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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 September 2004
No Fire Next Time: Black-Korean Conflicts and the Future of America's Cities. By Patrick D. Joyce. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. 240 pages. $45.00 cloth, $19.95 paper.
Patrick D. Joyce's book not only has a provocative title but also says something important about the future of America's cities. Joyce argues that the United States, and by extension, especially its cities, faces a contentious future, and that this is suggested by three trends: First, racial and ethnic diversity is increasing; second, economic inequality has widened; and third, our governing institutions have weakened. He suggests that these trends originate in separate causes, but their coming together at the same point in history means that the potential for racial and ethnic tension may be heightened just as our capacity to cope with them have diminished (p. 3). Central to his concerns is the black-Korean conflict in American cities.
Patrick D. Joyce's book not only has a provocative title but also says something important about the future of America's cities. Joyce argues that the United States, and by extension, especially its cities, faces a contentious future, and that this is suggested by three trends: First, racial and ethnic diversity is increasing; second, economic inequality has widened; and third, our governing institutions have weakened. He suggests that these trends originate in separate causes, but their coming together at the same point in history means that the potential for racial and ethnic tension may be heightened just as our capacity to cope with them have diminished (p. 3). Central to his concerns is the black-Korean conflict in American cities.
The central question that Joyce raises in the book is this: Why did black-Korean tensions result in violent clashes in Los Angeles but not in New York City? He suggests that tensions between blacks and Koreans emerged in the 1980s around the same issues but that the cities later reached a different climax: One was inexplicably violent while the other was remarkably restrained. Why? He argues that the answer to the question lies in politics, in particular, in political institutions, which vary from place to place but have profound consequences for the way groups interact (p. 2).
Joyce's book goes beyond the sociological and cultural explanations and shows how political practices and urban institutions can channel racial and ethnic tensions into protest or, alternately, leave them free to erupt violently. He notes that while the usual suspects have a role to play—poverty, unemployment, segregation, and racism—they fail to account for the different outcomes in Los Angeles and New York. All, he argues, exist in both cities in roughly the same proportions—thus, there must be other reasons why the outcomes are so different.
It is perhaps useful to note here that Joyce's answer to why Los Angeles and not New York erupted in violence lies in his case analysis. He argues that cities with strong traditions of machine-style politics—in which material incentives and neighborhood-level connections to politics long serve as incentives for people to participate in politics—tend to promote grassroots political activity, which enables community activists to channel tensions by mobilizing support. On the other hand, cities with the insulated reform-style political institutions that were the legacy of the Progressive movement tend to leave tensions unorganized and are more likely to see them result in violence (pp. 7, 169).
Joyce's concluding chapter is excellent in many respects as he attempts to pull it all together. His research points out several important things that cities need to be aware of if they are to avoid violent conflict. First, there are limits to leadership. Mayors, while saddled with the responsibility of solving problems in the city, have limited power in many cases to deal with problems outside the formal structure of government; and while the power and influence of mayors vary depending on leadership style, there are limits to their control over different factions, both inside and outside of government. Resolving conflict at the elite level may be doable for a mayor, but that is different from dealing with problems of groups at the grassroots level. Second, Joyce also advises cities to avoid false hopes. In Los Angeles, he argues, the use of dialogue to settle political issues will not work, and neither will the reliance on the court. The court is not set up to mediate conflicts related to ethnic tensions. In some cases, when they attempt to do so, as in Los Angeles, they make matters worse, not better. Third, there is a need to focus on neighborhoods; if the problems are political, then political remedies need to be political. Joyce is a pragmatist; he argues that city governments can do little to fight widening economic equality in an increasingly diverse nation, but that officials and activists can restructure political institutions to provide the foundations for new multiracial coalitions.
To be sure, No Fire Next Time is an overly optimistic view of the future. As the author points out in his conclusion (pp. 180–81), the problems have not been solved, the conditions are still there, government has given no resources to address the problems, and so while they have been overtaken by other events, the basic problems still exist.
Clearly, no help is likely to come from either of the three levels of government in the near future, given their budget deficits. Improving race relations is not a priority for any of them. Thus, the neighborhoods themselves are left to try and solve the problem.
In Los Angeles, for example, there are a few encouraging signs, but they all have their limitations. First, the Neighborhood Councils (NCs), established as part of the Charter Reforms of 1999, have the potential to bring more neighborhood participation to the community—but if these NCs are unrepresentative of the wide variety of interest found in the neighborhoods, or lack diversity, chances that grassroots interest will get on the agenda may be questionable. Second, community activists are reactive rather than proactive; they tend to recede or disappear when the immediate problem is solved, and by definition there are few “institutional activists.” Third, neither elite leadership nor grassroots leadership in community organizations have been able to control the “fringe elements”—youth and gangs. It is here that the usual suspects reappear: poverty, unemployment, poor education, and lack of parental guidance. However, a new community organization has arisen in South Los Angeles to specifically address this issue. The slogan is: “Stop the Violence.” Led by Kerman Maddox, a political consultant, professor, and news commentator, a group of volunteers has involved churches, black newspapers, radio stations, and others in an attempt to address this “fringe element.” It is a start, as the stakeholders in the community are speaking out as one to stop the violence. One can only hope that other communities will follow. Now all we need are leaders with the political will to help them sustain their efforts. This may be asking too much of our leaders and institutions—but it is better than the alternative.