This book may be seen as encompassing two separate, but related themes. The first is an analysis of how Hong Kong has fared politically with Beijing since the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) in 1997. The second attempts to show how the “spirit” of “one country, two systems” may be applied to settling Taiwan's political future.
The first theme addresses what the author calls “the Mainlandization of Hong Kong.” This entails an analysis of how aspects of China's political culture, notably “patron–client pluralism” have penetrated HK. In the process judicial autonomy has been weakened, but what he calls “constitutional conventions” (accepted non-rule-based practices) have emerged that allow for greater accountability, for example regarding the resignation of top officials.
Nevertheless, Lo shows how Beijing failed to control the HKSAR through its first chosen Chief Executive, Tung Chee Hwa, claiming that Beijing's politics were applied without regard to Hong Kong's political culture. He argues in effect that both Beijing and the HKSAR through its more effective next leader, Donald Tsang, learned the appropriate lessons so that the Chief Executive “election” of 2007 brought about what Lo regards as a successful fusion of Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong political cultures.
The argument and the supporting analysis are interesting, but they will not command universal support as evidence of success. Lo himself points up ways in which Hong Kong's system has been badly compromised by the closer political integration that seems to be accompanying Hong Kong's economic dependency on Mainland China. He makes much of the self-censorship of the media and Beijing's success in promoting a “patriotism” that means support for communist rule and policies in China. Whether the “fusion” denotes a long-lasting compromise, or just one step along the path to Hong Kong's fuller political absorption by Beijing remains to be seen.
The second and more contentious theme of the book is the applicability of the “one country, two systems” model to Taiwan. At the end of each of his eight chapters on the HKSAR, Lo attempts to find aspects of relevance to Taiwan. However, it is in his ninth chapter that he addresses the issue more fully. Recognizing that the Hong Kong model has no appeal in Taiwan, Lo suggests that it is the “spirit” of compromise and adaptation of Deng's formula that counts. He then outlines a number of ways in which approaches to a negotiated settlement may be reached.
The problem here is that all of this is contingent on Taiwan agreeing to one form or other of “one China.” Lo has little regard for democracy in Taiwan, which he regards as “chaotic and corrupt.” The question of Taiwanese consent to unification is a problem to be finessed. Cross-Strait negotiations in his view should be modelled on the secretive Sino-British negotiations over Hong Kong. Lo shows little understanding of the politics of Taiwan or of the US position regarding Taiwan. Indeed he shows little understanding of Taiwanese history and society. The underlying assumption is that the people of the PRC and Taiwan “have been traditionally brothers in the same Chinese family” (p. 260).
While the book may not have succeeded in the goal of demonstrating the applicability of the Beijing–Hong Kong model to Taiwan, it has successfully explored the evolution and the significance the first decade of the political relations between Beijing and Hong Kong. In that respect the book may be seen as an important contribution to the literature.