The Japanese had given Burma ‘independence’ in August 1943 and appointed Ba MawFootnote 447 as Head of State, U NuFootnote 448 as Foreign Secretary, and General Aung SanFootnote 449 as Minister of Defence; after releasing them from jail where they had been put after the Japanese invasion in 1942. However, the Burmese resented the Japanese as much as the British and Aung San was biding his time before turning his Burmese National Army [BNA] against the Japanese.
In March 1945, Mountbatten, without any political authority, stated that it was the British Government's aim to help Burma attain complete self-government. His object was to encourage the BNA in its rising against the Japanese, and to avoid a colonial war by securing the support of Aung San for the British. On the same day, Mountbatten received a telegram from London discounting the value of the Burmese nationalist movement. London was relying upon the advice of the former Governor of Burma, Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith.Footnote 450 Dorman-Smith, a former Conservative Cabinet Minister for Agriculture, had left Burma for Simla when the Japanese invaded in 1942, and had therefore been out of touch with recent political developments in Burma. He had taken with him some pre-war Burmese politicians, whose advice he relied on in spite of their total loss of influence and support in post-war Burma and who hoped to replace Aung San and his Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League [AFPFL] supporters when civil government had been restored by the British.
Mountbatten, whose main objectives were to enlist the resistance movement and to avoid a subsequent colonial war, was soon at odds with Dorman-Smith. He suggested that General Aung San should be told that he would be asked to serve on the Governor's Executive Council when Civil Government had been restored. Dorman-Smith refused even to consider this proposal. His Opposition was even more determined against the treatment of the BNA as an ally, and the suggestion to embody it in the loyal Burmese Army. But Mountbatten, of course, had his way while military government continued. Rangoon was retaken on May 2nd 1945 and he arranged for Aung San to meet Field Marshal SlimFootnote 451 to co-ordinate the campaign against the Japanese. In Field Marshal Slim's view: ‘I have always felt that, with proper treatment, Aung San would have proved a Burmese Smuts.’Footnote 452 In June there was a victory parade in Rangoon. ‘I am sure’, wrote Mountbatten, ‘that having Aung San and his army take part in the Review, will have done more to prevent strife and civil war and establish friendship, than anything else I could have done.’
Another step forward towards friendship with the national movement was made by the replacement by Mountbatten of Major-General PearceFootnote 453 who, shortly after Rangoon was taken, had advocated trying Aung San as a traitor, by a new Chief Civil Affairs Officer, Major-General Rance,Footnote 454 who shared the view that it was essential to work with the young Burmese political activists.
As an observer at the meetings of the India and Burma Committee of the Cabinet, in which capacity I was appointed by Leo Amery – Secretary of State for India during the Coalition Government – I had watched the development of our Burma Policy as it proceeded pari passu with our Indian Policy. The basic principle enunciated again by the Committee in December 1944, was ‘to establish self-government in Burma within the Empire.’ Sir Reginald Dorman-Smith advocated a seven year reconstruction period of direct rule, following the period of military rule, and even then British trusteeship, instead of independence, for the whole area of Burma not inhabited by Burmese.
The Coalition Government finally declared its Burma policy in a White Paper on May 17th, 1945 which was in summary that: first, the period of direct rule should be three (and not seven) years; second, when parliamentary government had been restored, a new constitution for Dominion status within the Commonwealth would be drawn up; and third, the hill areas, comprising about half the total area of Burma, would be excluded unless the inhabitants decided to join Burma. This was in contrast to the nationalists’ demands for an immediate transfer of power to a provisional government in readiness for a republic comprising the whole of Burma.
After the end of the war with Japan, Dorman-Smith threatened to resign if Mountbatten failed to hand over to him. Against his better judgment – he said this was the only bad mistake in his life – Mountbatten bowed out in October 1945. Dorman-Smith's attitude to nationalist movements was illustrated by his response to Wavell's request that he receive Nehru in Burma. According to Wavell, the response was to the effect ‘By all means send Nehru to Rangoon and I will put him straight into jail.’
The new Labour Government continued the White Paper policy as confirmed by wire from Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State, to Dorman-Smith on September 21st: ‘You should proceed on assumption that HMG's policy is that of the late Government's White Paper’.
In January 1946, Mountbatten told Dorman-Smith, on the advice of Wavell, that no Indian troops could be used in Burma and that he was not able to guarantee the use of the few British and Commonwealth Regiments in South East Asia Command. There was therefore no way of stopping a rebellion. Dorman-Smith did not report to London that he could not carry out the White Paper policy without provoking an armed uprising.
Indeed, there soon followed a crisis that could have sparked off an armed rising in Burma. In March 1946 Dorman-Smith asked Pethick-Lawrence for permission to arrest Aung San on a charge of murder arising out of the war against Japan. Mountbatten was of course consulted, and disagreed with the Governor because insufficient evidence had been collected to warrant an arrest. He was in fact furious about this, because he knew what the arrest of Aung San would mean. He told Rance, then a member of his staff: ‘That I will not for one moment contemplate allowing so gross a piece of disloyalty to my express wish, nor such an arrant act of treachery to the Burman Defence Army, who rose on our behalf long before the Fourteenth Army or Fifteen Corps could give their rebellion army support, as to arrest Aung San and throw him into jail while we decide to try him or not.’ We wisely accepted Mountbatten's judgment and refused the Governor's request.
Then chance took a hand as it does so often in politics. In March 1946 Pethick-Lawrence happened to be abroad. Attlee took over the Burma Office. ‘As soon as I began to read Pethick's papers I realised we would have to change our line’, recorded the Prime Minister, ‘the new policy could be described as following Mountbatten instead of Dorman-Smith’.Footnote 455 Mountbatten urged Attlee to dismiss the Governor before he involved us in a major war with Burma. This advice was probably crucial in the Government's decision to replace Dorman-Smith when he fell ill and returned to London in August 1946. The replacement was Major-General Rance, who confirmed that the White Paper policy was unworkable and that Aung San must be involved in policy. Accordingly, the India and Burma Committee's directive to Rance was to include a representative team from the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League, Aung San's party, and to involve Aung San, despite the unresolved murder charge. Rance took over at the end of August.Footnote 456 His arrival was followed almost immediately by a police strike in Rangoon, which spread to Government employees until it was almost a general strike. Rance immediately met Aung San, who agreed to join the Governor's Executive Council, with a number of his own colleagues also members of the AFPFL. A new Executive Council, for the first time representative of the nationalist movement, was thus set up by the end of September.
The Nationalist majority in the new Executive Council made it plain that they would accept nothing less than independence. On November 13th we had a letter from Rance ending with these words: ‘there is a new spirit of nationalism abroad, tempered and restrained, but quite unyielding. His Majesty's Government must either make terms with it quickly, or prepare without delay to hold the country by military force.’ Almost exactly what we had heard from Wavell about the situation in India. So we decided to invite a delegation from his Executive Council to London for discussions. The invitation was accepted, and the London meeting between British Ministers and the Burmese Delegates took place between January 13th and January 27th, 1947. We all realised that if we failed to reach agreement at the end of our talks, there would be serious anti-British violence, possibly civil war, in Burma. This was positively the last chance for a peaceful solution of the Burmese problem.
The first meeting at No. 10 Downing Street was on January 13th, when a statement of principle was made by the Prime Minister and Aung San and handed to the Press. The subsequent meetings were held in private. The British team, led by the Prime Minister, included Lord Pethick-Lawrence, A.V. Alexander, Sir Stafford Cripps, Christopher Mayhew,Footnote 457 Arthur Bottomley,Footnote 458 and myself. Attlee in his opening speech said that we wanted Burma to be free and to choose her own form of constitution when she reached independence: ‘it is for the people of Burma to decide their own future. We have no desire to retain any unwilling peoples within the Commonwealth and Empire. Our intention is to hasten forward the time when Burma shall realise her independence either within or without the British Commonwealth.’ Aung San replied that ‘whatever internal differences there may be in our country, we are one on the right of our country to full and unfettered sovereignty – the day of independence for our nation should be made possible within a year from now’.
The outcome of the conference was complete agreement between Attlee and Aung San about the road to, and timing of, independence. The forthcoming General Election would be for a Constituent Assembly to frame the constitution for the new country, though there would also be direct negotiations between Aung San and the frontier peoples to work out a scheme to bring them into a united Burma. He made it clear that he wished the frontier peoples to have a free choice between separate independence and union with ministerial Burma. I should perhaps explain that under British rule, Burma had been divided between the mainly Burmese area in the south, for which Ministers here were responsible, and the frontier areas in northern Burma under the direct rule of the Governor. Finally, the Governor's Executive Council would become an Interim Government, without prejudice to his existing powers, which would last until independence. In the meantime the interim government would be treated as a self-governing Dominion Government.
But the meeting was not to end without one of the most unpleasant examples of political chicanery I can remember. On Sunday January 26th at 10.30pm, just as we thought that there was nothing left to do but the dotting of a few i's before a short ceremony of appending signatures to the final document, Thakin Ba SeinFootnote 459 and U SawFootnote 460 staged a walk out. We were discussing the date for publishing the agreement. Just at this moment Thakin Ba Sein said he wished to speak. He told us he could not regard the agreement as satisfactory to Burma. One difficulty was that his country would not be independent within a year. Then U Saw said that he agreed with Ba Sein, and neither of them could be parties to the agreement. They walked out of the meeting at No. 10.
My friend Tin TutFootnote 461 was quick to point out to us after they left the meeting that their real motive was to get back to Rangoon before Aung San, so that they could denounce him as a tool of the British for the concessions he had made, before he could return to Burma in time to reply to their accusations. It should be remembered that U Saw, as a former Prime Minister of Burma, had considerable prestige, and led the important opposition Party which was hoping to overthrow Aung San. What astonished us, and even enraged the calm Attlee, was that neither U Saw nor Ba Sein had expressed any dissent when the matter to which they so strongly now objected in the agreement had been discussed at length at earlier meetings. Then Aung San, speaking for all the other members of the Burmese Delegation, said he would like to proceed without the two dissentients. The agreement was signed in Downing Street with only two dissentions on January 27th. From that moment a peaceful transition to independence was assured.
On his return to Burma, Aung San lost no time in approaching the leaders of the frontier areas about their willingness to unite with the Burmese in an independent Burma.Footnote 462 He was relieved to find that they were most anxious to co-operate, in order to bring their independence forward to the earliest possible date. This was confirmed by their representatives at a conference of the hill peoples at Pang LongFootnote 463 in the middle of February, when they decided, provided that their autonomy was preserved, to unite with the Burmese in a Federal State, and in the meantime to join the Interim Government and to send their representatives to the Constituent Assembly. The presence of a British Minister, Arthur Bottomley, contributed to the success of the Pang Long Conference, as he was able both to convince the Northerners that we were genuine about wanting their independence, and that we were also seeking their willingness to unite with their Burmese neighbours in the south to achieve it. At last the long separation between the Frontier Areas and Ministerial Burma would be ended, and the country could move forward towards a free and united Burma.
The Constituent Assembly to determine the democratic constitution of the new Burma would meet in June, and in discussing the procedure with Rance, Aung San mentioned that he intended to propose a resolution as follows: ‘that Burma should be a Sovereign Independent Republic.’ It was immediately apparent to Rance that the severance of allegiance to the Crown would put Burma outside the Commonwealth. Aung San agreed to this interpretation of his proposal, but replied that to keep the Crown link would break up his Party and let in the Communists.Footnote 464 This was the cruel dilemma that faced Burma, because it was the first of our dependencies to become independent after the war, before any provision had been made for Republics to remain in the Commonwealth. Rance anticipated the change in the relationship with the British Crown that made it possible later on for India, and all subsequent British dependencies that became Republics after their independence, to remain in the Commonwealth. What he said in a telegram to me dated June 9th, 1947 was this:
The conclusion I reach therefore is the time seems right for a new conception of association within the Commonwealth, not necessarily owing allegiance to the Crown, especially for those countries which have no ties of blood, culture, or religion.
His foresight came unfortunately too late to save Burma for the Commonwealth, or to burden it with the subsequent misfortunes of that unhappy country.
U Nu visited us in London in June as a member of a Goodwill Mission, and confirmed that quite apart from the objections against recognising the British Monarch as Head of State, the communists would say that the AFPFL ‘had sold Burma to the British’ on the basis that dominion status was not true independence. When this matter came up at the India and Burma Committee, Cripps echoed Rance's sentiments in suggesting the consideration of a modified form of Commonwealth association, as India would undoubtedly raise the question in due course and in the meantime, provision should be included in the prospective Treaty with Burma allowing her to return to the Commonwealth within a year of independence. The conclusion of the Cabinet Committee was however to refuse any concession to Burma.
I have sometimes wondered why Attlee did not accept Cripps’ suggestion, which would have enabled Burma to return to the Commonwealth as a Republic with the agreement of the old Dominions. I suppose he probably thought that Burma was not worth the long and difficult process of consultation with the other Commonwealth countries, or that even if this procedure had been adopted, as it would be later in the case of India, they would not have been in favour of changing the constitutional framework of the Commonwealth for the sake of Burma.
I found U Nu a delightful personality, with much more intellectual ballast than the run-of-the-mill politician. The arrangements made for his reception here had to be changed as soon as we knew what he really wanted. The Foreign Office had booked him for a popular show in London and a suite at a comfortable London hotel. Instead, he insisted on a separate bedroom for himself and his wife, and a visit to the Shakespeare season at Stratford-on-Avon instead of the London theatre. He explained to me that he was himself a playwright, and a devotee of Shakespeare and Bernard Shaw. The plays of Shaw had persuaded him, while still a University student in Rangoon, not to write in blank verse. One of his plays had been translated, and he gave me a copy asking for my honest opinion. This was distinctly embarrassing, as the play was typically Shavian, and I prefer action to argument in the theatre. However he was much too good natured to take my comments amiss.
U Nu invited me during this visit to stay at his home in Burma, but I told him that, much as I would like to do so, and to visit his country as soon as possible, I doubted whether I would have time for a private visit as well. U Nu, after a somewhat rackety youth had become a ‘born again’ Buddhist, a total abstainer, and a celibate who practised daily prayer and meditation. I am sure he would have been happier as the Abbott [sic] of a Buddhist Monastery than he was subsequently as Prime Minister of Burma. For us the main difficulty of his devoutness was that he was constantly threatening to retire. We could only get him to stay in politics by accepting a time limit. Aung San himself had pleaded with him to join the Constituent Assembly, but he would only agree on condition that he could retire altogether from politics in six months time. His admiration for our culture and way of life made him an invaluable friend at the highest political level in Burma. Little did I think when he left London that I should next meet him as Prime Minister of his country.
Normally I did not go to my office on Saturdays, but on the afternoon of Saturday July 19th I had a telephone call from the Duty Officer to say that an urgent telegram awaited me from the Governor. It was to be the worst Saturday afternoon I can remember in all my life. The message from Rance read: ‘An attack has been made on the Executive Council at about 10.30 this morning by three Burmans armed with Sten guns, five Counsellors have been killed, and Aung San himself wounded.’ This message was shortly corrected to include Aung San among the victims, though not until I had already sent him a telegram of personal sympathy. One of the Counsellors who survived described what happened.
The Executive Council normally met at Government House, but the agenda did not concern the reserve powers of the Governor on that occasion, so it had met at the Secretariat. This was the case on the morning of Saturday July 19th. At about 10.30am three men armed with Sten guns and in army uniform burst into the Council Chamber, having shot the guard outside the door. They opened fire point blank at the assembled counsellors. Aung San stood up as they entered, and received the first volley in the chest. They then fired to his right and left, killing six counsellors, and mortally wounding two others. Only three of those present survived. The assassins had also intended to kill U Nu after the attack on the Secretariat, but luckily he was out when they got to his house. There was an immediate danger of a rising organised by U Saw's supporters and the Communist Party, who spread the rumour that the British were responsible for the murders. The Rangoon Press was already accusing us of complicity in the crime. Calm was restored by Rance's presence of mind in asking U Nu, who was the President of the Constituent Assembly, to form a new Council of Ministers, which was sworn in the following day. He immediately issued a statement denying the complicity of the British Government or the Governor in the murder plot.
But it soon emerged from the enquiry set on foot by Rance that acts of negligence and even corruption in the Burma army had contributed significantly to the disaster. In June and July there had been two mysterious thefts of arms and equipment from the Army Ordnance Depot. In each case a bogus police party with forged documents had perpetrated the thefts. It transpired later that two British officers had been in the pay of U Saw.Footnote 465 One had forged the police documents, the other had sold the arms to U Saw. The officer in charge of the Ordnance Depot had revealed in a statement to the Military Police, and reported straight away to the Chief of Staff of the G.O.C., that U Saw in his cups had admitted to him that he was responsible for the arms thefts. Having read the statements of the officer in charge of the Ordnance Depot, this senior officer locked it up in his safe and forgot about it, instead of informing the Burma Police. He did not remember this vital statement until after the assassination. Rance notes in his memoirs that after he had read the incriminating statement he said aloud ‘Good heavens, if we had known of this earlier, the assassination could probably have been prevented.’ He informed U Nu immediately, emphasising secrecy, and U Nu's reaction also was that the murderers could have been foiled. What is really remarkable is that neither he nor any of his ministerial colleagues exposed the role of British officers in the assassination of their colleagues. As Kynev Nien, a senior Burmese civil servant, reported to Maung Maung,Footnote 466 a Burmese politician: ‘As Nu had said and [the British] had agreed “what had happened had happened, the point is to get Independence quickly without fail and not to provoke the British Authorities into … revoking promises”.’
Of course they had an undertaking from Rance that the culprits would be apprehended and brought to justice. If the true story had ‘leaked’ at this moment, and it had reached the press, Europeans would have been as much at risk all over Burma as they were in India during the Mutiny.Footnote 467 However this inaction by the British authorities did lead some Burmese to wonder whether the British officers were acting under orders.
I have dwelt at some length on the events of July the 19th, 1947 because they represented a turning point, in the history of Burma. Would the internal strife that marred the early years of Burmese independence have been avoided if Aung San had not been killed at the early age of 32? Could this country with its enormous natural resources, have gradually developed under wise leadership, like another United States of America, bringing peace and plenty to a union of peoples speaking many different languages and professing many different religious faiths? This is how Rance, who knew Burma and its leaders better than any other Englishman, put the question himself, and answered it:
The question will always be asked – if Aung San and his associates had not been assassinated on that fateful day in July 1947, would Burma's troubles in 1949 and succeeding years have arisen? In my view, as long as Aung San held the confidence of the Burmans and the Hill Peoples (possibly less the Karens) I don't believe they would. Aung San was a much stronger character than his successor, U Nu, and with the assistance of Mahn Ba Khaing,Footnote 468 a popular Karen leader, the Karen troubles of 1949 may not have escalated to the heights they eventually did.
I, with my much more limited knowledge, would entirely agree with Rance.
Aung San had the qualities of a soldier-statesman, like Washington,Footnote 469 and as the founder of independence had become the focus of a nationwide patriotism. He loved his army, and kept a battalion with him as his body guard. This would certainly have prevented a military dictatorship. I only knew him slightly myself, but I had observed at the Attlee/Aung San meetings in Downing Street that he spoke with blunt directness and quiet determination, using few words, in a way we associate more perhaps with soldiers than politicians. Let me quote Rance again:
I met Major-General Aung San for the first time in June 1945 and I was immediately impressed by his personality, which showed itself by his transparent honesty, his sincerity, his simplicity in dress, and his directness in thought and speech.
It was not surprising that Field Marshal Slim liked him: ‘the greatest impression he made an me was one of honesty. He was not free with glib assurances and he hesitated to commit himself, but I had the idea that if he agreed to do something he would keep his word’. His daughter, Aung San Suu KyiFootnote 470 has written a touching short biography of the father she was too young to remember – she was still a baby when he died – in which she describes what he meant to the peoples of Burma:
Aung San's appeal was not so much to extremists as to the great majority of ordinary citizens who wished to pursue their own lives in peace and prosperity under a leader they could trust and respect. In him they saw that leader, a man who put the interests of the country before his own needs, who remained poor and unassuming at the height of his power, who accepted the responsibilities of leadership without hankering after the privileges, and who retained at the core of his being a deep simplicity.
Would that he could have lived to see her awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991, when she was under house arrest in Burma. The Nobel Committee described her ‘non-violent struggle for democracy and human rights’ as ‘one of the most extraordinary examples of civil courage in Asia in recent decades.’
Alas, it was a saintly man who abhorred violence and detested politics, not a strong man who had learned that force was necessary to uphold freedom, who inherited the leadership after the tragedy of the July massacre. As Rance noted: ‘The only thing I would every say against Nu is that he utterly lacked a capacity for ruthlessness in the months leading up to, and following, independence. If he had been of a more ruthless mould, I think Burma might have escaped a great deal of its post war insurgent difficulties.’Footnote 471 Indeed, U Nu often told the story of the cobra that got away because he, U Nu, spent so long deciding whether or not he had the right to take its life. This respect for life is typical of Buddhism.
Our next step, now that it had become clear that Burma would leave the Commonwealth, was to negotiate a Treaty to regulate relations between Britain and Burma after it had become a foreign country. Attlee had intended to send out Cripps in September to handle negotiations on our side, and to discuss arrangements for the transfer of power, but a serious balance of payments crisis, including a possible run on the pound, obliged the Chancellor to stay at home, and I was asked to take his place. The proposal was made by Attlee to U Nu on August 15th, and welcomed by the latter.
On the flying boat between Calcutta and Rangoon I met Randolph Churchill,Footnote 472 not altogether surprisingly in the bar on the lower deck of the plane. My heart sank, remembering that his father,Footnote 473 Lord Randolph Churchill,Footnote 474 had annexed Burma. I was therefore much relieved when he told me he was en route for Singapore, not even stopping overnight in Rangoon. I arrived in Rangoon on September 1st, accompanied by Sir Gilbert Laithwaite as head of the Burma Office and my Private Secretary, Ronald Harris.Footnote 475 We were met at the airport by the Governor, who disregarded protocol, U Nu, and some Cabinet colleagues: and I drove off immediately to Government House.
It surprised me to hear that I was the first Secretary of State to visit Burma, and was therefore the first holder of my Office with first hand knowledge however slight of the country. My welcome was assured by my press statement stating our policy:
His Majesty's Government will introduce the necessary legislation (i.e. the Independence Bill) at the beginning of the autumn session in October, and they will do everything in their power to hasten the passage into law and to complete the necessary Parliamentary processes by the end of the present year.
The following morning I paid courtesy calls on the Prime Minister and on Mrs Aung San,Footnote 476 the General's widow, a remarkably lovely and intelligent lady who had been formerly a trained hospital nurse. I was given a civic reception at the Town Hall, and presented with an address in a beautiful silver casket.Footnote 477 I had lunch with U Nu and his party colleagues and also with the business community at the Rotary Club. The most memorable of my experiences was a visit to the greatest Pagoda in Burma, the Schwedagon.Footnote 478 A short account of my stay in Rangoon was subsequently published by the Government of Burma, and there is a paragraph about my visit to the Pagoda:
One Sunday morning on September the 7th, Lord Listowel and Sir Gilbert Laithwaite visited the Schwedagon. Lord Listowel and party offered flowers and symbolic umbrellas to the Pagoda. Lord Listowel also laid gold leaf on the superstructure of the Pagoda and tolled the second largest bell in Burma. In fact he is the first Earl who has ever climbed barefoot the Upper Platform of the Pagoda to offer gold leaf. In those good old days the ‘Footwear Prohibited’ notice was most annoying to our European friends but times have changed. His Lordship found it easier to walk the Burmese way. This was in itself a significant thing which endeared him to the Burmans.
There is another rather charming passage at the end of this record of my visit to the Schwedagon.
Lord Listowel lingered for more than two hours on the Pagoda platform. Then he retraced his footsteps at the request of the gentleman who offered him the philosopher's stone. He said goodbye to the flower girl at the Western entrance. He shook hands with her. She looked rather plump. Perhaps towards the end of this year when His Majesty the King announces in Parliament the transfer of power and subsequently the grant of independence she will be a proud mother. The baby will be a free Burman. This is very auspicious.
Most of my time, however, was spent at Government House, meeting people from all walks of life and all parts of Burma. My task was to find a modus vivendi between the Burmese and the Karens, and to agree the terms for a Treaty that would regulate our relations with Burma after independence. I had hoped that if I was successful with the Karens it would avert the civil war that would otherwise be almost inevitable, and unfortunately happened later. I was asked by U Nu to explain to the Karen leaders what he was prepared to offer them, and to do my best to persuade them to accept. They could have a separate Karen State in the Karen majority area, the independence of the Karenni Karens would be respected, and there would be safeguards for the Karen minority in Lower Burma. I met their leaders separately, and told the Karennis they could no longer expect subsidies or protection from His Majesty's Government after independence. Finally, I addressed a farewell speech to their ten representatives, expressing my sadness that they could neither agree among themselves about what they wanted, nor accept the generous offer of the Burma Government. I thanked them for their help in the war against Japan, and wished them well for the future. My effort as a mediator had been a total failure. Rance asked me to publish my speech to the Karens when I got home, but it remains I imagine in the archives of the Burma Office. I was glad to find later that in a letter I brought home from U Nu to Stafford Cripps, the former attached no blame to me for my failure. I quote from his letter:
Lord Listowel will tell you that the great efforts he made to secure a settlement of the Karen question failed in the end. The failure was certainly not due to any fault on the part of the Mission, which contacted all sections of Karen opinion and did its best for the Karens.
The Treaty under negotiation would come into effect from the moment Burma became a foreign country and would include all important matters of mutual concern, such as contractual obligations, nationality, finance, defence, and trade. For the Burmese the most important provision of the Treaty was contained in Article 1:
The Government of the United Kingdom recognises the Republic of the Union of Burma as a fully independent Sovereign State.
It was certainly our intention that the Treaty should give Burma the best possible start in life as a new member of the community of nations, and it was therefore drafted to go as far as we could to meet the urgent need for armed security and financial support. I only wish we could have gone much further to compensate Burma for the total devastation caused by the Japanese invasion and our failure to prevent it.
The financial settlement of the Treaty wiped off £15,000,000 of Burma debt, and allowed the balance to be repaid over a period of ten years. A distinct advantage for Burma was the continuation of Commonwealth preferential treatment for her trade, pending the agreement to the drafting of a Commercial Treaty. But more important still was the assistance offered by a Defence Mission led by a junior Minister, John Freeman,Footnote 479 to build up her armed forces under the supervision of British advisors from our own army, navy, and air force. We also offered military training in the United Kingdom for Burmese personnel. All British troops would be withdrawn as soon as possible after the transfer of power. In return, Burma would not receive a Service Mission from any foreign country. The Treaty was signed in London by Attlee and Thakin Nu [U Nu] on October 17th, amid the Victorian splendour of the conference room at Lancaster House.
It only remained to draft the Burma Independence Bill, and to get it through Parliament before the Christmas recess. The one difficulty we had in drafting it was to fix the date for independence. We were naturally anxious to meet the wishes of the Burma Government, and they had informed us that the ‘auspicious’ date would be January 6th, 1948. So, in accordance with their express wish, this date went into the Bill. Our dismay can be imagined when on November 4th, the day before the Second Reading of the Bill in the House of Commons, we received a telegram from Rangoon asking us to change the date to January 4th, because ‘the large body of opinion here regard that as most auspicious’.Footnote 480 I told Attlee immediately about this request for a last minute change; and he seemed unruffled, promising that ‘the adjustment would be carried into his speech’ on the Second Reading the following day and made in Committee. He did this rather neatly I thought, with due allowance for Burmese sensitivity, and the astrological scepticism of the House of Commons. An unopposed amendment to advance the date was duly moved at the Committee stage of the Bill.
The debate that followed Attlee's speech showed that the Conservative Party though opposing the Bill, was by no means united in its opposition. The official line was indicated by Churchill, who denounced the Government for breaking up the Commonwealth and described Aung San as a ‘traitor rebel leader’. Other Conservative speakers followed in the same vein, but R.A. Butler, who had been the Conservative's spokesman on the India Independence Bill, was conspicuous by his absence from the House. I suspect that his absence was in fact a deliberate manoeuvre to avoid a painful conflict between Party loyalty and intellectual integrity. He probably knew more about Burma than any of his Party colleagues, having been a junior Minister at the India Office at the time of the 1935 India Act,Footnote 481 with the added advantage of a family connection through his Uncle Harcourt Butler,Footnote 482 who at one time had been Governor of Burma. Four Conservative backbenchers supported the Bill, and three actually voted against their Party and on the side of the Government. It was a signal to Burma that even a Conservative administration would not necessarily be unfriendly or reverse the present attitude of the Government. This impression must have been reinforced by the expressions of goodwill towards Burma emanating from all sides of the House, whether or not the speaker was in favour of the Bill. Arthur Henderson made an excellent winding up speech in reply to his critics in the House of Commons, and the Bill was given a Second Reading by 288 votes to 114.
The Bill reached the House of Lords for its Second Reading on November the 25th. I opened with a much longer speech than I had intended, which must have been intensely boring for most of my audience, for whom Burma was a far off country about which they knew very little. But I was obliged to outline the provisions of the prospective Treaty covering defence, finance, and commercial relations, as well as the historical background of our policy for treating Burma as a dependency that had reached maturity, the stage for independence. Lord Munster, who had been a junior Minister at the India and Burma Office during the war, replied for the Opposition, but the best case against the Bill was made by the final Opposition spokesman, my old friend and Leader, Lord Salisbury. In the finest speech in either House he deplored the abandonment of our responsibility for Burma, I quote: ‘Sixty years of British trusteeship’, he said ‘recklessly cast away’, and he then extolled the peace and prosperity brought by the long period of British rule.
I was supported by my predecessor, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, and in an eloquent speech from Lord Samuel,Footnote 483 Leader of the Liberal Party. But the temper of the House was bound to be against the Government, and I was relieved that, on the wise advice of Lord Salisbury to respect the decision of the House of Commons, the Bill received its Second Reading without a vote. It passed into law without amendment on December 4th, as we had hoped, before the Christmas recess, and in good time for the hoisting of the flag of Burma in place of the Union Jack on January the 4th, 1948.
I had friendly letters from both Cripps and Attlee when I retired from the Burma Office:
11 Downing Street
20.12.47
My dear Listowel,
… I should like to say how much I have admired your conduct of India and Burma affairs during this most difficult year. Much of the credit for the smoothness and quickness of action is I know due to you personally.
Thank you for it.
Best of luck,
Stafford Cripps
10 Downing Street
3.1.48
My dear Billy,
Thank you so much for your generous letter. We are all greatly indebted to you for the good work which you did at the India and Burma Office. You took [it] on at a most difficult time. I greatly admire the way in which you tackled the problems before you and the clarity with which you presented your views.
Although your new post is outside the Cabinet, I think that you will find plenty of interesting and responsible work to do.
With all good wishes,
Yours ever,
Clem
This was the longest letter I ever had from Clem Attlee; he hated prolixity.
Attlee has been described by Roy HattersleyFootnote 484 as ‘the greatest of all British peace-time prime ministers’. I entirely agree. The independence of India was the greatest of his achievements, and he had prepared for it over a long period of time. During the war-time Coalition he had been Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Cabinet's sub-committee on India. He continued as Chairman after the 1945 General Election. By having the Secretary of State in the Lords – first Lord Pethick-Lawrence, followed by me – he made sure that he would be the party spokesman on India, and was later able to pilot the India Bill through the House of Commons. When asked towards the end of his life which of his many political achievements he valued most, he is believed to have said ‘India, I suppose’. A typical understatement.
