The study of Israel in academia has greatly improved since Michael Barnett’s anthology Israel in Comparative Perspective (1996). But many of the problems that he and his contributors identified persist: Israel is still often considered too unique for integration into general theory building and testing. Most scholars of Israel write for other scholars of Israel, in Israel-oriented journals, rather than for international relations scholarship, while most IR generalists who utilize Israel as a case study do not know enough of the deep rhythms of its history, politics, and society.

Things are much worse in the American public sphere, where there is so much written and electronic commentary on Israel that the serious work often gets subsumed beneath the ideological agendas and punditry. The biggest part of the explanation is that there are too few genuine scholars of Israel out there; most analysts are, at best, Middle East scholars.

In short, there are multiple disjunctions across analysts that, in addition to leading to incomplete, inaccurate, or tendentious analysis, do not allow for much cross-fertilization of scholarly and policy work. This is a significant problem. A better understanding of Israel would be appropriate not only for its own sake but also for academic knowledge and, given U.S. interests in the Middle East, for American foreign policy should decision makers ever decide to look outside the big think tanks or prominent journalists in Washington for analysis on Israel.

The two very good books reviewed here bridge these gaps in different ways. One, by a former (Israeli) policymaker, explores the decision-making process of Israel’s national security policies, while the other is by (Israeli) academics interested in advancing IR theory. They are a welcome addition, and it is to be hoped that they will be widely read.

Charles Freilich’s Zion’s Dilemma is detailed and systematic. The author identifies three key variables that shape Israel’s security decision-making process (DMP): Israel’s high threat environment, which constrains policy options; the country’s proportional representation system, which leads to too much politicking in decision making; and the inherent weakness of the civilian policymakers compared to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and the security agencies.

These, in turn, contribute to five “decision-making pathologies”: 1) an “unplanned process,” which means a focus on the short-term rather than on long-term strategies and goals; this, in turn, leads to a tendency to react rather than anticipate, and a reliance on crisis management; 2) high levels of politicization, which facilitates decisions that are politically safe rather than good policy; 3) “semiorganized anarchy,” because there are few formal avenues for systematic analysis, presentation of options, and debate in government; 4) an overly informal decision-making process, with individuals’ own priorities and personalities dominating the process; and 5) the preeminent role of the IDF and other security agencies in the decision-making process at the expense of the civilian agencies, which makes military concepts and inclinations the guiding framework.

Chapter 1 deals with the independent variables, while Chapter 2 details the pathologies. The bulk of the book applies the model to decisions in seven detailed case studies: those to engage in military action (the 1982 invasion of Lebanon and the 2006 Second Lebanon War), to try diplomacy (the 1978 Camp David agreement and the 2000 Camp David talks), on domestic military production (the 1980s efforts to construct the Lavi fighter jet), and on unilateral withdrawal from conquered Arab territories (Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005). The cases highlight ineffective decision making, failed outcomes, or both. Of particular relevance is Freilich’s caveat that in order to avoid selection bias, he tried finding major cases of effective decision making and successful outcomes but could not.

There is a short concluding section in which Freilich compares the cases to one another to determine which variable and which pathology operates most under which conditions, notes what has been done to address these deficiencies, and specifies a set of further reforms. The focus is, appropriately, on the National Security Staff, and the recommendations are well worth considering.

One reason the book is important is because it is in English. There is a wealth of information and analysis on Israeli foreign policymaking available only in Hebrew, which is therefore closed off to most American or Western scholars and analysts. Freilich draws directly from Hebrew-language books, monographs, and media reports, and his own interviews, to provide detailed information on the major players in the decision-making process.

Apart from brief mention here and there, though, there is no systematic comparison to other countries, such as the United States. This makes it seem as though Israel is truly unique and therefore there is little to be gained from analyzing it in a comparative framework—substantiating Barnett’s concerns from 1996. Indeed, Freilich ends by noting that Israel’s external environment makes the DMP “different and [more] unacceptable” from other countries (p. 257).

Gabriel Sheffer and Oren Barak address this very uniqueness. Although they explore the same issue as Freilich, Israel’s Security Networks is theoretically and conceptually broader. They define a security network as “first, acting and former members of the state’s large and powerful security sector, particularly the military, that is, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF); second, former lower-ranking security personnel, also mainly from the army; third, influential actors operating within various civilian spheres (politics, the economy, and civil society), including politicians, bureaucrats, wealthy private entrepreneurs, academics, and journalists” (p. 2). Thus, the effects are wider.

The authors also give a broader sense of the historical and cultural forces that led to and have sustained the power of the security network—including the nature of the military draft, the small population and sense of family that bind much of Israeli society together, and the civilian functions of the IDF. Where Freilich emphasizes rules and norms as channeling and binding actors in decision making, Sheffer and Barak stress collective memories, culture, and common values as major parts of the explanation.

Chapter 1 places Israel in an explicit theoretical-comparative framework by examining literatures on civil–military relations, state formation, and policy networks. Chapter 2 discusses the emergence of Israel’s security network, and demonstrates its relevance not just in security decision making but in broader Israeli politics, culture, and society; Chapter 3 expands on this to explain the components of the security network, its shared values, and how it operates. Chapter 4 examines six case studies of the network’s negative influence on domestic issues, while Chapter 5 explores its effects on foreign policy (policy toward the West Bank and Gaza, and policy toward Lebanon from 1975 to 2000). Chapter 6 compares Israel in more detail to other similarly situated small states (Taiwan, South Korea, South Africa under apartheid, and Singapore), and the Conclusion discusses implications and avenues for future research.

The rich theoretical discussion and the comparative nature of the analysis are important contributions. Of particular significance is Sheffer and Barak’s contention that Israel should not be compared to the United States or the West, as is common, but rather to other small states elsewhere in the world.

The authors’ reasoning for the four non-Western states to which Israel is compared, however, includes some features that seem relevant to other Middle Eastern states, such as the fact that they are still in a process of state development, face continuous threats, have high levels of militarization, and have a military that plays a prominent role in politics. The absence of comparison to Israel’s neighbors is, then, noticeable; indeed, it is perhaps more so given the events of the Arab uprisings, the increase in external and internal threats to the state, and the role of the army in dealing with these threats. Steven Cook, for instance, compares the role of the military in decision making in Turkey, Algeria, and Egypt (Ruling But Not Governing, 2007), and so provides a ready-made set of cases to build on for a second comparative analysis.

If the two volumes emphasize similar issues and concerns, they also both miss some of the implications of their arguments.

Left unexplored, for example, is why the security sector should sometimes push for nonmilitary solutions to problems, such as favoring diplomacy toward the Palestinians—which both books note has happened. It is not clear from the discussions here why this should be so, especially since peace would help undermine the justification for an autonomous military able to set its own budget.

Both books also note that military officers have, at times, exerted enormous and direct pressure on civilian leaders, particularly during crises. But while the security establishment does constrain Israel’s options, it is not clear why it has not gone further; no coup has ever taken place. Sheffer and Barak note five instances where security officers did push, or considered pushing, civilian leaders to take action they did not want (pp. 42–43), but most of these do not seem unusual. But even if they “count” (and I am not sure they all do), they were not sustained interventions. Neither of these books explains why Israel has been exempt from such a process.

It makes sense to recommend that these books be read together; they complement each other perfectly. Each reinforces the processes by which the security establishment influences policymaking traced out in the other. Both identify informal ties between the main players in national security decision making, but where Freilich focuses on specific roles and processes, Sheffer and Barak also explore the cultural canvas on which these play out. In addition, almost all of Freilich’s case studies examine foreign affairs, while Sheffer and Barak focus mostly on the domestic sphere. Collectively, they give a deep and broad sense of the security network’s influence in all aspects of Israeli life and policymaking.

One might be forgiven for thinking, after reading this review, that Israel is in great danger, which in turn means that the Middle East and American interests there are as well. But all is not lost. Both books point to improvements that have been made. And given that all three authors likely have some ties through the security network to various policymakers, perhaps there is even hope that some of their recommendations might reach the top decision makers.