that Nixon presents is not new (see, for example, the work of Young-Bruehl, Villa, Wolin, and Maier-Katkin), but it is presented in a particularly comprehensible and engaging manner. Nixon's contribution is to theorize an Arendtian conception of friendship that is consonant with her thought and serves as a thread through much of her life. The book begins with Arendt's historical context and early life. The next two chapters and final two chapters are more theoretically oriented. Sandwiched between them are chapters that provide sketches of her relationships with Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers, Mary McCarthy, and Heinrich Blücher. The theoretical discussions of Arendt's work are concise and well formulated, but not meant to be comprehensive. The book is very accessible and clearly written and moves at a brisk pace. Even if others have covered the intellectual/biographical ground, Nixon's book is a great place to start thinking about Arendt and her times.
The heart of Nixon's project, however, rests on the proposition that “to understand her [Arendt's] life we must… relate it to her work, and to understand the work we must relate it to her life” (viii). More specifically, how Arendt experienced her friendships tells us something about her theoretical conceptions of plurality, power, worldliness, and politics, and her theorization of politics tells us something about her friendships. Out of this to-and-fro emerges Nixon's Arendtian theory of friendship. This theory construes friendship as a halfway house between the public and private as well as a space that fosters the movement from solitary thinking to thinking in dialogue with others (192). It is distinguishable from the involuntary bonds of kinship and the intimate bonds of lovers (8) and conditioned by equality, trust, mutual respect, duty, and the promise of continuity (190). Arendtian friendship is very much alive to the world that is created between friends precisely because it admits differences that allow for multiple perspectives. Friends do not shut one another down because they differ. Consequently, the activity of being friends is a kind of dispositional training ground for political interaction (195). Moreover, Nixon contends that the cooperation that Arendt experienced with her friends was an expression of her idea of power as acting in concert (146). In sum, friendship both sustains and models the polity (37).
Even though Arendt never offered an extensive discussion of friendship, much of Nixon's theory seems to accord with significant elements of Arendt's larger political theory. For example, Arendt's own brief comments on the topic directly confirm the connections Nixon draws between friendship and discourse and friendship and plurality. While Nixon gets us to a plausible Arendtian theory of friendship, I am less confident about the manner of our arrival. Seeing Arendtian friendship as a kind of halfway house between the public and the private helps to ease Nixon's to-and-fro between her life and thought. Arendt's comments on friendship, however, suggest not a halfway house, but a house divided between public and private. If we take Arendt's comments in her essay “On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts about Lessing” as expressing a nascent theory of friendship, then certain puzzles emerge in Nixon's employment of Arendt's actual friendships. In that essay, Arendt distinguishes between how we see friendship and how the Greeks saw friendship. We tend to see friendship as a relationship of intimacy, in which friends open their hearts to one another. We tend to believe that we reveal ourselves only in our face-to-face encounters. In contrast, the Greeks saw discourse as the essence of friendship. It was through talk about the common world that the polis was sustained. The intimacies associated with contemporary friendships are not so much connected to eros or romantic love, but to the desire to talk about ourselves—how we are doing, our successes and failures, our secrets and dreams. In the stories that Nixon tells about Arendt's friendships, they appear much closer to the sentimental, intimate modern variety than the sober, world-building understanding that sustained the polis. In particular, her friendships with Heidegger (her lover) and Blücher (her second husband) were permeated with erotic love—a very unpolitical, if not antipolitical sentiment for Arendt. Even on Nixon's retelling, Arendt's postwar relationship to Heidegger seems lopsided and largely driven by Arendt's craving for his recognition. Given the complex motivations and desires that sustained these relationships (motivations that go beyond friendship), it is difficult to discern what we can learn about friendship per se from these two relationships. Nixon is aware of these issues (141, 55), but it may be that Arendt's friendships with McCarthy and Jaspers come closer to being motivated by philia as she understood it. Nixon's account raises the question of exactly how much of a political theory of friendship one can (and perhaps should) squeeze out of Arendt's personal life.
Alternatively, one can ask whether Nixon imports too much of Arendt's political thought into her personal friendships. For example, in Arendt's theory of politics, promising provides a stabilizing force against the unpredictabilities of the human condition. It allows actors to generate islands of certainty about the future, enabling them to act together despite the contingencies that accompany any human endeavor. It is therefore an important element of her notion of power. Clearly, Arendt did not need a notion of friendship to explicate a conception of promising. Promising, however, shows up in Nixon's account of Arendtian friendship even though he notes that “friendships do not usually involve promising” (39). Perhaps Nixon is suggesting that because promising can play the stabilizing function in Arendt's theory of politics, it can also fulfill this function in friendship. So, Nixon argues, friendship contains an implicit promise that the friends will continually seek to sustain one another as free and equal persons within the world (50).
The difficulty of reading Arendt's political theory back into her personal relationships is not that Nixon's general conclusion about the role of promising in friendship is mistaken. Rather, it is that in the absence of compelling evidence that Arendt saw her friendships in those terms and the possibility that the stabilities and continuities of friendships that she prized could be understood in other ways, it is not clear that promising was central to her friendships. Perhaps it is not promising but character that generated the expectations of continuity and the pluralism that Arendt treasured. These features of friendship could be a function of her beliefs about the sorts of people she thought her friends were and the sort of person she wanted to be. What were her friends disposed (as opposed to obligated) to do? Could they count on her? Would she abandon them “when the chips were down”? These questions may be ones of character and virtue rather than promises and obligations. Perhaps Nixon has read into Arendt's personal life a political concept of promising that may not be needed or that Arendt did not employ. Reading biography and theory together can be productive. Arendt most certainly saw her own work as responding to her context. The risk is that those productions may distort the theory and/or the experiences of theorist.
