The Bretton Woods conference of 1944 established the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) alongside the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IBRD subsequently expanded with the creation of the International Finance Corporation in 1956, the International Development Association in 1960, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes in 1966, and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency in 1988, in the process becoming the World Bank Group.
Ėric Toussaint approaches the task of writing the history of the World Bank as a passionate advocate for change rather than a dispassionate historian. He is currently the president of the Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt (CADTM) that was established in Belgium in 1990 with the aim of cancelling external public debt and “radically transforming the world’s institutional and financial framework” (CADTM 2007). The book draws together his wide personal experience in missions in the Global South, mainly on behalf of CADTM, and analysis of voluminous documents produced by the World Bank. As might be expected, the book is full of detailed information and critical insight, which allows him to construct a sweeping critique of the activities of the World Bank, and to indict it on thirty-two charges (pp. 335–338). The solution is to abolish the World Bank (and IMF) and create a new global architecture.
In Toussaint’s account, the World Bank “methodically supported despotic regimes” (p. 1), funded increased exploitation by colonial powers after the war, backed military coups, served American aims in the Cold War, sustained apartheid in South Africa, and acted as enforcer for private creditors. Behind such policies was the “hidden agenda of the Washington Consensus” (p. 3). The public agenda of poverty reduction masks this other agenda that reflects the United States’ drive for worldwide dominance, freedom for capitalism from the constraints of social mobilization in both the Global North and South, and the intensification of a “productivist-extractivist” economic model. As a result, poverty has been reproduced rather than replaced. Toussaint looks for a radical break with this model by rejecting the use of public debt as a road to development and switching to legitimate loans and socially just taxes. The break will, he hopes, come from social movements demanding an end to “the slavery of debt and oppression” (p. 9).
This demand for debt reduction or cancellation extends beyond CADTM. Joseph Stiglitz, who had been chief economist at the World Bank from 1997 to 2000, was invited by the late Pope Francis to chair a commission of the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences calling for an end to debt—and similar views have been expressed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), amongst others. An intellectual historian might place Toussaint’s book as a powerful statement within a long and wide discussion about the use of debt as a tool of exploitation that goes back to criticism of British loans to India and of American capital in Latin America and the Caribbean before the First World War, through to the Bandung Conference, the creation of UNCTAD and the New International Economic Order. What his book does not provide is an account of the intellectual history of the Bank or its critics. Toussaint’s use of the Bank’s documents and his personal experience are impressive, but he is not attuned to the political and ideological debates within which the history of the Bank should be located.
In the first chapter, Toussaint discusses the origins of the Bretton Woods institutions and has some brief comments on debates within the US administration. However, he misses the work of historians such as Eric Helleiner on Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and the Making of the Postwar Order (Reference Helleiner2014), which explains the ways that Latin American countries, the Congress party in India, and nationalist China attempted to shape the new institution, working with radical New Dealers who would sympathize with Toussaint’s hostility to the power of international finance. The subsequent shift in the Bank, and the dominance of Wall Street finance, has been analyzed by Michele Alacevich, in The Political Economy of the World Bank: The Early Years (Reference Alacevich2009), above all through the thwarted mission of the New Dealer Lauchlan Currie in Colombia—a story that continues in Jeremy Adelman’s outstanding intellectual biography, Worldly Philosopher: The Odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman (Reference Adelman2013).
By contrast with such works, based on deep archival research and engagement with the interplay of ideas, Toussaint’s book lacks nuance and subtlety. He does on occasion refer to dissenting voices within the Bank, such as Mahbub ul Haq, who criticized a failure to support Allende in Chile and to control Pinochet. But he has little to say about the different strands of thinking within the Bank and the emergence of different approaches to development. He rightly refers to intellectual terrorism within the Bank in the 1980s, led by its chief economist Anne Krueger, when there was a culture of spying to detect heretical views that led to the departure of senior figures such as Jeffrey Sachs. What the incident shows is that there were different views at play, and it would be interesting to know more about the internal debates. A good example would be debates over growth and the environment prior to the Earth Summit of 1992.
In 1991, Larry Summers—chief economist from 1991 to 1996—reflected on the forthcoming Earth Summit. The answer, according to an internal memorandum that he later claimed was sarcastic and that he signed without properly checking, was to promote the export of polluting industries to the “vastly underpolluted” South: “Just between you and me, shouldn’t the World Bank be encouraging MORE migration of the dirty industries to the Least Developed Countries? … [T]he economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage countries is impeccable and we should face up to that” (The Economist, 8 February 1992). In a public statement from which he could not distance himself, he claimed that there were “no limits on the planet’s capacity for absorption.… The idea that we should place limits on growth because of natural limitations is a serious error” (p. 235). A decade later, Krueger could claim there had been no “irreparable harm to the environment” (p. 236) and that initial deterioration caused by growth would be followed by subsequent improvement. Such views should be placed in the context of heated debates within bodies such as the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), which had, as Matthias Schmelzer has shown in The Hegemony of Growth (Reference Schmelzer2016), turned an initial pursuit of growth to a concern for the environment, and back to what Steven Bernstein has called “the compromise of liberal environmentalism” at the Earth Summit (Reference Bernstein1992). Summers and the World Bank should be placed within the context of these shifting debates. After all, the World Bank had, like the OECD, also moved from the mere pursuit of GDP to a concern for basic human needs in the work of ul Haq and others.
Toussaint does not place the World Bank within this wider literature on the intellectual history of international organizations and development. But that is to judge him according to a different standard. His book is a call to action against a level of public indebtedness that is a real and serious problem, and against economic policies that are harmful to the world. Whether the World Bank is the sole culprit might be doubted. The recent experience of Sri Lanka or Pakistan suggests that Chinese loans are also a serious problem. Toussaint looks for a new international architecture creating “fundamental international covenants” (p. 338) on human rights and the environment, with regionalized structures in place of the Bank, under the United Nations from which the Bank and IMF had escaped after the war. What he does not explain in any detail is how this outcome will be achieved. At times he looks to popular mobilization—but at the moment, this is more in the nature of right-wing populism than the idealistic policies he advocates. Change is certainly needed, but at present there is little sign that it will take the form he advocates.
