The often elegiac and wistful tone of this book suggests that it represents something of a labor of love. It has been a long time in the making: some of the interviews go back to 1959, only ten years after the young Tareq Ismael saw the bodies of the communist leaders Yusuf Salman Yusuf (Fahd), Zaki Basim, and Husayn Muhammad al-Shabibi hanging in public in Baghdad's al-Karkh, Bab al-Sharqi, and Bab al-Muʿadhdham. The book is an in some ways exhaustive account of the various transformations and tergiversations of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) from its foundation until very recently, or, as the title of the concluding chapter has it, “From Vanguard Activism to Rearguard Opportunism.” I say “in some ways exhaustive,” because, for example, Ismael does not tell us the names of those who were hanged with Fahd; for that one has to go to Hanna Batatu (The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed Classes and its Communists, Ba'thists and Free Officers [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978], pp. 568–69).
The author's explorations of a number of key themes make this book a significant contribution to the historiography of modern Iraq as well as to broader issues. Among the latter are the paradoxical relationship of Third World communist parties in states where they were not tolerated both to the USSR and to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the role of “democratic centralism,” the theoretical and practical underpinnings of an “independent Communist line,” and of course the narrative history of the Iraqi communist movement from the 1980s until the present.
In contrast to Hanna Batatu, who is oddly optimistic in this respect, Ismael makes no bones about the fact that he considers the Baʿthists (or at least many individual Baʿthists) to be sadistic torturers and murderers, to whom no quarter should be given (see, for example, pp. 107–13, 225–26, 260), or at best as unprincipled opportunists who, inter alia, exploited the gullibility and simplistic aspirations of the communists of the 1960s and 1970s in order to achieve power and then proceeded to liquidate them. Given that Batatu was writing after the Baʿth's decisive turn against the ICP in 1976, it is somewhat jarring that his penultimate page (p. 1,133) should contain the sentence “[the Ba'thists] are . . . in closer touch with their people and with reality than at any time since their advent to power,” which I take to be at least vaguely positive.
Ismael is a little less explicit than Johan Franzén (Red Star Over Iraq: The Iraqi Communist Party and the Evolution of Ideological Politics in Pre-Saddam Iraq [London: Hurst, 2011]), who suggests that the Baʿth's own fate might have been very different had the ICP “not listened to the Soviet Union” and opposed the Baʿth more single-mindedly between 1968 and 1972. Yet Ismael would probably agree that without communist support it would have been difficult for the Baʿth to survive those years.
A major debate among ICP members in the 1970s and 1980s was whether the party should have tried to seize power at some point between 1959 and 1963. As far as its immortal soul was concerned, it certainly should have attempted to do so, which is probably what one faction, headed by Secretary General Salam ʿAdil, whom Ismael depicts as a man of unimpeachable honesty and decency, would have wished. How far it might have succeeded is difficult to judge—although the army was still highly politicized—but at this distance it is tempting to speculate on the nature of the moral victory a heroic failure would have brought. Of course the party did not attempt to seize power; in fact, it proceeded, with indecent haste soon after its decimation at the hands of the Baʿth early in 1963, to dally with ʿAbd al-Salam ʿArif just as it had with Qasim and would subsequently do with the Baʿth in the early 1970s. This “unnatural” turn of events was largely due to the close relations forged with the CPSU by senior party members in exile in eastern Europe who, whether out of conviction or opportunism, toed the CPSU's line on the potentially progressive character of the ICP's unlikely partners.
The Soviet Union's relentless insistence on regarding first Qasim, then ʿArif, and then the post-1968 Baʿth as suitably “progressive” associates inflicted terrible damage on the ICP. Those who had been tortured by the Baʿth, and the relatives of those the Baʿth had murdered, found it unconscionable that they should be expected to forgive and forget and to praise the depth of their erstwhile opponents’ commitments to anti-imperialism. Egyptian communists for a time, and Syrian communists for much longer, had to suffer similar indignities, which led to the formation of innumerable splinter groups and in the Syrian case to the wry observation that the whole of the “official” Syrian party could be accommodated in the reception room of Khalid Bakdash's house.
Describing the situation in the immediate aftermath of the revolution of 1958, Ismael quotes Hesqal Kojaman, a strong supporter of Salam ʿAdil, writing many years later: “a few days after 14 July 1958 . . . the Baʿth . . . announced the end of the [National] Front and identified the ICP as the principal enemy of the revolution over and above imperialism . . .” (my emphasis) (p. 78). In the same vein, the British ambassador to Iraq reported a meeting with Saddam Husayn in December 1969 in which the latter's visceral dislike of the ICP emerged clearly:
We [British officialdom] were totally wrong if we believed Iraqi Ba'athists to have any natural affinity with the Soviet bloc. Ba'athism had nothing to do with Communism. He [Saddam Husayn] well knew that the long-term aims of the Soviet Union were to communize the world and subject it to Muscovite domination. He . . . heartily disliked the presence in Iraq of a Communist Party sponsored by Moscow (Glen Balfour Paul, Baghdad, to Peter Tripp, Foreign Office, 20 December 1969, FCO 17/871).
It is almost incomprehensible that such veterans of the struggle as Zaki Khairi, Amir ʿAbdullah, and Bahaʾ al-Din Nuri, all of whom had spent many years in prison, were prepared to swallow the contemporary claptrap praising the “progressive national bourgeoisie” or the merits of the “noncapitalist road.” Almost as astonishing, given the CPSU's own experience with the Nazis in World War II, is that it did not recognize, or perhaps chose not to recognize, the Baʿth as having come out of the same or from a very similar mold. It was also the case that the extreme “democratic centralism” adopted by this wing of the ICP cut it off almost completely from its supposed proletarian roots.
Ismael sets out the other side of this coin in Chapter 5 through a long and devastating critique of the ICP-CC (Central Committee), which he has summarized from a paper by Najim Mahmud of the ICP-CL (Central Leadership) published in 1980. Mahmud attacks “the Soviet policy revisionists [who] deviated towards the rightist, opportunist interest of American imperialism . . . and created obstacles for the proletarian struggle in the Third World” (p. 210) and goes on to advocate a “broad revolutionary alliance” to create a “new socialist Iraq” (p. 220). At this point the reader is almost tempted to throw up his or her hands and call down a plague on both their houses; the collaborators are unprincipled, the advocates of armed struggle naïve in the extreme. Chapters 6 and 7 chronicle the journey further down the primrose path in the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in the acceptance, in July 2003, by Hamid Majid Musa, the secretary general of the ICP, of a seat on Paul Bremer's Iraqi Governing Council (p. 302).
It is indeed difficult to envisage the “proper role” of Third World communist parties after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in spite of Ismael's moral indignation, it is just possible to imagine that Hamid Majid Musa thought he might wield more influence inside than outside the counsels of the regime—in the company not only of Ahmad Chalabi, certainly, but also of ʿAbd al-ʿAziz al-Hakim, Muhammad Bahr al-ʿUlum, ʿAdnan Pachachi, Nasir Kamil Chadirchi, Masʾud Barzani, Jalal Talabani, and other luminaries. Of course it was a far cry from the profound conviction of a Fahd or a Salam ʿAdil, but, as Iraqis say, holding up their hands in despair, “Shu nasawi?” (What [else] can we do)?
The book has a number of occasionally irritating defects, some of which can and should be remedied in any future edition. First, there is no bibliography, an odd omission from a book published by Cambridge University Press. Second, the index tiresomely groups all words beginning with the definite article al so that, for example, Yasin al-Hashimi appears under “a” rather than “h.” A more serious omission (at least after Chapter 1) is the virtual absence of any reference to works in languages other than Arabic. Because much of the Arabic material consists either of party reports and documents or pièces justificatives by individuals explaining their decision to stay in or leave the party, it is quite limited in scope. Thus Batatu, who is more informative than Ismael about many key episodes until about the mid-1960s, gets rather short shrift. Charles Tripp, who has written the best narrative history of modern Iraq, now in its third edition (A History of Iraq [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007]), and Pierre-Jean Luizard, one of the most perceptive commentators on modern Iraq, are not mentioned at all.
Finally, apart from the fact that it is easy to get lost in the welter of detail and that the narrative often jumps erratically backward and forward, there is, especially after the mid-1970s, insufficient attention to “scene setting” either at the Iraqi or regional/Middle Eastern level. The Iranian Revolution is mentioned only twice (pp. 186, 239), neither time in the context of its effects on Iraqi politics or of the “Shiʿi revival.” The central question of the role of communist parties after the fall of the Soviet Union is not addressed at all. That said, much of the “labor of love” aspect of this book shines through. One can only agree with Ismael's statement that “Iraqi communists have included, and still include, some of the most prolific intellectuals in the country” (p. 319). The opinions expressed in Chapter 5, on the ICP-CL in the 1970s, are conveyed in a most sympathetic manner, although the author sometimes shakes his head at their evident impracticality. Even the ICP-CC's subservience to the Soviet Union is described more in sorrow than in anger. One would so much wish it had been otherwise: alas the achievement of the ICP's goal, waṭan ḥurr wa-shaʿb saʿīd (a free homeland and a happy people), seems as far off today as when the slogan was first coined in the 1930s.
