Cyril Ghosh sets out to answer four major questions: “(i) What is the American Dream? (ii) Why do political leaders invoke the Dream in making appeals to their constituencies? (iii) What explains its ubiquity and popularity? and (iv) What features of American Dream rhetoric enable its invocation by leaders across the ideological spectrum?” (157). Ghosh conceives of his project as a theoretical one, but he is careful to circumscribe the scope of his “theoretical agenda.” As the framing of these questions suggests, his project is “analytical rather than normative” (19). He aims to teach us something about the origins and ubiquity of the American Dream in American political culture.
Given this agenda, one might expect Ghosh's method to be primarily historical. Although he makes forays into the history of the ideas essential to the American Dream, he warns the reader not to expect a detailed genealogy. (For such a “historical take” on the subject, Ghosh directs the reader to Calvin Jillison's Pursuing the American Dream [University Press of Kansas, 2004]). So Ghosh's “methods” are neither normative nor purely historical. As a result, this book occupies what might be called a “middle way” (or less charitably a “no man's land”) between political theory and intellectual history. I think this middle way is likely to lead historians and political theorists to be less than fully satisfied with what they find in this book. In order to demonstrate why, let us turn to Ghosh's responses to the major questions above.
In response to the first question—what is the American dream?—Ghosh offers the following working definition: “Ceteris paribus, the American Dream is the belief or hope that in America every individual possesses, or ought to possess, an equal opportunity to succeed in life, regardless of how she defines success for herself” (32). Ghosh elaborates by explaining that the Dream contains three major “constitutive elements,” individualism, equal opportunity, and success, and he complicates (and perhaps partially undermines) his definition by arguing that the American Dream does not, in fact, include the idea that individuals should be free to define success however they like. Instead, success is always bound up in the “triangular interrelationship” of work, virtue, and happiness (161).
With this working definition in mind, consider Ghosh's responses to his other major questions, which we might call the question of political utility, the question of ubiquity, and the question of ideological flexibility. In response to political utility—why do leaders find it useful to invoke Dream rhetoric?—Ghosh argues that since 1965 we have seen a proliferation of Dream rhetoric in presidential inaugural addresses, State of the Union addresses, and major party platforms. In order to demonstrate this, he introduces a figure (fig. 2.1: Dream utterances in American political talk, 1900–2010). This figure, the only one in the book, does indeed show that “Dream utterances” have become more common since 1965 with dramatic spikes in 1984 and 2000. One of the puzzles Ghosh is attempting to solve is why. He believes that two major developments of the mid-1960s—liberalized immigration policies and the advances of several progressive social movements—made it necessary for political leaders to find “tropes” supportive of “democratic inclusion” (a term which “serves as a shorthand for participation, citizenship, free movement, individual rights, political incorporation, representation, influence, and so on,” 61).
This leads us to the questions of ubiquity and ideological flexibility: why has Dream rhetoric been such an omnipresent feature of American political life? And what is it about this rhetoric that has made it accessible to leaders across the ideological spectrum? In response to the question of ubiquity, Ghosh offers an “intellectual history” of the cluster of ideas at the core of the Dream. His goal is to explain how this particular set of rhetorical tools came to be lying on the shelf when political leaders went looking for instruments to promote “democratic inclusion” from the mid-1960s to the present day. This “intellectual history” is the weakest part of the book and the roots of the trouble lie in Ghosh's eclectic methodology. As I noted above, Ghosh aims to offer a rigorous theoretical analysis of the American Dream, but does not want to commit himself to the sort of historical work such an enterprise would require. The reader meets a familiar cast of characters such as (that honorary American) John Locke, John Winthrop, Benjamin Franklin, and Horatio Alger. To ask Ghosh for a thorough reconstruction of these (and other) “iterations” of the Dream would be to ask him to write a different book, but I could not help being a bit disappointed with even the limited attempt to reconstruct that history. His intellectual history is dominated not by a careful reconstruction of the ideas of Locke, Winthrop, Franklin, and Alger, but rather by the ideas of leading commentators on Locke, Winthrop, Franklin, and Alger (e.g., Isaac Kramnick, Daniel Rodgers, and Carol Nackenoff). This reliance on secondary sources is especially disappointing since Ghosh demonstrates in his later discussion of Tocqueville on individualism that he is quite adept at interpreting primary sources.
Ghosh's last major question—ideological flexibility—is related to ubiquity: what is it about the American Dream that has made it a tool just as readily used by conservatives as by liberals? His answer can be summed up in one word: “elasticity” (158). All of the “constitutive elements” of the Dream are malleable enough that both liberals and conservatives have been able to incorporate them into their ideological and policy programs. In his exploration of this “politics of multiple meanings,” Ghosh delivers—at least in part—on a promise made in the introduction by offering a “content analysis” of several invocations of the Dream by political leaders from across the ideological spectrum. In this part of the book the reader gets a fuller explanation of the aforementioned figure showing that “Dream utterances” did indeed become more prevalent in presidential and party rhetoric in the mid-1960s. Ghosh demonstrates that this was the result of heightened usage by both Republicans and Democrats. I found Ghosh's “content analysis” to be useful and illuminating. In fact, I found myself wanting more. Ghosh is at his best when exploring the nuanced differences between, for example, Lyndon Johnson's and Richard Nixon's invocations of the Dream and the data seemed to call out for more of this sort of analysis. Why, for example, were there such dramatic spikes in invocations of the Dream in 1984 and 2000 and dips at other points in the last century? Were these the result of particular personalities, political time, rebranding attempts by one of the parties, or some combination of these and other factors?
This book's greatest weaknesses and greatest strengths are the product of Ghosh's methodological eclecticism. His unwillingness to go all or even most of the way with any particular methodological approach results in a book that is not entirely satisfying as intellectual history, political theory, or empirical political science. Ghosh's methodological versatility, though, enabled him to ask an incredibly interesting and provocative set of questions and to provide answers that may be, in his words, “the groundwork for future scholarship” (158).
