In this book, James Madison is established as an important source of authority for Supreme Court rulings on the Bill of Rights. Madison, according to Eric Kasper, “has been cited in 230 opinions (majority, plurality, concurrence, or dissent) written by 38 different justices between 1869 and 2009” (p. 11). Citations to Madison have increased in recent years, as 12 of the 16 justices serving on the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts from 1986 to 2009 “have utilized Madison in 65 different opinions and in a variety of areas in Bill of Rights cases” (p. 11).
The Court, Kasper further argues, is justified in citing Madison as an authority in their rulings. In the First Congress, he was, after all, the driving force behind the adoption of the Bill of Rights and its principal architect. The problem, however, is that justices have displayed varying levels of understanding of Madison's political theory in their Bill of Rights rulings. Some have grasped its nuance and complexity. Many have not.
To Secure the Liberty of the People is divided into two distinct parts in order to sharpen our understanding of this problem. Part I sets forth a broad view of Madison's political theory and fundamental commitments. Kasper maintain that an examination of the intellectual influences that formed Madison's complex view of human nature, the intricacies of his liberal political thought, his evolving position on the necessity and efficacy of bills of rights, and his vision of specific freedoms in the Bill of Rights will establish “Madison's comprehensive intent behind the Bill of Rights” (p. 22). With this foundation in place, we will then be able to judge whether or not justices have understood his political thought.
Kasper's characterization of Madison's political thought in Part I is conventional but sturdy: Influenced by David Hume and even more by his Princeton mentor John Witherspoon, Madison believed that most men most of the time were inclined to selfishness, but that some were capable of exercising virtue. The trick was to design a political system that would “take advantage of the possible virtues of humanity while also safeguarding against humanity's dark side” (p. 27). This goal was best achieved for Madison, according to the author, by adopting a liberal political order along the lines suggested by John Locke, Thomas Jefferson, and Adam Smith. Madison's liberalism, according to Kasper, was capacious and “multifaceted.” Liberalism was not an end in itself, but instead a means of promoting virtue and the common good. In protecting rights, the government would be cultivating virtue. In exercising rights, the people would learn their value. For Madison, the protection of civil liberties was thus unavoidably an exercise in civic education.
In this part of his study, Kasper also challenges justices and legal scholars who have treated the Bill of Rights as a collection of clauses that can be interpreted in isolation. In contrast, he explores Madison's understanding of the relationship of these rights to the structural safeguards in the original Constitution—including the enumerated powers, separation of powers, and federalism—as well as their synergy and interdependence with one another. Madison, Kasper argues, believed that protecting freedom of speech, for example, would allow discussion about the proper limits of government authority and thus, in turn, protect property rights. Similarly, he believed that First Amendment freedoms were essential to unbiased prosecutions and protection of the rights of the criminally accused. Most broadly, he saw that freedom of speech was essential to the realization and maintenance of a democratic republic.
While this interpretation of the Bill of Rights as part of a broader system for achieving a good society constitutes a useful and original line of analysis, Kasper's argument that Madison was transformed into a genuine champion of the Bill of Rights is less convincing and more troublesome. Kasper argues against a bevy of scholars who have stressed Madison's reluctant paternity as the father of the Bill of Rights that Madison did not champion a bill of rights in the First Congress only because he feared the calling of a second constitutional convention; sought to draw North Carolina and Rhode Island, which had not yet ratified the Constitution, into the union; and needed to fulfill a campaign pledge. Instead, according to the author, Madison's correspondence with Jefferson—who passionately defended such a bill—and his own reflections led him to change his mind and convinced him that a bill of rights would be a meaningful additional safeguard in favor of liberty.
To be sure, once the Constitution had been ratified, Madison defended the Bill of Rights as proper in itself. He integrated Jefferson's famous observation that the courts would become the guardians of these rights into his introductory speech advocating the bill in the First Congress. He also repeated his own reflections that these political truths might serve as standards for rallying opposition to the government if it became tyrannical and would be strengthened against the impulses of faction to the degree that they were venerated by the public. In the First Congress, he used broad language to enumerate the rights protected and included the future Ninth Amendment, which guaranteed the protection of unenumerated rights, to address his fears that listing rights would be dangerous because they would be narrowly construed, and any list of rights would necessarily be incomplete, leading the national government to assume authority where it had none.
Nevertheless, Kasper exaggerates the degree to which these observations increased Madison's beliefs in the efficacy of bills of rights in republican governments, and Madison never came to see the Bill of Rights as necessary or proper in the new “strictly republican” government that had been formed. Instead, he carried the doubts that he had had during the ratification struggle into the First Congress. The energy and stubbornness he displayed there for the Bill of Rights was never an indication of his conviction of its intrinsic worth. Instead of searching for a conversion, Madison's support for a bill of rights can be best understood by tying it directly to his broader—and monumentally successful—effort to separate the designing from the well-meaning opponents of the Constitution.
Kasper's strained efforts to mask Madison's deep reservations about bills of rights seem to spring from his concern about buttressing Madison's authority over the meaning of the specific rights in the Bill of Rights. If Madison lacked intrinsic conviction for what he was doing, then why should he be considered the first authority on the meaning of these rights? Answering that question requires telling a more complex story than Kasper has given us. That more complex story, however, needs to be told so that we do not convey a deeper misunderstanding of Madison's beliefs about the relationship of liberty and power and the real threats to individual rights in 1787. Put concisely, from Madison's perspective in the years surrounding the formation of the Constitution, adding a bill of rights to the proposed Constitution made little sense. During the crisis that led to the calling of the Constitutional Convention, individual rights had been threatened by democratic majorities within the small sphere of the state governments. Violations of rights within the states, Madison observed in “Vices of the Political System of the United States,” were not only a fundamental violation of justice; they threatened to spark international conflict and civil war among the states. The only adequate remedy for these problems, in Madison's eyes, was a universal veto lodged in the national government. The obstacles posed by the extended republic, in turn, would diffuse majorities across the nation, providing the best protection available against majority tyranny at the national level.
The problem, from Madison's perspective in 1787, was thus not to write paper declarations to try to prevent the national government from exceeding its limited authority. He sought instead to give the national government real powers that would allow it to defend its prerogatives against encroachments by the states and to reach into the states to protect rights where they were truly endangered. Most important, Madison's beliefs that strengthening the national government would enhance liberty, and that the national government would be a protector of the rights of minorities if it was properly structured and empowered with a universal veto, were the deepest assumptions underlying his persistent reservations about the propriety, necessity, and effectiveness of a bill of rights. As strange as it now seems, the most consistent and committed civil libertarian of his generation—and the proper person to look to first for understanding the original meaning of the rights protected in the Bill of Rights—simply did not believe that the national government was a real threat to these liberties.
In Part II, Kasper provides a sampling of the uses of Madison by Supreme Court justices adjudicating the Bill of Rights. He then divides these justices into four groups. “Devotees,” such as Hugo Black, William Brennan, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter, demonstrate “an acute awareness of Madison's theories” (p. 173). “Learners,” such as Potter Stewart and Sandra Day O'Connor, develop sophisticated understandings of Madison's political thought over time and eventually “get” him. “Inconsistents,” such as Warren Burger, John Paul Stevens, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas, “sometimes make correct use of Madison and yet at other times do not” (p. 184). “Name droppers,” including Felix Frankfurter, Robert Jackson, and William Rehnquist, get Madison's political theory and his view of human nature wrong.
Kasper emphatically argues that this portion of his book is “not intended to argue how Madison would have resolved any of these cases” but, rather, “to see whether the justices who have cited Madison have grasped the complexity and nuances of his thought” (p. 139). Point taken. Still, the book would have been strengthened if he had not simply provided a scorecard of the justices' insights and errors, but also at least discussed how a sophisticated understanding of Madison's political thought would inform disputes in such areas as the free exercise and establishment clauses, freedom of speech and the press, and the rights of the accused.
As it stands, To Secure the Liberty of the People is still a provocative and useful study that will interest students of Madison and the Supreme Court.
