In the summer of 1944, poor returns from the five-month rice harvest in northern Vietnam set the stage for a major subsistence crisis. Typhoons and floods destroyed the tenth-month crop due at the end of the year, and an exceptionally long and cold winter added to the misery of a population already deprived of food. The following summer, after torrential rains lifted the Red River to unprecedented heights, water poured through collapsing dykes, inundating paddy fields in large sections of the Tonkin delta. Credible estimates suggest that at least one million people starved to death.
These climatic and ecological factors help to account for the ‘Great Famine’, but, Geoffrey Gunn argues, a major share of the blame belongs to political formations, beginning with Japan, the de facto ruler of Indochina from 1940 to 1945. By enforcing annual ‘rice accords’, the Japanese ‘nakedly plundered’ food reserves (p. 144) and further insisted on shifting paddy fields to industrial crops for use elsewhere in their empire. Anti-Japanese aerial sorties launched by the United States against roads, bridges, and rail lines undercut potential south-to-north shipments of rice, the traditional route for in-country transfers of foodstuffs. Pillaging Chinese soldiers who occupied the North beginning in September 1945 (as per the Potsdam Accords) further drained off precious staple crops.
Among external players, Gunn dwells especially on France, and his citations from French colonial archives lend substance to the most original passages in the book. Colonialism's ‘agrarian-hydraulic pact’ with the population was fragile, he notes, but the authorities did believe that feeding the hungry was necessary to build consent for their rule over Indochina (p. 134). French emergency measures are said to have helped when ruptured dykes in the delta threatened to bring on famine in 1937. The author quotes at length from the papers of colonial official Paul Chauvet, who in 1944–45 was keenly aware of the unfolding catastrophe in the North and whose remedial efforts failed in part because Japanese authorities blocked the way. In developing this thread, Gunn takes his distance from Van Nguyen-Marshall, who offers a more critical view of French suzerainty in her book, In search of moral authority: The discourse on poverty, poor relief, and charity in French colonial Vietnam (2008).
With respect to the Vietnamese side of the story, chapter 2 on anticolonial resistance covers familiar ground and ends by noting that there was ‘opposition at all levels of society’ to the French presence (p. 70). The Nghe Tinh soviets of 1930–31 pose interpretative problems that the text does not solve. ‘For the authorities as much as the actors,’ the author declares, ‘it was also an act of protest fitting the tumultuous times, even if spontaneous and outside of any kind of communist agitation, but we cannot be sure of that as well’ (p. 93). French claims that Viet Minh leaders ‘exploited’ the 1945 famine (p. 206) seem ungenerous given that, once established, the new government did what it could to restabilise the food situation, as demonstrated in David Marr, Vietnam: State, war, and revolution, 1945–1946 (2013).
Gunn argues that ‘starving’ peasants (p. 215) played a decisive role in helping ‘the armed Viet Minh usurpation of power’ to achieve its objective (p. 4). It is an interpretation that deserves close scrutiny. People who are starving to death do not make revolutions or indeed undertake any other project beyond the elemental struggle to stay alive. One must go deeper to account for the remarkable collective endeavour of those Vietnamese who, in the midst of dire circumstances, found the strength to preserve social cohesion and even to dream of a happier future for themselves and their country. It is not enough to cite the ‘mandate of heaven’ passing from the colonial regime to Ho Chi Minh and the Communist Party (pp. 185–90). Without ground-level citations from common people who experienced the famine and the August Revolution, questions posed in the text cannot be answered.
Rice wars is a useful foray into new areas of scholarship. In addition to the titles already mentioned, readers might be interested in the extraordinary meditation on the environmental history of Vietnam in David Biggs, Quagmire: Nation-building and nature in the Mekong Delta (2010). On struggles for control over food and on the spectre of famine as a political weapon, see Nick Cullather, The hungry world: America's Cold War battle against poverty in Asia (2010).
