The appointments of John Roberts and Samuel Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court, contention over appointments to the lower federal courts, and recent criticisms over the role of politics in the firing of U.S. attorneys and hiring practices within the Department of Justice have all rejuvenated important questions concerning federal appointment politics. Specifically, these examples highlight concerns over the proper division of authority between the executive and legislative branches in carrying out the Constitution's Appointments Clause powers of Article 2, as well as what role politics should play in selecting and removing appointees. In his new book, Mitchel A. Sollenberger relies on extensive archival research to provide a detailed account of how the Appointments Clause was conceptualized and put into practice throughout American history. In contrast to the views of both unitary executive advocates and civil service reformers, Sollenberger argues that legislative influence over the selection of nominees (what is referred to as the “prenomination process”) has always been the norm, and that this system is the proper way to interpret and implement the republican values inherent in the U.S. Constitution.
What distinguishes Sollenberger's book is the specific focus on prenomination politics rather than the more commonly studied confirmation process, as well as his extensive use of archival research. Certainly, other recent books on judicial appointment politics have drawn extensively from archival research. Sheldon Goldman's Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt through Reagan (Yale University Press, 1997) and Christine L. Nemacheck's Strategic Selection: Presidential Nomination of Supreme Court Justices from Herbert Hoover through George W. Bush (University of Virginia Press, 2007) are excellent examples. Sollenberger, however, considers legislative influence over a broader array of federal appointments going back to the ratification of the Constitution, in a manner similar to Joseph P. Harris's The Advice and Consent of the Senate: A Study of the Confirmation of Appointments by the United States Senate (University of California Press, 1953). Sollenberger's project is ambitious, and the result is a successful and important addition to our understanding of the role that members of Congress have played in the prenomination process for a variety of federal appointments over time.
Sollenberger's primary goal is to demonstrate that members of Congress have always had a significant role in the prenomination process, and much of the focus of his book examines the constitutional debate over appointments and the early history of legislative influence in the prenomination process. As has been noted in previous works on appointment politics, senatorial courtesy developed for patronage purposes. Sollenberger notes that early American presidents who refused to play the spoils game faced reprisals, generally in the form of failed confirmation. What follows is a recounting of the historical pattern of presidents being particularly vulnerable to congressional demands when party control in the White House has changed, or when the president is unable to accommodate warring factions within his own party. Although legislative influence is primarily exerted by senators of the president's political party, Sollenberger recounts numerous examples of influence by House members or even governors or local party leaders as well.
With his assessment of the history of the prenomination process, Sollenberger specifically takes on advocates of a unitary executive, arguing that these advocates “largely ignore this history and its lasting impact on the basic constitutional principles involved in making appointments” (184–85). In short, Sollenberger argues that “[m]ore than 200 years of political practice belie the idea that the president is the only recognized actor in the pre-nomination process” (5). Sollenberger's archival research provides ample support for the argument that presidents throughout American history have either accepted legislative influence as a proper interpretation of Article 2's Appointments Clause, or have recognized the practical necessity of allowing a certain level of legislative input.
In the latter chapters of his book, Sollenberger focuses more extensively on judicial appointments, due to reform initiatives that moved many positions—particularly within the U.S. Post Office—under civil service protection. Sollenberger therefore argues that beginning with the Nixon and Ford administrations the judiciary became “the primary source of congressional patronage” (144), which led to the ongoing conflict over judicial appointments seen in recent years. In the chapter on the prenomination process from Presidents Carter to Bush 2, Sollenberger gives some sense of the complexity of the modern judicial appointment process and the resulting need for presidents to compromise with key senators of both the majority and minority parties. Certain key developments in the modern judicial appointment process (most notably the rise of interest group involvement in the prenomination process and the willingness of recent presidents to demonstrate publicly their refusal to compromise over certain nominees) are not discussed here. Although these developments have certainly altered how recent presidents have responded to legislative pressure over nominee selection, Sollenberger ably explains how key senators continue to exert pressure on the president when making nominations to judicial positions in this volatile and contentious era.
Although much of Sollenberger's focus is to demonstrate that legislators have historically had a key role in the prenomination process, Sollenberger takes this argument further with his contention that a shared-powers perspective on appointments is the proper interpretation of the Constitution, in large measure due to the “republican and representative values that give life and meaning to American democracy” (189). Here, he takes issue not only with advocates of the unitary executive school, but also with civil service reformers who, Sollenberger claims, “failed to see that lawmakers embody republican values implicit in the Constitution” (181). In his discussion of the Postal Reorganization and Salary Adjustment Act of 1970, for example, Sollenberger states that “[e]ach member [of Congress] has a constitutional duty to see that the Postal Service and its employees serve the public” (144).
After detailing multiple examples throughout American history of lawmakers forcing presidents to accommodate the lawmakers' patronage goals or ego-driven power grabs, however, it is hard to accept fully the argument that these lawmakers have maneuvered in a way that embodies the high-minded constitutional principles invoked here. Sollenberger provides many examples of lawmakers who challenged presidential authority over appointments by claiming that the lawmaker better knew the state and was thus better positioned to identify the appropriate candidate. However, these words were often coupled with actions of legislators confronting presidents over the appointment of a political enemy or when required to accommodate the opinions of a legislator from another faction within the same party. A shared-powers approach to the Appointments Clause may, indeed, be preferable to power residing in the executive alone, and Sollenberger makes a strong case that it is. However, the detailed assessment of how and why legislators have influenced the prenomination process over time gives less support for the argument that this influence has tended to “serve the public” in quite as lofty a manner as envisioned.
My disagreement with the forcefulness of Sollenberger's conclusions on this one point, however, should be taken as a minor criticism of a book that is impressive in its scope and very polished in its execution. This is a meticulously researched book that provides an important addition to our understanding of executive-legislative relations, the Appointments Clause, and the limitations of civil service reform in removing politics from the selection of appointees. It succeeds very well in using archival materials to shine light on the lesser-known aspect of the prenomination process. This book is a must read for anyone interested in federal appointment politics or the history of executive-legislative interaction. In addition, those who stake a claim in arguments concerning the unitary executive in the appointment arena and those who advocate that merit selection will cure the ills of politics in the appointment process will, as well, find a good deal to consider in Sollenberger's book.
