The scope of this book is impressive. Eight chapters detail the history and institutional design of the World Trade Organization and its forebear, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), analyze their successes and failures over nearly 60 years, and outline challenges that the regime must manage to remain politically viable. As the subtitle suggests, the authors examine the politics that have shaped and sustained the trade regime; legal issues, particularly in the settlement of trade disputes; and economics as an underlying factor in the regime's evolution, along with the trade effects of its presence.
The book's core arguments focus on two key problems that the WTO faces: first, challenges to its legitimacy from underrepresented countries and newly mobilized nonstate actors; and second, the threat from the continuing profusion of regional trading arrangements. The legitimacy issue is multifaceted, and successive chapters effectively analyze its different sides. The threat from regional trading arrangements is less complicated, and this part of the argument recedes into the background, apparently overshadowed by the trade regime's larger problems.
Challenges to the legitimacy of the WTO have come from two corners: developing countries, whose influence in trade negotiations falls short of their numbers, and nonstate actors (now including environmental groups, organized labor, and antiglobalization activists, in addition to businesses), which lack institutional access at the multilateral level. Though the interests of developing countries and nonstate actors sometimes coincide—Oxfam has spotlighted the harmful effects of U.S. and European Community (EC) subsidies for farmers in developing countries; Médecins Sans Frontières has pushed for changes in intellectual property rules to make AIDS drugs more widely available to the poor—often their goals stand in opposition, as the book notes of environmental regulation, labor standards, and outsider participation in dispute settlement. Many institutional and policy choices, therefore, will dissatisfy a constituency whose support is essential to the WTO's effectiveness.
For developing countries, the legitimacy issue is that the most powerful players, the United States and the European Community, remain the core of the trade regime. Although members are formally equal under the “one nation, one vote” principle and decision rules operate mostly by consensus, trade cooperation occurs “in the shadow of power politics” (p. 205). Specifically, negotiating procedures such as “Green Room” meetings and the ability of the leading countries to extract concessions through threats of market closure mean that the interests of the United States and EC dominate in practice. A notable example is the assent of developing countries to the Uruguay Round's “single undertaking,” which occurred after the United States and the EC issued credible threats to punish those who would try to pick and choose among the agreements. This formula, which bound developing countries to observe new rules for intellectual property, services, and trade-related investment measures despite limited concessions on textiles and agriculture, produced an asymmetric distributive bargain—the terms of which are enforceable in the WTO dispute settlement system. Fortifying the trade regime's authority with developing countries, the book implies, requires that the Doha Round revise this bargain to achieve greater mutual benefit.
For nonstate actors, the legitimacy issue is the “democratic deficit” at the WTO. Like its predecessor the GATT, the WTO is a member-driven organization; nonstate actor participation is limited to lobbying member states and filing amicus curiae briefs if invited by a dispute settlement panel. This exclusiveness worked well in the GATT, where negotiations traded off business interests to liberalize barriers at national borders. But in the WTO, where attention has shifted to “inside the border” regulatory rules, the spillover effects for labor, consumers, and the environment engage a larger number of actors and interests. If the trade regime cannot account for these new stakeholders, “they will likely remain in the streets, protesting against the system” (p. 16). However, readers seeking a more open and inclusive WTO will be disappointed: “[C]omplete democratization is infeasible” (pp. 182–83); added transparency is undesirable because imperfect information remains critical to forging difficult bargains that special interests might otherwise block; and while nonstate actors can play a useful role in dispute settlement, it is best not to cast too much light on how judicial decisions are sometimes packaged for political appeal. Rather, the institutional reform the book advocates is to establish new mechanisms for popular participation at the domestic level in order to prevent a recurrence of debacles like the 1999 ministers' meeting in Seattle.
Compared to its treatment of the trade regime's legitimacy problem, the book pursues the threat from regional trading arrangements with less conviction. Its preface worries that “bilateral arrangements could ultimately undermine interest in more global trade relations” and notes that “there are serious implications for developing nations that are left out of such free trade regions, and strict rules of origin may exacerbate the diversion of trade that arises from such preferential access” (p. xii). Rather than emphasizing the exclusion of developing countries, however, Chapter 6 lauds “developing and developed countries' success in coexisting in the same PTA” (p. 178). Moreover, there is no mention of how rules of origin distort trade. Instead, a more forgiving view emerges: Regional trading arrangements are “best understood as a functional part of the trading regime” (p. 54) because they “set the stage for multilateral arrangements by changing the political support for open trade,” and they provide “test beds for multilateral action” on new issues such as services and intellectual property (p. 55). Though additional discussion of the ineffectiveness of WTO oversight may be warranted, it seems that regional trading arrangements are not a significant threat to the trade regime's efficacy.
The Evolution of the Trade Regime is an excellent study of the trading system, cohesive and robust despite its sharing among four authors. The familiarized reader will recognize the individual stamp of the different contributors, yet the book stands on its own—it is not a recapitulation of their prior work. And in critically evaluating the trade regime in all of its shortcomings, the book depicts a largely healthy, still vigorous WTO that likely will remain the system's central feature into the future.
