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Section II - Part

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 September 2021

Jo. M. Martins
Affiliation:
International Medical University, Malaysia
Indra Pathmanathan
Affiliation:
United Nations University - International Institute for Global Health
David T. Tan
Affiliation:
United Nations Development Programme
Shiang Cheng Lim
Affiliation:
RTI International
Pascale Allotey
Affiliation:
United Nations University - International Institute for Global Health

Summary

Information

Figure 0

Figure 4.1 Pap smear slides taken and coverage in Malaysia, 1994–2003.

Source: Ministry of Health Malaysia, 2005.
Figure 1

Figure 4.2 Trends in the utilisation pattern of OPDs.

Source: Suleiman and Jegathesan, n.d.
Figure 2

Figure 4.3 Estimated outpatient visits to clinics per capita per annum, Malaysia, 1930s–2000s.

Note: Private outpatient refers to outpatient visits to both hospitals and clinics.Source:Health Policy Research Associates et al., 2013.
Figure 3

Figure 4-A Expansion of scope in PHC services.

Figure 4

Figure 4-B Approaches to healthcare require supportive practices and systems, which in turn create an ecosystem that is aligned to and facilitates that approach. Shifting a healthcare approach requires comprehensive changes to the healthcare ecosystem.

Figure 5

Figure 4-C Four changes to the PHC clinics’ setting were critical to the ecosystem change: locus of financing and decision-making, scope and alignment of healthcare staff responsibilities, professional development pathways, and facilities and operations.

Figure 6

Figure 4-D Reviewed approach of primary healthcare (REAP-WISE).

Source: Fadzil et al., 2018.
Figure 7

Figure 4-a Employee expectations and unionisation determine the effectiveness of their demands of employers for healthcare benefits.

Figure 8

Figure 4-b MCO-imposed caps on per-visit reimbursement generates hidden costs through multiple visits (R1) or inadequate provision of care (B2). These hidden costs are largely borne by GPs, patients and employers instead of the MCOs.

Figure 9

Figure 4-c Impact of MCOs on employer–employee–union dynamics changing the prior system (Figure 4-a) in ways that result in lower health benefits for the workforce.

Figure 10

Figure 4-d Pathways toward government regulation of practices related to healthcare benefits are ineffectual due to limited ability of the public and medical professionals to organise (B4 loop) and lack of information on how these practices affect the burden on the public healthcare system (B5 loop).

Figure 11

Figure 5.1 Evolving profile of types of hospitals, number of TB and leprosy beds, and childbirth in hospitals.

Source: Calculations by author based on data from Suleiman and Jegathesan (n.d.).
Figure 12

Figure 5.2 Utilisation of Ministry of Health hospitals in Peninsular Malaysia, 1970 and 1996.

Source: Suleiman and Jegathesan, n.d.
Figure 13

Figure 5.3 Dynamics of providing more sophisticated clinical services.

Figure 14

Figure 5.4 Rising demand for medical care outpaced public hospital resources, creating a gap in public sector capacity (B1). The expansion of private sector hospitals (B2 loop) offered a means of bridging this gap with private sector resources. However, private healthcare has drawn on medical personnel from the public sector, becoming another source of pressure on public sector capacity (R1 loop). This is a well-known system archetype known as ‘shifting the burden’, in which actions taken to address the outcomes of a problem (a gap in hospital capacity) can exacerbate the underlying causes of that problem (public hospital human resources).

Figure 15

Figure 5.5 Dynamics of improving clinical outcomes and establishing a quality culture at every level.

Figure 16

Figure 5.6 Dynamics of improving resource utilisation and client satisfaction.

Figure 17

Figure 5.7 Bed occupancy rates in MoH hospitals.

Source: Ministry of Health Malaysia, 2016.
Figure 18

Figure 5.8 Harnessing technology to improve access to seamless, integrated care.

Figure 19

Figure 5.9 Composition of inpatient care utilisation in public and private sector by socio-economic status.

Source: Health Policy Research Associates et al., 2013.
Figure 20

Figure 5.10 Interactions between the larger ecosystem and the healthcare provider sub-system with its enabling or constraining sub-systems.

Figure 21

Figure 5-A The gap between demand and supply. A simple balancing (B1) loop caused the rapidly increasing demand for dialysis in the 1990s to outpace the ability of the Malaysian public health sector to respond. Factors in the wider system kept the supply rate low and the supply gap large.

Figure 22

Figure 5-B A view of the wider system affecting dialysis demand and supply. The balancing loop in Figure 5-A interacts with a second balancing (B2) loop. The two reinforcing loops (R1a, R1b) show some of the factors that kept private sector involvement low.

Figure 23

Figure 5-C Changing the behaviour of the system through new policy. To increase supply, the Malaysian government subsidised private provision and fixed payment rates for dialysis services.

Figure 24

Figure 5-D Effect of the rapid expansion of services on the workforce (B3 and B4).

Figure 25

Figure 6.1 Incidence rate of communicable diseases per 100,000 population, Malaysia, 1975–1997.

Sources:Ministry of Health, 1983; Suleiman and Jegathesan, n.d.
Figure 26

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Figure 27

Figure 6-A A criminalisation approach emphasising criminal enforcement, education and rehabilitative efforts failed to reduce the number of new HIV cases from injecting drugs use.

Figure 28

Figure 6-B Stigmatisation and the paradigm of regarding the MoH as the main provider of outreach and services were barriers to a harm reduction programme.

Figure 29

Figure 6-C Commitment to MDG goals and local advocacy were critical enabling factors that overcame barriers to the adoption of the harm reduction approach.

Figure 30

Figure 6-D Success of the pilots created favourable conditions for institutional changes that persisted even after key enabling factors for the adoption of the harm reduction approach (MDGs and local advocacy) receded.

Figure 31

Figure 6-E While harm reduction strategies have reduced HIV in IDUs, the gains are being threatened by the increasing incidence of sexual transmission of HIV.

Figure 32

Figure 7-A The PWD strategy for expanding the water and sanitation network was unable to respond to rural disease burdens in a timely manner.

Figure 33

Figure 7-B Inadequate rural infrastructure investment in sanitation undermined community trust in government actors, hindering educational efforts that attempted to address the sanitation issues.

Figure 34

Figure 7-C The paradigm that the MoH mission is limited to healthcare delivery created internal and external barriers to its involvement in rural water and sanitation. However, once those barriers were overcome, its large personnel base and ability to prioritize health outcomes enabled community trust and responsiveness to rural water and sanitation interventions.

Figure 35

Figure 7-a Factors that led to poor clinical waste management. Limited government budgets prevented capital investment necessary for appropriate clinical waste management (dotted arrow). Adequate clinical waste management also requires prioritization by hospital staff; however, this was typically a low priority, with tasks directly related to the delivery of health services taking precedence.

Figure 36

Figure 7-b Inability of the government to allocate sufficient resources for clinical waste management undercut both the enforcement of standards that did exist and the development of further standards necessary for ‘cradle-to-grave’ management.

Figure 37

Figure 7-c Outsourcing of clinical waste services enabled necessary capital investment for clinical waste management, enabling the B1, B2 and B3 loops to function properly. Well-designed governance and information systems were critical to successful implementation.

Figure 38

Figure 8.1 Malaysian doctors in the public and private sectors, 1955–2013.

Sources: Calculations by the author derived from data from the Ministry of Health Malaysia (1971; 1974; 1982; 1983; 1984; 1986; 1995a; 2000; 2010) and the Government of the Federation of Malaya (n.d.).
Figure 39

Figure 8.2 Regional disparities in availability of doctors, 1970–2010.

Sources: Calculations by the author derived from data from the Ministry of Health Malaysia (1971; 1974; 1982; 1983; 1984; 1986; 1995a; 2000; 2010) and the Government of the Federation of Malaya (n.d.).
Figure 40

Figure 8.3 Utilisation of outpatient services in Malaysia.

Source: Reproduced from Health Policy Research Associates et al. (2013).
Figure 41

Figure 8.4 Distribution of selected specialist doctors in Malaysia, 2013.

Source: Ministry of Health Malaysia, 2016b.
Figure 42

Figure 8.5 Reported satisfaction with public and private clinics, 2015.

Source: Institute for Health Systems Research, n.d.
Figure 43

Figure 8.6 Reported satisfaction with public and private hospitals, 2015.

Source: Institute for Health Systems Research, n.d.
Figure 44

Figure 8-A New graduates entering the workforce as HOs.

Source: Ministry of Health Malaysia, 2016, p. 73.
Figure 45

Figure 8-B Doctors’ average career path in Malaysia.

Figure 46

Figure 8-C Meeting the demand. Pressure to meet the gap between supply and demand for medical education led the government to make policy changes that rapidly increased the capacity for medical education, with potential compromises in education standards.

Figure 47

Figure 8-D Lack of capacity planning. Employment planning did not reflect student intake rates. The dotted arrow indicates this lack of information flow and the missed opportunity to adjust the capacity of the health system to receive new medical graduates. The delay mark on the dotted arrow reflects the time required for the system to adapt to increase capacity.

Figure 48

Figure 8-E Impact of the bottleneck on the HO experience. Mismatch in graduation and HO intake rates created long waiting periods for employment. Inadequate entry competence of HOs and high HO-to-specialist ratios extended their training period, further reducing the availability of HO posts and reinforcing the longer waiting time for employment.

Figure 49

Figure 8-F The specialist bottleneck. The pool of public sector specialists limits the capacity to train HOs and medical officers and further their career progression, which in turn limits the pool of public sector specialists.

Figure 50

Figure 8-G Systems responses to the crisis. New measures were taken to increase training capacity (B3) and to restrict medical education intakes to prevent continued escalation of the HO crisis (B4a and B4b). However, the gaps in the flows of information that prevented anticipation and proactive response to the change in the number of medical graduates has not been addressed. Thus the health system remains vulnerable to future shifts in the production of medical graduates.

Figure 51

Figure 9.1 Public and private health financing sources, Malaysia, 1997–2017.

Source:Ministry of Health Malaysia, 2019.
Figure 52

Figure 9-A Concerns over sustainable health care financing and quality of care are creating an impetus to improve hospital performance. In response, efforts are being made to understand performance shortfalls to increase capacity for improving hospital performance, creating a balancing loop that should reduce the performance gap (B1). However, limited levels of understanding of hospital performance drivers hinder this and have created a demand for further tools to improve understanding. One potential tool is adopting a case-mix approach to accounting, which would generate the necessary data to facilitate comparisons of treatment performance across hospitals, improving understanding (B2 loop). Case-mix accounting achieves this by tracking costs per medical case instead of aggregating costs into line items.

Figure 53

Figure 9-B Institutional pressures keep generic accounting approaches in place over the adoption of the case-mix approach. The pre-existing adoption of generic accounting approaches has created ways of thinking and acting among administrative personnel that would be disrupted by the adoption of case-mix accounting. This creates a dominant reinforcing loop (R1) that competes against another reinforcing loop (R2) that would support case-mix accounting. Even when parallel case-mix accounting systems are created and maintained, improvements in hospital performance are limited, as the data are not used at national level to allocate resources and evaluate hospital-level performance.

Figure 54

Figure 10.1 Reinforcing loop showing how compliance with data collection improves the quality of data, enabling positive impacts on health outcomes. When health system personnel are able to observe these impacts, the intrinsic motivation improves the level of compliance in data collection. Conversely, when this connection is not made, data collection can be perceived as a box-ticking exercise, compromising the quality of data collected.

Figure 55

Figure 10-A For telehealth functions that cut across health facilities, the more health facilities adopt and operate within a particular interoperable telehealth standard, the greater the benefit for other facilities to adopt that standard, creating a reinforcing cycle (R1 loop). However, when there is not a critical mass of health facilities operating to a single standard, the proliferation of incompatible telehealth standards can occur, as facilities seek to set the definitive standard or simply meet locally relevant needs with locally available resources.

Figure 56

Figure 10-B The push for the adoption of telehealth could increase the number of facilities adopting an interoperable telehealth standard or lead to the proliferation of incompatible standards. Due to the lack of technical guidance and enforcement, a proliferation of incompatible standards occurred.

Figure 57

Figure 10-C The proliferation of incompatible telehealth standards actually increases the cost of adopting interoperable standards (R3 loop) due to health facility operations and structures coming to rely on incompatible telehealth software.

Figure 58

Figure 10-D The lack of a critical mass of health facilities operating on the same telehealth standard reduces benefits for certain functions, such as health information exchange. The lack of immediate benefits to health facilities discourages the adoption of telehealth, which in turn makes it difficult to achieve a critical mass (R4 loop).

Figure 59

Figure 11.1 Number of received reports of ADR.

Sources:Ministry of Health Malaysia, 2010; 2011; 2012a; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017.
Figure 60

Figure 11.2 Number and ratio of pharmacists per 10,000 population.

Sources:Ministry of Health Malaysia, 1995; 1996; 1997; 1998; 1999; 2001; 2019a; Suleiman & Jegathesan, n.d.
Figure 61

Figure 11.3 Number and ratio of assistant pharmacists per 10,000 population.

Source:Ministry of Health Malaysia, 2019a.
Figure 62

Figure 11.4 MoH medicine expenditure, 2008–2017.

Source:Pharmaceutical Services Programme, Ministry of Health Malaysia, 2018.
Figure 63

Figure 11.5 Number of outpatient prescriptions received, 2011–2017.

Source:Pharmaceutical Services Programme, Ministry of Health Malaysia, 2018.
Figure 64

Figure 11.6 Export and import value of pharmaceutical products to Malaysia, 2013 and 2017.

Source:Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2018.
Figure 65

Figure 11-A The registration and regulation of traditional medicines was in response to the adverse health impacts from the improper manufacture and use of traditional medicines and has successfully reduced poor practice and consequent outcomes.

Figure 66

Figure 11-B Regulation of traditional medicines creates costs to traditional medicine businesses, which some actors attempt to bypass (R1), creating a race to close regulation loopholes (B1) and enforce existing regulations (B2).

Figure 67

Figure 11-C Creating benefits for traditional medicine businesses for compliance with regulation can reward good actors and reduce attempts to bypass regulation.

Figure 68

Figure 12-A The paradigm that affordable medical treatment should be a right has led to the creation of tools meant to limit the price of treatment (B1 loop). These tools have provided governments with important leverage to negotiate treatment prices with suppliers (B2 loop).

Figure 69

Figure 12-B Reliance on the private sector for developing treatment solutions creates a competing paradigm that distrusts interference with market mechanisms (R1 loop). This paradigm undermines the availability of price control tools (B3 loop).

Figure 70

Figure 12-C Advocates for market-driven development of medical products have pushed for trade agreements, IPR protection and the use of political pressure and sanctions that increase the risk of using price control tools to limit government actions to control treatment prices (B4 loop). For governments to successfully utilise these tools, they must take a variety of actions to mitigate against these risks.

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