In view of the collapse of liberal democracy and the rise of dictatorship in Europe in the interwar period (1919–39), one may ask why extreme political movements and, specifically, the new phenomenon of fascism failed to make any decisive breakthrough in the Scandinavian countries Denmark, Norway and Sweden.Footnote 1 The countries’ resistance to anti-democratic forces is even more intriguing taking into account that the Scandinavian democracies were relatively young and thus, potentially, fragile.Footnote 2
The Scandinavian countries’ resilience to fascism in particular has preoccupied historians. On the one hand, research shows that the fascist political landscape was fragmented, especially in Sweden, and that the fascist organisations were characterised by rival factions, which inhibited the growth of the various movements.Footnote 3 On the other hand, research has pointed to the response of the Scandinavian political system, where the conservative and agrarian parties refused to collaborate with the fascist parties, which restricted the fascists’ ability to exert political influence in the parliamentary arena.Footnote 4 Nevertheless, within this framework of understanding, the political compromise between the farmers and workers in the 1930s has been regarded as the main explanation for the strength of the Scandinavian democracies.Footnote 5 In particular, research has emphasised the importance of the crisis agreements between the agrarian and social democratic labour parties that were made in Denmark in January 1933, Sweden in May 1933 and Norway in March 1935.Footnote 6 Apart from the difficulties of assessing the actual effect of these socio-economic measures, the reasoning seems to be that the adopted compromises restored the impression of well functioning parliaments and demonstrated care for the indebted farmers and the large group of unemployed. The political achievements created a front against the fascists, who were trying to take advantage of the negative consequences of the economic depression that hit Scandinavia in 1931.
Even though the explanatory model outlined above is plausible, we still lack empirical detail on the role of the crisis agreements in the defence of democracy.Footnote 7 The aim of this article is to examine how the main political parties responded to anti-democratic movements and what role this response played as an argument for the adopted crisis agreements. In particular the article will address whether the agrarian and social democratic parties actually linked socio-economic measures with a notion of reinforcement of democracy. In addressing this issue, the article combines the historiography of fascism and crisis policy, providing new knowledge concerning the Scandinavian interwar period. Moreover, the comparative scope contributes a nuanced understanding of Scandinavian political dynamics, which in recent decades has been studied mainly within a national framework.
The article argues that the crisis agreements were based on pragmatic considerations. However, the Scandinavian social democratic labour parties began to frame their crisis policy in terms of a democratic bulwark after the Nazi takeover in Germany in 1933. Regarding the agrarian parties, the article argues that they primarily took into account their own electoral base, whereas concern for democracy played a minor role, although fascist groups were supported by parts of the rural population.
The method applied in the article consists of qualitative asymmetric comparison, focusing on Denmark in the 1930s and with comparative perspective from Sweden and Norway. This focus is due to the fact that Denmark was the first Scandinavian country to conclude a crisis agreement. The comparative analytical parameters are determined by a combination of two analytical strategies, which are well suited to uncovering political response patterns and the motivations of the crisis agreements. One strategy focuses on the political actors’ rhetorical response to anti-democratic movements in relation to socio-economic issues. More specifically, the article seeks to clarify whether the parties rhetorically opposed or sympathised with alternative political projects that strove to replace parliamentary democracy (defined by political representation, parliamentarianism, universal suffrage, free elections and freedom of speech). In this respect, the article is particularly interested in arguments preceding the crisis agreements and how the main political parties attempted to frame them retrospectively.
The second strategy focuses on political practice, such as political decisions and alliances, while it examines the extent to which the established parties resisted or saw an interest in collaborating with anti-parliamentary or extreme political movements (denoting those political movements working towards dissolution of the democratic form of government, willing to use anti-democratic methods in the pursuit of their objectives). This strategy is inspired by Robert Paxton’s approach to fascism, which pays special attention to political practice and the function of the established parties as either an alliance partner or a barrier against fascist movements.Footnote 8 The argument holds that the success of fascism depended on political space and access to political power through alliances. Furthermore, Paxton is relevant because he shows, by comparing France, Germany and Italy, that farmers had less incentive to turn to fascism if the state and the traditional farmer organisations were responsive to their needs. Paxton’s work primarily concerns the right wing. However, the article explores the functional approach as a framework for analysis of the left wing. Paxton’s focus on political interests and alliances ahead of ideology allows this operationalisation.
The analysis is based on qualitative empirical studies of a wide range of sources comprising parliamentary debates, manifestos, campaign material and minutes from party committees, party conferences and ministerial meetings. The confidential sources have been consulted in order to identify the motivations of socio-economic measures, whereas the public sources reflect the political rhetoric. It should be noted that the sources are constrained by the fact that a major part of the Norwegian party archives were lost during the Second World War. Moreover, the source material reflecting the Danish Agrarian Liberals (Venstre) is rather limited, since the party began to build up its archive as late as in 1994. To compensate for this studies of the newspaper press have been conducted.Footnote 9
The following section briefly outlines the Scandinavian political landscape of the 1930s, after which the article examines the Danish material, focusing on the Social Democrats (Socialdemokratiet) and the Agrarian Liberals, respectively. The findings will be compared with those for Sweden and Norway, organised with the same structure as the Danish case and discussed in the concluding section.
The Political Landscape
During the first decade of the interwar period the organisation of Scandinavian society gave rise to severe political strife between socialist-rooted parties and bourgeois parties. In addition, the Scandinavian democracies were still in their initial phase, marked by parliamentary crisis and changing governments.Footnote 10 However, during the 1930s the political system became more stable under social democratic governance – despite the fact that the social democratic labour parties did not have absolute majority in parliament but were dependent on support from other parties.
In Denmark, the Social Democrats formed a coalition government with the Social Liberals (Det Radikale Venstre) in 1929. However, the balance of power between the two houses of parliament was contested until 1936, when the governmental parties won a majority in the first chamber by one seat, while the Agrarian Liberals lost six seats. In Sweden, the Social Democratic Party (Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet) formed a minority government in 1932 and was then replaced first by a short-lived agrarian government and second by a social democratic–agrarian coalition government in 1936. In Norway, Labour (Det norske Arbeiderparti) took office in 1935 with support from its former political enemy, the Agrarian Party (Bondepartiet). This outcome is remarkable considering the Agrarian Party’s anti-socialism as well as Labour’s turn to the left in 1918 and membership of Comintern between 1919 and 1923. Even though Labour abandoned the revolutionary strategy, the party leadership continued to stress its scepticism towards parliamentary democracy as late as in 1930.
It was against this political background that the crisis agreements were adopted. On the one hand, the agreements resulted in economic support for the indebted farm owners through devaluation, reduction of property tax, protectionist measures and raising of the prices of domestic farm products. On the other hand, the state launched construction projects to increase employment. In Denmark the agreement paved the way for a social reform, simplifying legislation of public insurance and financial aid for the unemployed.
The Danish Social Democrats’ Reform Policy as a Democratic Bulwark
At the Danish Social Democrats’ congress in June 1931 the dominant topic was the economic crisis, with unemployment and indebtedness of farmers caused by a decline in prices of agricultural products. Although the Danish prime minister and leader of the Social Democrats, Thorvald Stauning, denounced the communists’ violent methods and warned that communists held positions in trade unions, links between the crisis and extreme political movements were almost absent.Footnote 11 Prior to the congress internal party discussions had actually linked the economic crisis and political radicalisation. At a ministerial meeting on 2 February 1931 the prominent Minister of Social Affairs Karl Kristian Steincke reported that ‘the situation worsens week by week and the communists are gaining ground through their agitation due to unemployment and misery’.Footnote 12 Nonetheless, opinions of this kind were not expressed often and were not initially connected to fascism.
Around the turn of the year 1931–2, though, the Social Democrats began to register a change on the right wing in relation to the economic crisis, which was severely affecting the farmers. One potential threat came from the fascist party, the Danish National Socialist Workers’ Party (Danmarks Nationalsocialistiske Arbejderparti; DNSAP), founded in 1930, and rooted in the crisis-stricken rural region of Southern Jutland, which borders Germany. However, with regard to the increasing economic crisis the Social Democrats responded particularly aggressively to the new Farmers’ Union (Landbrugernes Sammenslutning; LS), which had developed during 1931 into a nationwide anti-parliamentary movement that made radical demands for reduced property tax and devaluation of the Danish currency. In January 1932 Stauning rejected LS’s financial demands and criticism of the government in a newspaper article entitled ‘Violent Threats from the Danish Lapua Peasants’.Footnote 13 The title explicitly associated LS with fascism in referring to the brutal Finnish Lapua movement, which, supported by farmers and big industry, exerted its fascist influence on Finnish politics from 1929 to 1932. Moreover, a few months afterwards, the Social Democrats characterised LS as a crisis phenomenon similar to German National Socialism.Footnote 14 Thus, the Social Democrats indicated that, in their opinion, LS could be regarded as a proto-fascist movement.
While the Social Democrats became aware of activity at both political extremes during 1932, the government was faced with an escalating economic crisis. In February and March 1932 unemployment rose to nearly 36 per cent of organised workers.Footnote 15 In addition, politicians had to face the indebted farmers and an increase in foreclosures, particularly in rural areas.Footnote 16 Although foreclosures accounted for a small percentage of the total number of agricultural properties, they were significant signs of recession, with far-reaching social repercussions which needed to be dealt with.
In June 1932, after months of negotiations with the bourgeois opposition, a minor agreement was reached on unemployment insurance and financial support for farmers and fishermen. The agreement is noteworthy, as the parliamentary debates reflect that the governmental parties were aware of the political turmoil worldwide. Thus, the Minister of Social Affairs, Steincke, expressed his concern about the political situation in Germany, where the Social Democratic Party was losing influence.Footnote 17 Moreover, Jørgen Jørgensen, of the Social Liberals, noted the apparently well functioning Danish parliament, where MPs had set aside party interests in favour of an agreement, in contrast to other countries which were affected by conflicts, growing class disparities and the collapse of public values.Footnote 18
Regardless of these statements, the Social Democrats showed a pragmatic attitude to the agreement, as they stressed the results achieved but also regretted that various social proposals had not passed into law.Footnote 19 The lack of social reform was due to the resistance of the bourgeois parties, which had the majority in the parliament’s first chamber, and they maintained their dominance after the election in September 1932.
Due to this parliamentary situation, the government had to recognise that it was impossible to retain power and called for an election for the second chamber on 16 November 1932 in order to determine the leadership of the country. The election showed support for the Social Democrats, who received 42.7 per cent of the votes and were able to continue the coalition government with the Social Liberals. While the election strengthened Stauning’s office, it also led to a new parliamentary constellation, since four LS representatives and two Communists entered the second chamber.Footnote 20 Although they held few seats, the Social Democrats responded with pronounced discontent. During the budget debate on 6 December 1932 Prime Minister Stauning disapproved of LS’s currency policy and influence on the Agrarian Liberals, which had included the LS members in their parliamentary group. In addition, Stauning condemned the Danish Communist Party’s revolutionary slogans and violent methods, indicating that the Social Democrats were challenged especially by the Communists, who were using the parliamentary arena for revolutionary agitation and criticism of the government.Footnote 21 This agitation could be an advantage for the Conservatives and Agrarian Liberals and could create conflicts within the labour movement.
Despite the resistance to extreme political forces, it is difficult to determine whether anti-democratic movements motivated the socio-economic settlement, called the Kanslergade Agreement.Footnote 22 This is partly due to the fact that the crucial negotiations between the government and the Agrarian Liberals, on the night of 29–30 January 1933, took place off the record. However, according to the parliamentary debates immediately before and after the political settlement, the legislative measures were regarded as acute crisis management, to avert labour market conflicts and to rebuild the economy, as the debates referred to the farm crisis, unemployment and the announced lockout. The critical situation was emphasised by Stauning as he presented a crucial crisis bill in parliament on 28 January 1933, estimating that two-thirds of the population were affected by the crisis and that the Danish nation was on the verge of a catastrophe.Footnote 23
Only in a single paragraph did Stauning address international matters, when he mentioned, without being specific, that other places were acting along other lines with other means.Footnote 24 However, that remark is not sufficient evidence to conclude that Stauning justified the legislative measures by a notion of safeguarding democracy. It is important to note that Hitler was appointed German chancellor on the same day that the Danish agreement was approved – 30 January 1933. This meant that the Danish MPs were acting without knowledge of the success of German National Socialism, although they were well informed about the political tensions in the neighbouring country.
A relatively short time later, however, the Social Democrats stressed that the economic measures had strengthened parliamentary democracy. For example, the Social Democrats concluded in their 1933 annual report that, by retaining the executive power, the party had demonstrated that it was possible to obtain political results by parliamentary means, and that this was combating communism and fascism. The argument runs: ‘in order to defeat Communism and Nazism, we had to maintain our governmental leadership and to show that the parliamentary system can be used for positive action to combat and alleviate the crisis’.Footnote 25
A similar view was expressed in the Social Democrats’ new programme ‘Denmark for the People’ (Danmark for Folket), launched on 23 May 1934. The programme, which stands as testimony to the Social Democrats’ transformation into the people’s party rather than a strictly working-class party, outlines above all the party’s ideas about production and society. Yet these political visions were connected to the struggle against extreme political movements, as the programme states: ‘we fight the dictatorial movement that bears the name communism, and we fight the various forms of fascism which have now also appeared in this country’.Footnote 26
The notion of how socio-economic reforms guaranteed the stability of society was repeated in the years that followed. In June 1935 the party congress agreed on a manifesto which declared that the Social Democrats would oppose the tendency to dictatorship and conversely safeguard democracy, hence protecting the Danish nation.Footnote 27 And during the election campaign for the second chamber in October 1935 the Social Democrats’ slogan made the election a choice between ‘Stauning or Chaos’. In a radio speech prior to the election Stauning disapproved of LS’s production strike and assault on society.Footnote 28 In addition, he criticised the Conservative Youth Organisation’s brutal behaviour and the new dissident parties, presumably alluding to DNSAP and the Free People’s Party (Det Frie Folkeparti), founded in 1934 by LS farmers. Finally, he rejected the Danish Communist Party’s request to form a united front against fascism, as he denounced the Communists’ anti-democratic nature: ‘we cannot have a united front with a party that believes in medieval dictatorship, violence and terror’.Footnote 29
Although the rhetoric should be seen in the context of the election, the number of statements shows that the Social Democrats were vigilant against communism and the rise of fascism. Moreover, the statements show that the party associated economic crisis management with security policy and the development of a social democracy. However, this understanding had not crystallised when the Kanslergade Agreement was reached in 1933, even though the agreement was considered significant.
The Danish Agrarian Liberals on the Defensive
At the beginning of the decade the Agrarian Liberals advocated liberal values such as free trade as opposed to socialism and regulatory policy.Footnote 30 However, a shift took place during 1931 away from a liberal stance and toward acknowledging the necessity of state intervention, though mainly to improve the economic situation of farmers. The change in attitude indicates that the Agrarian Liberals were under pressure from, in particular, the new LS movement.
The Agrarian Liberals’ political situation was delicate as LS, with approximately 100,000 members,Footnote 31 belonged to the Agrarian Liberals’ traditional electoral base, but could turn towards fascism.Footnote 32 In this respect the party chose to appeal to farmers’ sense of responsibility to rural community cohesion and to give space to LS representatives in the parliamentary group after the elections to the first and second chamber in autumn 1932. By means of this organisational adaptation, the Agrarian Liberals tried to disarm LS, while at the same time the party and LS had a common interest in helping farmers.
Based on these rather unpredictable political conditions the Agrarian Liberals entered into negotiations with the government, which led to the Kanslergade Agreement in 1933. However, during the negotiations the Agrarian Liberals managed to ensure the loyalty of the LS representatives within their parliamentary group, while at the same time the party was responsive to the demands of the traditional farmers’ organisations, the Farmers’ Associations (De danske Landboforeninger) and the Smallholders’ Associations (De Samvirkende danske Husmandsforeninger).Footnote 33 After the settlement was reached the Agrarian Liberals accordingly framed the compromise as a victory, stressing the unity of the agricultural community in addition to the tax cuts and devaluation of Danish currency which the party had pushed through the parliament.Footnote 34
Despite the political results the Agrarian Liberals’ optimism waned quickly as LS made new demands, which showed that the movement was not contained. The dissatisfaction culminated in July 1933, when LS initiated a production strike in Southern Jutland and campaigned against the political establishment and traditional farmers’ organisations. The campaign was especially devastating to the Agrarian Liberals since they were attacked by parts of their agrarian hinterland and LS members within the parliamentary group.Footnote 35
As a consequence the party leader, Thomas Madsen-Mygdal, resigned and Oluf Krag was elected as chairman of the party’s parliamentary group. The change in leadership did not end the political conflicts, and in the spring of 1934 the party broke with LS while outmanoeuvring the most controversial LS supporters in their parliamentary group. In the party’s newspaper press the Agrarian Liberals justified the manoeuvre by blaming LS’s aggressive agitation, which was damaging the party.Footnote 36 However, the party was also aware that LS was sympathetic to fascism. At a public party meeting a few days after the split Krag warned against flirting with dictatorship and criticised the widespread use of the ‘Nazi emblem’ among farmers.Footnote 37 Although it is not feasible to verify this use of the emblem, the statement reflects disapproval of fascism.
Subsequently, the Agrarian Liberals tried to revitalise their liberal profile. At the party’s conference on 30 May 1934 Krag stated that the most important political issue was liberalism’s struggle against socialism.Footnote 38 The liberal stance was also manifested in a proclamation that campaigned for business and free trade as opposed to state socialism.Footnote 39 The campaign can be seen as a counteraction to the Social Democrats’ programme ‘Denmark for the People’, launched the week before. At the same time the campaign can be seen as a reaction to the Free People’s Party, founded in mid-May by the three LS members who had left the Agrarian Liberals. This interpretation is supported by the fact that a few days before the party conference Krag had given a public speech in which he denounced the founding of the Free Peoples Party, as it aimed to split the Agrarian Liberals.Footnote 40 Krag’s statement suggests that the Agrarian Liberals felt challenged by the new party, which could develop into a rival.
Apart from the split theme, the Social Democrats remained the main enemy. At the party conference in July 1936 the Agrarian Liberals agreed on a proclamation profiling the party as the driving force behind private initiative, free enterprise and the existing democratic system, whereas the government’s interventionist trade policy and plan to change the constitution to a one chamber system was described as dictatorial.Footnote 41 At the conference Krag even characterised Prime Minister Stauning as a dictator with explicit reference to Hitler.Footnote 42 Nevertheless, the Agrarian Liberals also associated the Social Democrats with the revolutionary left. For example, in an election manifesto in 1936 the Agrarian Liberals warned against the left-wing parties, who through the trade unions had formed ‘The United Front of Social Democratic-Communism’.Footnote 43 The text, which exploited the fact that the communists were part of the trade union movement, was presumably intended to damage the Social Democrats. In turn, the Agrarian Liberals did not seem to worry about the Danish Communists, apart from their general aversion to socialism and communism.
Compared to their fierce criticism of the government, it is remarkable that the Agrarian Liberals only slightly addressed LS’s anti-parliamentarianism and activism (such as LS’s protest march, called the Peasant March, on Copenhagen July 1935, with 30,000–40,000 participating farmers). This suggests that LS’s radicalisation was not the party’s main problem. Rather, the Agrarian Liberals were troubled by their declining support in rural areas. The picture is further completed by the fact that the party lost its majority in the first chamber of the parliament in 1936. This meant that the Agrarian Liberals had difficulty promoting an agenda that accommodated farmers’ interests.
Reinterpreting the Kanslergade Agreement
The Danish case shows that during the 1930s the Social Democrats began to frame socio-economic measures as a means of stabilising democracy, although the Kanslergade Agreement of 1933 was considered to be acute crisis management. The study also shows that the Social Democrats’ promotion of their economic and social objectives as a shield against dictatorship, whether communist or fascist, was combined with an articulation of the party’s efforts to develop a social democracy.
As for the Agrarian Liberals, a complex picture emerges. At the beginning of the decade the party was responsive to farmers’ radical economic demands, yet this reaction can be seen as a defensive attempt to dismantle the political potential of the LS movement, which threatened the party organisation. Although the Agrarian Liberals were aware of political turbulence worldwide, the party consistently fought dictatorship in the guise of the Social Democrats. Whether or not this mainly served as a rhetorical strategy to undermine the credibility of the political enemy, it is remarkable given the fact that the party only occasionally denounced LS’s anti-parliamentary nature and the extreme right. The Agrarian Liberals’ internal discussions do not reflect a growing concern about Danish democracy due to the rise of fascism. Instead, the party expressed an awareness of economic issues and its weakened political position. In this sense the Agrarian Liberals appeared as a party that was mainly committed to defending its own party organisation and electoral base, even though the party rejected dictatorship.
Overall, the Danish findings reflect a decade marked by conflicts regarding the role of the state and the organisation of the society. As a consequence, and rather than creating a solid cross-class alliance, the government reached the political agreements of the 1930s ad hoc with either the Agrarian Liberals or the Conservatives.Footnote 44 The political situation was further complicated by the growth of various movements hostile to democracy. In response to the anti-democratic currents the Social Democrats began to articulate their socio-economic policy as a democratic bulwark. The rhetoric, as well as the Social Democrats’ reform programme, which showed a way out of the crisis, may have deprived the extreme political movements of a mobilisation theme. However, in order to qualify this finding, it could be of interest to clarify whether Swedish and Norwegian socio-economic measures, besides economic crisis management, were seen as a tool to combat anti-democratic forces. Hence, the Danish case will be discussed in a comparative Scandinavian perspective.
The Swedish ‘Kohandeln’
Four months after the Danish Kanslergade Agreement, the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the Agrarians (Bondeförbundet) reached a crisis agreement, Krisuppgörelsen, on 27 May 1933, which critics nicknamed ‘Kohandeln’, meaning political horse-trading. Although the Swedish agreement was similar to the Danish constellation, there is a major difference, since the Swedish compromise was adopted after the fascist takeover in Germany, which is reflected in the sources.
Prior to Hitler’s political success the Swedish Social Democratic Party was not severely worried about fascism, although the party leader Per Albin Hansson pointed out at the party congress in March 1932 that fascism had gained ground in Europe simultaneously with the economic crisis, and that it was important to be alert to the anti-democratic phenomena.Footnote 45 The link between Sweden’s economic crisis and the growth of anti-democratic forces was in turn articulated after Hitler seized power in Germany in January 1933 and after the Swedish Social Democratic Party had formed a minority government in September 1932. Barely a month before the political settlement was approved the Social Democratic Party published a manifesto on 1 May 1933 which stressed that the crisis created fertile ground for violent ideas. This tendency the party promised to defeat with policies that met the people’s basic needs.Footnote 46 Moreover, the manifesto claimed that fascists’ success in Central Europe had motivated anti-democratic forces within bourgeois circles in Sweden. Accordingly, the manifesto urged Swedes to defend democracy and fight communism and the fascist version of dictatorship.
The Social Democratic Party’s comprehension of crisis policy as a means of stabilising democracy is confirmed by confidential discussions within the party. At the party board’s annual meeting on 23 April 1933 several politicians expressed the view that the party could resist fascism with innovative socio-economic measures. Among others, Minister of Social Affairs Gustav Möller said that ‘a positive crisis programme was the most important means to fight fascism’; and Harald Åkerberg stated, in reference to the former German Weimar Republic’s lack of a progressive policy, that ‘it is vital for our party to contribute to a positive outcome which gives people hope and improves their situation. By this means, the fascists’ preconditions will disappear.’Footnote 47 Although the participants did not find any reason to panic, the prevailing view was that it was important to be vigilant against anti-democratic currents.
Similar opinions circulated in the party’s newspaper press immediately after the agreement was approved; here, in addition, the agreement was seen as a triumph for democracy. On 30 May 1933, for example, the newspaper Skånska Social-Demokraten cited Prime Minister Hansson’s assessment that the political settlement and parliamentary cooperation across party lines had given Swedish democracy ‘a stronger anchorage’.Footnote 48 In the decisive days of the negotiations the social democratic politicians, compared to their Danish colleagues, were apparently more aware of – or stressed more explicitly – the agreement’s democratic aspect. This was probably related to international political upheavals and the building of the Nazi regime in Germany. Unlike the Danish case Swedish parliamentarians acted with knowledge of Hitler’s dictatorial success, which included brutal persecution of political opponents.
Subsequently, the Social Democratic Party elaborated on the democratic effect of the economic solution. For example, the party stated in a manifesto on 1 May 1934 that welfare policy was the most effective means to combat the anti-democratic ‘infection’ since it deprived the anti-democratic forces of their growth layer.Footnote 49 In the following years the party stressed that the Nordic social democratic parties had coped with the challenges caused by the depression and anti-democratic forces and thereby consolidated democracy.Footnote 50 At a party meeting in April 1935 Hansson even argued that the Social Democratic Party should remain in power because their pursued policy had demonstrated that it was possible to overcome the economic crisis without turning towards dictatorship.Footnote 51 Thus, the Social Democratic Party was instrumental in creating a positive narrative about the socio-economic compromise and alliance with the Agrarians. This does not prove that the crisis policy made Sweden resistant to fascism or any kind of dictatorship, but it shows that the Social Democratic politicians consistently communicated their political ideas and articulated their socio-economic measures in terms of safeguarding democracy.
As for the Agrarians they predicted major concessions if the party supported the Social Democratic government’s unemployment policy.Footnote 52 Nevertheless, the party leader, Olof Olsson, preferred an agreement with the bourgeois bloc. Instead, Axel Pehrsson-Bramstorp and Karl G. Westman, negotiated an agreement on behalf of the Agrarians,Footnote 53 apparently driven by rational considerations of party and farmers’ interests.
Like the Danish Agrarian Liberals the Swedish Agrarians were attentive to political unrest in the agrarian hinterland, manifested by the new agrarian movements, the National Association of Rural People (Riksförbundets Landsbygdens Folk; RLF) and the Agricultural National Association (Jordbrukets Riksförbund); the latter only consisted of 1,000 members, but veered towards fascism.Footnote 54 Although RLF was sceptical of fascism, the two movements merged at the turn of the year 1932–3. By merging, the agrarian movement could turn in one of two directions: confrontational or consensual. However, Pehrsson-Bramstorp managed to modify the farmers’ economic demands, and, as a result, these were accepted by the Social Democrats in the spring of 1933.Footnote 55 Thus, the Agrarians gained control of the agrarian movement’s protest potential. This outcome was possible because the movement remained an interest organisation which did not threaten the Agrarians’ position in the political arena. As Ulf Lindström has noted, the organisation did not function as a ‘splinter movement’.Footnote 56
Despite the agreement in May 1933 the impression of reconciliation and moderate politics seems complicated by the nationalist and racist values emphasised in the Agrarians’ new programme, approved in June 1933.Footnote 57 This could be viewed as a right-wing turn. However, the Agrarians’ radical nationalism was also stressed in election programmes from the 1920s.Footnote 58 Rather than adapting fascist values the party programme activated the nationalist feature, embedded in rural traditions.Footnote 59
It should be added that the Agrarians positioned themselves within a democratic framework, although they only occasionally expressed concern for democracy. In a radio speech in September 1936 Pehrsson-Bramstorp announced, as party leader and (briefly) prime minister, that a collaborative parliament had stopped extreme political movements.Footnote 60 Nevertheless, the prevailing argument addressed the financial situation in agriculture. A few days after the radio broadcast, Pehrsson-Bramstorp linked the ‘Kohandeln’agreement with the improvement of the farmers’ economy.Footnote 61 Moreover, at the party conference in 1937 he justified the coalition government, formed with the Social Democratic Party in autumn 1936, as he claimed that it gave political influence.Footnote 62 Thus, the cross-class alliance turned out to be less problematic for the Swedish Agrarians than for the Danish Agrarian Liberals. This was probably related to the Swedish Agrarians’ anti-liberal nature, which in turn could be linked to its foundation as an agrarian interest party in 1913. Incidentally, the party increased its votes. This meant that there was greater incentive to perceive the cooperation with the Social Democratic Party positively.
The Norwegian Solution
In the first part of the 1930s the Norwegian political landscape was polarised into a bourgeois bloc and a socialist bloc, dominated by Labour. To reach a settlement with Labour, which succeeded in 1935, the Agrarian Party had to renounce traditional bourgeois alliances and restrain fascist sympathisers, while Labour underwent a reorientation where parliamentarianism was seen as a means to manage the depression.
Labour’s change of political course was closely connected with fear of the growth of fascism due to repercussions of the economic crisis. This became evident at the party congress in May 1933, where the participants revised Labour’s principle programme, stressing fascists’ appeal to the unemployed.Footnote 63 When the influential Martin Tranmæl presented the programme he also pointed out that the bourgeois parties’ interests in fascism posed a severe threat.Footnote 64 In line with this view, the congress adopted a manifesto which stated that ‘the reactionary ruling class’ was taking advantage of the economic crisis and the momentum of fascism to destroy the labour movement.Footnote 65
To counteract people embracing fascism, the congress furthermore agreed on an economic work programme, devised by Ole Colbjørnsen and aimed at increasing employment and helping distressed rural people by promoting proposals for reducing debts.Footnote 66 The programme entailed that the party decided to run for government. The reason seems to be that the party would enhance productivity and stimulate employment by virtue of its economic policy, which could only be implemented by governmental power. As Labour reduced people’s misery with socio-economic measures, the party could simultaneously defeat fascism.
The decision to strive for executive power was a departure from the congress of March 1930, where Labour had revised its principle programme, intensifying its revolutionary rhetoric.Footnote 67 In 1933 the political climate had changed, affected by Hitler’s rapid rise to power and the newly founded Norwegian fascist party, National Union (Nasjonal Samling; NS). Hence, the majority of Labour accepted parliamentary means to achieve the political goals.
Consequently, Labour launched an anti-fascist campaign to prevent NS and reactionary right wing forces from prospering at the election in October 1933. Although it is difficult to assess the effect of the campaign, it can be stated that the election was a victory for Labour as it won 40.1 per cent of the votes. This made Labour the largest party in the parliament, although it did not receive the majority needed to form a government.
The power balance tipped when the Agrarian Party supported Labour in March 1935, followed by a socio-economic agreement. Given Labour’s fear of fascism, it is surprising that the party could compromise with the Agrarian Party, which was seen as sympathetic to fascism.Footnote 68 However, as Labour’s policy corresponded with that of the Agrarian Party on economic issues, the temporary alliance was made possible. Besides, the settlement was a result of separate negotiations between the chairman of Labour’s parliamentary group, Johan Nygaardsvold, and the leader of the Agrarian Party, Jens Hundseid.Footnote 69
Due to the political circumstances at the time of the change in power, fascism was not a topic. Yet, in retrospect, Labour related its economic crisis policy to the fight against fascism. At the party congress in May 1936 the party leader Oscar Torp stated, for example, referring to a decline in farm foreclosures, that Labour’s policy had deprived fascism of a basis in Norway. Similarly, Tranmæl stressed that the accomplished crisis policy had obstructed support for fascism in rural areas.Footnote 70 The need to justify the settlement with the Agrarian Party might have motivated these statements. Nonetheless, the statements were probably also related to the fact that the fascist party NS was in decline. This fact, whatever the reason, could be used to promote Labour’s responsible governance and successful crisis policy.
Regarding the Agrarian Party an ambiguous picture emerges, as part of the party was receptive to the proposals of NS, formed by Quisling in spring 1933. In addition, the party was challenged by the economic demands put forward by the agrarian movement, Rural People’s Crisis Relief (Bygdefolkets Krisehjelp), which the party found difficult to meet.Footnote 71 As a result, the movement then turned to NS, fielding a joint list at the election in October 1933.
The ambivalence regarding Quisling and NS continued after the election, as the Agrarian Party negotiated with NS and the nationalist right wing organisation the Patriotic League (Fedrelandslaget), among others, on forming a national bloc. Nevertheless, the Agrarian Party gave up coming to terms with NS in the autumn of 1934. This was presumably due to strategic considerations of votes and traditional bourgeois alliances.Footnote 72 However, economic considerations also seem to have had a profound effect. From June 1934 party leader Jens Hundseid, who had reservations about Quisling, discussed crisis policy matters on a confidential basis with the chairman of Labour’s parliamentary group. As the Liberal government at the same time kept on rejecting the Agrarian Party’s political demands, the party acknowledged that economic regulations for the benefit of farmers could only be achieved by a compromise with Labour. As a consequence, the Agrarian Party voted down the governing Liberals in the budget debate in March 1935 in favour of a Labour government.
In contrast to the election campaign in 1933, where the Agrarian Party was promoted as ‘the rock that stops Marxism’,Footnote 73 the party helped Labour into power. This change required an explanation, even though the party, founded in 1920 as an agrarian interest party, had a policy in line with the protectionist measures. At a party meeting in September 1935 Hundseid justified the support for Labour in terms of the survival of the Agrarian Party.Footnote 74 Furthermore, he stressed that it was not a permanent constellation, presumably to defuse the harsh criticism that was expressed by the party newspaper, Nationen.
Subsequently, Hundseid legitimised the political settlement by adding a democratic aspect. In the parliamentary debate on 13 February 1936 Hundseid claimed that the bourgeois parties’ failure in dealing with the economic crisis had created distrust of politicians and democracy among farmers.Footnote 75 In turn, he stressed that the Agrarian Party’s economic intervention had improved conditions in rural areas, whereby political tensions had diminished and confidence in the parliament and democracy had been restored.Footnote 76 The positive effect provided by economic regulations was repeated at the party conference in September 1938. For, although the Agrarian Party lost votes in the election in 1936 and the cooperation with Labour became more marked by conflicts from 1937 onwards, Hundseid claimed at the conference that radical movements and the ‘Quisling mentality’ had declined due to the crisis policy measures.Footnote 77
Discussing the Resilience of the Scandinavian Democracies
The comparison presented here reveals that the Scandinavian socio-economic agreements were initially based on pragmatic considerations, but that the social democratic labour parties began to conceptualise the economic crisis policy in terms of safeguarding democracy after the rise of fascism in Germany. More specifically, the Danish Social Democrats presented their bill as acute crisis management in January 1933 but retrospectively framed the socio-economic measures as a defence of democracy. In contrast, the Swedish Social Democratic Party perceived the crisis policy as a means to defeat fascism and dictatorship before the ‘Kohandeln’ agreement was achieved in May 1933, although the democratic effect was consolidated in the following years. The differences could be due to the fact that Swedish politicians, unlike the Danish, approved the agreement after Hitler’s seizure of power in Germany. This also had an impact on Norwegian Labour’s crisis programme, which was explicitly motivated by fear of fascism. It should be added that, whereas the Swedish and Danish Social Democrats fought against extreme political movements on several fronts, Norwegian Labour was mainly worried about fascism. Nevertheless, all three parties rejected the communists’ proposal of a united front against fascism.
The agrarian parties’ crisis policy was above all determined by farmers’ interests, although the Swedish Agrarians stated in retrospect that the socio-economic agreement smoothed out contradictions in society, and the leader of the Norwegian Agrarian Party stressed that the agreement had reduced fascism in rural areas, incidentally ignoring fascist sympathisers within the party. However, the fear of fascism was not a salient feature. As for the Danish Agrarian Liberals, they described the Social Democrats rather as dictatorial, even though the party felt organisationally threatened by the radical LS movement. By contrast, the Swedish Agrarians emphasised the coalition with the Social Democratic Party. Yet the alliance was easier to justify, as the Agrarians, unlike the Danish and Norwegian agrarian parties, increased their votes during the 1930s.
The comparison makes it clear that the compromise between Scandinavian agrarian and social democratic labour parties primarily came about as policy makers acknowledged the severe economic crisis. In Denmark the socio-economic agreement could be accepted since it was obvious that the Agrarian Liberals and the governmental parties had to give each other concessions. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that, relatively quickly, while the crisis was not yet averted, the crisis policy was conceived of as a defence of democracy by the social democratic labour parties. This suggests that the politicians were aware of the pivotal role of rhetoric as a complementary strategy to the socio-economic measures. In particular, the Swedish Social Democratic Party cultivated the image of Sweden’s progressive welfare policy, which made society immune to extreme political movements.
Although this study provides knowledge that is in line with the historiography, the comparative approach also shows that the Norwegian, and in particular the Danish, crisis agreements did not create a precedent for a strong cross-class alliance. Yet the political climate of reconciliation seems, to a certain extent, applicable to Sweden in the 1930s. This said, the resilience of the Scandinavian democracies in the interwar period cannot be reduced to political compromises. Among several explanations, though, the article indicates that the social democratic solution to the economic crises left no political space for either communism or fascism. Moreover, following Paxton’s reasoning, the political establishment of the 1930s did not ally with extreme political movements. Instead the Scandinavian democracies demonstrated that they were capable of handling the economic crisis, giving people less reason to seek political alternatives to democracy. This outcome, however, does not leave an impression of consensus. Rather, the Scandinavian democracies struggled with conflicts over the organisation of society throughout the interwar period.
