It is often assumed that small countries have no ability to change the policy of large powers and that is especially true when the small country is in the same geographical region as the large one. At the same time, it has also been recognised that what is of vital interest to a small country may be of little importance to a large power, giving the former some opportunity to exercise leverage over the latter. Thus, asymmetry can work both ways and it becomes a matter of empirical investigation to see which force is more important.
This book looks at the relationship between Jamaica and the United States in this context. It covers a relatively short time period (mid-1991 to mid-2001) and focuses on three issues in particular: foreign aid and debt relief, counter narcotics cooperation and trade enhancement. The author, Richard Bernal, concludes that ‘Jamaica was successful in influencing U. S. policy.’
Bernal is eminently qualified to write this book. For the period under consideration he was not only Jamaica's Ambassador to the United States, but also Jamaica's Permanent Representative to the Organisation of American States (OAS). He also played a leading role in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and has been close to the ruling elites in Jamaica for several decades.
Bernal was an outstanding diplomat in Washington DC. However, he had to overcome a legacy of suspicion towards Jamaica, as his appointment as ambassador coincided with the return to power of Michael Manley in the Caribbean island (Manley's first two terms in power (1972–80) were marked by a serious deterioration of relations with the US government, which objected to the close relationship with Cuba, the application of a levy on the bauxite companies and a radical foreign policy more generally).
Bernal's argument that Jamaica was able to influence US policy in its favour is strongest when he discusses foreign aid and debt relief (chapter 5). He had to overcome the suspicions of officials in the administration of President George H. W. Bush (1989–93) and argue that Manley was now a reformed character. With the Cold War ended, however, he did not have to push too hard and Manley himself went out of his way to demonstrate that he had moved away from many of the radical positions he had previously adopted.
Bernal's argument is at its weakest when discussing trade enhancement. Jamaica was a beneficiary, it is true, of the reformed Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) introduced in 2000 to avoid trade diversion resulting from NAFTA. However, Jamaica was one of many countries that benefited and only Cuba among the eligible countries was excluded. Trade enhancement was not introduced to benefit Jamaica on its own and Jamaica would almost certainly have been a beneficiary even if it had not been well served in Washington DC by its ambassador.
The argument about counter narcotics cooperation is midway between these two positions. The big fear for countries in the Caribbean region is that they would be ‘decertified’ by the US State Department in its annual report on the drugs trade. Without a waiver, this would mean that the US government would have to vote against loans to the country from international financial institutions. Bernal explains how close Jamaica came to being decertified in one year and that it ‘went to the wire’ with frantic telephone calls in the last few days. However, Bernal does not explain that the State Department often uses the threat of decertification to secure a change in policy in some other area unrelated to drugs. He does not tell us if that was the case for Jamaica and so the reader is left uncertain of how efficacious Jamaican diplomacy was in this case.
This reviewer was therefore not wholly convinced by Bernal's argument about the influence of Jamaica on US foreign policy. In a sense, however, it does not matter because what Bernal does is supply a superb and detailed account of the machinations of making foreign policy in Washington DC. He is thoroughly familiar with all the agencies that make up the foreign policy establishment, their interactions with each other and how to influence them with the greatest chance of success.
He is also full of insights in his account of some of the individuals concerned. He explained, for example, his difficulty in gaining support for debt relief when dealing with Vice-President Dan Quayle as follows (p. 180):
[We] raised the issue of debt relief with. … Quayle. However, this turned out to be futile because the team was not able to explain to [him] what debt relief meant. [I] followed up on this initiative by attending a Redskins game at which [I] was sure to have five minutes with the Vice President during halftime. [I] took the opportunity to raise debt relief with [him] but with little success, as the concept still seemed to elude the Vice President.
This is an illuminating account of Bernal's time as ambassador in the United States. It is not an autobiography, but it is clear from reading it that Bernal is an accomplished diplomat whose devotion to Jamaican public service has helped his country greatly. Like many of his counterparts in the Caribbean, he is well read and familiar with radical as well as conservative literature. This makes his insights all the more compelling as it allows him to put some historical perspective on the bilateral relationship between Jamaica and the United States.
