1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS: SOCRATES, ASPASIA AND PLATO

One of the most puzzling aspects of the Menexenus is related to the way in which Socrates introduces the funeral oration. Within the dramatic framework, he tells Menexenus that he has studied rhetoric under Aspasia (235e2-8), and that the funeral oration he will offer was produced by her by combining ‘pieces’ of Pericles' funeral oration with some new passages (236b). As scholars have widely noted,Footnote ⁶ this establishes some connection with Pericles' oration, although it does not imply that Plato has any parodic aims (indeed, a critique does not have to be a parody). Be that as it may, the fact that the funeral oration is ascribed to Aspasia affects the problem at issue inasmuch as one could argue that Plato is not committed to the contents of Socrates' speech. Against this, I would make the following observations:

• • First, from a general point of view, it is nowadays clear that one cannot consider ‘Platonic’ only those doctrines and passages that are ascribed to the principal characters of the dialogues. The point is, rather, to check what function each passage has in its context, and what its relationship with Plato's philosophy may be. Moreover, attributing to someone else the content and the form of Socrates' speeches is a typical Platonic strategy to avoid explicitly ascribing excessive commitment or expertise to Socrates. If one rejects this principle, one is also compelled to state, for instance, that the contents of Diotima's speech in the Symposium cannot be ascribed to Plato. All this implies that it is still possible to demonstrate that the funeral oration contains certain Platonic elements.

• • Second, the very anachronism characterizing the Menexenus is telling with regard to the recourse to Aspasia: while undermining any historical likeliness, it implicitly draws the reader's attention, for instance, to the differences between the Platonic funeral oration and preceding or standard funeral orations. In other words, Aspasia's dramatic role should in any case have aimed to maximizing the impact of the funeral oration.

• • Finally, and most importantly, Menexenus' closing remarks make it clear that the funeral oration he has just listened to is Socrates'. Menexenus genuinely admires the funeral oration, and, since he has often met Aspasia (249d8-9), he emphasizes that she is not the author of the oration: Menexenus is grateful ἐκείνῃ ἢ ἐκείνῳ ὅστις σοι ὁ εἰπών ἐστιν αὐτόν. καὶ πρός γε ἄλλων πολλῶν χάριν ἔχω τῷ εἰπόντι (249e1-2). Menexenus shifts from the feminine to the masculine, and implicitly—but clearly—ascribes the authorship of the oration to Socrates.Footnote ⁷ So, Plato himself emphasizes—in the way the dialogic context allows him to do—that the content and the form of the oration strongly exceed Aspasia's role.

This is not the place to address the problem in its entirety. For the sake of the argument, it suffices to state that Aspasia's ‘authorship’ does not prevent the reader from looking for, and detecting, Platonic elements in the funeral oration. Whether and to what extent they are present in it is, of course, the question I seek to answer.Footnote ⁸

2. THE TRADITIONAL READINGS AND AN ‘APORETIC’ SURVEY OF THE FIRST PART OF THE EPITAPHIOS (236d4-246a4)

As stated above, the ironic reading deprives the Menexenus of every positive ethical commitment: for, according to this reading, the fundamental aim of the dialogue is to attack democracy and its rhetoric, and Plato would never mix his philosophical doctrines with the instrument of democratic propaganda. Thus no model of virtue would be detectable in the Menexenus. On the other hand, according to the strict reading, Plato outlines the history of Athens as the ideal state, or at least urges the reader to aspire to the philosophical model of virtue.Footnote ⁹ If this were the correct interpretation, it would be easy to claim that the exhortation that ends the epitaphios concerns virtue_k. Now, before addressing the final section and its moral content, it is important to verify whether these traditional readings really fit with the previous sections of the dialogue. This process will engage with the traditional readings, although it is not meant to provide a complete interpretation of the dialogue but rather a focussed analysis of some important passages. At the same time, it will be possible to define the ethical import of the dialogue up until its final section.

a. In accordance with the literary genre to which it belongs, Plato's funeral oration opens with a proem (236d4-237c4), which is followed by a praise of Athens, further divided into a praise of its origins and land (237c5-238b6), and a praise of its constitution and mythical/historical feats (238b7-246a4). There are no parts introduced ex nouo by Plato, nor any formal violations of the literary genre (as far as we can deduce from our sources),Footnote ¹⁰ although in the Menexenus the praise of the Athenian land and people is given more space than in any other oration and is more complex (for example, Plato uses not only images but also arguments, although these are more evocative than compelling).Footnote ¹¹ The praise of the Athenian land (237b1-238b6) revolves around the myth of autochthony, and immediately opens with a definition of Attica as the Athenians' authentic mother.Footnote ¹² This land not only generates but also feeds and raises men, and must be praised because it is dear to the gods. Finally (especially 238b1-6), the men generated by this land live with no need or privation, and are educated and cared by the gods as masters: this educational phase is necessary as the moment of the fateful parting of the gods and thus of increased independence for men. This implies that men's condition, during the phase of their generation and feeding, is pre-technical and pre-scientific, and hence pre-philosophical too.

Now, according to the ironic reading, the section is a criticism addressed to Pericles' Athens or a clearly parodic representation of its origins.Footnote ¹³ However, the theme of Athenian autochthony cannot be found in Pericles' oration, which in its first part insists on the transmission and augmentation of territories (2.26.1-3). In other words, Plato does not seem to be hinting at any aspect of the Thucydidean epitaphios: in the absence of such a link, this section can hardly be only a criticism of Pericles and his rhetorical representation of Athens. Furthermore, the weakness of this reading appears evident as soon as we compare this section to other dialogues, where myths—such as the myth of the Statesman—are presented in a similar fashion and without any irony (or, at least, without any parodic function). Therefore, the general presentation of the myth of autochthony would appear to be an element that runs against an ironic reading of the text. On the other hand, according to the strict reading, ancient Athens is here especially identified as a model of desirable virtueFootnote ¹⁴ and/or as the Urathen outlined in the Timaeus and above all in the Critias (as a model to aspire to, or an ever-present ideal reality).Footnote ¹⁵ The argument, then, is that in the Critias Plato's ideal state is described, and that similarities between the myth of the Critias and this passage of the Menexenus suggest that in the latter text too the ideal state is at issue. The major weakness of this argument is that the similarities between the two passages are not perfect correspondences. Here are a few examples: in the Menexenus Athens is not yet an actually existing state, while in the Critias Athens appears as a politically structured state; in the Critias the bountifulness of the land and its ability to bear fruit without being tilled is just briefly hinted at (110e5), while the Menexenus depicts a pre-technological Attica and seeks to emphasize that crops grow there spontaneously; finally, and most importantly, in the Critias the Athenians are said to be ἀγαθοί (109d1-2), whereas in the Menexenus the autochthons are not yet described as such. Indeed, in the Menexenus there is no mention of the autochthons' goodness and virtue, because Plato considers these features to be an effect of the political constitution of the city. This last difference keeps us from identifying Menexenus' primordial Attica with the Athens described in the Critias.

All in all, therefore, analogies with other Platonic passages prevent us from applying an ironic reading; however, these analogies are not so strong as to demonstrate the correctness of the strict reading. At the same time, however, both traditional readings detect some useful aspects: on the one hand, it is true that Plato does not hint at his ideal state; on the other hand, the parallel with the Critias, while not so strong as to identify a theory of the ideal state, indicates that such myths should be seriously considered. In other words, some kind of theory seems to be detectable, yet this cannot be that of the ideal state or virtue.

b. Something similar may be detected in the following parts of the oration, namely the praise of the constitution and the historical survey, which represents the most extensive section of the Menexenus. According to the ironic reading, Plato aims at censuring democratic (that is, Periclean) rhetoric by means of a parodic narration. On the other hand, according to the strict reading, Plato is fashioning Athenian history as the history of an ideal state. The puzzling feature of this section is related to its striking alterations to historical facts, which can be read as elements of parody or as ideal representations of Athens' feats. However, the two antithetical readings fail to account for some controversial issues. We can point out some revealing cases.

Plato firstly describes the Athenian πολιτεία (238b7-239a4).Footnote ¹⁶ This passage starts with a clear statement: πολιτεία γὰρ τροφὴ ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, καλὴ μὲν ἀγαθῶν, ἡ δὲ ἐναντία κακῶν (238c1-2). According to this general rule, if a state has a good constitution, it cannot become worse. This contradicts a well-known passage in the Republic (545d5-547a6), which grounds the shift from one constitution to another on an unavoidable worsening. Plato could, then, be talking about the constitution of his ideal state, at least for protreptic purposes.Footnote ¹⁷ Other elements could confirm this hypothesis: in the Menexenus the Athenian constitution is said to have remained free from alterations; in addition, although it is a δημοκρατία, it entrusts the government to ἄριστοι, so that it reveals itself to be an ἀριστοκρατία. However, some points lead to consider this interpretation too weak.Footnote ¹⁸ First, the features which this constitution shares with Plato's ideal state are here proposed in a paradoxical way: in the context of a funeral oration, it would seem rather inappropriate to claim that the stability of the δημοκρατία is grounded on the continuous presence of a king (238d2-3), or that Athens has never known other forms of government.Footnote ¹⁹ Secondly, the remarks aiming at identifying the government of πολλοί (δημοκρατία) with the government of ἄριστοι are much closer to Periclean rhetoric than to Plato's theory of the ideal state.Footnote ²⁰ Hence, if Plato is describing his ideal state here, he is doing so by using typically Periclean rhetoric and by concealing precisely the fundamental features of his ideal state.

At the same time, the ironic reading seems hardly any stronger, since it does not allow us to consider some Platonic ideas that are actually detectable in these pages.Footnote ²¹ This reading is grounded on two prejudices: first, Plato cannot support any form of democratic constitution; second, his rhetorical style constitutes a parody of Pericles' oration. From this point of view, the Platonic features of the state are in any case totally obliterated.

Therefore, both of these readings in their radical form seem to raise more problems than they solve, although each of them makes some valuable points. On the one hand, the criticism of Periclean rhetoric is evident, and this suggests that in such a context Plato is not positively hinting at his philosophical doctrines. On the other hand, Plato could be criticizing democratic rhetoric without simply making a parody of it, that is, by outlining a reformed democratic constitution, albeit not an ideal one: indeed, from a Platonic point of view, this democracy is much more valuable than the historical one.

It is possible to put forward similar remarks about the speech concerning Athens' feats (239d1-246a4). This large passage has been interpreted as an ironic description of Athens' democratic rhetoric as well as the celebration of the feats of the ideal Athens.Footnote ²² As a matter of fact, some remarks paradoxically recall democratic rhetoric, and cannot be devoid of irony; on the other hand, the behaviour ascribed to the Athenians could be positively valued by Plato. We can consider some telling examples. First, the narration of the Persian wars (239d1-241e5) is marked by partiality and might be reproducing the rules of the literary genre; however, some of the distortions operated here can also be detected in other Platonic works, where they cannot have an ironic function.Footnote ²³ Second, when narrating the Peloponnesian war and the democratic reaction to it, not only does Plato make no implicit hint at Socrates' death-sentence (of course, any explicit reference would be totally out of context), but he also praises Athens' behaviour in that historical moment, that is, its feelings of brotherhood and moderation. Finally, Athenians acknowledged that wars between Greek cities must not aim at destroying enemies (particularly at Menex. 242d1-4): this could be read as a rhetorical statement, but in the Republic (469b-471c) Plato puts forth the same thesis.Footnote ²⁴

In these examples it is possible to detect an interaction between ironic and non-ironic aspects. Sometimes the narration is probably devoid of irony: Plato criticized democratic rule during the Peloponnesian War, and above all was opposed to the democratic reaction, during which Socrates was killed. At the same time, however, some claims (such as the importance of the feelings of brotherhood and moderation) are not necessarily ironic, and are moreover consistent with Plato's political perspective. On these grounds, it seems awkward to apply only the strict reading or only the ironic one. On the one hand, it is likely that Plato is not interested only in criticizing democratic rulers, and that he is probably presenting some ethical content; on the other hand, these doctrines cannot concern Plato's ideal state or philosophical virtue grounded on knowledge (virtue_k). This means that the traditional readings must be supplemented and integrated: an analysis of the final part of the dialogue will provide important hints in this direction. Further, a final point that is worth considering is that, to some extent, Athenian history is presented here as being more successful (in absolute terms) and morally more valuable (from Plato's point of view) than it actually was.

To sum up: (a) in the Menexenus Plato is neither exclusively criticizing democracy nor celebrating his ideal state; (b) on the contrary, Plato seems to be tackling some issues related to ethical themes; (c) in general, the oration outlines a ‘positively refashioned’ history of Athens; (d) there is no reason to believe that the ἀρετή Plato describes here is virtue_k.

3. PLATO ON VIRTUE IN THE THIRD PART OF THE FUNERAL ORATION: AN ANALYSIS OF MENEXENVS 246a5-249c8 (EXHORTATION AND CONSOLATION)

The preceding analysis suggests that we should search for statements pertaining to the field of ethics. At the same time, it cautions us against expecting to find any accounts concerning Plato's ideal state. This perspective will also inform our reading of the last part of the epitaphios.

The third part of the epitaphios follows the same pattern of the exhortation and the consolation that we find in traditional funeral orations.Footnote ²⁵ Scholars disagree on the interpretation of this passage. On the one hand, scholars upholding the ironic reading detect some similarities between this section and those in other epitaphioi, but also note some stylistic and compositional features that would appear to be a parody of classical rhetoric.Footnote ²⁶ On the other hand, scholars supporting the strict reading show that Plato alters the rules of the funeral oration by introducing philosophical notions and doctrines that are detectable, for example, in the Apology and the Crito.Footnote ²⁷ However, nearly all scholars acknowledge a change in style: here Plato's style appears less similar to that of Gorgias' rhetoric and lacks the same extensive use of rhetorical devices (such as the one made, for instance, in the historical section).Footnote ²⁸ In this section I will highlight the motifs adopted by Plato, as well as the way in which these are reframed, in order to demonstrate that the traditional readings do not really work and that we can detect here a model of virtue_h.

1) 246a5-c8. The last part of the funeral oration opens with the observation that the fallen were courageous and did not desert: they have set an example that the living should follow. Scholars have often noticed that here Plato urges one to be ὡς ἀρίστους (c2), and on this ground they have suggested that Plato is exhorting us to acquire moral excellence (that is, virtue_k). This exhortation to virtue has often been connected to that of the Apology (especially 29d4 and 41c8-d9). Nevertheless, the fallen provide a perfect example of warrior virtues in other epitaphioi (for instance, in Lys. Epit. 69 and Thuc. 2.43.1),Footnote ²⁹ and nothing suggests here that Plato is speaking about another kind of virtue or excellence. In addition, the virtue mentioned here is related to war: it is soon reduced to the loyalty to the army.Footnote ³⁰ According to Plato, can loyalty to the army really be a criterion for virtue_k? Or, rather, can any given particular action be evidence of virtue_k? The following passages of the Menexenus will suggest that it cannot. In addition, in the Republic (429a8-430d5) Plato claims that authentic courage is the psychological condition which grounds courageous action. On the other hand, in the Laches (190e4-191e2) Socrates rejects a definition of courage similar to the descriptions provided in this section: this definition is related only to actions, and it is refuted because of its sclerotic nature.Footnote ³¹ So the identification of virtue, and especially of courage, with loyalty to the army and death in war is directly borrowed from tradition and does not represent an instance of virtue_k. At the same time, however, nothing suggests that Plato is implicitly criticizing this traditional virtue, or that this virtue is theoretically incompatible with virtue_k, as the ironic reading would imply.Footnote ³² It seems, on the contrary, that Plato seriously presents traditional virtue as a form of virtue.

2) 246d1-e2. Here starts the prosōpopoeia of the fathers, who directly address the city and first emphasize the choice of a beautiful death. The prosōpopoeia entails the rejection of a shameful life: this is a typical motif in funeral orations and one of the ideologically most relevant themes.Footnote ³³ On the other hand, it is unlikely that Plato might have considered the mere choice of perishing in battle as a sign of virtue_k: according to the Platonic description of virtue_k, what makes an action virtuous is not the action itself but the specific motivation behind it and one's inner disposition.Footnote ³⁴ However, Plato here already indicates a reasoning that could lead one to act courageously. Shame is indicated as a deterrent: before succumbing to fear, one should calculate that this would bring shame as a drawback. This is no philosophical reasoning, since such a calculation is not grounded in any knowledge; it implies, however, a non-philosophical calculation as a motivational system for acting virtuously.

3) 246e2-247c4. This is one of the most important sections for the strict reading. Scholars have detected a reference to virtue_k in the description of virtue as the basis of wealth and of ἐπιστήμη as the prerequisite for other virtues (246e2-247a2):Footnote ³⁵

The passage states that:

1. a. wealth acquired with vileness does not provide any beauty (246e2-4);

2. b. superficial beauty does not provide any benefit, if it is connected to vileness (246e4-7);

3. c. ἐπιστήμη is no wisdom, if it is not related to justice or any other virtue (246e7-247a2).

Firstly, Plato does not present three levels of ‘good’ corresponding to those identified in the Republic (357a1-358a6) or in the First Alcibiades.Footnote ³⁶ On the contrary, he points out three conditions (possession of money, beauty, ἐπιστήμη) that can become positive through a fourth condition, that is, virtue: wealth and beauty are positive if they are related to courage (a/b), and ἐπιστήμη is σοφία if related to justice and to the other virtues (c). So, virtue is not good per se, but rather a means to acquire something else. Such a position may be strictly Platonic (virtue_k) if the mentioned virtue consists in a conscious condition and the acquisition of other goods is an accessory occurrence. However, a deeper analysis reveals something different.

1. a) The possession of wealth is assessed in relation to the presence of courage. A strong link exists between courage and the acquisition of wealth: one function of courage, and of virtue more generally, is to amass further wealth so that this may be inherited, thus ensuring the preservation of the good name of one's family. Can courage be considered here as an example of virtue_k? Definitely not: earning money cannot be evidence for the possession of virtue_k, which is rather connected with one's inner life.Footnote ³⁷ So, Plato is probably mentioning money not as an actual goal or element connected to courage (or virtue). Courage here is only a condition to meet a non-Platonic aim, that is, the accumulation of wealth and the preservation of one's reputation: the moral background of this passage is as Platonic as that of Cephalus (Resp. 329e4-330c9).Footnote ³⁸

2. b) Of course outward beauty cannot be considered negative per se. However, the reason why beauty cannot exist without courage is at odds with virtue_k: without courage, beauty would make vileness more evident, highlighting an already negative condition. So, courage is necessary only in order to preserve an exterior reputation and condition. In this sense, it is actually reduced to the actions that may provide a good reputation and it is therefore limited to the outward sphere.Footnote ³⁹

3. c) The meaning of ἐπιστήμη here is ambiguous. By using it, Plato is not referring to the knowledge that grounds virtue_k, because this could never turn into πανουργία. Rather, ἐπιστήμη may be considered a form of technical knowledge that is to be used in accordance with justice.Footnote ⁴⁰ While this reading would appear to strip Plato's theory of virtue_k (and intellectualism) of its foundations, it is none the less upheld by the relationship that Plato establishes here between ἐπιστήμη, σοφία and virtue. The argument is similar to the previous ones: a quality X (wealth, beauty), if devoid of a virtue Y (courage), assumes a negative connotation Z (wealth becomes undeserved, beauty reveals vileness). In this case: X coincides with ἐπιστήμη; Z coincides with πανουργία; the positive version of ἐπιστήμη is defined anew as σοφία; Y comes to cover justice and the whole of virtue. Therefore, it is impossible for both ἐπιστήμη and σοφία to be subsumed within the virtue in question: similarly to wealth and beauty, technical knowledge only becomes wisdom if it is provided with the whole virtue, from which it is nevertheless excluded. Plato is then employing these words here (above all ἐπιστήμη and σοφία) according to their common meaning, which would have conjured up a range of well-known trades and techniques in the minds of his audience. He also proposes a theory of virtue that is quite different both from his own theory of virtue_k and from Socrates' simpler doctrine.Footnote ⁴¹

In the following lines, Plato accounts for the aim that makes these virtues and these goods worthy to be acquired: the preservation of one's good name and wealth (247a2-c4). In this paraenesis too he draws upon traditional motifs. The first is the moral duty to surpass one's father and increase one's wealth: a very ancient idea that continued to be dealt with, not least in the Menexenus. Footnote ⁴² Second, the image of the welcome that awaits one in Hades had often been used in poems and had later come to be employed by the authors of funeral orations.Footnote ⁴³ However, it is hard to believe that Plato could have embraced such an exhortation, which was grounded on the identification of virtue, reputation and wealth:

• • the challenge against one's father concerns ‘the virtues’ (247a4-6);

• • nevertheless, sons can win such a challenge by means of their own virtue, which consists in not wasting their fathers' name by acquiring a false good reputation, one actually belonging to someone else (that is, the fathers themselves). Virtue, then, can ultimately be reduced to the factual choice of fighting and dying for one's own country (247a6-b1);

• • therefore, acquiring and losing one's own reputation are reduced to acquiring and losing one's father's wealth (247b4-7).

Winning the challenge against one's father thus consists in surpassing him by displaying courage when dealing with one's own reputation and wealth.

Therefore, the passage implicitly proposes only a limitation of one's actions that is not imposed by the laws of the state. It constitutes an exhortation to observe an unwritten code of behaviour according to which each citizen can occupy a suitable position within the state. Plato, then, is suggesting that it is possible to execute virtuous actions by appealing to a non-epistemic viewpoint. However, this ‘exterior’ morality, which ensures order within the state,Footnote ⁴⁴ is justified by a criterion: sparing oneself and one's own family shame and dishonour. This means that such an exhortation results in a virtue, which is conditioned by a calculation made on the basis of the fear of greater trouble.

If this reading is correct, one can safely state that those who possess virtue_k will not make recourse to the virtue that Plato endorses here, that is, virtue_h. However, all this implies neither that virtue_h must be rejected from Plato's point of view nor that virtue_h is theoretically incompatible with virtue_k: as a matter of fact, it can lead one to accomplish virtuous actions, although the motivations it appeals to are not those of virtue_k. What we have here, then, is certainly a virtue: one which is based on a traditional code of behaviour, but is not condemned by Plato; one which is not virtue_k; one which can indeed guarantee virtuous actions even in the case of those who are not virtuous—i.e. those who do not possess virtue_k. If this is the case, this virtue may no doubt be said to play a role in Plato's ethics: the fact that it is grounded in a traditional code does not imply that it cannot play any role in the more complicated context of philosophical ethics. Indeed, one noteworthy aspect of this virtue suggests a ‘philosophical’ reading of it. Plato's exhortation is traditional in terms of what it exhorts to but not in terms of the way in which it does so. Although the code of behaviour Plato refers to here is traditional, the way in which it is presented is not usual for funeral orations, since it is traced back to a calculation of the benefits and the drawbacks of one's actions: for instance, the reason why one should avoid vileness is that wealth acquired in this way does not produce any beauty (246e2-4), and the superficial beauty connected to it does not provide any benefit (246e4-7). So, the calculation of benefits and drawbacks which was hinted at in the previous section is emphasized much more here: Plato frames traditional virtue within a motivational system, which can be instilled into the minds of ordinary citizens as the persuasive ground for a code of behaviour.

4) 247c5-248c5. This section opens the consolation and aims at pointing out that the death of one's relatives is a positive event, which deserves praise and not lament. The function of this moment within the funeral orations is quite clear, given that the orator concludes the paraenesis and replaces private sorrow with public celebration:Footnote ⁴⁵ we find such a section in all epitaphioi.Footnote ⁴⁶ Plato substantially enlarges the model by adding a reference to the principle of μηδὲν ἄγαν; it is however hard to detect any reference to virtue_k in this passage.

The opening (247c5-e5) does not show any peculiarity. Plato introduces a traditional issue in a very traditional manner. Listeners, or readers, are exhorted not to give in to feelings of pity or sorrow by claiming that ideals such as immortality are unworthy to be pursued compared to virtue, that is, the choice of dying for the state. Since these arguments are traditional, the following section (on μηδὲν ἄγαν, 247e5-248d6) appears to be an addition devised by Plato: this is a variation on the theme, one rich in philosophical content. The main argument consists in an exhortation to the principle of μηδὲν ἄγαν, which however belongs to the Seven Sages tradition.Footnote ⁴⁷ It could represent a reference to Socrates' ethics, then, only if such a reference is consistently detectable throughout the whole passage, so that one may prove that Plato is drawing on a traditional theme with the aim of highlighting Socrates' Delphic vocation.

In this section, Plato may be seen to apply the principle of μηδὲν ἄγαν in a wider sense: not only with regard to the theme of ‘measured sorrow’ but also with regard to more general behaviour. Just as it is necessary to assess what one has to rejoice and sorrow at, so it is necessary to strengthen the commitment to assume responsibility for one's actions and not to rely on others' fortune (247e6-248a7). Whoever observes such behaviour can be said to be σώφρων and hence ἀνδρεῖος καὶ φρόνιμος (248a4): self-control entails courage, and the latter implies φρόνησις. Here, however, φρόνησις cannot be identified with the φρόνησις that Plato attributes to virtue_k. It is rather the ability to evaluate situations and correctly react to them through one's actions and emotions. This is precisely the reason why φρόνησις is connected to self-control, which especially rules the emotions, and to courage, which will determine one's choice to take part in battle and meet death.

So, the plus which Plato's account introduces in the traditional framework does not consist in the mere introduction of the μηδὲν ἄγαν but also in the fact that here there is also a theory on the evaluation of situations and actions: it entails a practical focus on the issue of virtue. The virtue described here, therefore, is not simply traditional. The focus is not only on the proposed code of behaviour (in this case, the principle of μηδὲν ἄγαν) but also on the motivational system grounding virtuous actions. Such a system is different from that which virtue_k implies, but also represents a substantial reworking with respect to traditional consolations.

5) 248d7-249c8. The ending of the funeral oration is very traditional and does not display any of the peculiarities that critics have often claimed:Footnote ⁴⁸ the image of the state as the mother of the fallen, which looks after and raises its citizens, belongs to the repertoire of the funeral oration.Footnote ⁴⁹ The Platonic epitaphios just reformulates these issues, but does not provide any new suggestion, which might let us suppose that a targeted manipulation is at work.

Therefore, the last part of Plato's funeral oration is an exhortation to a virtue that consists in accomplishing virtuous actions; as the base for these actions, Plato repeatedly indicates the calculation of benefits and drawbacks. It is hard to identify this virtue with virtue_k: most of the statements in the passage seem to contradict the fundamental essence of Platonic ethics, that is, the coessentiality of virtue, knowledge and inner life.Footnote ⁵⁰ Is it however reasonable to suppose that Plato intends to ironically portray a model of virtue that he actually rejects? As we have seen, in the last part of the funeral oration the description of traditional virtue is not exaggerated, and standard literary elements are used consistently and harmonically. So, the only way to argue that Plato's perspective is ironic would be to demonstrate that the last section contradicts Plato's ethics. Yet, this is not the case, since Plato only proposes a philosophical rethinking of traditional virtue: the virtue at issue is not virtue_k.

4. TRANSFIGURATING TRADITION

So far, so good: standard readings of the last part of the funeral oration do not really work, since they are not able to detect the specific model of virtue emerging from it. A further problem arises, however, since the content of the code of behaviour embodying this virtue is taken from traditional ethics and rhetoric. So, one could still argue that the reference to traditional virtuous actions might only depend on the literary genre Plato is using: Plato might be ‘neutrally’ exploiting traditional themes. In other words, why should one suppose that Plato has any commitment to a model of virtue that essentially appeals to a traditional code of behaviour? Moreover, this could be supported by the fact that the exhortation is ascribed to the fathers, who are the best spokesmen for such a task. In this section I shall demonstrate that this ‘flattening’ reading is to be ruled out because: (a) it produces a serious interpretative problem; (b) it does not take into account the new frame within which the traditional code of behaviour is set; and (c) it is inconsistent with the fact that Plato refers to virtue_h also in other dialogues, where it plays an ‘active’ role in philosophical arguments.

a. If the recourse to virtue_h is nothing but a reference to traditional ethics, a huge problem arises. In this case, one is compelled to admit that at least the final part of the oration is intentionally devoid of any philosophical element. Once the ironic reading is ruled out (see the preceding section), this in turn amounts to accepting the idea that in the Menexenus Plato is only practising a non-philosophical kind of rhetoric, which moreover would be competing with traditional rhetoric only in terms of style (since its content would simply be a traditional one). But could one reasonably be prepared to ascribe such an aim to the author of the Gorgias and the Phaedrus? The fact that the final part consists in a prosōpopoeia of the fathers cannot sustain this interpretation: this is a traditional element, but its presence alone does not imply that Plato is merely reproducing rhetorical motifs.

b. There is, however, also an important positive argument. As noticed above, although the content of the code of behaviour is traditional, the virtue_h it promotes is discussed in passages 2, 3 and 4 (that is, in most of the last part) within the context of a motivational system that makes it convenient for anyone to act virtuously according to a calculation of benefits and drawbacks. This means, in turn, that the virtuous actions of every moral agent depend on a model of evaluation. This model, or criterion, must be different from knowledge, but linked to some individual appraisal (as we shall see, the best—and only—candidate for this way of evaluating contexts and action is belief). Now, this aspect cannot be regarded as being merely traditional, and in any case it directly reflects the core of Plato's theory of non-philosophical virtue as presented in other dialogues (see the following point).

c. Although the ‘philosophical use’ of virtue_h is theoretically compatible with a theory of virtue_k, the absence of any other reference to it could suggest that Plato is here only rephrasing traditional orations. This is not the case, however, since the very same model of virtue_h is referred to in other dialogues, where it is opposed to virtue_k while coexisting with it in Plato's ethics.

In the Phaedo (69a6-c3) virtue_k is opposed to another form of virtue. The former is provided with φρόνησις, which represents the epistemic criterion of choice and action (ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, ἀντὶ οὗ δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι). The latter, however, does produce virtuous actions but only by drawing an estimate of benefits and drawbacks, as well as by taking fear and pleasure into account. At the basis of this virtue of lower degree, then, there is a specific system of motivation, which is not philosophical at all, but is rather grounded in a practical calculation. This model clearly displays the same features as the one proposed in sections 2-4: it also presents a sort of estimate of the drawbacks that may come from not behaving in a virtuous way. This is all the more important if one considers that the reference to such an estimate is an element which Plato introduces in the tradition, and which frames the reference to traditional virtuous acting. Moreover, in the Phaedo this ἀρετή is defined as πολιτική and δημοτική (82a11), but produces actions that factually coincide with those provided by virtue_k.Footnote ⁵¹ Mentioning the examples of the Menexenus, it is possible to say that acting courageously is necessary to avoid bringing dishonour to one's family and to oneself, or more specifically (as in the case of ‘beauty’) that virtuous actions are needed in order not to make one's own vileness more evident.

Another case to consider is Resp. 429b8-430c5, where the Guardians are said to be provided with ὀρθὴ δόξα, which can be acquired through education, and concerns what one must and must not be afraid of. The Guardians, then, are supposed to behave appropriately and to possess a virtue that can also be defined as πολιτική (430c4). A similar perspective is suggested in the Meno (96d1-98b9). Plato proposes a virtue for Athens' politicians: this virtue is devoid of authentic φρόνησις, specifically concerns πράγματα and simply corresponds to ὀρθῶς ἡγεῖσθαι.Footnote ⁵² Both of these cases take into account a virtue that is not bound to knowledge, and is specifically aimed at practical behaviour, yet is ultimately incomplete. It clearly recalls virtue_h in the Menexenus: first, this virtue does not require any sort of superior knowledge; second, it is founded on actions and stands in a peculiar relation to politics; finally, it is specifically related to the perception of pleasure and pain, which on the basis of belief will be considered detrimental or non-detrimental. Again, it is important to note that the analogies with sections 2-4 are not confined to the reference to traditional elements—for instance, the appeal to the principle of μηδὲν ἄγαν; on the contrary, the parallel concerns the motivational and ethical frame in which virtue_h is set, and which is definitely introduced by Plato through the rhetorical scaffolding of the funeral oration.

These three points strongly suggest that the last part of the funeral oration is much more than just a piece of traditional rhetoric. If this were not the case, given the strong parallels between virtue_h in the Menexenus and that of the other dialogues, one should conclude that the former incidentally coincides with the latter, or that in the other dialogues Plato is not aware that what he is proposing is only traditional virtue.

At the same time, the last point helps to clarify a particular aspect of virtue_h, as it emerges in the funeral oration. First, in the Menexenus virtue_h is definitely a political virtue, that is, a virtue belonging—or acceptable—to the majority of citizens. But this is exactly the way virtue_h is also presented in the dialogues I have referred to: as indicated just above, it is πολιτική (as in Resp. 430c4 and Phd. 82a11), δημοτική (Phd. 82a11) or generally thought of as the virtue of politicians (as in the Meno). Second, given that in the Menexenus virtue_h is grounded in a calculation of benefits and drawbacks, it must be linked to some evaluative capacity. This cannot be knowledge, however, as I have been arguing. So, in a Platonic perspective non-epistemic judgements can only depend on belief. Indeed, belief is what can guide human actions in the absence of knowledge (see for example Meno 97b), and it is what allows people to produce their own evaluations of moral notions (see for example Resp. 479d-e). It is worth emphasizing that all this does not properly add any new features to the description of virtue_h deriving from the above analysis; rather, it only clarifies what a ‘Platonic’ description of virtue_h would amount to outside of the context of the funeral oration: the virtue in question is πολιτική, δημοτική and grounded in belief.

If this analysis is correct, the last part of the Menexenus refers to a notion of virtue, namely virtue_h, the contents of which are borrowed from tradition, but which is inserted within a new and philosophically relevant frame: it is a sort of bridge-notion between tradition and philosophy, which is widely conceivable by non-philosophers and is set within a specific belief-based motivational system for virtuous acting. In the next and last section, I will sketch out the philosophical function of virtue_h both in the Menexenus and, more generally, in Plato's ethics.

5. THE PHILOSOPHICAL PAY-OFF: VIRTUE_H, THE MENEXENVS AND PLATO'S ETHICS

In the final part of the epitaphios, therefore, it is possible to detect a model of virtue_h, which is based on habit and must be considered political or demotic; it consists in accomplishing virtuous actions through a calculation of benefits and drawbacks, and accordingly is linked to belief. This is a virtue of second degree compared to that based on knowledge and insight (that is, the virtue of the philosopher), which constitutes an important aspect of Plato's treatment of ethics in other dialogues. In what follows, I shall verify whether and how the identification of virtue_h enables us to understand better both the Menexenus and Plato's ethics; this will also help to confirm my reading. In other words, by assuming as a working hypothesis that the Menexenus refers to virtue_h, I will indicate: (a) the positive and negative contribution of traditional readings of the Menexenus, which have been demonstrated to be unconvincing; (b) what role virtue_h plays within the Menexenus as a whole (that is, how it changes and improves our understanding of the dialogue); (c) the overall philosophical pay-off of the introduction of virtue_h in Plato's ethics.

a. The survey of Plato's funeral oration and close analysis of its final part have suggested that both of the traditional readings give rise to several difficulties if they are applied too strictly. On the other hand, each of them provides readers with important insights: from a general point of view, one reading reveals the weaknesses of the other and emphasizes particular aspects which are detectable by applying a specific perspective.

The ironic reading leads us to consider carefully the implicit relationship between Plato's Menexenus and the traditional literary form of the epitaphios, that is, democratic propaganda. It emphasizes, moreover, the fact that Plato deals with a literary genre that has its own features, contents and recipients. But the most important contribution of the ironic reading is that it cautions us against simply identifying too easily Plato's claims with positive doctrines, even though at first sight they might seem to be consistent with a strictly Platonic framework. The strict reading, on the other hand, urges the reader to detect positive statements within the peculiar framework of the funeral oration: it emphasizes the possibility of identifying Platonic doctrines which might be found alongside the author's criticism of democratic rhetoric.

This means that the two readings should be supplemented by mutually integrating their contributions to the interpretation of Plato's Menexenus. This ‘third way’ has in fact already been covered by a few scholars (sometimes as part of more extensive studies, and above all by moderating the strict reading).Footnote ⁵³ This is the perspective I have adopted in my own reading of the final part of the funeral oration. On the one hand, the contribution of the ironic reading is helpful in order to point out both that Plato refers to topics and sections which were used in funeral orations and that he often criticizes Athenian rhetoric by means of them: the epitaphios, therefore, is likely to contain criticism to the moral content of these democratic speeches. On the other hand, the strict reading urges us to search for any relation between the moral content, which replaces the simply traditional content in the final part of Plato's funeral oration, and Plato's thought, that is, to move beyond the mere level of criticism. In other words:

• • the ironic reading is correct inasmuch as 1) it links the structure adopted by Plato to that of other funeral orations; 2) it detects the critical aim of Plato; 3) it rejects the idea that Plato is introducing virtue_k in this peculiar speech;

• • the strict reading is correct inasmuch as 1) it indicates that Plato is offering more than just a criticism of democratic rhetoric; 2) it detects Plato's attempt to outline a moral perspective; 3) it suggests, in general, the possibility that Plato's epitaphios is constructively positing some philosophical elements.

My analysis mutually integrates the above general points (along with some of the minor arguments raised in relation to specific passages by scholars on both sides). According to the reading I suggest, the final part of Plato's epitaphios stands in a dialectic (and critical) relation with the rhetorical tradition but is at the same time intended to introduce a specific and philosophically grounded moral model (which is not, of course, philosophical itself). This is possible because the moral account of this section addresses the whole state and is situated at a lower level compared to the philosophical core of Plato's ethics (that is, the theory of virtue_k): it is not ironically assumed by Plato, but at the same time it only concerns the way in which common citizens should act within the state; it implies criticism of democratic propaganda, but contains theoretical elements which are fundamental in order to engender non-philosophical virtue; it draws upon the traditional features of funeral orations, but refashions them with a wider, constructive aim in view, and frames them within the context of a form of calculation. The point is not that traditional elements are re-used, but that they converge on a model of virtue, namely virtue_h.

b. The funeral oration was the most ‘popular’ among the rhetorical genres: from a historical point of view, its declamation was a fundamental moment for the whole state, the moral identity of which was thereby reaffirmed and celebrated. In particular, rhetors would celebrate the virtue of the fallen, namely the courage they displayed in fighting and dying for the state—a positive example of virtue for everyone.Footnote ⁵⁴ Generally speaking, therefore, the virtue of the good citizen was the underlying topic of such genre, and it exercised a specific function, that is, to urge Athenians to gain awareness of their city's ethical principles and to act in accordance to them.

If, then, in the final part of the dialogue it is possible to find a discussion of the kind of virtue that, according to Plato, citizens should possess and act upon, it is likely that it also represents the core content of the Menexenus. Now, if we assume that Plato actually considers virtue_h something that citizens should acknowledge, this section would be presenting an ethical cornerstone of the whole state, since the latter (in the Menexenus) does not depend on the (quite exceptional) possession of philosophical knowledge. This would clearly explain why Plato chose to adopt the rhetorical genre of the funeral oration, and would further confirm that this perspective is totally consistent with his choice of the epitaphios: for this literary genre, albeit historically linked to democratic propaganda, was probably the best means to outline a moral model for the whole state.

This conclusion (to which I shall be returning soon) implies, however, that the previous parts of the epitaphios are better explained if one assumes that they somehow presuppose a notion of virtue_h, or at least that they leave open the possibility of introducing such a model of virtue. This can be first demonstrated, in general, by verifying that Plato's references to virtue in the funeral oration are consistent with the notion of virtue_h that I have outlined. As stated above, the historical speech of the Menexenus relates the Athenians' feats. Accordingly, Plato here frequently refers to the notion of ‘virtue’. Now, it must be pointed out that Plato here never uses the word ἀρετή for virtue_k: on the contrary, he quite clearly refers to ‘executing virtuous actions’, that is, to a kind of political virtue (that is, the virtue which is possessed by the good citizen). This section opens (239d1-4) with a reference to the ἀρετή of those who fought against the Persians: they were courageous and valiant, but nothing allows us to subsume these traits under virtue_k. This becomes evident when Plato points out that the Athenians possessed ἀρετή in so far as they won against the most powerful army in the world (240d1-7; cf. 241c4 and c8). The word ἀρετή, then, describes Athens' valour during the Peloponnesian War (at 243a6, c1, d1). However, here Plato uses the term in order to underline that the Athenians defeated a strong enemy and did so without Persian help. This brief survey confirms that Plato does not use ἀρετή in a strict philosophical sense: on the contrary, the term describes the Athenians' noble behaviour and courage in battle and death, and this is totally consistent with my analysis of the last part of the oration.

This is not all, however, since by applying the notion of virtue_h to the previous sections the funeral oration starts expressing a better meaning. First, the myth of autochthony describes the prehistory of Athens, when men had no practical or moral concerns;Footnote ⁵⁵ the ancestral land of the myth, however, was later replaced by the historical state, which requires moral guidelines. Virtue_h can effectively embody these guidelines. Plato's puzzling praise of the constitution also becomes more understandable in the perspective suggested. As noted above, the constitution that Plato praises is neither his ideal state nor the parodic representation of democratic Athens.Footnote ⁵⁶ Therefore, Plato must be referring to a constitution based on some moral principles, which are nevertheless different from those that ground Kallipolis. Footnote ⁵⁷ Now, inasmuch as the citizens represented here are excellent (ἄριστοι) and choose their rulers wisely, the image of this constitution and of the citizens that it shapes is perfectly consistent with the moral model outlined in the final part of the epitaphios. Finally, the narration of the historical feats frequently refers to the virtue of Athenians, but the context indicates that this ἀρετή is not virtue_k but something similar to virtue_h.Footnote ⁵⁸ This is the case, for example, with Plato's careful description of the Persian Wars (239a5-241e5): according to Plato, in this critical juncture the Athenians were mostly virtuous,Footnote ⁵⁹ and this virtue must be identified with a historical one, or at least with a virtue that is not grounded on knowledge and philosophy. Hence, the notion of virtue_h seems to fit well with the positive aspects of the other parts of the epitaphios: it could be considered as the moral model which it is necessary to follow after the rule of the gods has come to an end, and which is implied by the praise of the constitution and the narration of the Athenians' feats.

This reveals a sort of double tendency in the funeral oration. On the one hand, the alteration of Athens' history implicitly emphasizes the moral shortcomings of contemporary Athens and its politicians (the ironic reading is correct with respect to this aspect). On the other hand, if Athens' history is refashioned in positive terms, and if this refashioned history implies that citizens behave according to virtue_h, one can read the funeral oration also as describing a sort of ‘what if’ scenario: this would have been the history of Athens if citizens had been correctly educated according to virtue_h and had really behaved according to it. Of course, this would not have been the history of an ideal state; instability and mistakes would have been possible, since the calculation that embodies virtue_h is not scientific. However, that traditional code of behaviour is shown to allow citizens to deal better with any situation. In other words, Plato indicates the utility of providing the city with unwritten moral rules to be respected and with a motivational system to uphold them. The tracing of closer links between the different sections of the dialogue would require a whole commentary, but the general frame that I have sketched out shows the consistency between my interpretation of the last part of the epitaphios and the previous sections, outlining a new way of reading the Menexenus.

c. Plato's doctrine of virtue_k is grounded in the idea that knowledge—or, as in the Phaedo passage quoted above, φρόνησις—is a necessary and sufficient condition for a person to be completely virtuous. If this theory is not supplied, one might be led to conclude that only a minority of people who possess knowledge—that is, the philosophers—can be virtuous and act virtuously. This implies, in turn, that the vast majority of people, namely ordinary citizens in a non-ideal state, are condemned not only to uncertain beliefs but also to bad actions. This would be puzzling from the point of view of both practice, since it is evident that non-philosophers as well can act virtuously, and theory: Plato's ethics would imply a dangerous philosophical grey area concerning ordinary people's behaviour. One may claim that Plato was not aware of this problem, but external evidence suggests the opposite. A telling clue is provided by Xenocrates, who distinguishes (fr. 259 IP) between a πρακτικὴ φρόνησις and a θεωρετικὴ φρόνησις: this is clearly meant to eliminate the apparent problem raised by a strict application of Plato's intellectualism (or to clarify more subtle aspects of it, as I am arguing). So, it is reasonable to conclude that Plato too sought to guarantee for some kind of virtue to non-philosophers as well. Moreover, this would be absolutely compatible with his theory of virtue_k: given that being virtuous implies acting virtuously, but acting virtuously does not require being virtuous, the fact that knowledge is a sufficient condition in order to be completely virtuous does not imply that there is no sufficient condition limited to acting virtuously. So, one might argue that it was possible for Plato not only to see the problem but also to detect the theoretical framework allowing him to come up with a solution.

Did Plato find it? It seems to me that the solution in question is provided precisely by virtue_h, and that its value is best revealed by the frame of the Menexenus. That virtue_h is a very suitable solution for the philosophical problem I indicated is quite evident. As it emerges from the Menexenus, virtue_h consists in a code of behaviour allowing ordinary people to act virtuously. This code is a traditional one, but is now based on a motivational system; hence, it is also easily achievable and applicable by anyone, since it is grounded in belief and not in knowledge. However, the Menexenus makes it possible for Plato to shed light on this issue from a specific, and positive, point of view. As a matter of fact, the Phaedo’s account is developed according to the best possible philosophical standards and conditions, and accordingly virtue_k is celebrated and proposed as the best ethical model: this is why in the Phaedo Plato emphasizes the shortcomings of virtue_h. Similarly, the Meno stresses the instability of belief. Finally, in the Republic virtues other than σοφία are framed in a context, that of the virtuous soul, or state, which makes it difficult to examine them in themselves, apart from a perfectly realized system. Thus, virtue_h can be fully appreciated only in a context which 1) virtually excludes virtue_k, 2) emphasizes the importance of acting virtuously in itself, 3) makes its continuity with tradition clear and 4) establishes direct communication with those who should achieve it, that is, the majority of people, the citizens of a non-ideal state. Now, a funeral oration, and especially a paraenesis by the fathers, maximizes all these conditions: this typically political context allows Plato to show to what extent virtue_h can be important in the context in which it is important. Further, a funeral oration makes it possible to reform the tradition from within: as stated above, the content of the code of behaviour of virtue_h is chiefly traditional, but its frame (that is, virtue_h as a philosophical notion) is not. In a funeral oration, moreover, Plato can show how one should use traditional rules, that is, from which perspective they assume a true ethical value.

Of course, one could also go further. The above analysis raises other (and more general) questions. For example, we are led to wonder whether the distinction between virtue_h and virtue_k is only provisional, that is, whether virtue_h is to be thought of as the first step towards the possession of virtue_k. The Menexenus does not (and cannot) provide any answer. Our dialogue offers only one element, which could be helpful in this perspective: the idea that virtue_h can be acknowledged and cultivated by common citizens. Accordingly, it seems quite doubtful that Plato considers it as a means to achieve virtue_k: if this were the case, Plato would be suggesting the possibility of a state (and a human race) consisting of philosophers. This does not mean that virtue_h cannot be a first step towards virtue_k: however, it is unlikely that virtue_h in the Menexenus is conceived just for the sake of the acquisition of virtue_k. Moreover, according to the way in which virtue_k and virtue_h are defined, a discussion about the conditions on which the problem depends would hardly fall only within the field of ethics. In as much as virtue_k is characterized by the possession of knowledge and insight,Footnote ⁶⁰ any transition from virtue_h to virtue_k must be posited in epistemological terms, that is, in terms of the transition from belief to knowledge, of the education to dialectic, and of the conditions for ἀνάμνησις. In order to answer the question completely, therefore, it would be necessary to extend the enquiry by taking other dialogues into account, such as the Meno and the Republic: while this is not an endeavour I can pursue here, I hope the present article will contribute to launching future investigations in this direction.