This book discusses how contemporary Chinese political identity was shaped by various interpretations of historical events, cartography, domestic ethnic minorities, and overseas Chinese, as well as gender. These Chinese interpretations were made against the background of contemporary China's foreign relations. The author, William A. Callahan, analyzes this identity-building process by examining contradictory Chinese views on such dichotomies as “pessimism/optimism,” “civilization/barbarianism,” “foreign/domestic,” “hero/traitor,” “honor/shame,” “masculine/feminine,” “self/other,” “modern/backward,” and “East/West.”
The introduction discusses China's rise and the soft power that the country has gained with it. The Chinese perceive the world as either civilized or barbaric, and, as a result, “different peoples were not allowed to coexist with Chinese civilization on their own terms” (p. 22). For the Chinese, there is only “one China, one truth, one world, one dream” (p. 33). This mind-set also resulted in a seemingly contradictory situation: while the Chinese have become more convinced that the country is headed in the right direction in recent years, from 48 percent in 2002 to 86 percent in 2008, China also has one of the highest suicide rates in the world.
Addressing the issue, “When Is China?” chapter 2 discusses how patriotic education has shaped the Chinese identity. China, as a civilized country, was historically a victim of the barbaric Westerners and Japanese. Patriotic education as a way to remold political consciousness does not come from a unique Chinese way of thinking, but from political manipulation by the Nationalist and Communist regimes. For instance, humiliation-centered history textbooks came alive after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, following their absence from 1937 to 1990.
The following chapter continues to discuss how history helped rebuild Chinese identity by focusing on National Humiliation Day. Callahan shows that the use of National Humiliation Day to shape identity was a tactic not only of the Chinese Communist Party, but also of the Kuomintang. While much of contemporary Chinese nationalism is driven by Japan's occupation of China during World War II, “this holiday was not only a criticism of Japan, but a self criticism of China itself” (p. 73). By the mid-1990s, national humiliation discourse had spread beyond official control as China's popular media were opened up to market forces.
In discussing the topic of “Where Is China?” chapter 4 studies how Chinese identity was reflected in cartography. As was the case with using National Humiliation Day to rebuild political consciousness, the Chinese Communist Party, the Republican government, Western countries, as well as Korea, have used the construction of maps to reflect national identity.
On the topic of “Who Is China?” chapter 5 looks at another paradoxical situation: those ethnic minorities inside Chinese borders are often viewed as the “other,” while those ethnic Chinese who live overseas are often viewed as “self.” But the author recognizes the sometimes awkward situation for the overseas Chinese: they feel comfortable neither abroad nor in China.
To continue the discussion on “Who Is China?” chapter 6 focuses on gender, especially as it is related to the Nanjing Massacre in 1937. Chinese nationalist historiography sometimes presents a gendered image of China: when China is a victim, as during the Nanjing Massacre, it is presented as feminine; when China appears as a hero, it is presented as masculine. Under the government's sponsorship or acquiescence, the attention to the Nanjing Massacre was intensified after the Tiananmen incident in 1989. The nationalistic feelings regarding the event were so intense that anybody who did not hate Japan risked being considered not Chinese.
The conclusion examines how official and nonofficial intellectuals dream about China's future. As Callahan points out, “In many ways, now is the best time to be Chinese” (p. 191). He also correctly remarks that, although many “like to assume that American studies of Beijing's foreign policy engage in demonizing China as part of power politics, most recent analysis is quite optimistic too” (p. 192). This observation contrasts with the lament of Taiwan author Bo Yang, who wrote in the 1980s that to be Chinese is a tragedy in the twentieth century.
This provocative book uses not only a new analytical framework for studying Chinese political culture, but also a new range of sources. As a significant contribution to the understanding of political culture and how it is related to contemporary international relations, this book will surely generate more discussion on the subject matter. I was a little disappointed that the author did not devote a chapter to discussing the contradictory mind-set of optimism/pessimism, and so on, which I consider a Chinese way of thinking. In contrast, Callahan repeatedly shows in the book that some concrete tactics, such as using nationalism to remold political identity, have been adopted by other countries as well, therefore downplaying the uniqueness of the Chinese way of thinking. Some technical details of the book needed more work. For instance, some of the maps were not clearly printed, particularly those on pages 97 and 135.
