Introduction
Since its earliest days the modern Jewish settlement of Palestine faced challenges from two directions. It encountered resistance from indigenous Arabs (initially “mute” but becoming increasingly vocal over time),Footnote 1 and it experienced dissent from various Jewish constituencies. Two critical trends were particularly important among Jews (in addition to the religious opposition to nationalism): a liberal-humanist trend that rejected the quest for a Jewish state in Palestine as the ultimate goal of the settlement project, and a leftwing trend that elevated universal socialist principles above specific nationalist aims. Even before the establishment of the Zionist movement, these trends had become evident shortly after the beginning of the settlement project. Both trends were concerned with the implications of the project for relations between Jews and Arabs in the country.
The liberal-humanist critique is associated, above all, with the name of the Russian Jewish thinker Asher Ginzburg, better known by his pen name Ahad Ha'am (one of the people). In a series of landmark articles written after his visit to the new settlements in 1891, titled “Truth from the Land of Israel,” he sharply criticized the settlement project for its economic dependence on overseas donations, and for the exploitative relations it established between Jewish farmers and Arab workers. He said that the farmers “treat the Arabs with hostility and cruelty, unjustly trespass their boundaries, shamelessly beat them without good reason, and even boast of having done so.” He went on to warn prophetically that in the event “the life of our people in the Land of Israel develops so far that they push out the inhabitants of the country on a small or on a large scale, then the latter would not easily yield their places.”Footnote 2
More than a decade later, similar criticism was voiced in another classic article, “The Hidden Question,” written by Yitzhak Epstein. These seminal articles provided inspiration to dissident movements that adopted a binational approach—regarding the country as the shared homeland of both Jews and Arabs—as an alternative to the goal of a Jewish state. Prominent among these movements were Brit Shalom (Peace Covenant) and Ihud (Union), both of which operated in the British Mandate period, 1917–1948.Footnote 3 Although these groups never managed to gain much popular support, they carried great weight due to the moral and intellectual stature of spokespersons such as Martin Buber, Judah Magnes, and Moshe Smilansky. Their legacy is being resurrected today in debates over the one-state versus two-state solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the prospects of binationalism there.
Less well known is the legacy of another critical trend mentioned above, that of the leftwing critique of Zionism, whose roots go back to the same period. In a long-forgotten text from 1886, a Russian Jewish socialist revolutionary by the name of Ilia Rubanovich raised the following question: “What is to be done with the Arabs? Would the Jews expect to be strangers among the Arabs or would they want to make the Arabs strangers among themselves?” He went on to argue that if the rights of Arabs were violated through the ability of settlers to rely on international powers, local people would defend their rights: “They will answer tears with blood and bury your diplomatic documents in the ashes of your own homes.” Not only would this doom the prospects of Jewish immigrants, but it would also be disastrous for Jews in Russia, who would become alienated from their fellow Russian masses.Footnote 4
Rubanovich's opposition to the Palestine settlement project captures the three main themes of leftwing opposition to Zionism: that it would trample over the rights of indigenous Arabs, that it would force the settlers into an alliance with imperialist forces, and that it would segregate Jews from the toiling masses in their own countries and thus prevent working-class unity. These themes consistently run through the history of the anti-Zionist left. While working-class unity in the Jewish Diaspora is no longer an issue, the conflict between indigenous Arabs and settler Jews is very much alive today. In addressing this conflict and seeking possible solutions, the legacy of early attempts to address it from liberal-humanist and leftwing perspectives is still relevant (though space limitations permit discussion only of the leftwing perspective). Both attempts failed to gain much political allegiance from the Jewish and Arab masses; however, they may allow us to examine the tensions between class organization and national mobilization and to explore the difficulties of breaching the boundaries created by nationalism through the formulation of and advocacy for an internationalist perspective.
In what follows, two leftwing political movements—related but distinct—are presented. These are the pre-1948 Palestinian Communist Party, and the post-1948 Israeli Socialist Organization (Matzpen).Footnote 5 Their experience may shed light on the historical relations between class and nation as principles of organization and offer some insights regarding the implications of these for the Left today. We cannot expect clear answers to the question, “What is to be done?” but a study of historical cases—even marginal ones restricted to a few hundred activists—can help identify the obstacles to progressive change. It can allow us to begin attempting to overcome them. In particular, the question of how to reconcile deep nationalist loyalties with international solidarity, in the context of sharp political conflict, will be addressed historically and with a view to the future.
The Palestinian Communist Party, 1919–1948
Having spent its entire existence in the shadow of the Jewish-Arab conflict over the political future of the country, the Palestinian Communist Party was shaped by the same forces that shaped the conflict itself: British imperial policies, Zionist ideology in the Eastern European Diaspora and settlement practices in Palestine, and Arab nationalism. In particular, at various intensified conflict periods it found itself torn apart by the pressures of competing nationalist movements. At the same time, like all Soviet-aligned parties, its policies were shaped by turns and shifts of the international Communist movement and factional struggles within the Russian political leadership, which must be taken into account when discussing the Party's history.
In its early stages the Party attempted to reconcile lingering attachment to its roots in the Zionist labor movement with its wish to join the newly-founded Communist International (Comintern). Operating under the name of Socialist Workers Party (MPS in Hebrew), its members sought to maintain a link with the left wing of the Poalei Zion movement, while joining the Comintern.Footnote 6 This proved impossible. The left wing of Poalei Zion was torn between the national focus of labor Zionism and the anticolonial focus of international communism, with the injunction of “supporting every liberation movement in the colonies.”Footnote 7
When the MPS applied for membership in the Comintern, its representative, Yaakov Meirson, took care to distance it from other organizations: “Our party draws a line separating it from all other parties operating in Palestine, in that it is a territorially-based party which sees no place for national socialist parties.” By relying on the Comintern, the Party could “distinguish itself more clearly from all the other Jewish and Arab parties that are socialist in name but nationalist in spirit.”Footnote 8 In contrast to the ethnically based Poalei Zion, the MPS was open to Jews and Arabs who lived in the territory but in practice remained entirely Jewish. While the Comintern welcomed the Party's application, it did not accept it until 1924, after several name changes and splits, settling eventually on the Yiddish name Palestinische Kommunistische Partei (PKP).
Yishuvism
The Party's work among Arabs was hampered by lack of familiarity with local culture and language and, above all, by the foreign origins of its members: the vast majority owed their presence in the country to Zionism, even if they had renounced it after having arrived there. Most of them joined the Histadrut labor federationFootnote 9—without which it was difficult to find jobs and receive social protection—and were part of the organized Jewish community (Yishuv), which remained their main constituency until the mid-1930s. Since Jewish immigration was the main concern for the Arab national movement, the Party faced a critical dilemma. To oppose immigration would have undermined the position of its Jewish members and its own existence. To accept it as a right would have alienated it from the Arab movement. The contradiction facing the Party was that it was an anti-imperialist force, drawing support from a community that existed and grew thanks to the same imperial force the Party regarded as its main enemy.
The way out of the dilemma was the approach that became known as Yishuvism, developed by the Party's foremost leader in the 1920s, Wolf Averbuch. It rejected Zionism as a nationalist ideology and political movement that called for a Jewish state; at the same time, it accepted the Yishuv as a legitimate community, which would continue to grow and develop due to immigration. The practical implications of that was a strategic combination of participating in Yishuv activities (elections to representative institutions, cultural events, union membership and cooperative life), and fighting exclusionary Zionist labor and land policies. The goal of the strategy was to radicalize Jewish immigrants and push them beyond Zionism, while demonstrating to Arabs that dissident Jews could become allies rather than enemies. This aimed to serve as a basis for joint Jewish-Arab struggle against British imperial rule. That one national group was indigenous to the country, and the other arrived there as part of a settlement project (and was new to the country) did not seem to play a major role in the analysis .Footnote 10
The strategy of Yishuvism—which Nahman List refers to as “anti-Zionist Zionism” or “Zionism without Zionism”—and the Party's predominantly Jewish membership and leadership were at odds with the overall thrust of the Comintern line. That line focused on support for “any national revolutionary movement against imperialism” and on mobilizing the indigenous peasant and working masses in an “anti-imperialist united front” for national liberation. Communists of European origins were supposed to assist the local proletariat to organize, without forming their own parties.Footnote 11 How this should have applied to Jews in Palestine, who were neither native to the country nor citizens of the colonial power, was not obvious. They did not enjoy privileged political status or social rights and did not control the indigenous population. They differed thus from equivalent groups in “normal” cases of colonial rule, which informed the Comintern policy.
For Arab nationalists, though, this distinction was immaterial: all Jewish immigrants were foreign to the country, and they arrived there through a colonial settlement process aimed at establishing a “National Home” in Palestine for the Jewish people; thus, they had no legitimate political rights in the country, which was Arab in essence.Footnote 12 The Party had to change its image by distancing itself from the Yishuv if it wished to gain more support from Palestinian Arabs. That was the foundation for the debate over what became known as Arabization.
The Comintern and Indigenization
Since its earliest days the Party was made acutely aware of the discrepancy between its anticolonial approach and its settler origins. The first Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) resolution on Palestine, in 1923, highlighted the Party's work “in circumstances of a backward, semifeudal country, subject to unique form of Zionist colonization, promoted by imperialism,” which allowed the Arab national movement to unite the indigenous population behind it. It called on the Party to play an active role in the movement in order to “expose mercilessly the traitorous role of the feudal, land owning elements, who seek to compromise with British imperialism,” and support the “nationalist elements of the urban and rural bourgeoisie” who take part in the struggle but suffer from “lack of consistency and hesitation.” The practical task outlined by the Comintern was “to intensify its activity among the urban Arab proletariat and peasantry” and help them organize and become effective in the fight against Zionism and imperialism.Footnote 13 This did not mean neglecting Jewish workers, and specific tasks regarding class organization were outlined for them. Participation in the Histadrut, despite its active Zionist role, was considered essential in order to reach the Jewish working masses.
Reporting on the progress made in working with the Arab movement and recruiting Arab members became a component of all the Party's communication with the Comintern. A 1926 ECCI resolution opened with the notion that “the center of gravity of the PKP's activity must be among the Arab toiling masses.” At the same time, the PKP “must help increase the discontent of the toiling Jewish population [with British policy]. It must pay particular attention to increasing its ideological and organizational influence among the Palestinian proletariat and link its struggle with that of the Arab people, against imperialist oppression.”Footnote 14
In theoretical terms, this did not mean abandoning Yishuvism and giving up on Jewish workers. The Comintern urged a course of “linking the interests of the daily struggle of the Arab toilers with the interests of the daily struggle of the Jewish proletariat while waging a systematic campaign against Arab and Jewish chauvinism and pooling Jewish and Arab workers into a joint organized fight against the class enemy.”Footnote 15 The anti-Zionist struggle aimed at “transforming the Histadrut into a true class-based trade union,” that is, making it into “an organization whose doors are open to all proletarians, and particularly Arab workers.” Strengthening the existing Arab unions must also be carried out through “uncompromising struggle against Arab nationalists” and their influence among Arab workers.Footnote 16
This formulation, which guided the Party in its first decade, adopted an anti-Zionist position and yet maintained a balance between potential Jewish and Arab constituencies. It was not neutral between Zionism and Arab nationalism, clearly siding with the latter against the former. But, it did not abandon its independent position. Working with left Arab nationalist elements and progressive Jewish workers within their organizations was seen as a way of combining an anticolonial agenda with a socialist class perspective. The two were seen as theoretically compatible, even if in practice they were difficult to reconcile.
The 1929 Riots and Arabization
The delicate balancing act had collapsed by the end of the decade. Increasing tensions between the organized Jewish and Arab communities over control of the holy places resulted in the outbreak of countrywide violent clashes in August 1929, in which hundreds of civilian Jews were killed. The Party was caught unawares by these events, which exposed its isolation from the growing nationalist sentiments among the masses of both groups. The Comintern, which was experiencing the fervor of the “Third Period” with its expectation of revolutionary insurrections in the colonial world, used that opportunity to push Arabization forward in a decisive manner.Footnote 17
The Party's initial response was to condemn the killings and point to the tacit collaboration between the British, Zionist, and Arab forces aimed at diverting the masses from anti-imperialist struggle into intercommunal fighting. It called on Jewish and Arab workers to unite and resolve all the national and social questions together in a new true anti-imperialist rebellion, free of pogroms.Footnote 18 The Comintern rejected this approach as reflecting a rightwing deviation, a result of failure to implement Arabization. It was expressed in “an underestimation of revolutionary possibilities, open or hidden resistance to Arabization of the party, pessimism and passivity with regard to work among the Arab masses, fatalism and passivity on the peasant question, failure to understand the role of Jewish comrades as assistants but not as leaders of the Arab movement… . The evaluation of the uprising as a ‘pogrom,’ and hidden resistance to Arabization, are manifestations of Zionist and imperialist influence on the communists.”Footnote 19
A year later, the ECCI sent an open letter to all Party members, urging “a consistent and uncompromising revolutionary struggle of Jewish and Arab workers, for the national independence of Palestine as an Arab country.” Only on the basis of an anti-imperialist and agrarian revolution “can the victory of the Arab masses, as well as the rights of the Jewish national minority in Palestine, be guaranteed.”Footnote 20 While Jewish nationalism was the main enemy in the current stage, there was a need to be alert to the danger of Arab nationalism as well. Arabization of the Party was the central task while strictly avoiding a reduction of work among the Jewish workers. There was need for a “united front from below” of all proletarians, “over the heads of the traitorous Histadrut and the bourgeois nationalist Arab leaders.”Footnote 21
Historians regard Arabization as a crucial turning point for the Party, as indeed it was: many Jewish members and the entire leadership left or were expelled or emigrated and then purged in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. At the same time, a new element was introduced into the Party's discourse, which proved crucially important in retrospect. Jews in Palestine were recognized as a “national minority” for the first time. The 1930 Party Congress attacked the former leadership as having lived in a “Jewish ghetto” and having failed to define Jews in Palestine as a “special dominant minority.” It overestimated the progressive role of Jews and underestimated the revolutionary potential of Arabs. The Party had to “expose the true aims of the Jewish [Zionist] bourgeoisie and its being, together with the Jewish national minority in Palestine that fell under its influence, the main instrument of oppression wielded by the English occupiers against the indigenous Arab population.” Only by struggling against Zionism alongside Arab workers, could Jewish workers expect a positive resolution of the Jewish national problem—realization of their rights as a national minority in Palestine, and the revival of their national cultural heritage.Footnote 22
From a Zionist perspective, though, the minority status of Jews was temporary and would change with ongoing immigration. Relying on Arab workers to guarantee the realization of Jewish rights would doom the prospects of national revival. Little wonder then that the Party's promises fell on deaf ears. Jewish workers content to live as a dependent minority did not become Zionists and did not move to Palestine in the first place. Those who did immigrate there envisaged a different future, and their willingness to remain a minority was less evident than ever following the 1929 riots. On the contrary, a decisive turn in the direction of building up independent military and political force characterized their attitude in the 1930s and 1940s.
The 1930s saw a decisive shift in the Party's orientation toward the Arab population, though the majority of its members remained Jewish. The new leadership headed by Radwan al-Hilu, which took over after 1934, had a Jewish majority, though its Jewish members were committed to Arabization.Footnote 23 At the same time, the intensification of national conflict in the country with the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939 gave rise to growing tensions among members, leading to the formation of a “Jewish section” in 1937, which maintained tense relations with the Party leadership. The Comintern's shift from Third Period to Popular Front policies (that is, from grassroots insurrection to antifascist alliances between communists and the progressive national bourgeoisie), accentuated this trend.Footnote 24 In a country divided between two hostile groups, each with its own “national bourgeoisie,” the Popular Front was bound to lead to different cross-class alliances and thus to inevitable divisions within the Party.
Nationalism Contested
Tensions within the Party had to do not with theory but with its practical implications. On the one hand, the leadership, supported by Arab members, saw its role as that of taking an active part in the Arab national struggle, even when it was directed against Jews (not only Zionist institutions).Footnote 25 On the other hand, many members used the notion of Jews as a national minority to advocate minority national rights within an independent country. With the demise of the Revolt in 1939, the Party leadership recognized that it had been wrong to support Arab nationalist forces uncritically, and that as a result it lost much of its support among Jews. It attributed its errors to the lack of contact with the Comintern since 1935, which made it fall prey to nationalist “deviations.”Footnote 26 The Soviets in turn criticized the Party for having abandoned the class struggle due to a failure to “position the national question” correctly.Footnote 27 Ironically though, it was precisely the Comintern's constant pressure in the 1920s that forced the Party into its nationalist “deviation” in the 1930s.
This shift in approach alienated the large group of left-wing Arab intellectuals and activists who were attracted to the Party in the 1930s, when it supported the national struggle without reservations. Although many of them did not agree with the uncritical support granted to the movement's leadership, they continued to see themselves as the vanguard of national liberation. They regarded the Party leadership as weak and indecisive, shifting between the two national communities. The result was a situation “where the Party was talking to each community in its own political language and appealing to it in terms of its national sentiments.”Footnote 28 National divisions within the ranks became sharper with the growing feeling that the ongoing Second World War would force a decision regarding the political status of the country. The 1942 Biltmore Program of the Zionist movement, which put forward the goal of a Jewish state for the first time in explicit terms, made contestation over the future of the country more acute than ever.
In 1943 the Party split, giving rise to the National Liberation League (NLL), an Arab leftwing party, alongside the Palestinian Communist Party, which continued under a new Jewish leadership.Footnote 29 Another Jewish faction subsequently formed the Hebrew Communist Party, with a positive attitude towards Zionism. The split in the movement remained in force until the end of the period and “foreshadowed the coming partition of the country.”Footnote 30 In a sense, each faction of the Party pushed it into an alliance with some nationalist force, and their differences reflected the differences between the national movements themselves.
The NLL sought to advance Arab national goals with a focus on grassroots mobilization. It defined itself as the left wing of the national movement rather than as the Arab wing of the Communist movement. For the NLL, Palestine was an Arab country struggling for independence from foreign rule. Jews residing there deserved equal rights as a minority group but had no collective claim to the country. While it rejected Zionism, the NLL recognized the Jewish community with its internal class divisions and diverse interests. The fight was against the leadership of the community, not the masses of people. An independent Palestine would allow all residents equal participation: Arabs were the majority but the country would not grant special rights to members of any ethnic or national group. Although this view clashed with the mainstream Arab nationalist position (which did not grant Jewish settlers any rights in the country), the NLL did share the other practical demands of Arab nationalism: an end to Jewish immigration and land transfers, and independence to the country.Footnote 31
The PKP, at the same time, was moving toward integration within the organized Jewish Yishuv. While opposing partition and calling for an independent democratic state, it increasingly upheld a binational vision, based on “the principle of equal rights of Jews and Arabs for free national, economic and cultural development, without artificial interruptions and in mutual cooperation and brotherhood of nations.”Footnote 32 Palestine was defined by Party leader Meir Vilner in the PKP Congress in 1946 as a binational country, in which Jews and Arabs lived together and had no separate territorial basis; partition thus was not a viable option.Footnote 33 On the basis of that position, the PKP sought to reunite with the NLL. Despite their differences regarding the national rights of Jews, both parties rejected the Arab nationalist notion that Jews were an alien group and that a solution would require their departure from the territory. Opposing partition as unviable, while maintaining separate national organizations, was an obvious contradiction that undermined the quest for a unified solution for the country.
Both Communist parties shared one important position: loyalty to the Soviet Union, which recognized for the first time in May 1947 “that the population of Palestine consists of two peoples, the Arabs and the Jews. Both havehistorical roots in Palestine. Palestine has become the homeland of both these peoples.” A just solution must address “the legitimate interests of both these peoples,” in the form of “an independent, dual, democratic, homogeneous Arab-Jewish State … based on equality of rights for the Jewish and the Arab populations.” However, “if this plan proved impossible to implement, in view of the deterioration in the relations between the Jews and the Arabs,” an alternative plan would be suitable, providing for “the partition of Palestine into two independent autonomous States, one Jewish and one Arab.”Footnote 34
Despite their differences, all factions agreed on one core principle of the binational approach: the need to treat members of both national groups equally, whether as citizens in a joint state or as members of national collectives enjoying the same rights within a federal state, or as groups entitled to the right of national self-determination. They shared this approach with the liberal-humanist Ihud movement, which carried the banner of binationalism. However, these positions were rejected by both Jewish and Arab national movements as incompatible with their quest for exclusive control. The Zionist movement's acceptance of the 1947 United Nations Resolution 181 was but a prelude for an ethnic cleansing campaign—known by the Palestinians as the Nakba—that preceded and followed the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. These events saw the regrouping of all Communists who remained in the State of Israel as the Israeli Communist Party (Maki), overcoming initial resistance by some elements within the NLL.Footnote 35 Others who ended up in the West Bank founded the Jordanian Communist Party. A new chapter in the history of the country, and of the Left within it, opened with these dramatic changes, as discussed in the next section.
The Israeli Socialist Organization (Matzpen)
With the creation of the State of Israel, Palestinian Arabs disappeared from the scene as political agents: they were dispersed as a people and became Israeli and Jordanian citizens, or stateless persons. Their unified leadership was destroyed, and it took more than a decade before they started organizing independently again. In Israel itself their main political vehicle was the Israeli Communist Party (Maki), which was the only genuine Jewish-Arab political organization in the country. It played a major role in allowing Palestinians to recover their voice after their 1948 defeat.Footnote 36 Its legal status and parliamentary presence created space in which it could operate openly and extend its influence. In contrast to the pre-1948 period, though, the Party no longer challenged Zionism directly and focused instead on addressing practical issues facing its Arab constituency. Despite its oppositional stance, Arab nationalist forces in Israel did not regard the Party as sufficiently radical in its rejection of Israeli policies; they attempted to create other structures to replace its leading role.Footnote 37 These structures largely aligned themselves with the Arab nationalist wave led by President Nasser of Egypt, however, and had no interest in the Party's class perspective. Their ability to operate and mobilize support openly was limited due to constant monitoring and harassment by the security services. Only in the early 1960s was the radical left anti-Zionist banner taken up by a new movement, the Israeli Socialist Organization—ISO—which became known by the name of its publication Matzpen (“compass” in Hebrew).
Having risen to political prominence in the aftermath of the 1967 war, five years after it had been formed, Matzpen epitomized the radical left critique of Zionist ideology and practices. Although its members were few in number, usually no more than a few dozen activists, its impact was huge. It was the clearest voice speaking against the 1967 occupation, calling for the restoration of the rights of Palestinians in Israel, the occupied territories, and the Diaspora. Its voice was fresh and authentic, and it was independent of the imperatives of Soviet foreign policy. It thus represented a true alternative to the official ideology, especially as its rise coincided with the emergence of the New Left internationally, and it embodied the appealing spirit of the youth rebellion of the 1960s. Still, it never moved beyond the political margins.Footnote 38
In 1961, two of the future founders of Matzpen, Akiva Orr and Moshe Machover (members of the Israeli Communist Party at the time), published a book in which they reiterated the position of the Party in favor of mutual recognition of the right to national self-determination of the two peoples residing in the country (Israeli-Jews and Palestinian-Arabs). They also supported the right of the 1948 Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland and receive compensation for their land if they chose not to return.Footnote 39 This position was upheld, even after they and a few other members were expelled from the Party in 1962 for violating internal discipline. In the first issue of their new journal, Matzpen, the front page editorial called for “recognition of the national rights of the two peoples of Eretz Israel—the Jewish and the Arab.”Footnote 40
A few months later, A. Israeli (Orr and Machover) asserted that “The Question of Palestine”—the entire set of relationships between Jews and Arabs in the Land of Israel—had not been resolved yet: “the focus of the problem is that Israel and Jordan divided between them the territory that belongs to the Arabs of Palestine. Both the private property of individuals and the homeland of an entire nation were forcibly taken away from them. But the nation itself did not disappear and still exists.” They concluded:
Only an Israeli policy that would dare to abolish immediately the military government [over Arabs] in Israel, declare publicly that it is ready to return to the Arabs of Palestine what was taken away from them in 1948, recognize their rights as individuals and as a nation, help them acquire political independence and remove Hussein's yoke [Jordanian rule]—only such a policy can save Israel from the threatening future.”Footnote 41
Although these positions placed the organization at the extreme left of the Israeli political spectrum, they were not substantially different from those of Maki. Opposition to the military government and to discrimination against Arabs were not unusual, and were perceived usually as an internal critique of government policy. However, Matzpen did pose a fundamental challenge to the state in its rejection of Zionism and call for Israel to cease being a state for all Jews.Footnote 42 Having said that, until 1967 this critique of Zionism seems to have taken a back seat to other issues, such as workers struggles in Israel, international conflicts (Vietnam, Cuba, the US civil rights movement) and questions facing the Left globally (the Sino-Soviet conflict, Che Guevara's revolutionary expeditions, the Chinese Cultural Revolution and so on).
The year 1967 marked an obvious turning point. Growing tensions in the region and the rise of the PLO and the Fatah movement had redirected attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict even before June. With the countdown to war, the issue became more urgent and occupied the attention of the organization, and indeed of the entire political scene in Israel, as never before. The centrality that the conflict acquired during that period has not diminished, and it continues to be the most important fault line in Israeli politics and culture. In common political discourse, the term “left” has been reserved for people and organizations advocating a restoration of Palestinian rights and opposing Israeli military and political domination to various degrees.
By the time the June 1967 war broke out, Matzpen had sharpened its analysis of Zionism and its role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In a statement dating from May 1967, it argued that this was “not an ordinary conflict between two nations” because “the state of Israel is the outcome of the colonization of Palestine by the Zionist movement, at the expense of the Arab people and under the auspices of imperialism.” The solution to the conflict involved the “de-Zionization of Israel,” meaning transformation of Israel into a state that represents all its residents. This would end the discrimination and oppression suffered by Arab citizens. In addition, Palestinian-Arab refugees who wished to return would be able to do so or receive compensation if they chose not to be repatriated. At the same time, “the recognition of the right of the Hebrew nation to self-determination” was essential because it was the only solution “consistent with the interests of both Arab and Israeli masses.” It would lead to the “integration of Israel as a unit in an economic and political union of the Middle East, on the basis of socialism.” Without the prospect of living as equals in the region, Israeli Jews would not free themselves from the influence of Zionism.Footnote 43
This formula, the de-Zionization of Israel and its integration into a socialist union of the Middle East, became the foundation of the Matzpen approach. Another component, added shortly thereafter was, of course, the struggle against the occupation and its consequences. From Matzpen's perspective, the June 1967 war and occupation served to confirm the nature of Israel and Zionism as “a colonizing movement of settlers … [whose] modus operandi has always been to create faits accomplis—if necessary, by force of arms—at the expense of the Arabs and against the Arabs.” To counter that tendency, Israel must “withdraw from all the occupied territories and from the attempt to impose a settlement by force. This demand is the test for every progressive group and person.”Footnote 44 Ending the occupation was necessary but not sufficient, however. An overall solution would require “Israel's withdrawal from the Zionist path and the integration of a socialist, non-Zionist Israel in the region.” Socialism was also the only way to Arab national unification that would end the Balkanization imposed by imperialism on the Arab world. But the occupation did not come to an end, and it led to ongoing expansion, political oppression and popular resistance. Palestinians have become “entirely a conquered people … robbed not only of the most elementary political rights, but also of the very prospect for national and human existence.” Their response was natural, as
it is both the right and duty of every conquered and subjugated people to resist and to struggle for its freedom. The ways, means and methods necessary and appropriate for such struggle must be determined by the people itself and it would be hypocritical for strangers—especially if they belong to the oppressing nation—to preach to it, saying, “Thus shalt thou do, and thus shalt thou not do.”Footnote 45
Unique among Israeli forces, Matzpen rejected the “enlightened occupation” myth. It challenged the self-image of Israel as a liberal democracy practicing “purity of arms.” The Communist Party (RakahFootnote 46) condemned the occupation, but Matzpen alone linked it to Zionist ideology. Israel had to be transformed
from a Zionist state, a tool for furthering Zionist colonization … into a state expressing the real interests of both Jewish and Arab masses … [this goal would require] a consistent struggle against a continued Israeli occupation of the Arab territories. Only through this struggle could the Jewish and Arab masses be mobilized for socialism.Footnote 47
Crucially, Matzpen never equated the realization of the rights of Israeli Jews with the State of Israel. Its support for self-determination went together with opposition to the existence of Israel as a Jewish-Zionist state, a product of colonial settlement. Matzpen thus drew a line that distinguished it clearly from the Zionist Left.
In contrast to the Zionist Left, Matzpen rejected the notion that reconciliation between Jews and Arabs could be based on the post-1948 distribution of population, land, and resources, which was an outcome of colonization and dispossession processes. Israel was not a “classic” colonial society, however, as its “economic, social and political features are so unique that any attempt to analyse it through the application of theories or analogies evolved for different societies will be a caricature.”Footnote 48 One of these unique features was the dominance of the Zionist labor movement in the settlement process and its insistence on a Jewish labor policy, which acted to displace rather than exploit the indigenous population. As a result, the majority of the working class were Jews who occupied a privileged position vis-à-vis Palestinians. They were exploited as workers but were politically dominant as Jews; their class interests were not enough to move them in a revolutionary direction. The overlap between national and class oppression in South Africa was not replicated in Israel/Palestine. However, “Israeli society, unlike white society in South Africa, can be revolutionized from within, provided that such a development is subordinated to revolutionary developments in the Arab world.”Footnote 49 A revolutionary strategy would focus on fighting Zionist ideology and practices and recruiting marginal elements from within society (youth, Arabs), while aiming at an overall regional socialist transformation.Footnote 50
New Directions
Matzpen's theoretically elegant synthesis of principled support for legitimate national rights with the struggle for socialism in the Middle East had started to fracture by 1970. It was attacked from two opposing angles: as not being sufficiently resolute in its support for the anticolonial struggle waged by Palestinians, and as not being sufficiently resolute in its support for working-class struggles. Both attacks came from within, and while neither rejected the original Matzpen formula outright, both stretched it in different directions.
Adopting the name Revolutionary Communist Alliance (RCA), the first group of dissenting activists split off from the ISO in 1970 and moved to assert a distinct identity with a new journal called Ma'avak (“struggle” in Hebrew). Among the list of criticisms of Matzpen, the following is particularly relevant:
Despite its correct and courageous slogans regarding “Zionist nationalism” and “Arab nationalism,” Matzpen tends to detract from the typical colonial character of the [Israeli-Arab] contradiction, and to emphasize its national aspects. It therefore refrains from fighting to break the Zionist monopoly on land, and holds an ambiguous position regarding the national rights of Jews in Israel/Palestine and the meaning of the principle of self-determination. This is the reason it sees the State of Israel only as a capitalist oppressive apparatus, which will be destroyed by the revolution as all other states, and not as an oppressive colonial instrument (in addition to its capitalist nature) which is therefore the main tactical enemy of the revolutionary struggle in Israel.Footnote 51
In outlining its political program, the Ma'avak group asserted its view of Zionism and Israel as colonial instruments aligned with imperialism and operating at the expense of the Arab and Palestinian populations. Due to its history, “Israel is not a society in which internal class contradictions can form the background for an independent Israeli socialist revolution, disconnected from the regional revolutionary process.”Footnote 52 At the same time, it was crucial to expose internal contradictions within that society by undermining the power of Zionist ideology over the Jewish masses. Blocking this effort are Arab chauvinistic trends, which deny the existence of a Jewish national entity in Israel/Palestine. Without recognizing the political rights of Jewish workers, they would not join the revolutionary struggle.
Having recognized the national rights of Jews in Israel/Palestine, the political program went on to assert that Palestine was a binational unit and that the existing territorial concentration of the Jewish population reflected the realities of dispossession of Arabs from their lands. Under these circumstances, territorial separation between Jews and Arabs would serve to entrench the realities imposed by Zionism. The alternative to the national conflict was a joint revolutionary struggle of Jews and Arabs. In the vanguard of this struggle are Palestinians and their national movement: “By virtue of its historical position, the Palestinian movement is in the forefront of the struggle not only against Zionism and pro-imperialist Arab reaction, but also against the power and ideology of the [Arab] petty-bourgeoisie, which presents its nationalist reformism as socialism.”Footnote 53 This statement, and others like it (equating the Cuban and Vietnamese socialist struggles with the Palestinian nationalist struggle), were criticized as unprincipled concessions to nationalism (albeit that of the oppressed Palestinian people).Footnote 54 If the struggle of nationalists received uncritical support, argued Matzpen in its response, what need was there for socialism?
Parallel to the move in the nationalist direction, a move in an opposite direction was taken by another group at the same time, adopting the name Avangard (“vanguard” in Hebrew). In contrast to Matzpen, Avangard refused to acknowledge any specific features of Israeli society that would justify treating it as a special case. Israel had a unique history, of course, but so did all states and societies, and the task of activists was to mobilize the working class toward a socialist revolution. Zionism and Arab nationalism were manifestations of class rule in the particular context of the Middle East. Their presence did not call for the suspension of class analysis. Whereas for Ma'avak the colonial nature of Israeli society was crucial, and the only way to socialism was through a consistent struggle for national liberation, for Avangard the only way to national liberation was through a consistent struggle for socialism. Matzpen's claims to be fighting for both goals were ridiculed as a typical “centrist” attempt to avoid having to make clear choices.Footnote 55
The departure of two groups in 1970 weakened Matzpen, but of greater importance was another split in 1972, which saw it divided into two groups equal in size, claiming the same name and historical legacy. Initially, the two groups—which became known as Matzpen Tel Aviv and Matzpen Jerusalem (later as Matzpen Marxist) after their respective strongholds—differed little in their analysis. The most important compilation of analyses and documents reflecting Matzpen's positions was prepared before the split but published after it and was regarded by both groups as a crucial resource.Footnote 56
Matzpen Tel Aviv's basic principles document, dating from 1973 (slightly modified in 1978), reiterated most of the positions discussed earlier: it identified its field of operation as the struggle against the existing regime in Israel and positioned it in an “irreconcilable contradiction with Zionism … a colonial enterprise that is being implemented at the expense of the Arab masses (primarily the Palestinian Arab people), under the protection of and in alliance with imperialism.” It regarded the State of Israel “in its current Zionist form,” as the product of the Zionist enterprise and also as an instrument for its expansion.Footnote 57
Only a socialist revolution would provide a solution to the national and social problems of the region by toppling “all the existing regimes” and building a political union: “In this united and liberated Arab East the right to self-determination (including right to form a separate state) of each of the non-Arab nationalities in the region will be recognized, including the Israeli-Jewish nation.” In Israel/Palestine itself, Matzpen's task was to topple the Zionist regime by abolishing the institutions, laws, and practices on which it was based. Its ultimate goal was the “integration of the two peoples of the country—the Israeli-Jewish people and the Palestinian-Arab people—in a regional socialist union” on a basis of free choice and full equality.
At the same time, Matzpen Marxist began to distance itself from these positions. Much of its analysis revolved around the concept of an Arab Revolution, which had “an objectively socialist tendency,” in that “it must destroy all the existing oppressive and exploitative structures in the Arab East” in order to succeed. The Zionist state would be defeated, and the only question facing the Israeli Jewish masses was “whether they will ultimately recognize the Zionist state as their own oppressor and join the Arab masses in the struggle to overthrow it … [or] permit themselves to remain a counter-revolutionary force that must be crushed by the Arab revolution.” To move the masses in the right direction, it was essential to ensure “the right of national self-determination for non-Arab nationalities in the region—including the Israeli Jews—so far as the exercise of this right is consistent with defense of the socialist revolution in the Arab East.”Footnote 58
Noticeable in this document, as compared to previous Matzpen writings, is the growing harshness of the rhetoric. Consistent with that position, the organization called for the defeat of the Israeli side in the October 1973 war:
We see Zionism as responsible for every drop of blood spilled in the region, by Jews and Arabs alike; the Arab masses who wish to regain their territories that are occupied by Israel, and restore the full rights of the Palestinians are not our enemies. Our enemies are the Zionist state and the ruling classes in Israel.
As long as Palestinians are denied their rights, war is inevitable: “Only a revolutionary leadership, which combines the struggle against Zionism with anti-imperialist and anticapitalist struggle against all the privileged and propertied classes in the region, can lead the masses to victory.”Footnote 59
In summarizing its historical approach in its 100th issue, which celebrated its fifteenth anniversary, Matzpen Marxist identified its programmatic bases as anti-Zionism, “opposition to the legitimacy of the Zionist state's existence,” support for “equal coexistence of the two peoples of Palestine in their joint homeland,” and the need to mobilize the Israeli working class—on the basis of its contradictory interests—to the struggle against “Zionist colonialism.”Footnote 60
Both of the Matzpen factions continued to support a position that reconciled class analysis with national struggles. The difference between them consisted in that Matzpen Tel Aviv was more “diplomatic” in its rhetoric while Matzpen Marxist adopted a blunt language that sounded more radical and ran the risk of moving in a Palestinian nationalist direction. Ultimately, though, despite their different styles, they retained much in common as compared to Ma'avak, Avangard, and other offshoots of the original united organization: both prioritized the struggle against Zionism, and relegated class struggle to a secondary position, but they did that without falling into the Arab nationalist camp. In the public imagination they remained associated with the radical anti-Zionist position.
Historical and Political Contexts
As we approach the 1980s, it would be useful to provide a brief contextual analysis of the period during which the developments discussed so far had taken place. The 1960s saw the rise of the New Left and movements against the war in Vietnam, in support of racial equality in the United States and gender equality everywhere, against authoritarianism in the Soviet bloc and in solidarity with radical guerrilla campaigns in Latin America. The rise of the Palestinian resistance movement fit this pattern by creating a popular grassroots alternative to the corrupt and inefficient Arab regimes.
The following decade of the 1970s presented a mixed picture. The early years of the decade witnessed the American retreat from Southeast Asia as well as the first serious military setback suffered by Israel in 1973. The rise of third world forces continued with developments all over the globe: from the Ethiopian revolution of 1974 through the liberation of the Portuguese African colonies in 1975 and the Soweto uprising of 1976, all the way to the victory of the Sandinista Front in Nicaragua, the Iranian revolution in 1979, and the liberation of Zimbabwe in 1980. Locally, the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and Yasser Arafat's 1974 speech at the UN General Assembly established the Palestinian movement as an international player. This was accompanied by growing delegitimation of Israel: African countries broke off diplomatic relations with it following its 1973 occupation of Egyptian territory, and in 1975 a landmark UN resolution defined Zionism as racism and a form of racial discrimination. The growth of resistance in the occupied territories and Israel, and especially the Day of the Land in 1976, provided an important impetus to all leftwing forces.
There were also counter developments during that period, such as Black September in 1970 in which Jordan forced the relocation of the Palestinian resistance to Lebanon, resulting in a disastrous civil war in that latter country, and the defeat of the armed Left and the installation of military regimes in the Southern Cone of the Americas. Above all, one development proved crucial for Israel/Palestine: the 1977 victory by Likud in the Israeli elections and the subsequent visit to Jerusalem by President Sadat of Egypt, leading to the Camp David accords in the following year. These provided the State of Israel with the most important diplomatic breakthrough in its history and, arguably, allowed it to embark on the massive settlement enterprise that has dominated its policies in subsequent years. Internally, the Black Panthers' protests early in the decade—which, together with the Ashdod Port workers of the same period, were the “great black hope” of the Left, promising the long-expected uprising of the Oriental Jewish proletariat against the state—had given way to massive support of the same oppressed population for Menahem Begin's government by the end of the decade. This trend grew even stronger in the 1980s and beyond.
In this environment, the call for “the destruction of the Zionist state” began to look increasingly anachronistic. The shift in the mainstream PLO toward acceptance of a solution, which would see an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel, reflected its recognition that not much could be expected from a marginalized rejectionist position. This reality could not have failed to have an impact on the anti-Zionist groups in Israel. With an Israeli-Jewish working class firmly aligned with rightwing forces, showing no signs that its “objective” proletarian status would ever lead it to develop a “subjective” anti-Zionist class consciousness, and with the demise of the Arab Revolution and its Palestinian militant components, what was to be done?
Within two decades of the emergence of the original Matzpen, most of its spinoff groupuscules had ceased to exist. They were replaced by a large number of groups and movements, with loose structures and a focus on specific issues. The Committee for Solidarity with Bir Zeit University, the Committee against the War in Lebanon, Yesh Gvul (soldiers refusing to serve in the occupied territories), Women in Black, the Committee against House Demolitions, the Committee against Torture, Physicians for Human Rights, Taayush, Anarchists against the Wall, and so on, are all examples of such movements. In addition, a focus on the dissemination of information has given rise to media agencies, such as the Alternative Information Center, and numerous publications and forums for exchange and debate including News from Within, Between the Lines, Mahsom, Kedma, Haokets, Hagada Hasmalit, Challenge, and others.
The new mode of activism has two main features that distinguish it from the preceding mode: it is more focused, mobilizing people around a specific issue that is of direct concern—war in Lebanon, torture, migrant workers' rights, the “apartheid wall” —instead of trying to present an overall program, and it addresses the occupation and related issues from moral, political, and human rights perspectives, without adopting an explicit socialist approach.
We no longer have leftwing revolutionary organizations. Instead, single-issue movements, which may collaborate with each other, retain a focus on the occupation. Abandoning socialism did not mean abandoning the quest for social justice, however; it meant rather discarding one specific and restrictive mode of analysis and action. Having said that, it is important to realize that we are not looking at a completely new set of activists; many of the new movements have benefited from the experience, initiative and ongoing involvement of former members of radical left organizations.
Conclusions
With changing organizational modes of action and the dropping of socialism and class struggle as guiding principles, what is left of the anti-Zionist agenda? There is no single program, of course, but much of what unites activists today was captured in a 2004 statement known as the Olga Document.Footnote 61 That the two most prominent members of Matzpen Tel Aviv and Matzpen Marxist, Haim Hanegbi and Michel Warschawski, respectively, are among its six authors is a testimony to the legacy of the ideas associated with the organization.Footnote 62
The document asserts that “the State of Israel was supposed to grant security to Jews” (but has created a death trap instead), that “the State of Israel was supposed to tear down the walls of the ghetto” (but is constructing the biggest ghetto in the entire history of the Jews), and that “the State of Israel was supposed to be a democracy” (but instead has set up a colonial structure, combining “elements of apartheid with the arbitrariness of brutal military occupation”). Hence, “we are living in a benighted colonial reality—in the heart of darkness.”
There is a need for an alternative vision based on the principle of “coexistence of the peoples of this country, based on mutual recognition, equal partnership and implementation of historical justice.” Zionism is based “on refusal to acknowledge the indigenous people of this country and on denial of their rights, on dispossession of their lands, and on adoption of separation as a fundamental principle and way of life.” Against this, “we are united in the recognition that this country belongs to all its sons and daughters—citizens and residents, both present and absentees (the uprooted Palestinian citizens of Israel in ‘48) —with no discrimination on personal or communal grounds, irrespective of citizenship or nationality, religion, culture, ethnicity or gender.” Dissolving the Zionist character of Israel and bringing the 1967 occupation to an end are essential to the opening of a dialogue between Jews and Arabs, in order to put behind us “the nightmare of apartheid, the burden of humiliation and the demons of destruction” that have plagued the country.
Written in 2004, the Olga Document can be read as a summary of the main positions put forward by the anti-Zionist left since 1967. While they enjoy the support of a small minority among Jews, they offer the only serious challenge to Zionist ideology from within Israeli society and, in that sense, provide a true alternative to official policies. A few years later, in 2007, another document, the Haifa Declaration, makes many of the same points as the Olga Document, though it represents a majority perspective (among Israeli Palestinians). Speaking in the name of “institutions and members of the Palestinian minority,” it defines the Zionist project as colonial-settler, and puts forward a vision of “historic reconciliation between the Jewish Israeli people and the Arab Palestinian people.” Israel must “recognize the historical injustice that it committed against the Palestinian people through its establishment,” recognize the Right of Return, the right of Palestinians to self-determination and an independent state, and the rights of Palestinians in Israel. Palestinians and Arabs, in turn, must “recognize the right of the Israeli Jewish people to self-determination and to life in peace, dignity, and security with the Palestinian and the other peoples of the region,” in a “state founded on equality between the two national groups.”Footnote 63
Both documents advance a common vision of reconciliation, democracy, and equality, but they do that on a separate ethnic-national basis. The proposed solution is identical, but the power of national identity seems too strong to allow a program that transcends nationalism altogether. Perhaps this is the most important conclusion of the two case studies discussed in this article: in a nationally divided society, the universal language of class has great difficulties in appealing to intended constituencies on its own. At the same time, when it is combined with nationalism it runs the risk of becoming subordinated to it. What is the way forward then?
There is no obvious formula, and the case studies offer more cautions than promises. The PKP was torn apart by nationalism and ended up shunned in both camps, except when it abandoned its class perspective and supported the national struggle without reservations. Matzpen was less prone to violent fluctuations but remained a marginal political group.
The only strategy that seems potentially more successful in such sharp conflict situations is that of anchoring leftwing discourse and struggle in another universal language—that of democracy, justice, equality, and human rights. The advantage of this approach is that it is not burdened with the legacy of revolutionary party organization and is not tied to the fortunes of specific social forces. It can associate itself with the global justice movement and struggles of independent forces, civil society organizations, media activists, and so on.Footnote 64 This is not a strategy that can guarantee success, of course, but it is more in tune with contemporary realities, and the lessons of the past are that a new strategy and mode of organization are desperately needed.
What possible form can such strategy take? A thorough discussion deserves a study on its own, and only a brief outline is possible here. First, we must recognize that progressive forces can neither ignore nationalism (risking total marginalization) nor surrender to it (risking losing their voice). Second, in a society historically shaped by sharp ethno-national conflict, most social and political issues are affected by the conflict but should not be reduced to it. Third, the conflict can be seen as an overall framework, but its many dimensions may be better tackled as multiple political fronts that call for distinct local approaches and contingent alliances. This requires charting a course that would go beyond nationalism without seeking to write it off.
Concretely, a series of campaigns that position Palestinian national demands within a broader framework of rights is one way of establishing a link between particular and universal discourses and opening the way for cooperation between Arabs and—at least some—Jews on specific issues. Examples may include questions of access to land (affecting Palestinians as well as ethnically and socially marginalized Jewish groups), questions of citizenship and immigration policies (affecting Palestinians as well as many Jews with ambiguous legal status such as recent Russian and Ethiopian immigrants), questions of labor organization, jobs, and access to services (affecting Palestinians, working-class Jews, and migrant workers from Eastern Europe and South-East Asia), questions of culture, education, and social exclusion (affecting Palestinians, Oriental Jews, and Orthodox Jews), questions of gender and sexuality (affecting everyone), and so on.
Each of these campaigns would involve alliances between different groups working for different causes, but they all share, in their specific domains, a quest for a greater equality and democracy for all, regardless of origins. They all fall under the “radical democracy” approach as advanced by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, though without necessarily having a “hegemonic articulation” to unify them.Footnote 65 Unlike the radical left approach, this strategy is not based on expectations that Jews would renounce Zionist ideology, confront state power directly, and opt for a socialist future. Rather, it assumes that they would show some willingness to address the concerns of Palestinians, working jointly with them, if these were in line with their own concerns.
This approach does not tackle directly all of the core issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, some of which pit Jews and Arabs against each other as mutually exclusive groups fighting over resources and rights. In the short-to-medium term there is no prospect of weakening the boundaries between these groups or constructing an identity that would transcend ethno-nationalist loyalties. No easy formulas to deal with this situation exist, and current debates over one- or two-state solutions miss the crucial point: the Palestinian population was fragmented in 1948 and further in 1967; a holistic political solution would have to address all its components (the 1948 dispersal of refugees, the 1967 occupation, and the fate of Palestinians within Israel proper), but is very unlikely to be implemented simultaneously. Hence, forces seeking to change the status quo need to work on each component on its own instead of seeking in vain to solve all issues in one go, as the Left historically—and unsuccessfully—attempted to do.
Progress on one front should not be impeded by the lack of progress on another, and the final outcome cannot be predicted in advance. The key guiding principle for a solution is common to all components, however: the need for a binational approach that would treat members of each ethno-national group equally, as individuals as well as collectives. The combination of a political approach operating on many different if related fronts, with the new mode of activism discussed above, may overcome some of the limitations of the old left approach. Rethinking the Left is a task without obvious answers, but posing the right questions is a crucial step towards a solution.
