Machiavelli's Gospel provocatively delineates and deciphers biblical allegories in Machiavelli's political writings, especially The Prince. Parsons radicalizes “Straussian” interpretations of the Florentine secretary's engagement with Christianity, arguing that Machiavelli intended not merely to undermine Christianity as a tradition, or to challenge the papacy as a political force, but rather “to reject what is most essential to Christianity: the commandment to imitate the life of Christ” (3). Parsons provides exciting new interpretive twists on figures such as Savonarola and Cesare Borgia, whom Machiavelli clearly meant to serve as symbolic proxies for Christ. Parsons also sheds fresh light on the Christological (or anti-Christological) elements of Machiavelli's depictions of other figures such as Philip V of Macedon, Philopoemen of the Achaean league, and Piero Soderini, Machiavelli's patron and the gonfalonier of justice in the Florentine Republic.
In Parsons's often astonishing renderings, Machiavelli's Philip and Philopoemen become figurative Antichrists attempting to resist conquest by a universalizing empire located in Rome. In order to combat imperial expansion by ancient Rome, which Parsons reveals to be Machiavelli's stand-in for Christian Rome, Philip impiously destroys religious institutions to defend and expand his emphatically worldly dominions (160–62), and Philopoemen transforms philosophy from a pacifistic into an exclusively militaristic enterprise (85–88). Soderini is Machiavelli's closest approximation of Jesus: an individual who naively and complacently believes that truth, kindness, and forbearance, rather than duplicity, cruelty, and expediency, will overcome evil eventually—an “eventually” tantamount to never in Machiavelli's estimation (51–54).
There is one Christological aspect of Machiavelli's treatment of Soderini that one wishes Parsons might have considered in some depth. In Discorsi 3.3, Machiavelli explains why Soderini hesitated taking up “extraordinary authority” in the effort to eliminate the enemies of the 1494 republic; specifically, the young nobles intent on enlisting foreign powers to usurp Florence's popular government and restore the Medici to power. Soderini worried about “terrifying the collectivity such that after his death it would never again gather together to make a lifetime Gonfalonier, an order that he judged good to keep and perpetuate.” This seems to be a direct gloss on the Gospel of Matthew 18:20, in which Christ declares that, after his death, “wherever two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in their midst.” The parallel of these two passages seems to signal Machiavelli's sharp criticism of Soderini's understanding of an afterlife. For whatever reason, Soderini associates the perpetuation of his name (his soul?) with the maintenance of the chief-executive office that he was the very first citizen to hold—gonfalonier for life. He would, as it were, live forever so long as this office endured. In this respect, Machiavelli seems to substantively, if subtly, contrast Soderini with Furius Camillus, whom Machiavelli deems “Rome's most prudent Captain.”
Bracketing the most obvious differences between the two—that Camillus, unlike Soderini, withstands both internal conspiracies and foreign invasions—another perhaps not superficial contrast is this: Camillus exercised greater, indeed “extraordinary,” political authority and historical renown than Soderini did precisely because he did not aspire to a life-tenured office. Camillus held dictatorial and consular authority multiple times, often renouncing such authority as quickly as he could; he consented to exile such that the Romans might call him back in their time of most dire need; and, consequently, he earned eternal fame as “father of his country.” It would be intriguing to learn what Parsons thinks might be the deeper theological—or antitheological—significance surrounding the issue of immortality that Machiavelli seems to be exploring with this contrast of Soderini and Camillus.
Leo Strauss, in his pioneering efforts to explore the status of religion in Machiavelli's work, pursued a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, Strauss identified the means, allegorical or otherwise, through which Machiavelli fundamentally criticized Christianity and encouraged its historical overcoming; on the other hand, he identified aspects of Christianity that Machiavelli appropriates to further the success of his own political-philosophical project—”his propagation of faith,” as it were. For Strauss, the latter strategy overwhelmed the former in Machiavelli's endeavors such that his ultimate triumph was pyrrhic: the new religion, “modernity,” founded by the Florentine “unarmed prophet,” is, at its core, a form of secularized Christianity afflicted by many of the same contradictions and weaknesses that plagued the religion of the Nazarene unarmed prophet. In Strauss's view, Machiavelli relied too extensively on Christianity in his efforts to overcome it, ultimately succumbing to it by promoting the following quasi-Christian tenets: the worth of the many over the few, the centrality of personal security, an instrumental, proto-utilitarianism view of morality, and others.
Most Straussians exclusively take up the first prong of Strauss's approach; they focus on Machiavelli's critique of (and supposed victory over) Christianity, without considering Machiavelli's active appropriations of Christianity—especially his often quite Christian rhetorical-textual approach. Machiavelli's Gospel is an especially extreme example of this tendency: Parsons focuses almost exclusively on critique and attempted conquest and largely eschews the notion of appropriation in Machiavelli's engagement with Christianity.
Take Parsons's treatment of Cesare Borgia in The Prince: “Machiavelli surely invites a comparison of Christ and Cesare in chapter 7, but he does so to emphasize the deleterious effects of Christ's legacy, rather than any potential value Christian teachings might have for a modern founder” (68). Does Parsons really believe that Machiavelli intends nothing from Borgia's career to serve exemplary purposes? Does he really think that Machiavelli does not endorse the Christian symbolism contained within the vivid example of Remirro's execution? Does not the lesson, imparted by this “spectacle,” of “one individual dying for the sins of everybody else” facilitate a quasi-Christian form of scapegoating that Machiavelli enthusiastically recommends for emulation? Moreover, are readers to believe that Machiavelli does not really mean what he says when he declares Borgia worthy of imitation, and when he repeatedly attributes virtù to him? I think it dubious to affirm any of these negatives in the foregoing questions, and, furthermore, I think Strauss would agree.
My final considerations apply not just to Parsons but to any scholar more or less partial to Straussian interpretations of Machiavelli. If Machiavelli was as singularly focused on overcoming Christianity as many Straussians insist, and if he was historically successful in this endeavor, as many assert, then does this make The Prince and the Discourses obsolete as works of political philosophy? Must we then read Machiavelli only for genealogical purposes; merely to trace the overcoming of the classical and biblical traditions effected by the establishment of Machiavelli's new modes and orders, that is, modernity? Or do Machiavelli's works also contain nonreligiously affiliated lessons that he intended to be followed or operationalized once Christianity had been superseded? I offer one example. Machiavelli's hostility to rich and powerful political elites, and his rather severe prescriptions for how to deal with them, outlive any demise of religion that his writings may encourage. This is a crucial aspect of Machiavelli's democratic republicanism that he intended to persist beyond any eclipse of Christianity's political influence he may have otherwise desired—a stubbornly anti-elitist element of his political philosophy that Straussians, unfortunately, are far less inclined to view with grudging admiration than his uncompromising impiety.
