Rousseau is often taught in dialogue with Hobbes, comparing and contrasting their views of human nature, descriptions of the state of nature, and theories of the social contract and sovereignty. Likewise, among scholars it is commonplace to see Hobbes as one of Rousseau's principal intended interlocutors or targets in his political philosophy or to situate Rousseau within the social contract tradition initiated or at least importantly represented by Hobbes. In fact, perusal of the indices of studies of Rousseau's thought is likely to show that Hobbes is among the most widely cited authors that scholars feel obliged to consider when interpreting Rousseau. Given the apparent consensus on the importance of Hobbes for Rousseau, then, it is surprising that no book-length treatment of the subject has been produced. Robin Douglass's impressive study is therefore a welcome addition to Rousseau scholarship. One of Douglass's principal contributions is to proceed with an open mind as to whether—or, rather, in what way—Rousseau engages with Hobbes, contrary to what is typically assumed.
The overall argument of Rousseau and Hobbes is that Rousseau engages polemically with Hobbes and with the thinkers who themselves engaged with Hobbes in the century prior to Rousseau, to reveal the ultimately Hobbesian character of both the natural law tradition of the period, which presented itself as anti-Hobbesian, and the doux commerce theorists of the time. Douglass sets the stage for this analysis by a review of the reception of Hobbes's thought in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries to identify the intellectual debates to which Rousseau was contributing. In Douglass's interpretation, Rousseau alters the intellectual landscape of his day by grouping together thinkers and intellectual movements that saw themselves and were seen as being opposed to Hobbes. Instead Rousseau offers his own theory of human nature, society, and politics that partly agrees with Hobbes, notably concerning human asociability, and partly opposes him, for example by proclaiming man's natural goodness and using that goodness as a positive standard by which to reconstruct a republican solution to the ills that beset socialized humans. Central to Douglass's arguments are three claims about Rousseau, each of which is indicated in the book's subtitle. First, he argues that man's natural goodness allows Rousseau to retain “nature” as a substantive standard for human life and politics in a way that Hobbes (arguably) did not permit. Douglass thereby parts ways with the interpretation of Strauss and others who claim that nature is no longer a substantive standard for Rousseau. Second, he claims that free will and freedom are for Rousseau essential attributes of human nature which, unlike Hobbes, Rousseau seeks to preserve in his own theory of the social contract and democratic sovereignty. In making this argument, Douglass rejects Kantian interpretations of Rousseau by Cohen and others by arguing that Rousseau is not an autonomy theorist or rationalist. Third, given his argument that the passions and not reason are central to Rousseau's theory of human nature and politics, Douglass examines “will formation” in Rousseau's political theory, namely, how Rousseau thought education and cultural institutions could shape the human will and make individuals good citizens in a way that transforms but preserves their natural goodness. In doing so, Douglass rejects Cohen's and others’ attempts to set aside what for them is a separable or even embarrassing enthusiasm on Rousseau's part for nationalistic patriotism and treat Rousseau's principles of political right in isolation. Douglass's book is clearly written and organized, although occasionally repetitive.
Douglass combines two interpretative traditions within the discipline of political theory: historical analysis and textual exegesis. In my view, he is more successful in specifying the historical context for Rousseau's engagement with Hobbes than in his textual analysis. I do not mean to diminish the important contribution he has made with his attention to historical context, for I agree with Douglass that this context is too often underemphasized in studies of Rousseau's thought, leading scholars to misidentify the debates and participants in those debates to which Rousseau is responding, and so to mischaracterize his intention. An important contribution of his study is to ask whether Rousseau could have even read Hobbes's texts directly or whether his view of Hobbes is instead indirect, mediated by the reception of Hobbes in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.
Was Rousseau responding to Hobbes or to Hobbism? In this light, it is perhaps instructive to recall that Diderot's article in the Encylopédie is entitled “Hobbisme.” Douglass comments on this article, noting that Diderot lifted the text of the article almost entirely from someone else, as was often the case, with the exception of the final paragraph in which he compares Hobbes to Rousseau (a comparison Douglass curiously does not exploit in his treatment). Through a survey of which of Hobbes's works would have been available to Rousseau, Douglass concludes that he likely knew Hobbes's De Cive, whether in Latin or French translation, and was possibly acquainted with some other texts. Importantly, however, Douglass argues that Rousseau was not familiar with Leviathan, the text especially Anglophone scholars typically work with in discussing Rousseau's relationship to Hobbes. One shortcoming of Douglass's detective work in this regard is that he does not ask what difference Rousseau's apparent acquaintance with De Cive and ignorance of Leviathan make for understanding his response to Hobbes. Indeed, at one point Douglass notes that Rousseau could have been familiar with what is often viewed as the most important difference between Hobbes's two major accounts of his political theory, the doctrine of sovereign authorization, from other sources.
Further, while I agree with Douglass that Rousseau seems to have had limited facility in English, and is therefore highly unlikely to have read Leviathan himself, he does not entertain the possibility that others who had read Hobbes's English masterpiece could have been Rousseau's source. One possibility in this regard was Diderot, who translated Shaftesbury in the mid-1740s and who gave an inscribed copy of his translation to Rousseau, then his closest friend. Be that as it may, Douglass discusses at length the many works with which we know Rousseau was familiar, especially Barbeyrac's annotated translations of Grotius, Pufendorf, and Cumberland, in which Hobbes's thought was discussed, often with extensive quotations. Once again, however, Douglass does not reveal whether these discussions and quotations depended on Leviathan or De Cive, even though in the case of Cumberland Leviathan would have been the principal text. More importantly, he does not discuss whether or in what way this matters for Rousseau's understanding of Hobbes. His study would have been strengthened by attending to these issues, and his extensive knowledge of the texts in question would have enabled him to edify us.
But to return to the question, was Rousseau responding to Hobbes or to Hobbism? Douglass's analysis is enlightening, especially in chapter 1, regarding how Hobbes was received and understood in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century thought, especially in France. Douglass pays particular attention to two strands of thought in this period, both of which Rousseau was familiar with. The first strand is the French moralists and related thinkers, such as Nicole, Malebranche, and Bayle. Bayle's Dictionary contains an extensive and perhaps surprisingly friendly discussion of Hobbes, and was the principal secondary source concerning Hobbes for eighteenth-century thinkers, including Rousseau. In turn, Nicole and Malebranche, among other thinkers discussed by Douglass, engaged in a neo-Augustinian discourse, in limited dialogue with Hobbes, that developed theories of amour-propre in relation to mankind's original goodness and subsequent Fall that would be of central importance to Rousseau, including his engagement with Hobbes in the Discourse on Inequality on amour-propre versus amour de soi.
The second strand Douglass investigates is equally important, both in itself and for Rousseau's reception of Hobbes and Hobbism: the natural law tradition of the period. The principal thinkers in this second strand are Pufendorf, Barbeyrac, and Burlamaqui, all of whom Rousseau cites. The most important scholarship concerning this second strand is Derathé, but Douglass does a fine job of updating this useful but outdated source in order to explain Rousseau's intellectual context. Overall, Douglass concludes that Rousseau is responding as much, if not more, to how Hobbes was represented if not caricatured in this natural law tradition, and therefore to “Hobbism,” as he was responding directly to Hobbes. In this regard, then, Douglass argues that it is often less important for understanding Rousseau's thought and intentions to compare Rousseau to Hobbes than it is to situate Rousseau within the contemporary discourse concerning Hobbes and Hobbism. In general, I am persuaded by Douglass's approach and conclusions, but I would have also been interested to hear more about the ways in which this distinction matters for our understanding of Rousseau.
Douglass resituates Rousseau in terms of the intellectual debates of his time by arguing that his principal novelty was to join intellectual movements with Hobbes and Hobbism in a way that these movements were eager to set asunder. Most of the natural law theorists of the century before Rousseau were eager to divorce their theories from Hobbes, denying, for example, his argument concerning human asociality and developing theories of sociability, sociality, and conscience. Rousseau effectively reveals the Hobbesian affinities of these theories and joins Hobbes concerning human asociability while parting from him concerning natural goodness and the positive possibilities of self-love. (Douglass curiously has little to say about Rousseau on pity.) As for the doux commerce theories of the time, according to Douglass, Rousseau also aligns them with Hobbes by pointing out that they assume something like the barbarous condition of humans by nature that required “commerce” in all its senses to remedy. Overall, I find the way Douglass resituates Rousseau in relation to Hobbes and Hobbism persuasive and illuminating.
Turning now to Douglass's substantive interpretation of Rousseau's thought, I disagree with a number of his claims; more importantly, I wish he had engaged in closer textual analysis at times to support his own interpretation and to refute other interpretations more effectively where he can. Let me address a few issues by way of the tripartite subtitle: nature, freedom, and the passions. On the subject of nature and freedom together, Douglass relies heavily on Rousseau's statements in the Discourse on Inequality about free will distinguishing humans, and he supplements his claims with brief reference to the dualist arguments in the Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar in Emile. In doing so, he quickly dismisses Strauss, Masters, and others who note that Rousseau seems to put aside free will and instead identifies “perfectibility” as the distinctive human faculty. Douglass provides very little textual analysis of these important passages in the Discourse to substantiate his claim, and while his position is certainly plausible, it would be stronger in its own terms and against other positions with more careful exegesis.
Likewise, his brief reference to the dualist metaphysics of the Profession of Faith comes with almost no textual support or analysis, which is especially problematic given the uncertainty regarding whether the vicar's arguments are consistent with Rousseau's own position. Douglass does cite places where Rousseau addresses the issue of the relationship between his own views and those of the vicar, but does not note how Rousseau consistently hedges on the issue, for example when he says mysteriously in the Reveries that his own views are “approximately” the same. Similarly, he does not note how Rousseau persists in distinguishing his own views from those of the vicar in his defense of Emile against the archbishop of Paris, who claimed that the vicar was Rousseau's “mouthpiece,” as many contemporary scholars also assume. In short, Douglass assumes unproblematically that Rousseau's theory of freedom is based on a dualist metaphysics that distances him from Hobbes without critically examining that assumption. But does Douglass need to make this assumption to make the claims he does? I do not think he does. He notes in passing (140) that Rousseau's attempt to retain nature as a normative standard for both freedom and justice resembles Cicero's arguments, which do not rest on a dualist metaphysics. Is it not possible that Rousseau could be doing something similar? Does retaining nature as a positive normative standard require a dualist metaphysics?
Much more persuasive in my view was Douglass's attention to the tertium quid of the passions, namely to Rousseau's suggestions on how the passions and the will can be molded to produce good citizens. His discussion presents a useful corrective or alternative to Kantian interpretations. Nonetheless, insofar as Douglass's interpretation in this regard relies on his earlier claims about Rousseau on free will and its dualistic metaphysics, his case remains incomplete. What is the relationship between the passions and reason for Rousseau? Douglass gives us somewhat more on this issue than in other cases, but his argument that Rousseau's republic is meant to retain human beings’ natural goodness in a different form of good citizens, and thus his argument that “nature” remains a positive normative standard for Rousseau throughout his works, depends critically on Rousseau's view of human nature. For example, Douglass argues that Rousseau's citizens are “good” rather than “virtuous”—that goodness and virtue are consistent and not opposed. He does so in contrast to Strauss, among others, who argues that Rousseau has two models of human beings: the naturally “good” man (for Strauss the philosopher in terms of developed humans), and the “virtuous” citizen who is not naturally good but instead “denatured.” For Rousseau natural man thus is spontaneously “good” for himself and others owing to his natural constitution, whereas the “virtue” of a citizen or anyone else requires a kind of self-overcoming of the (natural?) passions, and is thus far from spontaneous. Doesn't the citizen's conscious choice to prefer his general will as a citizen to his particular will as an individual likely involve a struggle, and thus “virtue”? Indeed, I would have thought that Douglass's attention to Rousseau's account of human asociality in the first part of the Discourse on Inequality (esp. 64), a portion of his work that Kantian interpreters and others tend to ignore, would have pushed him to consider how this asociality poses a problem for Rousseau (as it does for Hobbes in a different way) when it comes to creating good citizens. This consideration might have led Douglass to say more about “goodness” versus “virtue,” as well as to further distance his interpretation from the Kantian versions by his insistence on attending to “will formation” in Rousseau.
In sum, Douglass has produced a learned and important study of Rousseau that should be of interest not only to Rousseau scholars, but to scholars of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political and moral theory. He offers us a new way of situating Rousseau's thought and understanding his intentions, and while I disagree with some of his arguments concerning Rousseau, I found his interpretation consistently stimulating.
