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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 February 2004
Communities are the chief source of philosophical sloppiness these days. Varying endlessly across the entire range of human experience, communities raise the specter of moral relativism that makes ethics sometimes seem a misguided and futile enterprise. Yet the language of communities and their multitude of norms, preferences, and principles present an opportunity, and challenge, to confront abiding moral problems in immeasurably richer and more novel ways. But neither the opportunities nor the challenges were always obvious. On the contrary, the origins of the Enlightenment coincide with an assault on the disharmony posed by restless and unruly communities.
Communities are the chief source of philosophical sloppiness these days. Varying endlessly across the entire range of human experience, communities raise the specter of moral relativism that makes ethics sometimes seem a misguided and futile enterprise. Yet the language of communities and their multitude of norms, preferences, and principles present an opportunity, and challenge, to confront abiding moral problems in immeasurably richer and more novel ways. But neither the opportunities nor the challenges were always obvious. On the contrary, the origins of the Enlightenment coincide with an assault on the disharmony posed by restless and unruly communities.
Liberalism, born on the back of the shattered estates and dismembered communities of premodern society, made its mark as the champion of the universal. Detached from the unity of thought and purpose offered by God and divine will, emerging political thought nevertheless reconstructed its own towering edifices to reach to the limits of human reason. There, like Moses on Sinai, the great philosophers etched their stones with the mantras of liberalism: equality, life, liberty, dignity, and tolerance. Transcending time and space and certainly the petty differences that spring up between peoples, liberalism anchored in transcendent Reason, together with the empirical sciences that accompanied its development, bred a measure of moral certitude unmatched since the Revelation.
Late nineteenth-century developments, however, undermined this certitude. Pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty puts the blame on Darwin “when it became possible to believe that nature was not leading up to anything—that nature has nothing in mind.” As a result, “history,” he writes, “began to replace God, Reason and Nature as the source of human hope,” leading to an “ever increasing proliferation” of “different, but equally valuable, sorts of human life.”1
See the afterward in: Rorty R. Philosophy and Social Hope. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin; 1999:265–6.
Politics caught up with political philosophy at just about the same time that medicine did. Initially, bioethics sought the universalist ethics made famous in the Enlightenment: respect for autonomy and dignity, self-determination, patient welfare, and justice. But the euphoria would be short-lived. As ideas like communitarianism gained ground, the idea of universally valid individual rights protecting the “good of the patient” would soon lock horns with the interests and rights of the “community.” In the meantime, every effort was made to subordinate the community to the common good.
Traditional liberal thought largely ignores communities in the grand scheme of things. This is particularly true of ethnic, racial, and religious communities, as liberalism draws a firm distinction between the private and the public spheres, tightly confining community norms, values, and interests to the former. Firmly leashed, communities were always careful to frame their political demands in terms of universal human rights: voting privileges, freedom of movement and speech, tolerance, and fair access to medical care and other social services. Within this carefully defined environment, community organizations were the vanguard of political activism encompassing, among many others, social movements to protect patients' rights.
In this unique context, however, communities want nothing special for themselves; they are merely a vehicle that allows a particular group of individuals to acquire the same rights, goods, or services as everyone else. This renders the liberal community an instrumental entity, often essential for the acquisition of rights but of no enduring value in and of itself. Communities, in this sense, are akin to “pressure groups” rather than the entrenched, corporate “organic” entities that typified premodern society (and some European nations today). For this simple reason, ethnic communities, as such, have no legal standing in modern liberal democracies like the United States. There, communities are not represented by their own political parties nor entitled to special services such as a government-funded school system. When communities fade away, the fate, for example, of many “white” ethnic groups in the United States (e.g., Irish, Italian, and lately Japanese and Jewish), the reaction is not necessarily a lament. On the contrary, it marks the group's successful integration into liberal society. Political success, as it were, breeds communal failure.
The rise and fall of social movements, including the patient rights movements, illustrate this relationship between the individual and the community. Although patient rights organizations ostensibly represented the poor, black, or Hispanic community, these organizations fought for political equality: equal access to primary and acute healthcare, respect for informed consent, protection of privacy, and community representation on hospital boards. Their foremost concern focused on protecting their constituents' basic rights as American citizens; the thought of special conditions for members of their communities could not be further from their minds. Later, after many of these demands were met, the community organizations responsible for achieving these landmark successes often faded away.
The idea of enduring ethnic entities was to receive a postmodern shot in the arm once it was realized that liberalism was falling short of its expectations to secure human happiness. Multicultural particularism was a reaction to the vacuum that liberal universalism created for many political philosophers and no few number of ordinary individuals. Cosmopolitan citizenship proved rather frightening for many who found themselves cast adrift without a relatively small, cohesive group to mediate between them and liberal society at large. Not only does political efficacy suffer in the absence of communal institutions, but the needs of personal identity are far too voracious to survive on the pruned and somewhat antiseptic values of the American ethos. More, much more, was needed, and the resurgent community was the natural body to fill the need.
Successfully resurrecting communities would require both a concerted effort to maintain the community in the realm of the private (where it had always been relegated and ultimately foundered) and to reassert community interests in the public sphere by appealing for recognition in a number of areas, such as education and medicine, that were previously off limits to particularist demands. The resurgent role of the community expanded traditional concepts of life, liberty, and happiness in a way previously unimagined. Once understood as individual prerogatives of the highest order, these basic liberal values are now modified and sometimes superseded by the life, liberty, happiness, dignity, and autonomy of the community.
The highly charged abortion debate, for example, brings the tension between liberal and communitarian perspectives into clearer focus. Ordinarily, abortion is viewed as a conflict between maternal and fetal rights. But this only characterizes the debate in the context of a particular community. Move the community—to Israel, say—and we see that “rights talk” wanes and is replaced by a different linguistic paradigm. There, religious circles oppose abortion not because it brings the death of an innocent human being (whose status is questionable in Jewish law) but because it violates the biblical commandment to “be fruitful and multiply,” a necessary condition of continued national existence. The right to individual life, so central to the American abortion debate, is subtly transformed into the right to national life in a different communal context.
This new/old idea of community designates any group of individuals, ranging in size from a family to a national minority, that has interests and rights of its own that are distinct from the aggregate welfare of its members. Although most often these are linguistic, historic, or religious groups who take pride in perpetuating their culture, language, and values, there is an increasing understanding that new configurations such as the Deaf or gay communities may have the same claim to persistence as traditionally defined communities. In each case, the community has an abiding and independent interest in survival, and its welfare may conflict with and sometimes supersede the needs and rights of its individual members.
In the context of medical care, “community,” together with the rights and interests it engenders, has several ramifications that affect the scope of medical care together with its governing principles. Concern for communal welfare easily expands the basic unit of care as attention to an individual patient's welfare is blunted by the reemergence of communitarian interests. The idea of the “patient” grows to include the family and community so that a decision to continue or discontinue care of a critically ill neonate, for example, might depend on the financial, social, and emotional impact this has on the caregiving family—a factor considered irrelevant if not immoral not long ago. The treatment of deaf children raises a similar problem. In times past there would be no doubt that children qualifying for cochlear transplants would be afforded every opportunity to attain normal hearing. Now the issue is not so clear-cut.2
Crouch RA. Letting the deaf be deaf: reconsidering cochlear implants in prelingually deaf children. Hastings Center Report 1997;27(4):14–21.
Community interests affect resource allocation in a similar way. Communitarian suggestions to distribute resources to allow communities to respect and preserve local values may sometimes come at the expense of individual liberties.3
See: Emanuel EJ. The Ends of Human Life: Medical Ethics in a Liberal Polity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press; 1991.
Beyond expanding the unit of care, communal interests also reorder individual rights. Over the years, bioethical norms have not only achieved a measure of consensus but are consistently ranked in a similar way. Autonomy and patient welfare in particular—two norms that mirror the liberal principles of liberty, life, and happiness—are paramount values that are rigidly ordered. In most Western contexts, liberty and autonomy override a patient's welfare and life. The entire history of the right-to-die debate points to the overwhelming preference of most Western nations to respect a patient's dignity and decision to die over the state's duty to preserve his or her life.
But this ranking rests on liberal bias that is in no way binding as communities assert their own rights and interests. The World Medical Association, for example, prohibits physicians from force-feeding hunger-striking prisoners.4
World Medical Association. Tokyo Declaration (1975). In: Gordon N, Marton R, eds. Torture: Human Rights, Medical Ethics, and the Case of Israel. London: Zed Books; 1995:159. By 1991 the WMA altered its policy to allow that “when the hunger striker has become confused … or lapsed into a coma the doctor shall be free to make the decision for his patient as to further treatment which he considers to be in the best interest of that patient”; World Medical Association. Declaration on Hunger Strikers, Article 4, 1991. In: British Medical Association, ed. Medicine Betrayed: The Participation of Doctors in Human Rights Abuses. London: Zed Books; 1992:212–4.
Glick S. Unlimited human autonomy: a cultural bias? New England Journal of Medicine 1997;336:954–6.
Gross ML. Autonomy and paternalism in communitarian society: patient rights in Israel. Hastings Center Report 1999;29(4):13–21, at 17.
In each of these cases, the community is not a vehicle for protecting individual rights, like in liberal times, but instead integrates the individual into a hierarchy of predetermined social preferences reflecting history and tradition rather than any democratic decisionmaking process. These traditions often spawn distinct communal interests that conflict with those of a patient and sometimes require communities to gently coerce individuals for the common good. But one should not be misled by the word “common.” It does not mean aggregate utility or the “best for the most” but the interests of an amorphous, sometimes indistinctly defined, nearly primordial entity. This idea of commonality far precedes Benthamite utilitarianism, already ordained a single generation after the Flood as “peoplehood” emerges as the defining element of the human condition (Gen. 10:32).
What are the goals of medicine when peoplehood or community interests are factored into the question? How should doctors behave? On one hand, communities can enhance the values associated with liberal bioethics without causing a normative earthquake. Communities can serve as a gauge for the fair distribution of resources, making it important to ask whether members of the black, poor, or Hispanic communities receive equal access to quality care. Communities can provide the social networks and infrastructures that allow dispossessed or weak groups to organize and press their claims in the appropriate branch and level of government or in other public forums. Communities can provide solutions to difficulties caused by linguistic and cultural differences. Respect for a patient's dignity, for example, may require subtle adjustments in light of differing ethnic views of decisionmaking, truthtelling, and delivery of bad news.
But I stress here the word “subtle.” Within the liberal framework of discourse there is no room for reordering the basic values of autonomy and life or for introducing new values that may compete with these norms. However, a real consideration of community does just this by forging a framework that shatters the normative monism imposed by liberalism. Within this moral multiverse an individual patient may lose his place as the supreme subject of medical care, as seemingly sacrosanct values are jettisoned and replaced with relative ease. Liberal societies have to adjust to this challenge as best they can, and whereas some may create firm limits to communal intervention, others may allow their institutions to bend in response to community demands. Herein lies the sloppiness that communities bring to medicine. The normative directions are now less clear-cut, less universal, and less focused on the individual as patient. Conflicting norms and players compete with one another, bringing a measure of chaos to medical decisionmaking. One can respond by tightening the reins of liberalism and reasserting the hierarchies dictated by God, Reason, and Nature, or one can loosen the reins with the hope that emerging solutions wrought by the pulling and hauling of conflicting forces will, as Rorty suggests, simply “fulfill our needs more adequately.”7
See the chapter “Ethics without Principles” in: Rorty R. Philosophy and Social Hope. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin; 1999:72.