This book presents an annotated French translation of the Commentary on Aristotle, Physics 2.1–3, by the Neoplatonist philosopher Simplicius. Simplicius’ entire commentary on Ph. 2 has previously been translated into English by B. Fleet in 1997 for the Ancient Commentators on Aristotle series. However, as is widely known, while the translations in this series have the great merit of making Neoplatonist philosophers’ Aristotelian commentaries available in a modern language, they are not furnished with a significant apparatus of notes. L.'s book is of a rather different nature. L. has chosen to focus on a section of Simplicius’ commentary that both identifies specific topics in Aristotle's Physics and presents certain defining features of Simplicius’ commentary. The Aristotelian topics are the definition of the notion of nature (Chapter 1), the difference between the natural philosopher and the mathematician, particularly with reference to scholars of physical-mathematical sciences such as astronomy and optics (Chapter 2), and, finally, a technical discussion of the theory of causes (Chapter 3). In elucidating the Aristotelian text step by step, though, Simplicius performs a series of theoretical operations, which L. presents in a concise yet effective introduction. This helps even the reader who is not an expert on late-antique, and specifically Neoplatonic, philosophy to approach this text. In the introduction and in the translation, with its explanatory notes and commentary, the book also presents itself as a handy and effective teaching tool. But let us now move on to some specific features of Simplicius’ text that L. clearly illustrates for the benefit of his reader.
First, the book clearly explains the concordantist paradigm by which Simplicius seeks to bring Aristotle into agreement with Plato. It shows how Aristotle's criticism of Plato is only apparent, in so far as the former actually sought to warn his inexperienced readers against the kind of interpretative errors they might commit by reading Platonic texts superficially and without the required competence. Second, the book neatly outlines the reasons why Simplicius displays a great admiration for Aristotle as a natural philosopher and for the doctrines through which Aristotle reputedly surpassed Plato in the investigation of nature. At the same time, L. clarifies the fact that to Simplicius’ eyes even Aristotle the natural philosopher is essentially a Platonist. For, just as the Timaeus (Plato's work on physics) is a prelude to the theology presented in Parmenides, so Aristotle's Physics is a prelude to the overcoming of sensible reality in the direction of the intelligible. What is even more interesting is the way in which Simplicius develops the Aristotelian doctrine of causality: on the one hand, in relation to the Aristotelian causes the Commentator distinguishes between two real causes, namely the moving cause and the final one, and two accessory causes, namely matter and form; on the other hand, upon this causal model he tends to superimpose the Platonic one, in which alongside these four causes we find the paradigmatic cause and the instrumental, but also, and most notably, the Neoplatonic model, according to which the real causes are the divine ones, namely the One, the Intellect and the Soul. With respect to these causes, Aristotelian physis, the causal principle of the phenomenal world, is only an accessory cause.
L. then discusses the role played by Alexander of Aphrodisias in Simplicius’ commentary on Ph. 2.1–3. While drawing upon previous commentators, including Themistius and Porphyry, Simplicius takes Alexander as his main point of reference. The reason for this is that, whereas Simplicius, as already noted, places Aristotle fully within the Platonist tradition, certain views of Alexander's present the Neoplatonist commentator with some highly significant doctrinal problems that must be tackled. The main doctrinal issues on which Simplicius locks horns with Alexander in the commentary on these three chapters of Aristotle's Physics are, first of all, the mode of existence of the soul and the question of how to reconcile natural finalism and the irrationality of nature. This latter issue leads to a discussion of Alexander's position, which suggests that mechanism and finalism coincide. As regards the first question, that of the soul, Simplicius engages with Alexander in an effort to understand what the difference is between the soul and physis, if it is true that the soul is the principle of living beings, which are natural entities. As regards the second question, instead, it is a matter of understanding how it is possible for nature to act as an orderly and oriented principle, if neither intelligence nor chance account for natural generation. This is where Alexander comes into play, in so far as he compares Aristotle's model for the reproduction of living beings in De generatione animalium with the functioning of automata, namely self-moving mechanisms: for just as their cogs start turning once an initial movement has been imparted, thereby transmitting this movement in a regulated way from start to finish, so among human beings, once the male has brought generation about by depositing a seed in the female matter, a succession of orderly movements occurs until a living creature is born. Simplicius notes, however, that in Alexander's explanatory model, the embryo's stages of development are juxtaposed and hence entail a different nature for every individual change. But, according to Simplicius, the correct explanation of Aristotle's embryology posits a continuous change that has a single nature as its principle, namely a logos, a productive reason that contains all the stages of growth of the embryo from the very beginning of the process, as a blueprint for its development. This, once again, enables Simplicius to overcome the purely physical level, by establishing the subsequent causal principles that transcend it. In such a way, physics leads to a reaffirmation of the very foundations of Platonism, since only transcendent forms are the true paradigms of natural reality.
In the book, an analytical ‘Résumé’ of Simplicius’ commentary on Ph. 2.1–3 guides the reader through the topics addressed in the text. The section ‘Note sur le texte’ indicates those passages in which L. has adopted a different lectio compared to H. Diels's text (1882).
I shall note here a few instances in which I disagree with L. At line 270.23, instead of εἰς τοῦτον τεινούσας τὸν νοῦν παρατρέχω L. reads εἰς τοῦτον τεινούσας τὸ νῦν παρατρέχω: it is unclear to me how L. justifies this varia lectio from a palaeographical standpoint, but will note that the use of τείνω with τὸν νοῦν is widely attested (and with τὴν ψυχήν and τὸν λόγον also in Plato: cf., respectively, Tim. 34 and Phd. 63). Should we read νῦν, as L. suggests, this would not be accompanied by an article, as other examples show.
At line 279.32 the correction of ᾗ into ἢ seems unnecessary to me. The lectio ᾗ can already be found in editions of Aristotle's text because ᾗ φύεται is precisely an explanation of the fact that ‘what grows proceeds from something to something else’ (Ph. 193b17).
At line 284.29 ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα λαμβανόμενος is also correct with ἐφ’ ἑκάστῳ, but this correction seems unnecessary to me, since ἐφ’ ἑκάτερα refers to the previous πᾶσι τοῖς σημαινομένοις, an expression by which Simplicius indicates the multiple meanings of nature.
At line 295.35 it seems to me that ὁρισμῷ περιλαμβάνοι clearly conveys the sense of Simplicius’ argument, without the need to change the expression into ἐν ὁρισμῷ παραλαμβάνοι, as L. suggests.
The usefulness of this new translation of Simplicius’ commentary on Ph. 2.1–3 should be stressed. In addition to a general overview of the topics addressed in his introduction, L. provides a clear and smooth translation of Simplicius’ text, along with a considerable apparatus of explanatory notes, in which he refers to ancient sources while also engaging with the modern literature on these topics. For all these reasons, the book seems useful for both specialists and students.
