As is the case of all the texts authored or co-authored by Stuart Kauffman, also the one searching for ‘economics for a creative world’, published in this journal, is innovative and thought-provoking (Koppl et al., Reference Koppl, Kauffman, Felin and Longo2014, henceforth ‘KKFL’). It was especially thought-provoking for me, as I have been searching in a similar direction. While I do not speak of ‘creative world’ and ‘econosphere’, but simply have in mind what many economists now refer to as ‘real-world economies’, I agree that at least some of them may indeed be called ‘creative’ – even if not entirely in the same sense that KKFL have in mind. While their treatment, as they put it, ‘locates novelty production within the process of evolution, rather than viewing it as exogenous or attributable primarily to individual creativity’, for my mind can an economy be creative only if it offers opportunities and incentives to creative individuals. I can fully agree with KKFL that novelty production is best viewed as an endogenous part of evolution, and not exogenously falling from the sky, but I cannot understand it without attributing this production to creative individuals. I am simply unable to conceive of inventions without inventors and of innovations without innovators.
But, leaving this conceptual difference aside (which a personal discussion might perhaps attenuate), I find again much agreement with KKFL. Much like them, I have been searching for a better economic theory that would be more relevant to problems of modern, innovative, and thus in some sense ‘creative’ economies than the existing theories. Both parts of their objective – to move away from mechanistic economic models and toward a more evolutionary and institutional approach to economic theory and policy – are basically also mine. And I also did some drawing on current biology, which is what lead me to call the economics that started to emerge from my search ‘evolutionary-developmental’ or, in short, ‘evo-devo’ (Pelikan, Reference Pelikan2011, Reference Pelikan2012, Reference Pelikan2013, Reference Pelikan, Mamica and Tridico2014).
All these similarities with my research made me read KKFL with particular attention, which resulted in several notes, some supportive and some critical. I thank Geoff Hodgson, editor-in-chief of this journal, for his generous invitation to publish these notes as a little addendum to KKFL. I find his invitation so much more generous that my evo-devo economics, which he thus helps to propagate, does not entirely agree with his and Thorbjørn Knudsen's generalization of Darwinism (Hodgson and Knudsen, Reference Hodgson and Knudsen2010, Reference Hodgson and Knudsen2012), and we still have a few friendly differences that remain to be settled.
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KKFL's arguments for moving away from mechanistic economic models, in which economic dynamics are law-governed in a strong mechanistic sense – in particular the microeconomic models of general equilibrium theory and the macroeconomic models of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium – have my full support. I find these arguments deeper and more developed than mine.Footnote 1 I particularly appreciate their sophisticated way of bringing to light two important facts: (i) that low-dimensional approximations, required by such models, cannot properly grasp a possibly high-dimensional reality, important to take into account in many policy applications; and (ii) that the very list of traded goods on which all mathematical models of resource-allocation must be based is changing in unpredictable ways.
However, I appreciate somewhat less the terminology. As I prefer to stick as much as possible to standard economic terms – and consider it to be the wisest strategy for anyone trying to tell economists something non-standard – I do not like very much the terms ‘cambiodiversity’ and ‘unprestatable’. As far as I could understand them, the former denotes what economists have for a long time called ‘commodity space’ or ‘product space’, and the latter refers to a special case of unpredictability – the one of a model's parameters. But of course, all authors are free to invent and define their terms according to their taste, so I cannot seriously object.
More serious are my objections to the claims that there are no entailing laws of economic dynamics, and that the economy is not a causal system. The doubts concern both their contents and their implications for the possibilities of conducting an orderly and fruitful economic analysis, or what KKFL call ‘analysis of the econosphere’. The problem I see is that KKFL limit their attention to strictly deterministic causality, leaving aside its stochastic variants. I intuitively believe – though I cannot prove it – that both these claims, together with much of the reasoning about the non-algorithmic nature of economic change, would be significantly weakened if the existence of stochastic causality and stochastic algorithms were properly taken into account.Footnote 2
Moreover, even if precise predictions of what will happen are impossible, predictions of what can never happen – such as a perpetuum mobile, or a creative economy without private and tradable ownership of capital – may be possible and highly useful. I find KKFL not to appreciate enough this kind of predictions.
But most serious is my objection to two illegitimate extensions of initially sound arguments to a broader context than the one for which they were elaborated. One is the jump from the arguments elaborated against mechanistic economic models in the above-specified sense to a sweeping claim that ‘analysis of the econosphere’ in general lacks a stable implicit frame, and cannot therefore be conducted in an orderly and meaningful way. The second is the jump from the reasonable observation that the phase space of economic activity is not stable to the claim that also the phase space of economic evolution is not stable.
Of course, if the latter space had to be reduced to the former – that is, if economic evolution could only be understood in terms of enormous datasets expressing in detail all the changing types of economic activities – no orderly and meaningful evolutionary analysis would indeed be possible. But there are other, more fruitful views of economic evolution, which do make some meaningful analysis possible. Their main idea is to stratify the phase space into several levels, of which changes in concrete economic activities is only the lowest. The higher levels consist of constraints that delimit the space for changes of lower levels.
My evo-devo economics contains two such higher levels: (A) changes in the network of economic actors – the performers of detailed economic activities – such as entry and exit of firms, opening or closing of markets, and expansion or shrinking of government; and (B) changes in formal and informal institutional rules – the rules-of-the game, by which all the three levels of changes are guided and constrained. I propose to term level (A) ‘economic development’, taking place under given institutional rules, and level (B), ‘economic evolution’ of these rules – which appears to be the first well-defined distinction between these two often used terms. Economists who understand modern biology may find it enlightening to compare – but with a large pinch of salt and lots of qualifications – the lowest level to changes in actual activities of actually living organisms; level (A) to the anatomical and behavioral changes during an organism's ontogeny; and level (B) to the genomic changes of the tree of life during phylogeny.
While KKFL are certainly right that the phase space of the lowest level, to which they limit their attention, is highly unstable, levels (A) and (B) appear more stable, in the sense that the constraints of which they consist may stay put longer, and thus change less frequently, than detailed economic activities. For instance, many changes of the product space (aka ‘cambiodiversity’), possibly including many innovations, may be realized by the same firms acting on the same markets. Similarly, many changes in the population of firms and the network of markets may be realized under the same institutional rules. This appears to make the phase space of institutional rules stable enough to allow analysis to obtain some meaningful results about their evolution, although possibly only in the rough form of what Hayek (Reference Hayek1967) termed ‘pattern predictions’.Footnote 3
In fact, however, KKFL do not deny the potential fruitfulness of analysis of institutional change; this is even what they eventually recommend. Their entire elaborated argument for leaving mechanistic models and giving up ‘analysis of the econosphere’ because of the impossibility to provide it with any solid implicit frame – which sounded first as if the entire economic profession should close down – thus boils down to saying that there are limits to how detailed predictions economists can make, which hardly anyone would deny. The only novel point I can see is that because of human creativity and innovativeness, the limits are more severe than usually believed.
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Turning from the kind of economics that KKFL argue should be abandoned to the kind that they indicate should be adopted and elaborated, I again start by being entirely on their side. As follows from what I have already noted, I cannot agree more that this economics should be more evolutionary and accord more importance to entrepreneurs, institutions, and institutional change. But I lose quite rapidly the contact with their arguments. I see them taking off very steeply to a high metatheoretic level, from which they lose sight of the concrete, down-to-earth results that modern institutional economics has for a long time been obtaining.
For instance, none of the three Nobel laureates within this field – Douglass North, Oliver Williamson, and Elinor Ostron – is mentioned. Yet if KKFL properly noted what has actually been done, they would find out that much of their argument for according more importance to institutions and institutional change is only forcing an already widely open door. An important precursor to studies of influences of institutions on what KKFL would call ‘creativity of economies’ is North and Thomas (Reference North and Thomas1973). This book clearly explains in theory and documents empirically that it was thanks to the forms of their property rights, an important subset of institutional rules, that the economies of Northern Europe have become much more ‘creative’, and therefore developed more rapidly, than the economy of Spain. The seminal work on which most of modern institutional economics directly or indirectly builds is North (Reference North1990). More recently, vigorous arguments demonstrating how crucially an economy's performance depends on its institutions (though not in a very clearly defined meaning) can be found in Acemoglu and Robinson (Reference Acemoglu and Robinson2012).
Where I see that most work still remains to be done is on the connection between institutional and evolutionary economics. So far, most of evolutionary economists have been ignoring institutions, while most of institutional economists have paid little attention to evolutionary processes. A discussion of how to import institutions into evolutionary economics started some 10 years ago (see, e.g., Nelson, Reference Nelson2002; Pelikan, Reference Pelikan2003), while several recent attempts to connect the two may be found collected in the specialized December 2014 issue of this journal, extensively introduced by Hodgson and Stoelhorst (Reference Hodgson and Stoelhorst2014). However, I continue immodestly to believe that the connection, to be clear and fruitful, must in some way build on my evo-devo economics, where institutions, in the well-defined meaning of formal and informal institutional rules (‘rules-of-the-game’), are clearly put in the center, as the products of economic evolution, and the guides of, and constraints upon, economic development.
KKFL would be most welcome if they wanted to help with this work. For this, however, they would have to descend a little from their metatheoretic heights and start by giving the terms they use more precise and more concrete meaning. For example, they would have to specify what they mean by the term ‘institutions’ and enter into details of institutional forms – including property rights, economic freedoms, types of taxation, and the government economic agenda. Only then could they say something interesting on which of these forms promote what Baumol (Reference Baumol1990), in their reference to him, defines as productive entrepreneurship, and which forms stifle it, or encourage instead some of its unproductive variants. To advocate ‘entrepreneurial economics’ at a high metatheoretic level is no longer very useful, as many economists have for quite some time been working on it at a quite concrete level, with useful policy implications. Good recent examples are Henrekson and Sanandaji (Reference Henrekson and Sanandaji2012), and Sanandaji and Sanandaji (Reference Sanandaji and Sanandaji2014).
Otherwise, I am afraid, the highly abstract metatheoretic framework that KKFL propose will not be of much help for the future development of economics. I simply doubt that many economists will see in their results, which they openly admit are mostly negative, a helpful prolegomena for future economic analysis. I may be mistaken, but my imperfectly informed guess is that even among the most brilliant institutional and evolutionary economists, far from all will know what kind of animal the prolegomena is, and many of those who know it (now including myself – but I confess, I had to consult Wikipedia), may not know very well what to do with it.
